Research › Search › Judgment

Orissa High Court · body

2008 DIGILAW 1007 (ORI)

Arakhita Nath v. State of Orissa

2008-11-11

B.K.PATEL

body2008
JUDGMENT B.K. PATEL, J. — The appellant having been convicted for commission of offences under Sections 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short ‘the Act’) and sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay fine of Rs.500/-, in default to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one month as well as under Section 7 of the Act and sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for six months, has preferred this appeal. 2. The appellant was working as a clerk in the Regional Transport Office (R.T.O.), Sundargarh during the period of occur¬rence dealing with issue of driving licenses. Prosecution case is that the informant-decoy P.W.2, a resident of Rourkela, went to the R.T.O. on 13.10.1988 to obtain a driving license. The appel¬lant demanded bribe of Rs.150/- from him saying that unless he paid the amount he would not be issued with the license. In view of applicants’ demand, P.W.2 borrowed Rs.50/- from P.W.1 one of his friends who had come to the R.T.O., and paid to the appel¬lant. When P.W.2 met the appellant on 25.10.1988 the appellant told that the license was ready and would be delivered to him if he paid the balance bribe amount of Rs.100/-. On 26.10.1988 P.W.2 lodged written report Ext.10 before the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Vigilance at Rourkela stating therein that on 27.10.1988 he was going to pay the balance bribe amount to the appellant. The First Information Report Ext.10 was forwarded to the Superin¬tendent of Police, Vigilance, Sambalpur and P.W.9 Inspector of Vigilance was entrusted with the investigation. In course of investigation P.W.9 laid a trap stated to have been prepared with the assistance of P.W.3 Sub-Inspector of Police, Vigilance, Rourkela against the appellant on 27.10.1988 in presence of raiding party comprising of P.W.7 another Inspector of Vigilance and P.W.8 Additional Commercial Tax Officer, Rourkela. The appel¬lant was caught red handed after accepting the tainted currency notes from P.W.2 towards illegal gratification as a motive for issuance of driving license. The tainted currency notes were seized. Hand wash of the appellant sent for chemical examination revealed presence of chemical powder with which the currency notes were smeared in course of preparation of the trap. On 31.12.1988 P.W.9 made over charge of investigation to P.W.4. On completion of investigation P.W.4 submitted charge-sheet for commission of offences under which the appellant stands convicted and accordingly charge was framed. 3. On 31.12.1988 P.W.9 made over charge of investigation to P.W.4. On completion of investigation P.W.4 submitted charge-sheet for commission of offences under which the appellant stands convicted and accordingly charge was framed. 3. The appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. In course of examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. the appellant stated that he never demanded money from P.W.2 and that P.W.2 paid the amount of Rs.100/- towards donation to Red Cross Fund. 4. In order to substantiate the charge the prosecution examined 9 witnesses, P.Ws. 1 to 9, and relied upon the documents marked Exts.1 to 11. P.Ws.1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 have already been introduced. P.Ws. 5 and 6 were working as Peons in the R.T.O., Sundargarh. It is pertinent to point out that the inform¬ant P.W.2 as well as P.Ws.1, 5 and 6 did not support the prosecu¬tion case. Only one defence witness, D.W.1, was examined on behalf of the appellant. 5. It was submitted by the learned counsel for the appel¬lant that there is no evidence on record to show that the appel¬lant ever made any demand for money from P.W.2 as motive for issuing driving license. Plea of the appellant that P.W.2 paid him Rs.100/- towards donation to Red Cross Fund finds support from the evidence of D.W.1 as well as P.Ws.7 and 8. Having taken the Court through the evidence on record it was argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the findings of the learned trial Court are based on presumptions, surmises and conjectures. In support of his contentions learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in V. Venkata Subbarao v. State represented by Inspector of Police, A.P., 2007 AIR SCW 9 and this Court in Kailash Chandra Sahu v. State of Orissa, (1988) 1 OCR 329. In reply, it was argued by the learned counsel appearing for the Vigilance Department that even though none of the independent witnesses including P.W.1 supported the prosecution, evidence of official witnesses and materials on record including the F.I.R. Ext.10 clearly establish that the appellant demanded and accepted Rs.100/- as bribe from P.W.2, as alleged. 6. It is not disputed that the tainted currency notes amounting to Rs.100/- was recovered from the possession of the appellant. Evidence on this score adduced by the prosecution through P.Ws. 6. It is not disputed that the tainted currency notes amounting to Rs.100/- was recovered from the possession of the appellant. Evidence on this score adduced by the prosecution through P.Ws. 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 is rather accepted by the appel¬lant. The specific case of the prosecution is that money was paid by P.W.2 to the appellant consequent upon his demand as illegal gratification for processing the driving license. It was alleged that the appellant demanded Rs.150/- in toto and P.W.2 paid Rs.50/- which he borrowed from P.W.1 on 13.10.1988. Not only P.W.2 but also P.W.1 did not support such allegation. So there is no evidence on record that the appellant had accepted Rs.50/- towards part payment of bribe on 13.10.1988. 7. There is also no evidence regarding demand made by the appellant when he saw P.W.2 on 26.10.1988 or on 27.10.1988. The witness stated to have accompanied P.W.2 to the R.T.O. and in whose presence the appellant is stated to have demanded the balance amount of Rs.100/- on 27.10.1988 has not been examined. In his evidence P.W.2 did not make any allegation against he appellant. He even denied to have lodged report before the vigi¬lance officers. Therefore, contents of the F.I.R. remained un¬proved, and the F.I.R. being not a piece of substantive evidence, and the evidentiary value there of being limited to the extent of simply being used for the purpose of corroboration or contradic¬tion of the maker thereof, the F.I.R. is of no avail to the prosecution. In course of cross-examination P.W.2 categorically stated that the Vigilance Inspector asked him to pay Rs.100/- to the appellant after saying that he was paying subscription to¬wards Red Cross Fund. In this connection, P.W.2 further clarified that he had met the Inspector of Vigilance in connection with seizure of his motor-cycle by police. At that time he disclosed to the Inspector of Vigilance that he had applied for obtaining the license for an auto rikshaw and that subscription towards Red Cross Fund was being collected from license applicants by the R.T.O. In the background of such conversation, the Inspector of Vigilance asked P.W.2 to pay Rs.100/- to the appellant. It was further testified by P.W.2 that before the appellant could grant a receipt towards subscription, the vigilance people caught him. 8. Thus, the positive evidence of P.W.2 was that the appellant did not demand any bribe from him. It was further testified by P.W.2 that before the appellant could grant a receipt towards subscription, the vigilance people caught him. 8. Thus, the positive evidence of P.W.2 was that the appellant did not demand any bribe from him. D.W.1 who was working as Senior Clerk in the office of R.T.O. categorically stated that during the period of occurrence Red Cross Donation Receipt Books received from the office of the Collectorate were entrusted to some of the clerks including the appellant for collection towards Red Cross Fund from public. The learned trial Court appears to have disbelieved D.W.1 on the ground that in course of his cross-examination he failed to say regarding the number and the serial numbers of the Red Cross Donation Receipt Books entrusted to each of the clerks including the appellant and as D.W.1 denied to have seen collection of the Red Cross donation by the appel¬lant on the date of occurrence. The alleged occurrence took place in the year 1988 and D.W.1 was examined in Court in the year 1997. In such circumstances, it is unwise to expect that a Senior Clerk of the R.T.O. would be able to remember and depose regard¬ing number or serial numbers of Red Cross Donation Receipt Books entrusted to the appellant. In fact, the appellant himself could not have been remembered such details. Evidence of P.Ws.7 and 8 also goes to show that on being confronted by the raiding party, immediately after he accepted Rs.100/- from P.W.2, the appellant stated that P.W.2 voluntarily and on his own accord paid the tainted money to him. 9. In Kailash Chandra Sahu (supra) also the complainant-decoy as well as the accompanying witness did not testify regard¬ing demand made by the accused facing trial for offences under Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 5(2) read with 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. Rather the accompanying witness supported the defence plea that the com¬plainant voluntarily paid Rs.100/- to the accused towards sub¬scription for a farewell party. In view of absence of evidence regarding demand made by the accused, it was observed by this Court that there was yawning gap in the prosecution case, i.e., the gap between the arrival of the raiding party and the recovery of the notes. Once the evidence of complainant decoy and the accompanying witness is rejected, there remained little to sustain the prosecution case. Once the evidence of complainant decoy and the accompanying witness is rejected, there remained little to sustain the prosecution case. There was reason to reject the defence plea. Mere recovery of money divorced from the circum¬stances under which it was paid is not sufficient to convict the accused when the substantive evidence in the case is not reli¬able. 10. The trial Court also appears to have held that in view of recovery of tainted money from the appellant the prosecution is entitled to presumption under Sub-section (1) of Section 20 of the P.C. Act. However, a bare reading of the provision under Sub-section (1) of Section 20 of the P.C. Act goes to show that the presumption contemplated therein, though applicable in a trial of offence punishable under Section 7, is not available in a trial of offence punishable under clause (d) of Sub-section (1) of Section 13. Sub-section 1 of Section 20 of the P.C. Act reads : “Where, in any trial of an offence punishable under Section 7 or Section 11 or clause (a) or clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 13 it is proved that an accused person has accepted or obtained or has agreed to accept or attempted to obtain for him¬self, or for any other person, any gratification (other than legal remuneration) or any valuable thing from any person, it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that he accept¬ed or obtained or agreed to accept or attempted to obtain that gratification or that valuable thing, as the case may be, as a motive or reward such as is mentioned in Section 7 or, as the case may be, without consideration or for a consideration which he knows to be inadequate.” 11. In V. Venkata Subbarao (supra) it has been categorically held that in the absence of proof of demand, the question of raising of presumption would not arise. Section 20 of the P.C. Act provides for raising of presumption only if the demand is proved. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has also reiterated that Section 20 of the Act is not attracted when accused has been charged for commission of offence under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the P.C. Act. 12. It is also pertinent to point out that burden of ac¬cused to establish his plea does not require the same standard of proof as is required from the prosecution. 12. It is also pertinent to point out that burden of ac¬cused to establish his plea does not require the same standard of proof as is required from the prosecution. Burden of accused is akin to the burden of defendant in a civil proceeding. An accused does not have to establish his plea by adducing proof beyond reasonable doubt. Test of probability satisfies the burden of an accused. 13. Evidence of the official witnesses associated in the trap is also not cogent and consistent. P.W.7 deposed that prepa¬ration for trap was made at Vigilance Office, Sundargarh. Howev¬er, P.W.8 says that on 27.10.1988 on being directed by the Com¬mercial Tax Officer he went to the office of Deputy Superintend¬ent of Police, Vigilance. From his evidence it appears that preparation for the trap was made in the office of Deputy Super¬intendent of Police, Vigilance at Rourkela. Though P.W.7 deposed that when raiding party arrived in the office of R.T.O., the appellant was sitting in a chair and P.W.2 was standing by his side, P.Ws.8 and 9 were silent regarding the presence of P.W.2 when they confronted the appellant. P.W.7 deposed that recovery of tainted money was made after hand wash of the appellant was taken whereas P.Ws.8 and 9 testified that first the hand wash of the appellant was taken and thereafter recovery of the tainted money was made. 14. Thus, not only the prosecution has failed to adduce any evidence of demand for bribe but also circumstances disclosed by D.W.1 as well as P.Ws.7 and 8 support the defence plea to the effect that the tainted money was paid by P.W.2 to the appellant voluntarily as contribution to the Red Cross Fund. That apart, the evidence for the trap witnesses themselves with regard to circum¬stances preceding, attending upon and following the trap is far from being cogent and consistent. Therefore, the prosecution is found to have failed to establish the charge against the appel¬lant. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and order are set aside. Appeal allowed.