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2008 DIGILAW 1008 (DEL)

Bougainvillea Multiplex and Entertainment Center Private Limited v. Shankar Rai

2008-11-03

SHIV NARAYAN DHINGRA

body2008
ORDER: 1. The petitioner is aggrieved by an order dated 16.10.2006 passed by ADJ whereby an application of the petitioner under section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short “the Act”) for referring the parties to arbitration was dismissed. The petitioner filed a review against the said order, which was also dismissed vide order dated 12.2.2007. 2. Brief facts relevant for the purpose of deciding this petition are that the respondent in order to open a photo sticker shop approached the petitioner to take on lease a shop in NOIDA Entertainment Centre. A Term Sheet Agreement was entered into between the parties on 15.2.2005 and respondent paid a sum of Rs.3,97,196/- to the petitioner through cheque as interest free security deposit. The shop was promised to be handed over to the respondent in March 2005. The date was described in the agreement as tentative. Respondent submitted that on the basis of this assurance of the petitioner that shop would be ready and handed over, respondent sought quotations in respect of photographic machine from DAE-SEUNG Intercom Co., Korea. The machine at that time was quoted at a price of US$ 6750. Respondent visited the office of petitioner several times in the month of March 2005 and requested for possession as promised. The petitioner did not deliver the shop nor gave any exact date. Subsequently in response to an e-mail sent by the respondent, petitioner through reply e-mail assured that possession of the shop would be handed over around 30.5.2005 and mall would be open by August 2005. The shop was not handed over even on 30.5.2005 and the petitioner, vide its letter dated 29.6.2005 informed the respondent that possession of the shop will be handed over between 15th to 25th July, 2005 and mall would become operational from September, 2005. However, the possession of shop was still not handed over on the dates promised. Respondent submitted that construction work of the shop was much behind the schedule. Respondent vide letter dated 19.7.05 expressed his grievance regarding failure of the petitioner to hand over the shop as promised and asked the petitioner to refund the security amount of Rs.3,97,192/-. The petitioner did not give reply to this letter nor refunded the security amount. Respondent submitted that construction work of the shop was much behind the schedule. Respondent vide letter dated 19.7.05 expressed his grievance regarding failure of the petitioner to hand over the shop as promised and asked the petitioner to refund the security amount of Rs.3,97,192/-. The petitioner did not give reply to this letter nor refunded the security amount. The respondent then served a legal notice dated 20.8.05 for refund of security amount and seeking a sum of Rs.14,73,039/-towards expenses incurred and damages suffered by him. Petitioner vide its letter dated 21.9.2005 replied that the security amount had been forfeited in terms of clause 43 of the Term Sheet Agreement. The respondent thereafter filed a civil suit seeking a decree of declaration to the effect that the agreement “Term Sheet-Rent Offer” dated 15.2.2005 was null and void and that the petitioner was guilty of violating the terms and conditions of the Agreement by not handing over the possession of the shop and had no right to forfeit the security. The respondent also claimed damages in the suit; pendente lite and future interest; and costs of the suit. The petitioner, instead of filing WS, filed an application under section 8 of the Act contending that the subject matter of the suit was covered under clause 41 of the Term Sheet Agreement and the suit should be dismissed and parties should be referred to arbitration. By the impugned order, the learned ADJ dismissed the application observing that the Term Sheet Agreement was more or less unilateral in nature. It provided for penalties in case of default by the lessee but correspondingly it did not provide for any remedy to the lessee if the lessor failed to deliver the possession of the shop on the promised date or even where it fails to deliver the possession at all. The agreement also made no provision for compensating the lessee in such an eventuality. The respondent had made a claim for damages in the suit which was beyond the scope of arbitration agreement. The subject matter of the suit was not covered by arbitration agreement as entered into between the parties. 3. It is contended by the petitioner that the learned ADJ failed to appreciate that the subject matter was squarely covered by arbitration agreement entered into between the parties and therefore, the matter should have been referred to the Arbitrator. The subject matter of the suit was not covered by arbitration agreement as entered into between the parties. 3. It is contended by the petitioner that the learned ADJ failed to appreciate that the subject matter was squarely covered by arbitration agreement entered into between the parties and therefore, the matter should have been referred to the Arbitrator. It is submitted that section 8 of the Act takes away the discretion from the Court and the Court is bound to refer the dispute to Arbitrator in case the dispute between the parties was covered within the Arbitration Agreement. 4. The arbitration agreement entered into between he parties is as under:- “ i) Any dispute and differences shall be referred to the sole arbitrator to be appointed by the Lessor under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 amended upto date; ii) The venue of the arbitration will be NOIDA” 5. There is no quarrel with the proposition of law that section 8 of the Act is peremptory in nature and in cases where there is an arbitration clause in the agreement, it is obligatory on the Court to refer the parties to arbitration in terms of the Arbitration Agreement. However, the applicability of section 8 must satisfy the four conditions as enunciated in P. Anand Gajapathi Raju vs. P.V.G. Raju (2000) 4 SCC 539 , namely; i) there is an arbitration agreement; ii) a party to the agreement brings an action in the court against the other party; iii) subject matter of the action is the same as the subject matter of the arbitration agreement; iv) the other party moves the court for referring the parties to arbitration before it submits his first statement on the substance of the dispute. .6. However, when the subject matter of suit includes subject matter of arbitration agreement as well as other disputes, the Court need not refer the matter to Arbitrator as there is no provision under law for splitting the cause of action and splitting the dispute into two parts and referring one part to the Arbitrator and keeping second part with the Court. The Court therefore, has first come to conclusion as to whether the entire subject matter of the suit was covered by the arbitration agreement or not. The Court therefore, has first come to conclusion as to whether the entire subject matter of the suit was covered by the arbitration agreement or not. The issue was considered by the Supreme Court in Sukanya Holdings (P) Ltd. vs. Jayesh H. Pandya (2003) 5 SCC 531 and the Supreme Court observed as under:- “ Secondly, there is no provision in the Act that when the subject matter of the suit includes subject matter of the arbitration agreement as well as other disputes, .the matter is required to be referred to arbitration. There is also no provision for splitting the cause or parties and referring the subject matter of the suit to the arbitrators. The relevant language used in Section 8 is: “in a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement”. The court is required to refer the parties to arbitration. Therefore, the suit should be in respect of “a matter” which the parties have agreed to refer and which comes within the ambit of arbitration agreement. Where, however, a suit is commenced---”as to a matter” which lies outside the arbitration agreement and is also between some of the parties who are not parties to the arbitration agreement, there is no question of application of Section 8. The words “a matter” indicate that the entire subject-matter of the suit should be subject to arbitration agreement. The next question which requires consideration is --- even if there is no provision for partly referring the dispute to arbitration, whether such a course is possible under Section 8 of the Act. In our view, it would be difficult to give an interpretation to Section 8 under which bifurcation of the cause of action, that is to say, the subject matter of the suit or in some cases bifurcation of the suit between parties who are parties to the arbitration agreement and others is possible. This would be laying down a totally new procedure not contemplated under the Act. If bifurcation of the subject matter of a suit was contemplated, the legislature would have used appropriate language to permit such a course. Since there is no such indication in the language, it follows that bifurcation of the subject matter of an action brought before a judicial authority is not allowed. If bifurcation of the subject matter of a suit was contemplated, the legislature would have used appropriate language to permit such a course. Since there is no such indication in the language, it follows that bifurcation of the subject matter of an action brought before a judicial authority is not allowed. Secondly, such bifurcation of suit in two parts, one to be decided by the Arbitral Tribunal and the other to be decided by the civil court would inevitably delay the proceedings. The whole purpose of speedy disposal of dispute and decreasing the cost of litigation would be frustrated by such procedure. It would also increase the cost of litigation and harassment to the parties and on occasions there is possibility of conflicting judgments and orders by two different forums.” .7. In the present case the facts as enunciated by the respondent/plaintiff in the suit make it clear that the plaintiff has not only claimed relief under the agreement but has also filed a suit for damages under tort and has claimed damages for the losses suffered by him because of rise in the cost of equipment he was to install and loss of business. The Term Sheet Agreement entered into between the parties is only a sketchy agreement which does not have detailed terms and conditions of the lease, neither it provides for any obligation on the part of the petitioner in respect of consequences of not handing over possession to the lessee/respondent. It is settled law that an .Arbitrator is bound by the terms of agreement between the parties and therefore, cannot travel beyond the agreement entered into between the parties. Where a suit is filed by a party for damages under tort and beyond the terms and conditions of the contract, the matter cannot be referred to the Arbitrator under the terms of the agreement. Had the agreement contained detailed provisions as to the consequences of breach of contract on both the sides, the Arbitrator would have jurisdiction to entertain the claim in the suit. 8. I consider that the trial Court rightly came to conclusion that the application of the petitioner under section 8 of the Act was liable to be dismissed since the subject matter of the suit was not covered under the agreement between the parties and the scope of the suit was beyond the terms of agreement. 8. I consider that the trial Court rightly came to conclusion that the application of the petitioner under section 8 of the Act was liable to be dismissed since the subject matter of the suit was not covered under the agreement between the parties and the scope of the suit was beyond the terms of agreement. Neither the subject matter of the suit could be split into two parts and one part could be referred to the Arbitrator and the other retained by the Court. 9. I, therefore, find no force in this petition. The same is hereby dismissed.