Research › Search › Judgment

Calcutta High Court · body

2008 DIGILAW 1005 (CAL)

Rukbanur Rahman v. State

2008-11-18

AMIT TALUKDAR, PRABUDDHA SANKAR BANERJEE

body2008
JUDGMENT:- (1.) Playing the role of a Santa Claus, Shri Madhusudan Datta, learned Vacation Judge of the City Sessions Court, Calcutta in Criminal Misc. Case No. 504 of 2008 showered all the bounties which were available within the ambit of section 439 Cr. PC. (2.) Necessarily rerversing the order passed by Smt. Madhumita Roy, the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Fourteenth Court, Calcutta in G.R. Case No. 2632 of 2008 whereby she took each of the opposite party Nos. 2, 3 and 4 into Custody by her order dated 30.09.2008, when the said opposite parties submitted themselves before her on 30.09.2008. (3.) Elder sibling of Rizwanur Rahman, whose unnatural death haunts the sceptre, Shri Rukbanur Rahman has come up before this Court invoking its jurisdiction under subsection (2) of section 439 Cr. PC since he felt that the Order passed by the learned Vacation Judge was not a just decision and the same was passed upon non-consideration of the material facts and was not legally sustainable. (4.) At the Bar, Shri Kalyan Bandopadhyay, the learned Senior Advocate (with Shri Rajdeep Majumder) addressed us at length. (5.) Shri Bandopadhyay after placing the Order impugned submitted that the very basis of the same was wrong. According to the learned Senior Counsel, who quoted from the last paragraph of the said Order showed that the concerned opposite parties were directed to find interim bail. (6.) Learned Senior Counsel invited our attention to the foregoing paragraphs of the said portion of the Order and showed that the application was disposed of and it was a final order. (7.) Firstly, learned Senior Counsel submitted in the event the learned Vacation Judge had granted interim bail, he should have fixed a particular period for which the opposite parties would remain on bail; secondly by way of granting interim bail he had disposed of the application, which necessarily, meant that the interim bail was of permanent in nature. (8.) According to Shri Bandopadhyay, the learned Metropolitan Magistrate after accepting the Custody of the concerned opposite parties remanded them to Custody by her Order dated 30.09.2008. On the very next day, i.e. on 01.10.2008 what was the emergent situation that the learned Vacation Judge, by passing all norms and practices considered the prayer for bail in the absence of the Case Diary and formal Notice being served on the parties. On the very next day, i.e. on 01.10.2008 what was the emergent situation that the learned Vacation Judge, by passing all norms and practices considered the prayer for bail in the absence of the Case Diary and formal Notice being served on the parties. (9.) Next, he submitted that there was absolute non-application of mind by the learned Vacation Judge in allowing the prayer for bail without considering the materials-on-record and Shri Bandopadhyay was very much peeved with the finding of the learned Vacation Judge ".......I find nothing to show that if the accused petitioners be enlarged on bail, they may tamper with the prosecution witnesses.............." (10.) According to the learned Senior Counsel without having the entire record before him, the learned Vacation Judge ought not to have come to such a conclusion and abruptly passed an order in favour of the concerned respondents in such hot haste. (11.) A copy of the Order dated 30.09.2008 passed by the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta was also placed before us on behalf of the petitioner. It was reflected therein that on the strength of a petition filed under section 410 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the case records of G.R. Case No.2632 of 2008 was called for from the Court of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Fourteenth Court, Calcutta for the purpose of staying the Order of rejection of bail passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate. (12.) However, we find that the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, after having called for the record and having heard the submissions made at the Bar , refused to stay the operation of the order rejecting the prayer for bail as passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Fourteenth Court, Calcutta. (13.) Shri Bandopadhyay, as a part of his submission relied on the decision of Puran vs. Rambilas and Anr., 2001(6) SCC 338 and submitted that when there is a arbitrary and wrong exercise of discretion in grant of bail by the Lower Court, it needs to be corrected keeping in mind the effect the offence may have on society. (14.) He also referred to the unreported decision of the Supreme Court in Lokesh Singh vs. State of U.P. and Anr., passed in S.L.P. (Cri.) 2861 of 2007 dated 21.10.2008 and pointed out the criterion for grant of bail. (14.) He also referred to the unreported decision of the Supreme Court in Lokesh Singh vs. State of U.P. and Anr., passed in S.L.P. (Cri.) 2861 of 2007 dated 21.10.2008 and pointed out the criterion for grant of bail. According to Shri Bandopadhyay, keeping in mind the ratio of the decision in Puran (supra) and Lokesh Singh (supra), the Order impugned -apart from being an absolutely illegal order, is required to be set aside. PER CONTRA (15.) A. Shri Basu with Shri Biswajit Manna for the opposite party No.2 has presented before us the entire profile of the case relating to how the incide it happened leading to registration of the present case against the said opposite party and passing of the order, which is being assailed before this Court. Shri Basu at the very outset has submitted, even though the Order passed by the learned Vacation Judge was termed as interim but in effect it was permanent in nature. He heavily dwelt on the fact that from the entire tenor of the Order it should be understood that the learned Vacation Judge meant it to be permanent in nature and the word interim should not be strictly construed in its etymological term and be given a broader meaning. Then Shri Basu further submitted after the learned Vacation Judge had allowed the prayer for bail of the opposite party No.2-even though the bail may have been granted erroneously, the considerations for cancellation are more, rigid and is rather rare. Unless there are supervening circumstances, the said Order passed by the learned Vacation Judge should not be interfered with. Shri Basu was of the view that the incident took place quite some time ago and the formal FIR was registered a year back. The opposite party No.2 has been interrogated extensively and there has been no whisper against him that he has either threatened the witnesses or tampered with any of the evidence. He submitted that all along during the course of investigation the Custody of the opposite party No.2 was not sought for and since he has already been enlarged on bail by the Vacation Judge; this Court should be slow in interfering with the same. He submitted that all along during the course of investigation the Custody of the opposite party No.2 was not sought for and since he has already been enlarged on bail by the Vacation Judge; this Court should be slow in interfering with the same. Shri Basu winding up his submission harped on the fact that Custody of the opposite party No.2 was not necessary as charge-sheet has already been filed and the opposite party No.2 being a functionary of the Government, there was no chance of his absconsion. He supported the Order of the learned Vacation Judge, which was passed after giving opportunity of hearing to the parties concerned. He referred to the decision of Ramcharan vs. State of M.P, 2004(13) SCC 617 , Gurcharan Singh and Anr. vs. State (Delhi Administration), 1978(1)SCC 118 and State (Delhi Administration) vs. Sanjay Gandhi, 1978(2) SCC 411 to illustrate his point that the considerations which would weigh while dealing with an application for grant of bail cannot be the same for the purpose of cancellation of the same. He referred to the decision of Bhagirathsinh Judeja vs. State of Gujarat, 1984(1) SCC 284 , to show that unless there are very cogent and overwhelming circumstances, an Order granting bail should not be interfered with. He referred to the decision of Manjit Prakash and Ors. vs. Shobha Devi and Anr., 2008(5) Supreme 265 and Mehboob Dawood Shaikh vs. State of Maharashtra, 2004(2) SCC 362 , to show that cancellation of the bail is a very harsh order since it takes away the liberty of an individual and should not be lightly resorted to. Two Division Bench decisions of our Court were also relied upon by Shri Basu. Firstly, he referred to the decision of Superintendent and Remambrancers of Legal Affairs vs. Amiya Kumar Roy Choudhury alias Dadaji, 78 CWN 320, and submitted that once an order of bail is granted-even if some defects are found therein, it should not be lightly interfered with and set aside the same by way of cancelling it. He referred to the decision of Bhola Nath Das vs. State and Anr., 1991 Cr. LJ 1422, to show that unless there is any prima facie case that being on bail the accused will tamper with the evidence or threaten the witnesses or impede the course of justice; an order of bail should not be cancelled. He referred to the decision of Bhola Nath Das vs. State and Anr., 1991 Cr. LJ 1422, to show that unless there is any prima facie case that being on bail the accused will tamper with the evidence or threaten the witnesses or impede the course of justice; an order of bail should not be cancelled. (16.) B. Shri Moitra for the opposite party Nos. 3 and 4 adopted the submission of Shri Basu. However, by way of a corrigendum he was of the view that even though summons was issued by the learned Magistrate, which he showed from the order passed by her on 22.09.2008 and pursuant thereof the opposite party Nos. 3 and 4 surrendered themselves-rejection of their prayer for bail was, not proper. Replying to the question of haste in passing the order Shri Moitra submitted that all the concerned opposite parties were Government Officers and in the event they were in Custody for more than 24 hours then they would have been suspended. Shri Moitra was of the further view that since the opposite party No.l (CBI) did not choose to prefer cancellation of the order, which has been impugned; the de facto complainant, i.e. the petitioner did not have any ground to move this application. He submitted that neither this order was perverse or it is illegal so as to render it bad in law and should be set aside. Shri Moitra referred to the decision of Nityanand Rai vs. State of Bihar, 2005 SCC (Cri) 1159 and submitted that the grounds for cancellation of the bail should be referable to the conduct of the accused while he is on bail. But in the absence of such allegation that the opposite party Nos. 3 and 4 has misused the liberty, this Court should not interfere with the order which has been impugned. Referring to the decision of Dolat Ram and Ors. vs. State of Haryana, 1995(1) SCC 349 , he submitted that once a bail has already been granted, 118 and State (Delhi Administration) vs. Sanjay Gandhi, 1978(2) SCC 411 to illustrate his point that the considerations which would weigh while dealing with an application for grant of bail cannot be the same for the purpose of cancellation of the same. vs. State of Haryana, 1995(1) SCC 349 , he submitted that once a bail has already been granted, 118 and State (Delhi Administration) vs. Sanjay Gandhi, 1978(2) SCC 411 to illustrate his point that the considerations which would weigh while dealing with an application for grant of bail cannot be the same for the purpose of cancellation of the same. He referred to the decision of Bhagirathsinh Judeja vs. State of Gujarat, 1984(1) SCC 284 , to show that unless there are very cogent and overwhelming circumstances, an Order granting bail should not be interfered with. He referred to the decision of Manjit Prakash and Ors. vs. Shobha Devi and Anr., 2008(5) Supreme 265 and Mehboob Dawood Shaikh vs. State of Maharashtra, 2004(2) SCC 362 , to show that cancellation of the bail is a very harsh order since it takes away the liberty of an individual and should not be lightly resorted to. Two Division Bench decisions of our Court were also relied upon by Shri Basu. Firstly, he referred to the decision of Superintendent and Remambrancers of Legal Affairs vs. Amiya Kumar Roy Choudhury alias Dadaji, 78 CWN 320, and submitted that once an order of bail is granted-even if some defects are found therein, it should not be lightly interfered with and set aside the same by way of cancelling it. He referred to the decision of Bhola Nath Das vs. State and Anr., 1991 Cr. LJ 1422, to show that unless there is any prima facie case that being on bail the accused will tamper with the evidence or threaten the witnesses or impede the course of justice; an order of bail should not be cancelled. 16. B. Shri Moitra for the opposite party Nos. 3 and 4 adopted the submission of Shri Basu. However, by way of a corrigendum he was of the view that even though summons was issued by the learned Magistrate, which he showed from the order passed by her on 22.09.2008 and pursuant thereof the opposite party Nos. 3 and 4 surrendered themselves-rejection of their prayer for bail was, not proper. Replying to the question of haste in passing the order Shri Moitra submitted that all the concerned opposite parties were Government Officers and in the event they were in Custody for more than 24 hours then they would have been suspended. 3 and 4 surrendered themselves-rejection of their prayer for bail was, not proper. Replying to the question of haste in passing the order Shri Moitra submitted that all the concerned opposite parties were Government Officers and in the event they were in Custody for more than 24 hours then they would have been suspended. Shri Moitra was of the further view that since the opposite party No.l (CBI) did not choose to prefer cancellation of the order, which has been impugned; the de facto complainant, i.e. the petitioner did not have any ground to move this application. He submitted that neither this order was perverse or it is illegal so as to render it bad in law and should be set aside. Shri Moitra referred to the decision of Nityanand Rai vs. State of Bihar, 2005 SCC (Cri) 1159 and submitted that the grounds for cancellation of the bail should be referable to the conduct of the accused while he is on bail. But in the absence of such allegation that the opposite party Nos. 3 and 4 has misused the liberty, this Court should not interfere with the order which has been impugned, Referring to the decision of Dolat Ram and Ors. vs. State of Haryana, 1995(1) SCC 349 , he submitted that once a bail has already been granted, the consideration for canceling the same is totally different. Unless there are very cogent and overwhelming circumstances the same should not be interfered with. (17.) Shri Roy, learned Special Public Prosecutor for the CBI (opposite party No.l) has endorsed the views of Shri Bandopadhyay, the learned Senior Counsel. According to Shri Roy it was not proper on the part of the learned Vacation Judge to have passed the order that has been impugned before this Court without looking at the Case Diary or the Lower Court Records and considering the other materials on record. In fact, Shri Roy was of the view that the case of the CBI was not at all considered by the learned Vacation Judge and hastily the impugned order was passed which has resulted in a failure of justice. In fact, Shri Roy was of the view that the case of the CBI was not at all considered by the learned Vacation Judge and hastily the impugned order was passed which has resulted in a failure of justice. Shri Roy submitted that the learned Vacation Judge did not at all apply its mind to the stand taken by the CBI that there was every likelihood of the accused persons tampering with the evidence and threatening the witnesses and the order of bail was passed by the learned Vacation Judge in undue haste, which could not be supported. He also submitted that the threat perception as felt by Shri Bandopadhyay, the learned Senior Counsel, was not totally unfounded. Shri Roy shared his concern. It was submitted by him the prospect of the witnesses being meddled cannot be ruled out. Replying to the point raised by Shri Moitra that as to why the CBI did not prefer to move this application instead of the petitioner, he submitted that the CBI prayer was in the process and in the meantime since this application was already filed-they did not choose to file. Shri Roy referred to the decision of Dr. Narendra K. Amin vs. State of Gujarat and Anr., 2008(3) AICLR Vol.79, Page-175 and submitted that since bail was granted on untenable grounds it is liable to be cancelled. (18.) After we have heard the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner Shri Bandopadhyay, Shri Basu for the opposite party No.2 and Shri Moitra for the opposite party Nos. 3 and 4 including Shri Roy, Public Prosecutor for the CBI (opposite party No.l), we would now proceed to see for ourselves as to whether the Order No.2 passed by the learned Vacation Judge, City Sessions Court, Calcutta in Criminal Misc. Case No. 504 of 2008 on 01.10.2008 can be sustained. (19.) For this purpose we would, at first apprise ourselves with regard to the principles of law in respect of cancellation of bail. (20.) The law in this respect has been fully crystallized by several decisions of the Apex Court as to when and under what circumstances resort to sub-section (2) of section 439 Cr. PC should be taken by the Court. (20.) The law in this respect has been fully crystallized by several decisions of the Apex Court as to when and under what circumstances resort to sub-section (2) of section 439 Cr. PC should be taken by the Court. It is by now a settled principle of law that an order of bail once granted, should not be cancelled in a mechanical fashion in the absence, of any extenuating circumstances which has exposed the accused to a situation where it is no longer prudent to permit him to retain his freedom. (21.) Liberty once granted by the Court-----unless the same is misused or there has been any palpable violation of either any Statute or material-on- record, the same should not be interfered with by a superior Court. In this perspective we would read the materials including the order that stands impugned before us. Background facts may be necessary to have a whole hog of the entire issue and facilitate proper disposal of this application. (22.) The unnatural death of one Shri Rizwanur Rahman prompted his mother to move this Court for directing an inquiry by the opposite party No.l. Pursuant thereof, the investigation was taken up on the basis of an order of a learned Single Judge by the later and a charge-sheet was laid. Acting on the basis of the same the learned Metropolitan Magistrate concerned in G.R. Case No. 2632 of 2008 took cognizance and issued summons upon the Accused persons fixing 27.10.2008 for their appearance. This order was passed by the learned Magistrate on 22.09.2008. However, the opposite parties concerned submitted themselves before the learned Magistrate on 30.09.2008 by a put up petition: The learned Magistrate "......perused the case record along with chargesheet and documents" and was of the opinion: ".........It reveals that the present case is exclusively triable by ld. Sessions Court. Considering this aspect I am not inclined to allow the prayer for bail of the accd. persons Ajoy Kumor, Sukanti Chakrabarty and Krishnendu Das. Hence bail petition of the accd. persons abovenamed stands rejected. Accused persons abovenamed are taken into custody. Sessions Court. Considering this aspect I am not inclined to allow the prayer for bail of the accd. persons Ajoy Kumor, Sukanti Chakrabarty and Krishnendu Das. Hence bail petition of the accd. persons abovenamed stands rejected. Accused persons abovenamed are taken into custody. Accd, persons (1) Ajoy Kumar, (2) Sukanti Chakrabarty and Krishnendu Das be remanded to J/C till 14.10.2008-----till 27.10.2008........" (23.) It is found from the later order passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate that a petition was filed by the concerned parties praying for review of the said order by way of serving a Notice upon the opposite party No. 1. We find the learned Magistrate in her wisdom rejected the same since ".......the Court can not review its own order." (24.) We do not know for what purpose again thereafter at 5-30 p.m. the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate called for the Records of the case and subsequently, the same was sent back to the concerned learned Metropolitan Magistrate. (25.) Now, we will enter into the trouble area. (26.) We have already seen that the prayer for bail of the opposite party Nos. 2, 3 and 4 was declined by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate. The same was questioned before the learned Vacation Judge on the very next day i.e. on 01.10.2008. (27.) It appears from the Order No.1 passed by the learned Vacation Judge that he fixed the application under section 439 Cr. PC on the very same day for hearing. He heard the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, the opposite parties and came to the conclusion that".........all the three accused persons namely, Ajay Kumar, Sukanti Chakraborty and Krishnendu Das may find interim bail of Rs. 10,000 (Rupees Ten thousand) each with two registered sureties of Rs. 5000 (Rupees five thousand, each) to the satisfaction of the ld. Metropolitan Magistrate, 14th Court, Calcutta, on condition that they shall not leave the jurisdiction of the Court below without prior permission of the ld. Court....." and directed that the opposite party Nos. 2, 3 and 4 be released on interim bail. (28.) The learned Metropolitan Magistrate on the basis of the order impugned on the same day enlarged them on interim bail. (29.) This is the basic feature of the entire case, which has to be understood in order to have a better grasp of the entire profile of the case. 2, 3 and 4 be released on interim bail. (28.) The learned Metropolitan Magistrate on the basis of the order impugned on the same day enlarged them on interim bail. (29.) This is the basic feature of the entire case, which has to be understood in order to have a better grasp of the entire profile of the case. (30.) We have with utmost circumspection considered the submissions of both Shri Basu and Shri Moitra in the light of the counter-argument of Shri Bandopadhyay, the learned Senior Counsel in line with Shri Roy for the CBI. (31.) The main plank of Shri Bandopadhyays submission, which we have seen, relates to non-application of mind by the learned Vacation Judge and the haste in which the order was passed without giving sufficient opportunity of hearing and production of the Case Diary or the lower Court Records by the CBI and that the interim bail being indefinite without specifying any particular period. (32.) Against this, his adversaries were very much vociferous that since summons was issued, as if it was incumbent upon the learned Magistrate to have allowed the prayer for bail when they voluntarily surrendered before the Court. And when the CBI has not chosen to move this Court, what was the necessity for the petitioner to have come up with this application. (33.) The other part of their submission relates to the accused persons being already interrogated and there has been no allegation that either they have threatened any of the witnesses or there is any chance of their absconsion-----custody of these accused persons were not necessitated as already charge-sheet was placed before this Court. (34.) At the outset, we must say that the Order passed by the learned Vacation Judge being Order No.2 dated 01.10.2008 in Criminal Misc. Case No.504 of 2008 is absolutely a bad order. The learned Judge did not thought it fit to at least consult the Case Diary before accepting the prayer of the accused persons for being released on bail and if we may say with due respect to the learned Vacation Judge that he seems to have been swept away by the position of the opposite party Nos. 2, 3 and 4 and acted in such a hot haste in the process he has caused a failure of justice-----it will not be a fallacy on our part. 2, 3 and 4 and acted in such a hot haste in the process he has caused a failure of justice-----it will not be a fallacy on our part. (35.) We have very carefully considered each and every submission of both Shri Basu and Shri Moitra for the opposite parties. We reverentially bow down to the decisions referred to by them at the Bar. (36.) It is no doubt true that cancelling a bail, which has already been granted is quite a different aspect from rejection of a bail. In this context the decisions cited by Shri Moitra in Dolat Ram and Ors. vs. State of Haryana (supra), Shri Basu in State (Delhi Administration) (supra), Ramcharan (supra) and Gurcharan Singh and Ors. vs. State (Delhi Administration) (supra) are squarely applicable. (37.) The reference made by Shri Basu to the decision of Bhagirathsinh Judeja (supra) that cogent and overwhelming circumstances are necessary for cancellation of bail have also been considered by us. (38.) We have also perused the decision cited by Shri Basu in Manjit Prakash and Ors. vs. Shobha Devi and Anr. (supra) and Mehboob Dawood Shaikh vs. State of Maharashtra (supra) to the effect that rejection of an order of bail is a harsh order as it takes away the liberty of an individual and the Division Bench Decision cited by Shri Basu in Superintendent and Remambrancers of Legal Affairs vs. Amiya Kumar Roy Choudhury alias Dadaji (supra) to the extent that the cancellation of bail, however, is an extraordinary order. (39.) We have also considered the decision relied upon by Shri Basu in Bhola Nath Das vs. State and Anr., 1991 Cr. LJ 1422 and Shri Moitra in Nityanand Rai vs. State of Bihar and Anr. (supra) with regard to the conduct of the accused at the posterior stage when they were released on bail. (40.) We find that the position here is quite different. All the citations of the Honble Apex Court relied upon, both by Shri Basu and Shri Moitra, we are very much afraid, may not be squarely applicable in the peculiar factual matrix of the present case. (41.) Stepping aside prior to entering into our foray of the key issue we wish to deal with the objection of Shri Moitra in the petitioner moving the application. We feel we need not proceed further. This point is fully covered by Purans case (supra). (41.) Stepping aside prior to entering into our foray of the key issue we wish to deal with the objection of Shri Moitra in the petitioner moving the application. We feel we need not proceed further. This point is fully covered by Purans case (supra). (42.) Since Shri Rukbanur was the elder brother of the deceased, whose cause of death remains the sheet anchor of the case, he is very much an aggrieved person. And he has every right to move this application. (43.) The manner in which the impugned order was passed and if we may say, the tearing hurry which persuaded the learned Vacation Judge to pass such an order in the manner noticed by us, without looking at the Case Diary and practically, on the basis of conjectures and surmises has rendered the same vulnerable. Irrelevant materials were taken into consideration by the learned Vacation Judge while arriving at its conclusion which were not germane to the fact in issue. As such, certainly, this Court is required to interfere with the same. [See Dinesh M.N. vs. State of Gujarat, 2008(2) SCC (Cri) 508] (44.) We are of the considered view that the learned Vacation Judge completely lost sight of the impact of the materials and practically, acted on relevant materials before arriving at his conclusion and we find that there is total non-application of mind. The said order passed by the learned Vacation Bench should not be permitted to be sustained. [See also Rizwan Akbar Hussain Syyed vs. Mehmood Hussain, 2007 Cr. LJ 3255] . (45.) The decision cited by Shri Bandopadhyay in Lokesh Singh vs. State of U.P, and Anr. (supra), in our view, is quite appropriate. The criterions laid down in paragraph 8 of the said decision, for the purpose of considering a prayer for grant of bail was not adhered to by the learned Vacation Judge. But that by itself simply, would not render the order to be set aside in view of the ratio of the decisions, which we have seen that cancellation of bail is a diametrically opposite proposition than grant of bail. (46.) We would agree with Shri Bandopadhyay that this is a perverse order as the learned Vacation Judge had ignored materials while arriving at his finding and in the interest of justice it is required that the said perverse order should be set aside. (46.) We would agree with Shri Bandopadhyay that this is a perverse order as the learned Vacation Judge had ignored materials while arriving at his finding and in the interest of justice it is required that the said perverse order should be set aside. The decision cited by him in Puran vs. Rambilas and Anr. (supra), also has square application. (47.) We have also seen the decision of Dr. Narendra K Amin vs. State of Gujarat and Anr., (supra). We are of the considered view that indeed this Order is untenable in view of the various situation that we have come across in this application. (48.) We are conscious of the fact that on order cancelling the bail is no doubt, harsh. It takes away the liberty granted by a Court. The said power, which has been vested upon us by virtue of sub-section (2) of section 439 has to be exercised with utmost care and caution. Applying all the tests as laid down by the various decisions of the Apex Court, which has been cited before us at the Bar and on close analysis with a sense of precision, we feel the order impugned is required to be set aside. (49.) We cannot break bread with Shri Basu that the word interim used by the learned Vacation Judge should not be read in its etymological term. After all, the learned Vacation Bench presided over by a very senior Judicial Officer of the rank of a Sessions Judge is required to understand the import of the word interim. We do not find fault with the same; but if it was an interim order without specifying the period, it makes no sense. (50.) Furthermore, the learned Vacation Judge has rushed to the conclusion that"........At this stage, from the materials on record and the documents filed on behalf of the Spl. P.P., I find nothing to show that if the accused/petitioners be enlarged on bail, they may tamper with the prosecution witnesses and/or if they are enlarged on bail they may exploit the opportunity to inflict any crime on the members of society......." In our view, the case of the CBI that the opposite party Nos. 2, 3 and 4 being high ranking police officers and there is every likelihood of their tampering with the evidence including the documents filed by the prosecution, has been lightly brushed aside. 2, 3 and 4 being high ranking police officers and there is every likelihood of their tampering with the evidence including the documents filed by the prosecution, has been lightly brushed aside. In this respect we may refer to the decision of Gobarbhai Naranbhai Singala vs. State of Gujarat, 2008(2) SCALE 82 : 2008(2) SCC (Cri) 743, on the proposition that when basic requirements necessary for grant of bail are ignored then it would be proper to cancel the bail. (51.) We would be required to strike a balance between two propositions-----in the event if the order, which has been impugned is allowed to remain, would the course of justice be deflected? Or if the same is set aside, the liberty of opposite party Nos. 2, 3 and 4 be curtailed? (52.) In this meridiem our approach will be based. (53.) Peoples faith in the criminal justice system would be lost in the event the palpably illegal and patently absurd order passed by the learned Vacation Judge is allowed to be retained. (54.) After all, a plain reading of the order shows the manner in which the same was passed, was based on a one sided approach adopted by the learned Vacation Judge. (55.) In the light of the situation that we have perceived in the foregoing paragraphs, we have found that the opposite party Nos. 2, 3 and 4 has forfeited their right to remain on bail. The manner in which they approached the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta by way of invoking its jurisdiction under section 410 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was absolutely abominable. (56.) The learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, however, later on seemed to have relented and refused to act on the same. Shri Basu in his usual fairness submitted that since the Metropolitan Magistrate, Fourteenth Court, Calcutta was a designated Court-----such a course ought not to have been adopted. We fully agree with him and since the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate has refused to proceed further; we would treat this part of the case as a closed Chapter while recording our dissatisfaction with the approach made by the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta. (57.) The order impugned, which has been passed by the learned Vacation Judge seemed to have been passed in a tearing hurry for reasons not understood by us. (57.) The order impugned, which has been passed by the learned Vacation Judge seemed to have been passed in a tearing hurry for reasons not understood by us. We have yet to come across a case where a learned Sessions Judge, after admitting the application on the very same day without either calling for the Case Diary or the Lower Court Records hastily proceeds to grant bail in such a serious case. (58.) This is one aspect of the matter. (59.) In the Order passed by the learned Vacation Judge, amongst other considerations the said Court seemed to have persuaded to arrive at its finding ".........At this stage, from the materials on record and the documents filed on behalf of the Spl. P.P., I find nothing to show that if the accused/ petitioners be enlarged on bail, they may tamper with the prosecution witnesses and/or if they are enlarged on bail they may exploit the opportunity to inflict any crime on the members of society and/or they may evade the trial, specially when they are residents within the jurisdiction of this Court.......". We pointed out to the learned Counsel for the opposite party No.2 that from the Address in the Cause Title it has been shown he resides beyond the jurisdiction of the Court granting bail, i.e. the learned Vacation Judge, City Sessions Court and cannot be said to be "resident within the jurisdiction of this Court." (60.) In the affidavit filed by him, which is defective as the Deponent has not been identified-we find his address has been shown in a place described as 10, Middleton Street, which of course, was very much within the territorial jurisdiction of the learned Vacation Judges Court. We failed to understand what was the necessity of describing the said address on behalf of the opposite party No.2 by way of a cosmetic approach in the face of the exposure made by us in course of the hearing. (61.) The affidavits used by the opposite party Nos. 3 and 4 arc not convincing and does not inspire any confidence in the mind of the Court. (62.) We arrive at the conclusion that the Order passed by the learned Vacation Judge, if allowed to remain alive; it would erode the faith and confidence of the people in the entire Justice Delivery System. 3 and 4 arc not convincing and does not inspire any confidence in the mind of the Court. (62.) We arrive at the conclusion that the Order passed by the learned Vacation Judge, if allowed to remain alive; it would erode the faith and confidence of the people in the entire Justice Delivery System. After all, it was an unequal battle between the high and mighty in one hand and the weak petitioner on the other hand. The very fabric of the Order impugned would destroy peoples perception about Court because of the manner in which the entire Order has been passed by the learned Vacation Judge. (63.) Casual and the cursory manner in which the matter was dealt by the learned Vacation Bench, would at once give rise to the perception that keeping in view the status of the concerned opposite parties the order was passed without conforming to the Rules. (64.) It is absolutely a perverse and patently illegal order and we would have no hesitation in setting aside the same. (65.) Accordingly, we allow this application, cancel the bail bonds submitted before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate by the concerned opposite party Nos. 2, 3 and 4 pursuant to the direction passed by the learned Vacation Beach. (66.) They are directed to surrender to their bonds within three days. (67.) Bail bonds stand cancelled. (68.) Application allowed. (69.) In view of the Order aforesaid passed in this application the petition of Shri Joydeep Mukherjee (In Re: Joydeep Mukherjee.... petitioner) is -accordingly disposed of. Appeal allowed.