BARIN GHOSH & C.M. PRASAD, JJ.:–Writ petitioners respondents having had obtained appropriate licenses under the provisions of the Bihar Agricultural Produce Market Act and the Bihar Trade Articles (Licenses Unification) Order, 1984, engaged themselves in whole sale business of sale and purchase of sugar within the market-yard declared under the Bihar Agricultural Produce Market Act. In such view of the matter, the market Committees, within whose yards the writ petitioners-respondents were carrying on business, issued notices directing the petitioners-respondents to deposit market fee. The said direction was issued on the strength of a Memo dated 24th January, 2000, issued by the Managing Director of the appellant-Board asking the Secretaries of Marketing Committees to realize market fee with regard to sugar from traders except mill owners. 2. The notices, thus, issued as well as the Memo of the appellant dated 24th January, 2000, were assailed in the writ petition. A learned Judge, who dealt with the writ petition, noticed that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Belsand Sugar Co. Ltd. Vs. State of Bihar and Others; 1999 (IX) SCC 620, on 7th October, 1999, has held that the appellant-sugar Company though has its factory situate within the Market-yard, is not liable to pay market fee and in paragraphs 104 and 114 of the said judgment made it clear that the observations made in the said judgment are applicable to sugar factories i.e., manufacturers, and to no other, but the Food Corporation of India, who is not a manufacturer of sugar, in Civil Appeal No. 2110 of 1989 obtained an order on 20.1.2000 from the Hon'ble Supreme Court to the effect that the liability of the Food Corporation of India under the Bihar Agricultural Produce Market Act stands concluded by the decision in Belsand Sugar Co. Ltd. (supra) and that Food Corporation of India has no liability under the Bihar Agricultural Produce Market Act in relation to sugars dealt with by it. The learned Judge also noted that the review petition filed in Civil Appeal No. 2110 of 1989 had also been dismissed, while it was held that on merit the Hon'ble Supreme Court sees no ground to entertain the review petition. The learned Judge also noted that the review petition filed in Civil Appeal No. 2110 of 1989 had also been dismissed, while it was held that on merit the Hon'ble Supreme Court sees no ground to entertain the review petition. Therefore, applying the ratio of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in Civil Appeal No. 2110 of 1989 the writ petitions were allowed and we, having not been persuaded to take a different view, refuse to entertain this appeal any further and, accordingly, dismiss the appeals.