D.D. SINHA, J.:- Rule returnable forthwith. Heard finally by consent of Shri. Gordey, learned Counsel for the petitioner, Shri. Mishra, learned Assistant Solicitor General for the respondent no.1, Shri. Ravi Kadam, learned Advocate General for respondent nos.2, 3 and 4, and Shri. Dharmadhikari, learned Counsel for the respondent nos.5 and 6. 2. Shri. Gordey, learned Counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is challenging tender notice dated 22-2-2007 pertaining to sale of land of the Model Mills issued by the respondent no.3 National Textile Corporation (Maharashtra North) Ltd. The petitioner is also challenging letter dated 22-22008 issued by the respondent no.3 whereby offer of respondent no.6 M/s. Golddricks Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. has been accepted. 3. Shri. Gordey, learned Counsel for the petitioner, contended that in the present petition, the petitioner is espousing the cause in public interest since action of respondent nos.2 to 4 is against public interest and has resulted in causing great loss to the Public Exchequer. According to petitioner, there is a tremendous increase in the price of the landed property in and around the city of Nagpur and in order to secure appropriate market price, tender document ought to have contained upset price to enable public at large to know whether it shows the correct market value of the land in question. It was submitted that earlier Model Mill was owned and run by the private entrepreneur and due to mismanagement, the Government of India nationalised the Model Mill under the provisions of Sick Textile Undertakings (Nationalisation) Act, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act of 1974") with effect from 1974 and accordingly the property of the said Model Mi 11 was transferred and vested in the Central Government and thereafter in the National Textile Corporation, which is a Government of India Undertaking. It is the case of the petitioner that National Textile Corporation is a Company wholly owned and managed by the Union of India in view of provisions of Section 6 of the Act of 1974. Similarly, as per provisions of the Act of 1974, the respondent nos.2, 3 and 4 are the instrumentalities of Union of India and, therefore, are "State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Similarly, as per provisions of the Act of 1974, the respondent nos.2, 3 and 4 are the instrumentalities of Union of India and, therefore, are "State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. It was submitted that National Textile Corporation (Maharashtra North) Ltd., which is a subsidiary Company of National Textile Corporation, decided to sell properties of Model Mill, which included land admeasuring 28.96 hectares, i.e. 1,17,257 square metres located in the heart of Nagpur city, which is a part of land bearing Sheet Nos.259, 260, 269, 270 and 271, along with building situated thereon, used machinery, etc. The respondent no.3 National Textile Corporation issued impugned tender notice for sale of the said properties. 4. Learned Counsel Shri. Gordey submitted that location of the property in question has been given in Clauses 1.2 and 1.3 of the tender notice. Clause 2.1 lays down the eligibility conditions, which read thus: "2.1: Eligibility Conditions: The tenderer should: (i) be any person, registered trust, registered firm, registered co-operative society, private Limited company registered in India,. (ii) be legally competent to enter into contract as per prevailing laws, (iii) Income Tax Assessment Orders for the last three years would be required. NTC (MN) Ltd. may also consider a bid submitted by a consortium of persons/ companies. It is, however, made clear that there should be no change in the consortium structure during finalisation of the tender right upto the stage of depositing bid amount with NTC (MN) Ltd. If there are any changes in the consortium structure, NTC (MN) Ltd. reserves right to cancel the sale. However, the financial arrangement between the parties should be specified in the tender document. No did by a consortium/ partnership/company shall be entertained, if in the opinion of the Asset Sale Committee, 1. R. K. Structures Pvt. Ltd. (respondent no.5) 2. F. -City Financial Corporation 3. Om Meatel Consortium Pvt. Ltd. 4. D.L.F. Pvt. Ltd., Mumbai 5. Gundecha Builders Pvt. Ltd., Mumbai 6. Azme Tree Gown-ship The above chart shows that respondent no.5 M/ s. R.K. Structures Pvt. Ltd. has given highest bid of Rs.164.22 crores. 5. Learned Counsel Shri. Gordey contended that National Textile Corporation was restrained by this Court by an interim order passed in Writ Petition No.5907/2007 filed by Rashtriya Mill Mazdoor Sangh, Nagpur and, therefore, process of acceptance of bid remained in abeyance. 5. Learned Counsel Shri. Gordey contended that National Textile Corporation was restrained by this Court by an interim order passed in Writ Petition No.5907/2007 filed by Rashtriya Mill Mazdoor Sangh, Nagpur and, therefore, process of acceptance of bid remained in abeyance. The said petition came to be dismissed by this Court on 15-1-2008. However, this Court stayed the judgment for four weeks so as to enable the said petitioner to approach the Supreme Court. The time expired on 12-2-2008. It was submitted that Rashtriya Mill Mazdoor Sangh probably did not approach the Supreme Court during the said period. The Estate Management Committee considered the question of finalization of offers received in respect of property in question in its meeting dated 14-2-2008 and accepted offer of Rs.164.22 crores submitted by respondent no.5 R. K. Structures Pvt. Ltd. and finalised the sale in favour of respondent no.5 being the highest bidder. It was contended that the National Textile Corporation issued letter of acceptance not in favour of respondent no.5, but in favour of respondent no.6 on the request of respondent no.5. 6. Learned Counsel Shri. Gordey submitted that petitioner has challenged the aforesaid acceptance letter dated 22-2-2008 it has led to reduction in competition." The learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that there were six tenderers, who submitted their bids and the price quoted by them as per the press report is as follows: Rs.164,22,12,119/- Rs.164.00 crores Rs.161.10 crores Rs.151.29 crores Rs.138.00 crores Rs.117.00 crores issued in favour of respondent no.6 on the following grounds: (i) The respondent no.6 does not satisfy the eligibility conditions as laid down in Clause 2.1 of the tender notice. The first condition of tender notice is that tenderer should be any person, registered trust, registered firm, registered co-operative society or private limited company registered in India and it is an admitted position that respondent no.6 Company was not in existence at the time of submitting the bid and was formed later on. Since respondent no.6 Company was not in existence at the time of submission of tender, it failed to fulfill the first condition of the tender document and, therefore, contract of sale of the property mentioned in the tender cannot be awarded in favour of respondent no.6. Since respondent no.6 Company was not in existence at the time of submission of tender, it failed to fulfill the first condition of the tender document and, therefore, contract of sale of the property mentioned in the tender cannot be awarded in favour of respondent no.6. (ii) Similarly, condition no.2 in Clause 2.1 provides that tenderer should be legally competent to enter into contract as per prevailing laws and since it is an admitted fact that respondent no.6 was not at all in existence at the time of submitting bid, it cannot be said to be legally competent to enter into contract as per prevailing laws. (iii) As per condition no.3 in Clause 2.1, it is mandatory to submit income tax assessment orders for the last three years and since respondent no.6 Company was not in existence at the relevant time, question of submission of income tax assessment orders by the respondent no.6 for the last three years does not arise. (iv) The last para in Clause 2.1 specifically lays down that there should be no change in consortium structure during the finalisation of tender right upto the stage of depositing the bid amount with NTC (MN) Ltd. and if there are any changes in the consortium structure, NTC (MN) Ltd. reserves right to cancel the same. (v) The conditions of eligibility clearly indicate that financial structure of the tenderer should remain the same right from the submission of bid till the last day of depositing the entire bid amount with respondent no.3. The respondent no.6 does not satisfy the said condition and, therefore, contract of sale could not have been concluded by the respondent no.3 in favour of respondent no.6. On the other hand, as per condition of tender, respondent no.3 ought not to have issued the letter of acceptance dated 22-2-2008 in favour of respondent no.6 on the ground of non-fulfillment of essential eligibility conditions and should have issued fresh tender notice. (vi) There is no provision either in the tender notice or in the prevailing law, which entitles respondent no.3 to transfer contract of sale in favour of respondent no.6. There is also no power or authority with the respondent no.5 to transfer its contract of sale in favour of respondent no.6. (vi) There is no provision either in the tender notice or in the prevailing law, which entitles respondent no.3 to transfer contract of sale in favour of respondent no.6. There is also no power or authority with the respondent no.5 to transfer its contract of sale in favour of respondent no.6. The action on the part of respondent no.3 to transfer contract of sale by issuing letter of acceptance dated 22-2-2008 in favour of respondent no.6 is inconsistent with the conditions of tender and, therefore, same is not only illegal, but also unsustainable in law. (vii) Though it was contended by the respondent nos.5 and 6 that respondent no.6 is a subsidiary company of respondent no.5 and hence, it is permissible for the respondent no.5 Company to transfer its bid in favour of respondent no.6 Company, however, there is neither any statement in this regard in the affidavit nor in the written submissions filed by the respondent nos.5 and 6. It was submitted that no material has been placed before this Court by the respondent nos.5 and 6 to substantiate that respondent no.6 Company is a subsidiary company of respondent no.5 Company and, therefore, oral statement made by the learned Counsel for the respondent nos.5 and 6 before this Court in this regard is without foundation. 7. Learned Counsel Shri. Gordey also contended that action of sale of property of Model Mill in favour of respondent nos.5 and 6 at Rs.164.22 crores is against the public interest since same is grossly inadequate being much less than the prevalent market price of comparable transaction of sale of land in the city of Nagpur. It was contended that respondents have relied upon Clause 2.7(iii) of the tender notice to indicate that "reserve price" was fixed by the Assets Sale Committee and total reserve price of land, building and machinery in question was fixed at Rs.75 crores though it was not indicated in the tender document. It was also submitted orally by the learned Counsel for the respondents that the said price was fixed on the basis of price of land prevalent in the year 2006. It was contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that there is no basis for fixing the reserve price at Rs.75 crores, which does not even match with the price of the land mentioned in the ready reckoner of the city of Nagpur. It was contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that there is no basis for fixing the reserve price at Rs.75 crores, which does not even match with the price of the land mentioned in the ready reckoner of the city of Nagpur. It was submitted that price of the machinery is Rs.20 crores and value of the land comes to Rs.55 crores and, therefore, "reserve price" of the land in question is only Rs.55 crores, which is far from the real market price of the land. It is the case of the petitioner that valuation done by the respondent nos.2, 3 and 4is arbitrary, grossly less than the market price and unreal and, there fore, the said valuation cannot be accepted. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that even otherwise, no material has been placed on record by the respondent nos.2 to 4 in order to demonstrate the basis on which the aforesaid price of Rs.75 crires as "reserve price" has been worked out and what were the principles and procedures undertaken while fixing the valuation of the land, machinery, etc. in question. It was, therefore, contended that land and machinery in question have been sold by the respondent nos.2 to 4 grossly below the prevalent market price of the same, which has resulted in causing loss to the public exchequer and, therefore, the entire sale transaction right from issuance of tender notice till finalisation of contract of sale in favour of respondent no.6 is against the public interest and cannot be sustained in law. 8. It was further submitted by learned Counsel Shri. Gordey that if "reserve price" of Rs.75 crores was already fixed, in that event, it was incumbent on the respondent no.3 to mention the same in the tender notice itself in order to have transparency in the entire sale transaction. It was contended that respondent nos.2, 3 and 4 being "State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution are under legal obligation to keep transparency in the entire deal specially in respect of sale of public property. It was contended that respondent nos.2, 3 and 4 being "State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution are under legal obligation to keep transparency in the entire deal specially in respect of sale of public property. It was submitted that since reserve price was not mentioned in the tender notice, the public at large including petitioner was completely unaware that property of Model Mill was being undervalued by the respondent nos.2, 3 and 4 and, therefore, action of respondent nos.2 to 4 in respect of sale of land and machinery in question not only lacks transparency, but it also causes huge loss to the public exchequer and, therefore, cannot be sustained in law. 9. Learned Counsel Shri. Gordey contended that whole transaction of sale being opposed to public policy is void and against the provisions of Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act. It was submitted that the very purpose of floating tender and inviting bids for sale of land in question was to get maximum price out of the sale transaction. Accepting the bid at a price, which is grossly lower than the market price by the Government Corporation is opposed to public policy and, therefore, entire sale transaction in question is hit by the provisions of Section 23 of Indian Contract Act and hence, is liable to be quashed and set aside by this Court in exercise of extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. In order to substantiate the said contentions, reliance is placed on the decisions of the Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan and others V s. Basant Nahata ( AIR 2005 SC 34 (H); Tata Cellular Vs. Union of India (AIR 19% SC 11) and Sterling Computers Ltd. V s. M/s. M & N Publications Ltd. and others ( AIR 1996 SC 51 ). 10. Learned Counsel Shri. Gordey further submitted that preliminary objection raised by the respondents that petitioner has no locus to file the present petition is devoid of substance. The present petition has been filed by the petitioner in the public interest as a citizen with the sole objective that the National Textile Corporation (Government Undertaking) should get maximum price for the public property. The present petition has been filed by the petitioner in the public interest as a citizen with the sole objective that the National Textile Corporation (Government Undertaking) should get maximum price for the public property. Similarly, public Authorities, i.e. respondent nos.2, 3 and 4 being "State" under Article 12 of the Constitution are expected to function in the interest of general public and their actions should be transparent and must serve the public interest. It was contended that sale of property belonging to public authority at the price, which is much less than the market price and without adhering to the conditions of the tender notice gives cause of action to the petitioner to invoke the extra-jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution in order to canvass public cause, hence, present petition is maintainable in law. 11. Learned Counsel Shri. Gordey also submitted that there is no delay in filing the present petition and, therefore, the said ground is not available to the respondents. It was pointed out that in view of interim order passed by this Court (referred to hereinabove), the process of finalisation of tender remained in abeyance for some time. The writ petition wherein interim order was passed was finally decided on 15-1-2008 by this Court. This Court granted time to the said petitioner to approach the Supreme Court till 12-2-2008. On 14-22008, the Assets Sale Committee of the respondent no.3 finalised the bid in favour of respondent no.5 and the respondent no.3 issued letter of acceptance in favour of respondent no.6 on 22-2-2008 and the present petition has been filed on 22-2-2008. It was submitted that the bid, which was opened in February, 2007, could not have been accepted by the respondent no.3 Corporation in February, 2008, i.e. after a time gap of more than one year by ignoring escalation in the market price of the land during the said period. The petitioner has filed the present petition with the sole objective to bring to the notice of this Court that sale transaction in respect of land in question undertaken by the respondent no.3 apart from being inconsistent with the conditions of tender, has factually resulted in causing tremendous losses to the respondent no.3 Corporation, which is a Government Undertaking. The petitioner, therefore, has locus to canvass public grievance by filing the present petition, which is maintainable in law. 12. The petitioner, therefore, has locus to canvass public grievance by filing the present petition, which is maintainable in law. 12. Shri. Ravi Kadam, learned Advocate General for respondent nos.2, 3 and 4, contended that though the petitioner claims to have filed the present petition in the public interest, however, in fact it does not serve any public purpose and amounts to abuse of process of Court. It was submitted that the petition is not maintainable in law and needs to be dismissed on this sole ground. It was further submitted that the Apex Court in Ashok Kumar Pandey Vs. State of West Bengal (2004(3) see 349) has held that the public interest litigation is a weapon, which has to be used with great care and circumspection and the Judiciary has to be extremely careful to see that behind the beautiful veil of public interest, an ugly private malice, vested interest and/or publicity seeking is not lurking. It is to be used as an effective weapon in the armoury of law for delivering social justice to citizens. The attractive brand name of public interest litigation should not be used for suspicious products of mischief. It should be aimed at redressal of genuine public wrong or public injury and not publicity-oriented or founded on personal vendetta. It was further submitted that the Apex Court in para (14) of the said judgment has held that Court has to be satisfied about - (i) The credentials of the applicant (ii) The prima facie correctness or nature of information given by him, and (iii) The information being not vague or indefinite. 13. Learned Advocate General Shri. Ravi Kadam submitted that in view of law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Ashok Kumar Pandey (cited supra), it is evident that present petitioner has no credentials and it is not at all a claim of the petitioner that he is a public spirited man. On the other hand, in the very first paragraph of the petition, petitioner has stated that he is neither an employee nor in any way connected with the Model Mill or its Institution. It was contended that bare perusal of the petition shows that various allegations made by the petitioner are totally vague and indefinite. The petitioner has not verified the relevant basic facts before filing the petition. It was contended that bare perusal of the petition shows that various allegations made by the petitioner are totally vague and indefinite. The petitioner has not verified the relevant basic facts before filing the petition. The petitioner has made baseless allegations against the respondents without verifying the basic facts. There is enough material to demonstrate that petitioner is acting as a proxy of some other person, who has vested interest to challenge sale of land belonging to Model Mill, which is evident from the fact that documents at Annexures "B" and "F" to the petition, are the tender document and letter of acceptance issued by the respondent no.3 in favour of respondent no.6. The petitioner has not disclosed how he came in possession of these two documents, particularly letter of acceptance. The learned Advocate General further submitted that the Apex Court in para (16) of its judgment in the case of Ashok Kumar Pandey (cited supra) has observed thus: ".... The other interesting aspect is that in pills, official documents are being annexed without even indicating as to how petitioner came to possess them ...." It was submitted that in the present petition petitioner has not disclosed how he came in possession of the said documents. The learned Advocate General further contended that the Apex Court in Dr. B. Singh Vs. Union of India (2004(3) see 363) as well as Dattaraj Nathuji Thaware Vs. State of Maharashtra and others (2005(1) see 590: [2005(5) ALL MR (S.C.) 270]) has reiterated the same legal principles as laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Ashok Kumar Pandey (cited supra). It was submitted that on the backdrop of the above referred aspects, it is implicitly clear that the petitioner in fact is acting as a proxy of someone else. It was contended that in view of law laid down by the Apex Court and in the absence of any material to show credentials of the petitioner as well as information given in the petition being vague and indefinite and petitioner has not given the source from where he has obtained the said documents, the present petition is not maintainable as a public interest litigation and needs to be dismissed on this sole ground. 14. 14. Shri. Ravi Kadam, learned Advocate General further contended that without prejudice to the submissions made above, the petitioner, even otherwise, failed to make out any case for interference on merits. It was submitted that contention of the petitioner that no "reserve price" was mentioned in the tender notice or tender document, creates suspicion about sale transaction as well as affects transparency of procedure adopted for the sale of property in question is misconceived. It was contended that sale of land in question was undertaken as per order passed by the Board of Industrial Finance and Reconstruction (BIFR) on 25-7-2002. Vide order dated 25-7-2002 the BIFR sanctioned scheme for rehabilitation of respondent no.3 Corporation and as per guidelines issued by the BIFR, no reserve price was to be mentioned in the tender document or tender notice. It was submitted that after taking into consideration the combined value of land, building and machinery, reserve price was fixed at Rs.75 crores. It was further submitted that it was not necessary to mention the reserve price in the tender document and non-disclosure of reserve price has nothing to do with valuation of the land. Merely because the reserve price was not mentioned in the tender notice, it is not correct to jump to the conclusion that sale transaction is grossly undervalued unless there is proper evidence to demonstrate the same, placed on record by the petitioner. 15. Learned Advocate General Shri. Ravi Kadam also contended that Clause 2.7 of the tender document shows that reserve price was in fact fixed. Clause 2.7(iii) shows that after opening the sealed offers, in case highest valid offer is found to be lower than the reserve price, the Assets Sales Committee was entitled to give valid tenderers an opportunity to improve upon their offers. It is thus evident that reserve price was in fact fixed and it was not mandatory to mention the said reserve price in the tender notice or tender document. On the other hand, mentioning of such reserve price would have affected the offers as the tenderers, who have given the bids, would have quoted the price, which would have been little above the reserve price. On the other hand, mentioning of such reserve price would have affected the offers as the tenderers, who have given the bids, would have quoted the price, which would have been little above the reserve price. In the instant case, offer which is accepted by the respondent no.3 is of Rs.164.22 lacs, which is more than double the reserve price and, therefore, non-mentioning of reserve price in the tender notice or tender document has not adversely affected the sale transaction in question. 16. The learned Advocate General further submitted that while fixing the reserve price, the respondent nos.2 to 4 took into consideration the market value of the property in question. For the purpose of ascertaining the market value of the property, respondent nos.2 to 4 sought opinion of Mr. Amitabh Belekar, Chartered Engineer and Government Registered Valuer, M/s. Renaissance Planners and Engineers Pvt. Ltd., a firm of Chartered Engineers and approved Valuers, Mr. Anand. Gawande, Architect and Valuer as well as Mr. D. K. Khedkar, Chartered Engineer and Government Approved Valuer. Based on the reports given by the above experts, reserve price was fixed at Rs.75 crores by the respondent n08.2 to 4. It was also submitted that contention of the petitioner that reserve price fixed by the respondent nos.2 to 4 was arbitrarily or without taking into consideration the prevalent market value of the land is devoid of substance. 17. The learned Advocate General also submitted that it is not the case of the petitioner that respondent no.5, who has submitted the bid, was not eligible as per Clause 2.1 of the tender document. The respondent no.5 is admittedly a private limited Company and is, therefore, not a consortium. Perusal of the acceptance letter shows that respondent no.5 while submitting the bid also gave a letter of intent informing the respondent nos.2 to 4 that it proposes to float a Special Purpose Vehicle Company (SPVC) comprising of its shareholders and other investors on finalisation of tender. Considering the fact that respondent no.6 is a Company floated by the respondent no.5 as a Special Purpose Vehicle Company, respondent no.3 issued acceptance letter in favour of the said Company. It was, therefore, submitted that there is no violation of eligibility condition mentioned in Clause 2.1 of the tender document. Considering the fact that respondent no.6 is a Company floated by the respondent no.5 as a Special Purpose Vehicle Company, respondent no.3 issued acceptance letter in favour of the said Company. It was, therefore, submitted that there is no violation of eligibility condition mentioned in Clause 2.1 of the tender document. Similarly, there is no question of change in the consortium structure as the bid in the first place, was not submitted by the consortium. It was contended that perusal of Clause 2.1 shows that respondent no.3 merely reserved right to cancel the same, if there is a change in the consortium structure. There is absolutely no prohibition in Clause 2.1, which would prevent the respondent no.3 in giving acceptance letter in favour of respondent no.6. 18. The learned Advocate General further submitted that contention of the petitioner that offer given by the respondent no.5 was grossly inadequate and was much less than the market price is also misconceived. It was submitted that respondent nos.2 to 4 published tender notice in the newspapers, which had wide circulation in the area. The respondent nos.2 to 4 received six valid bids from six parties. The respondent nos.2 to 4 have accepted the highest bid given by the respondent no.5. However, because of interim order passed by this Court, the bid of respondent no.5 could not be accepted for a period of about one year. The entire exercise undertaken by the respondent nos.2 to 4 is totally consistent with the conditions of tender and is completely transparent in nature. It was also submitted that the contention of the petitioner that during the period of one year, price of land has escalated is a vague statement made in the petition without placing any material on record to substantiate the same and, therefore, the said contention cannot be accepted on its face value. 19. Learned Advocate General Shri. Ravi Kadam further contented that the news report, which is annexed as Annexure R-I to the submissions, shows that 20.20 acres of land belonging to Nagpur Sahakari Sut Girni received highest bid ofRs.81.l0 crores and thus, the price fetched by the said property roughly comes to Rs.4 crores per acre. As against this, property of Model Mill consisting of Rs.28.96 acres received highest bid of Rs.164.22 crores. As against this, property of Model Mill consisting of Rs.28.96 acres received highest bid of Rs.164.22 crores. It was submitted that though tenders were invited in the year 2007, even then, the property in question fetched approximately Rs.5.60 crores per acre. It was contended that even on merits, petitioner failed to make out a case for showing indulgence and, therefore, same deserves to be dismissed on this count ailo. 20. Shri. Dharmadhikari, learned Counsel for the respondent nos.5 and 6, contended that the present petition has been filed at the instance of someone having vested interest and the petitioner is not canvassing genuine public cause by filing the present petition. It was contended that petitioner is in no way interested in promoting a public interest, he is neither a social worker nor associated with any Organization dealing with. public cause. Since bonafides of the petitioner are doubtful, the present petition may not be treated as public interest litigation. It was further contended that as per law laid down by the Apex Court in Ashok Kumar Pandey Vs. State of W.B. ( 2004(3) SCC 349 ); Dr. B. Singh Vs. Union of India and others ( 2004(3) SCC 363 ) and Dattaraj Nathuji Thaware Vs. State of Maharashtra and others ( 2005(1) SCC 590 : [2005(5) ALL MR (S.C.) 270]), the present petition is not maintainable. 21. Shri. Dharmadhikari submitted that the petitioner has not approached this Court with clean hands and is guilty of filing this petition belatedly by concocting and suppressing the material facts. It was contended that. if the petitioner, who is not connected with the issue (as he claims), has no reason to possess the above referred documents, which were only within the knowledge of respondent nos.3, 5 and 6. The petitioner has also not disclosed source of information nor has mentioned in the petition how he came in possession of the said documents. All these facts make it evident that the petitioner by filing the present petition is canvassing somebody else's cause, which has nothing to do with the public interest. 22. Shri. Dharmadhikari submitted that this Court in Writ Petition No.5907/2007, decided on 15-1-2008, has held that the scheme sanctioned in the matter has been approved by the Apex Court and, therefore, there is no force in the contention raised by the petitioner in the said petition in this regard. 22. Shri. Dharmadhikari submitted that this Court in Writ Petition No.5907/2007, decided on 15-1-2008, has held that the scheme sanctioned in the matter has been approved by the Apex Court and, therefore, there is no force in the contention raised by the petitioner in the said petition in this regard. It was contended that respondent no.6 Company was floated by the respondent no.5 as Special Project Vehicle. The respondent no.5 being promoter of respondent no.6 Company had participated in the tender process and mentioned in the tender itself that upon finalisation of the tender, it proposes to float a special project vehicle (SPV) comprising of its shareholders and other investors. It was submitted that respondent no.5 subscribed one lac equity shares in respondent no.6 Company. Other three shareholders are Directors and family members of Directors of both the Companies. It was contended that respondent no.6 Company was incorporated with total 1,03,000 shares, out of which 1,00,000 shares are in the name of respondent no.5 and remaining 3,000 shares are in the name of Shri. Rakesh Saraogi, Smt. Rani Saraogi and Shri. Nitesh Jain, who are Directors in both the Companies. It was contended that after completion of project in question, respondent no.6 would be merged and amalgamated with respondent no.5 Company. The respondent nos.I and 2 were given all the relevant consent papers relating to all these decisions taken by the respondent nos.5 and 6 to show that respondent no.5 Company is a major promoter of the respondent no.6 Company and, therefore, there is absolutely no impediment in permitting formation of the said special project vehicle. It was also stated that the Resolution in this regard passed in the meetings of both the Companies, certificate issued by the Chartered Accountant of the Company as well as Memorandum of Association and Articles of Association of respondent no.6 Company as well as letter addressed to the respondent nos. 1 and 2 certifying these facts are placed on record for consideration of this Court. The learned Counsel, therefore, contended that claim of the petitioner that respondent no.3 has awarded the contract in question to a Company, which did not participate in the tender is absolutely incorrect nor can it be said that tender submitted by the respondent no.5 was a conditional tender. 23. The learned Counsel, therefore, contended that claim of the petitioner that respondent no.3 has awarded the contract in question to a Company, which did not participate in the tender is absolutely incorrect nor can it be said that tender submitted by the respondent no.5 was a conditional tender. 23. Shri. Dharmadhikari further contended that it is wrongly claimed by the petitioner that property in question is in the heart of city when the properties in Civil Lines and Ramdaspeth, which are considered to be prestigious localities, were sold at Rs.5,0006,500/- per sq.ft. In absence of any material placed on record by the petitioner, it cannot be said that action of respondent nos.2 and 3 has resulted in financial loss to the Government Undertaking. It was contended that respondents have placed on record the material to show that price of land received by the respondent no.3 was much higher than the price mentioned in the Government ready reckoner. It was further contended that reliance placed by the petitioner on certain news items published by some of the newspapers cannot be the basis for determining market value of the land in question. 24. Learned Counsel Shri. Dharmadhikari further contended that petitioner is challenging validity of tender notice dated 22-2-2007 after a period of one year. The petition suffers from delay and laches because even the letter of acceptance dated 22-2-2008 was already issued by the respondent no.3 in favour of respondent no.6. Similarly, earlier petition filed by Rastriya Mills Mazdoor Sangh was already dismissed by this Court. It was submitted that after awarding the contract for Rs.164.22 crores, the respondent nos.5 and 6 have already paid sum of Rs.114 crores to the respondent nos.1 and 2 except one last installment of Rs.49,97,73,190/-. It was submitted that respondent nos.5 and 6 have also invested huge amount apart from the money which they have already paid to respondent nos. 1 and 2. It was contended that when the parties have altered their positions and/or third party interest has been created, public interest litigation in such situation, needs to be summarily dismissed. 25. Shri. Dharmadhikari further contended that tender in question was floated by the National Textile Corporation after examining all pros and cons, viability as well as after considering opinion of the experts. 25. Shri. Dharmadhikari further contended that tender in question was floated by the National Textile Corporation after examining all pros and cons, viability as well as after considering opinion of the experts. It was an open tender for which wide publicity was given and the date of tender was extended from time to time to get maximum participation. The tender document was not only in respect of Nagpur Model Mill property at Nagpur, but it was also in respect of some other properties of National Textile Corporation situated at Akola and Aurangabad and, therefore, the contention of the petitioner that manner in which transaction was carried out by the respondent nos. 1 and 2 lacks transparency is unsustainable in law. 26. Learned Counsel Shri. Dharmadhikari further submitted that eligibility conditions mentioned in Clause 2.1 of the tender document were very specific and since tender was for sale of property, endeavour of National Textile Corporation was to get maximum price. The respondent nos. 1 and 2 on the basis of opinion obtained from the experts in the field had fixed reserve price of the property in question at Rs.75 crores and in order to get maximum price, the respondent nos. 1 and 2 had not mentioned the reserve price in tender document though there is no such mandatory requirement in law to do so. The condition in the tender document required the tenderer to furnish earnest money deposit of Rs.750 lacs and, therefore, this condition of tender would demonstrate that intention of the respondent nos. 1 and 2 was to attract only genuine buyers and not the frivolous one. It was contended that as against the reserve price ofRs.75 crores, the offer given by the respondent no.5 was of Rs.164.22 crores and, therefore, the contention of the petitioner that property in question was undervalued is misconceived. 27. Shri. Dharmadhikari further contended that after Nationalisation of Mill in 1974, the National Textile Corporation has taken over all the Sick Textile Mills and policy was framed by the Government for development of the entire open land and building belonging to such sick Mills. It was submitted that scheme formulated by BIFR in Case No.536/1992 on 25-7-2002 was implemented in letter and spirit by the respondent nos.1 and 2 in respect of property in question. 28. It was submitted that scheme formulated by BIFR in Case No.536/1992 on 25-7-2002 was implemented in letter and spirit by the respondent nos.1 and 2 in respect of property in question. 28. Shri. Dharmadhikari further contended that respondent nos.5 and 6 have absolutely no nexus with the chawla of Model Mill in which employees of Model Mills are residing. To the best of knowledge of these respondents, separate tender was floated for the purpose of rehabilitation of such persons and it is in respect of that area only the Government of Maharashtra, Department of Urban Development has issued notification wherein provision was made for special F.S.I. It was submitted that the said Government Resolution is not applicable in respect of property in question and, therefore, contention of the petitioner in this regard is misconceived. 29. Learned Counsel Shri. Dharmadhikari further submitted that respondent no.5 was the highest bidder, who had given offer of Rs.164.22 crores. It is absolutely false to allege that value of machinery is about Rs.20 crores and, therefore, after deducting the said amount, price of land comes to Rs.1,143/- per sq.ft. The machinery installed in the Mill was old, used and outdated, which more or less is in the nature of scrap and, therefore, contention of the petitioner about valuation of machinery is figment of imagination based on no evidence. Similarly, claim of the petitioner that available F.S.I. in respect of land in question is 2.5 is incorrect and improper as tender notice mentions the same as 1.00. It was submitted that the tender document provides that as per letter dated 191-2007 received from the Assistant Director (Town Planner), Nagpur Municipal Corporation, F.S.I. of area in question is 1.00 and, therefore, claim of the petitioner that F.S.I. in respect of land in question is 2.5 is wholly misconceived. 30. Learned Counsel Shri. Dharmadhikari further contended that Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act is not applicable in respect of sale transaction in question. On the other hand, extra-ordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is invoked by the petitioner purportedly to show that petitioner is canvassing the public interest. 30. Learned Counsel Shri. Dharmadhikari further contended that Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act is not applicable in respect of sale transaction in question. On the other hand, extra-ordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is invoked by the petitioner purportedly to show that petitioner is canvassing the public interest. However, above referred facts and circumstances show that neither public interest is affected by the sale transaction in question nor there is any loss caused to the Government Undertaking and, therefore, petition needs to be dismissed on the ground of maintainability as well as on merits by imposing exemplary costs on the petitioner. 31. We have given anxious thought to the rival contentions canvassed by the learned respective Counsel for the parties. The petitioner claims to have filed the present petition in the public interest and challenged validity of the tender notice dated 22-2-2007 and letter of acceptance dated 22-2-2008 issued by the respondent no.3 National Textile Corporation. The learned Advocate General raised a preliminary objection about maintainability of the petition as public interest litigation. However, we feel it proper to deal with the issue of maintainability of the present public interest litigation along with the merit of the matter. 32. It is the case of the respondents that petitioner has not even mentioned that he is a public spirited person or a social worker. There is no material on record to demonstrate that in the past, petitioner was doing social service and was propagating public cause before appropriate Forums. The respondents also claimed that credentials of the petitioner are doubtful and the petitioner has annexed with the petition some documents, particularly copy of the tender notice and acceptance letter dated 22-2-2008 issued by the respondent no.3 without disclosing the source from where he has obtained the same and, therefore, it is contended that petitioner is canvassing somebody else's cause by filing present petition since he himself has admitted that he is neither interested nor connected with the sale of Model Mill's land in question. The learned Advocate General as well as learned Counsel for the respondent nos.5 and 6, therefore contended that petitioner does not have locus nor petition is in the public interest. The learned Advocate General as well as learned Counsel for the respondent nos.5 and 6, therefore contended that petitioner does not have locus nor petition is in the public interest. In order to substantiate this contention, reliance was placed by the learned Counsel for the respondents on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Ashok Kumar Pandey (cited supra). The Apex Court in para (16) of the said judgment, has observed thus: "16) As noted supra, a time has come to weed out the petitions, which though titled as public interest litigations are in essence something else. It is shocking to note that courts are flooded with a large number of so called public interest litigations where even a minuscule percentage can legitimately be called public interest litigations. Though the parameters of public interest litigation have been indicated by this Court in a large number of cases, yet unmindful of the real intentions and objectives, courts are entertaining such petitions and wasting valuable judicial time which, as noted above, could be otherwise utilized for disposal of genuine cases. Though in Duryodhan Sahu (Dr.) Vs. Jitendra Kumar Mishra this Court held that in service matters pils should not be entertained, the inflow of so-called PILs involving service matters continues unabated in the courts and strangely are entertained. The least the High Courts could do is to throw them out on the basis of the said decision. The other interesting aspect is that in the PILs, official documents are being annexed without even indicating as to how the petitioner came to possess them. In one case, it was noticed that an interesting answer was given as to its possession. It was stated that a packet was lying on the road and when .out of curiosity the petitioner opened it, he found copies of the official documents. Whenever such frivolous pleas are taken to explain possession, the courts should do well not only to dismiss the petitions but also to impose exemplary costs. It would be desirable for the courts to filter out the frivolous petitions and dismiss them with costs as afore stated so that the message, goes in the right direction that petitions filed with oblique motive do not have the approval ,of the courts." The Apex Court has once again reiterated in its decision in the case of Dr. It would be desirable for the courts to filter out the frivolous petitions and dismiss them with costs as afore stated so that the message, goes in the right direction that petitions filed with oblique motive do not have the approval ,of the courts." The Apex Court has once again reiterated in its decision in the case of Dr. B. Singh (cited supra) the guiding principles to be kept in mind by the Court while considering scope and ambit of public interest litigation, which are similar to the law already laid down in the case of Ashok Kumar Pandey (cited supra). The observations made by the Apex Court in para (16) of both these decisions make it implicitly clear that merely because the petitioner claims to have filed the petition in the public interest, that by itself, cannot be a ground to take cognizance of the issue unless it serves the public good. 33. The expression 'public interest litigation' as defined in the Advanced Law Lexicon means a legal action initiated in a Court of law for the enforcement of public interest or general interest in which the public or a class of the community has pecuniary interest or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected. The expression 'public interest law (litigation)' is the name that has recently been given to efforts to provide legal representation to previously unrepresentative groups and interests. Such efforts have been undertaken in the recognition that ordinary market place for legal services fail to provide such services to significant segments of the population and to significant interests. Such groups and interests include the proper environmentalists, consumers, racial and ethnic minorities and others. 34. It is well settled that whenever there is a public injury or public wrong caused hyany act or omission of the State or, Public Authority, which is contrary to the Constitution or law, any member of the public acting bonafide and having sufficient interest can maintain .an action for redressal of such public wrong or public injury. The object of public interest litigation is to bring justice within the reach -of poor and disadvantaged classes of the society. In order to understand the concept of evolution of 'public interest litigation', we have considered the decision of the Apex Court in the case of S.P. Gupta and others Vs. The object of public interest litigation is to bring justice within the reach -of poor and disadvantaged classes of the society. In order to understand the concept of evolution of 'public interest litigation', we have considered the decision of the Apex Court in the case of S.P. Gupta and others Vs. President of India and others ( AIR 1982 SC 149 ), which serves as a guide. His Lordship Bhagwati, J., in the said decision, observed as follows: "It may, therefore, now be taken as well established that where a legal wrong or a legal injury is caused to a person or to a determinate class of persons by reason of violation of any constitutional or legal right or any burden is imposed in contravention of any constitutional or legal provision or without authority of law or any such legal wrong or legal injury or illegal burden is threatened and such person or determinate class of persons is by reason of poverty, helplessness or disability or socially or economically disadvantaged position, unable to approach the Court for relief, any member of the public can maintain an application for an appropriate direction, order or writ in the High Court under Art.226 and in case of breach of any fundamental right of such person or determinate class of persons, in this Court under Art.32 seeking judicial redress for the legal wrong or injury caused to such person or determinate class of persons. Where the weaker sections of the community are concerned, such as under-trial prisoners languishing in jails without a trial inmates of the Protective Home in Agra or Harijan workers engaged in road construction in the Ajmer District, who are living in poverty and destitution, who are barely eking out a miserable existence with their sweat and toil, who are helpless victims of an exploitative society and who do not have easy access to justice, this Court will not insist on a regular writ petition to be filed by the public spirited individual espousing their cause and seeking relief for them. This Court will readily respond even to a letter addressed by such individual acting pro bono publico". This Court will readily respond even to a letter addressed by such individual acting pro bono publico". Similarly, it is well settled that Courts will not interfere at the instance of a busybody interfering in things, which do not concern him, but certainly when there is a point, which affects the interests and liberties of all the citizens and public at large, he would be heard. The three considerations, which normally are emphasized in the matter of public interest litigation are that: (1) the person moving the Court must have sufficient interest, (2) there must be a public injury, (3) the action must be bonafide .. At the same time. it is necessary for the petitioner to disclose the full particulars about himself including the status, avocation and other relevant factors so that Court would be in a better position to appreciate the question raised by the petitioner, who is claiming to propagate public cause. It is no doubt true that justice cannot be denied for want of money or a poor is unable to approach the Court, however, that does not mean that anyone can casually approach this Court and invoke extra-ordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and make allegations, which are unfounded and without any basis. The public interest litigation is not ad versarial litigation and. therefore, petitioner who is real! y interested in serving the public good, must reveal complete facts and assist the Court in a dispassionate manner, The tenor of the petition must show that petitioner is genuinely concerned with the public interest and is espousing the public cause. 35. The public interest litigation is not ad versarial litigation and. therefore, petitioner who is real! y interested in serving the public good, must reveal complete facts and assist the Court in a dispassionate manner, The tenor of the petition must show that petitioner is genuinely concerned with the public interest and is espousing the public cause. 35. The purport of public interest litigation, in other words, is a collective effort on the part of the petitioner, the State or Public Authority and the Court to secure observance of the constitutional or legal rights and privileges conferred upon the vulnerable sections of the community and to reach social justice to them, The principles already laid down by the Apex Court in this regard show that in case of public interest litigation, the Courts have permitted departure from the strict rule of locus standi as applicable to a person, who initiates private action, by liberalising rule of standing and permitting member of a public having no personal gain or oblique motive to approach the Court for enforcement of constitutional or legal rights of the socially and economically disadvantaged persons, who on account of their poverty or total ignorance of their fundamental rights are unable to approach the Court for redressal of their grievance. At the same time, the petitioner must act bonafidely and should have sufficient interest in the public interest litigation. In such situation, he will have a locus to approach the Court in order to serve public good. Similarly, Court shall not entertain a petition in the public interest, if petitioner has filed the same for personal gain or private profit or for any oblique consideration. The Court must ascertain whether under the guise of redressing a public grievance, the petitioner has a private interest or publicity oriented objective. The Courts are expected to see whether petition is filed for redressal of public wrong or injury. The Court must ascertain whether under the guise of redressing a public grievance, the petitioner has a private interest or publicity oriented objective. The Courts are expected to see whether petition is filed for redressal of public wrong or injury. The Apex Court in the case of State of Rajasthan (cited supra), has observed thus: In Chitty on Contracts, 28th edition at page 838, it is stated: "Objects which on grounds of public policy invalidate contracts may, for convenience, be generally classified into five groups: first objects which are illegal by common law or by legislation, secondly, objects injurious to good government either in the field of domestic or foreign affairs, thirdly, objects which interfere with the proper working of the machinery of justice, fourthly, objects, injurious to marriage and morality, and fifthly, objects economically against the public interest. This classification is adopted primarily for case of exposition. Certain cases do not fit clearly into any of these five categories. " 36. The Apex Court in paras (98) and (99) of its judgment in the case of Tata Cellular (cited supra) has observed thus: "98. At this stage, the Supreme Court Practice 1993 Volume 1 pages 849-850 may be quoted: "4. Wednesbury principle - A decision of a public authority will be liable to be quashed or otherwise dealt with by an appropriate order in judicial review proceedings where the Court concludes that the decision is such that no authority properly directing itself on the relevant law and acting reasonably could have reached it." (Associated Provincial Picture Houses Limited Vs. Wednesbury Corpn., (1948)1 KB 223: (1947)2 All ER 680 per Lord Greene M.R.) 99. Two other facets of irrationality may be mentioned: (1) It is open to the Court to review the decision maker's evaluation of the facts. The Court will intervene where the facts taken as a whole could not logically warrant the conclusion of the decision-maker. If the weight of facts pointing to one course of action is overwhelming, then a decision the other way, cannot be upheld. The Court will intervene where the facts taken as a whole could not logically warrant the conclusion of the decision-maker. If the weight of facts pointing to one course of action is overwhelming, then a decision the other way, cannot be upheld. Thus, in Emma Hotels Ltd. V s. Secretary of the State of Environment, (1980)41 P & CR 255, the Secretary of State referred to a number of factors which led him to the conclusion that a non-resident' s bar in a hotel was operated in such a way that the bar was not an incident of the hotel use for planning purposes, but constituted a separate use. The Divisional Court analysed the factors which led the Secretary of State to that conclusion and having done so, set it aside. Donaldson LJ said that he could not see on what basis the Secretary of State had reached his conclusion. (2) A decision would be regarded as unreasonable if it is impartial and unequal in its operation as between different classes, On this basis in R. Vs. Barnet London Borough Council, ex p. Johnson (1989)88 LGR 73, the condition imposed by a local authority prohibiting participation by those affiliated with political parties at events to be held in the authority's parks was struck down." 37. Similarly, it is necessary for the Court to keep in mind that the concept of public interest litigation evolved by the Supreme Court for providing justice to community or class of persons, who have no means to approach the Court by following normal procedure provided petition deserves to be dismissed on this count. However, considering subject matter of the present petition, it will be expedient to conclude whether the petition is in the public interest or not, after taking into consideration merits of the matter. 40. It is well settled that State is legally competent to formulate terms and conditions of the tender document. On the other hand, it alone has expertise in the field and, therefore, unless conditions of the tender document are apparently against the public policy or result in public injury, the Court should be slow in showing indulgence. 41. 40. It is well settled that State is legally competent to formulate terms and conditions of the tender document. On the other hand, it alone has expertise in the field and, therefore, unless conditions of the tender document are apparently against the public policy or result in public injury, the Court should be slow in showing indulgence. 41. So far as merit of the present petition is concerned, the petitioner wants to demonstrate that sale of land by the respondent no.3 National Textile Corporation has resulted in great loss to the public exchequer since the land in question was sold for the price, which was much less than the prevalent market price at the relevant time. In order to appreciate this aspect of the matter, there are few undisputed facts, which are necessary to be considered. The tender notice was issued by the respondent no.3 for sale of land on 22-2-2007 by giving wide publicity. It is also not in dispute that reserve price was not mentioned either in the tender notice or the tender document. It is, therefore, clear that public at large including persons, who had offered the bids, and the petitioner were well aware of the publication of tender notice. It is no doubt true that petitioner should have filed the petition earlier, however, that does not mean that responsibility of the State to act justly, fairly and in a transparent manner in any way gets absolved. It is the public interest, which should be the paramount consideration. Though it is expected that the action of the State, if not in the public interest must be questioned within a reasonable time, however, in the instant case, for want of conclusive evidence to show the market value of the land in question for the year 2008, the contention of the petitioner in this regard cannot be accepted. 42. It is no doubt true that it is not mandatory to mention the reserve/upset price of the property in question in the tender notice and, therefore, non-mentioning of reserve price in the tender document cannot be the ground for quashing the tender notice. However, it is always better to mention the reserve price in the tender notice so that people at large will know that the reserve price mentioned in the tender notice is the factual prevalent market price of the land in question. However, it is always better to mention the reserve price in the tender notice so that people at large will know that the reserve price mentioned in the tender notice is the factual prevalent market price of the land in question. In the instant case, as pointed out by the learned Advocate General, the reserve price though was not mentioned in the tender document, but was fixed on the basis of report/opinion expressed by the experts in the field, which was Rs.75 crores. The explanation given by the learned Advocate General for non-mentioning of reserve price in the tender document appears to be reasonable since the price, which has been fetched for the land in question is almost more than double the reserve price. However, we want to reiterate that it is always expedient to mention reserve price in the tender document in order to avoid confusion regarding prevalent market price and same will also bring transparency in the tender process. 43. So far as letter of acceptance dated 22-2-2008 issued by the respondent no.3 in favour of respondent no.6 is concerned, it is not in dispute that respondent no.5 submitted the bid in the individual capacity and, therefore, clause pertaining to bid to be submitted by the consortium is not attracted. The bid of respondent no.5 was the highest bid of Rs. 164.22 crores and, therefore, acceptance of the said bid by the respondent no.3 is just and proper. In the instant case, respondent no.3 has already received amount of Rs.114 crores and last installment of RsA9,97,73,119/- only is due. It is, therefore, evident that respondent no.3 has received substantial sale consideration except the last installment and, therefore, this is not the case where letter of acceptance issued by the respondent no.3 in favour of respondent no.6 can be said to have resulted in causing any loss to the respondent no.3 for want of conclusive evidence regarding market value of the land in 44. The petitioner though tried to canvass on the basis of newspaper reports that market value of the land in question at the relevant time was much more than the price, which is fetched by the respondent no.3, however, in absence of any conclusive evidence placed on record by the petitioner to demonstrate that the market value of the land in question was much more than the price bid, which was given by the respondent no.5, it is difficult for us to agree with the contention canvassed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner in this .regard, particularly because it is not the case of the petitioner that respondent no.5 otherwise was not eligible to submit bid in view of terms and conditions of the tender notice. 45. It is no doubt true that in the instant case, tender notice was issued on 22-2-2007, letter of acceptance was issued on 22-82008 and the reserve price of the land in question was fixed on the basis of market value of the land prevalent in the year 2006. Therefore, the procedure adopted for fixing the 'reserve price' in the year 2008 based on the market value of the land prevalent in the year 2006 though does not appear to be normal, however, since petitioner has not placed on record conclusive evidence regarding the market value of the land prevalent in the years 2006, 2007 and 2008, it is difficult to conclude that the land in question was sold for the price, which was much less than the market value of the land in question prevalent in the year 2008. 46. Similarly, in the case in hand, the tender was issued by the respondent no.3 for sale of land along with machinery and building and, therefore, price of the land received by the respondent no.3 would be the sole factor to determine whether total consideration received by the respondent no.3 out of the sale transaction in question serves the public purpose or has resulted in causing monetary loss to the public Authority. We have already observed hereinabove that it is difficult for us to hold that the 'reserve price' fixed by the respondent no.3, for want of conclusive evidence placed on record by the petitioner to hold otherwise, was unjustified and, therefore, contention canvassed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner in this regard cannot be accepted. 47. We have already observed hereinabove that it is difficult for us to hold that the 'reserve price' fixed by the respondent no.3, for want of conclusive evidence placed on record by the petitioner to hold otherwise, was unjustified and, therefore, contention canvassed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner in this regard cannot be accepted. 47. Similarly, contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that action of the respondent nos.2 to 4 in non mentioning reserve price in the tender notice is against public policy, for the reasons stated hereinabove, also suffers from lack of merit. 48. For the reasons stated hereinabove, the petition is dismissed. However, in view of the facts and circumstances of the present case, there is no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.