Research › Search › Judgment

Allahabad High Court · body

2008 DIGILAW 1013 (ALL)

HARI PRASAD VERMA v. DISTRICT JUDGE GORAKHPUR

2008-05-07

DILIP GUPTA

body2008
This writ petition has been I filed by the tenant for setting aside the order dated 21-8-2007 by which the Prescribed Authority allowed the application filed by the landlord under Section 21 (1) (a) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent & Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the act ). The petitioner has also sought the quashing of the judgment and order dated 31-1-2008 by which the appeal filed by the tenant under section 22 of the Act for setting aside the aforesaid order was dismissed. 2. The records of the writ petition indicate that the landlord had filed the application un der Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act for eviction of the tenant from the premises in dispute on the ground that the same was bona fide re quired by the landlord for establishing a chamber for his son who was engaged in the profession of law. It was stated that the land lord was practicing in the Civil Court for the last 39 years and his sole son Shri Ved Prakash Kesharwani had also started law practice in the year 1996; that the landlord had a very small residential portion in which it was not possible to establish another independent chamber for his son and that the landlord would suffer greater hardship in case the ap plication was rejected. During the pendency of the application, the tenant moved an ap plication before the Prescribed Authority of appointment of an Advocate Commissioner for inspection of the house of the landlord to determine the extent of accommodation avail able with him as the case taken up by the ten ant was that the landlord had two indepen dent chambers in the residential house and so did not require the premises in dispute. The Advocate Commissioner submitted a report that there was only one chamber on the ground floor of the house where the landlord was re siding. The tenant filed objections and the report was accepted subject to evidence be ing led. The tenants thereafter filed the map sanctioned by the Authority in which both the ground floor and top floor were shown for commercial purposes. 3. The tenant filed objections and the report was accepted subject to evidence be ing led. The tenants thereafter filed the map sanctioned by the Authority in which both the ground floor and top floor were shown for commercial purposes. 3. The Prescribed Authority allowed the application filed by the landlord holding that premises in dispute were bona fide required by the landlord for establishing the chamber for his son and that the landlord would suffer greater hardship in the event the application was rejected. A finding was also recorded that in the residential house of the landlord there was only one chamber on the ground floor. The tenant filed an appeal which was dis missed. 4. I have heard learned counsel for the pe titioner and learned counsel appearing for the respondent landlord. 5. The contention advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner is that the landlord did not bona fide require the premises in dis pute. Elaborating his submission, learned counsel submitted that the Advocate Commis sioner submitted a wrong report that there was only one chamber on the ground floor in the residential premises of the landlord when, in fact, there was one more chamber on the first floor. Learned counsel submitted that the ten ant had filed the map sanctioned by the Au thority in which the premises were shown for commercial use and, therefore, the first floor of the house was also being used for the cham ber. This contention cannot be accepted. The Advocate Commissioner submitted a detailed report mentioning therein that only one room on the ground floor was being used as a cham ber. This report was accepted subject to evi dence and even according to the learned coun sel for the petitioner the only evidence that was filed by him in support of this plea was the map sanctioned by the Authority. This map cannot determine whether two rooms were being used as chambers in the residential house or only one room on the ground floor was used as a chamber. This map cannot determine whether two rooms were being used as chambers in the residential house or only one room on the ground floor was used as a chamber. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the decisions of this Court in Alok Brothers (Tea), Pvt. Ltd. Kanpur v. VIIth Additional District Judge, Kanpur Nagar, and others, 1989 (2) ARC 99 : (1989 All LJ 876) & Amar Nath Tandon v. G. K. Bhargava and others, 1987 (1) ARC 297 : (1987 All LJ 564) in support of his conten tion that the objection filed by him to the re port submitted by the Advocate Commis sioner should have been considered. In the present case the objection have been consid ered but it has been found that the tenant could not substantiate that two rooms were being as chambers. These decisions do not, there fore, help the petitioner. In such circum stances, when there was no clinching evidence to establish that two rooms were used as chambers, the finding recorded by the Pre scribed Authority and the Appellate Author ity that only room on the ground floor was being used as a chamber and that the land lord bona fide required the premises for his son for his chamber cannot be said to be per verse. 6. The Supreme Court has time and again explained what bona fide need is. In Siddalingamma & Anr. v. Mamtha Shenoy, AIR 2001 SC 2896 , the Supreme Court pointed out:- "rent Controls Legislation generally leans in favour of tenant it is only the provision for seeking eviction of the tenant on the ground of bona fide requirement of landlord for his own occupation or use of the tenanted accommodation which treats the landlord with some sympathy. In Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta (1999) 6 SCC 222 : ( AIR 1999 SC 2507 ) this Court has held that a bona fide requirement must be an outcome of a sincere, honest desire in contradistinction with a mere pretext for evicting the ten ant on the part of the landlord claiming to occupy the premises for himself or for any member of the family which would entitle the landlord to seek ejectment of the tenant. The question to be asked by a judge of facts, by placing himself in the place of the landlord is, whether in the given facts proved by ma terial on record the need to occupy the pre mises can be said to be natural, real, sincere honest? If the answer be in the positive the need is bona fide. The concept of bona fide need or genuine requirement needs a practi cal approach instructed by the realities of life. An approach either too liberal or too conser vative or pedantic must be guarded against. If the landlord wishes to live with comfort in a house of his own, the law does not com mand or compel him to squeeze himself dwell into lesser premises so as to protect the tenants continued occupation in tenancy pre mises. . . . . . . . . . . . . " (Emphasis supplied) (*not found in certified copy. . . . . . . Ed.) The Supreme Court in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. , AIR 1999 SC 100 , also observed:- ". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . When a landlord asserts that he requires his building for his own occupation the Rent Controller shall not proceed on the presumption that the requirement is not bona fide. When other conditions of the clause are satisfied and when the landlord shows a prima facie case it is open to the Rent Controller to draw a presumption that the requirement of the landlord is bona fide. It is often said by Courts that it is not for the tenant to dictate terms to the landlord as to how else he can adjust himself without getting possession of the tenanted premises. While deciding the question of bona fides of the requirement of the landlord it is quite unnecessary to make an endeavour as to how else the landlord could have adjusted himself. " 7. In Mst. Bega Begum, & Ors. v. Abdul Ahad Khan (dead) by L. Rs & Ors. , AIR 1979 SC 272 the Supreme Court observed:- "moreover, S. 11 (1) (h) of the Act uses the words "reasonable requirement which un doubtedly postulate that there must be an el ement of need as opposed to a mere desire or wish. In Mst. Bega Begum, & Ors. v. Abdul Ahad Khan (dead) by L. Rs & Ors. , AIR 1979 SC 272 the Supreme Court observed:- "moreover, S. 11 (1) (h) of the Act uses the words "reasonable requirement which un doubtedly postulate that there must be an el ement of need as opposed to a mere desire or wish. The distinction between desire and need should doubtless be kept in mind but not so as to make even the genuine need as nothing but a desire as the High Court has done in this case. It seems to us that the connotation of the term need or requirement should not be artificially extended nor its language so unduly stretched or strained so as to artifi cially extended nor its language so unduly stretched or strained so as to make it impos sible or extremely difficult for the landlord to get a decree for eviction. Such a course would defeat the very purpose of the Act which affords the facility of eviction of the tenant to the landlord on certain specified grounds. This appears to us to be the general scheme of all the Rent Control Acts, preva lent in other States in the country. This Court has considered the import of the word "re quirement" and pointed out that it merely con notes that there should be an element of need. " (Emphasis supplied) (*not found in certified copy. . . . . . . Ed.) 8. This Court in Sardar Kulwant Singh v. Vlth Additional District Judge, Saharanpur & Anr. 2007 (66) ALR 498 : (2007 (2) ALJ (NOC) 206 (All) has observed that the need of the landlord to establish a lawyers cham ber is bona fide. 9. In the present case, it is not in dispute that the son of the landlord was practicing in the District Court from the year 1996. The application was filed under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act on 10-10-2002. It has also been found that the existing residential premises of the landlord where he was residing and doing his practice was not sufficient for opening another chamber. This is a finding of fact and no submission was advanced to assail this find ing. Even otherwise, the need to establish a separate independent chamber for the son in such circumstances is bona fide. The Supreme Court in Munni Lal and Ors. This is a finding of fact and no submission was advanced to assail this find ing. Even otherwise, the need to establish a separate independent chamber for the son in such circumstances is bona fide. The Supreme Court in Munni Lal and Ors. v. the Prescribed Authority & Ors. , AIR 1978 SC 29 observed that while examining the findings of bona fide need and comparative hardship of landlord and tenant, it is not for the High Court, in the exer cise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, to reappraise the evidence and come to its own conclusion which may be different from that reached by the District Judge or the Prescribed Authority. 10. In such circumstances, the contention advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted. 11. There is, therefore, no merit in this writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. Petition dismissed. .