JUDGMENT :- K. Chandru, J. Heard the arguments of Mr. K. Thennan, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, Mr. R. Singaravelan, learned counsel for the first respondent and Mr. M. Dhandapani, learned Special Government Pleader representing the respondents 2 to 7 and have perused the records. 2. The petitioner is aggrieved by the common order dated 111. 2002 passed by the Tribunal in O.A. No. 5282 of 2002 and O.A. No. 4745 of 1995. While the first respondent filed O.A. Nos. 4745 of 1995 and 3487 of 2001 before the Tribunal seeking to set aside the order of the official respondents and to promote him as Tamil Pandit from the year 1991 and also to place his name above the petitioner in the list of Headmasters of Middle Schools, the petitioner filed O.A. No. 5282 of 2002, threatened by reversion from the post of Headmistress to that of Tamil Pandit by the order of the respondents dated 19. 2002 and claimed that her seniority should be restored and that she should not be reverted. 3. All the Original Applications were heard by the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal [for short, TAT] and by a common order dated 111. 2002, the Original Application 5282 of 2002 filed by the petitioner was dismissed and the Original Application 4745 of 1995 filed by the first respondent was allowed. It was found that the said Palanisamy (first respondent) was senior to the petitioner and that though he was appointed as an Headmaster in 1995, his pay will have to be revised from the year 1991 in the post of Tamil Pandit. But, however, it was indicated that he was not eligible for any arrears of pay. Since the case of the petitioner is consequent to the case filed by Palanisamy (first respondent), it was held that the petitioners application is not maintainable. But, however, the Tribunal recommended that she can be accommodated in the post of an Headmistress of a Middle School in the next vacancy that may arise. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition as noted already. 4. Though the petitioners case and the case of the first respondent were heard together and a common order was passed, the petitioner had preferred to file only one writ petition. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition as noted already. 4. Though the petitioners case and the case of the first respondent were heard together and a common order was passed, the petitioner had preferred to file only one writ petition. It was not pointed out as to how the said writ petition is maintainable when the other orders in O.A. Nos. 4745 of 1995 and 3487 of 2001 remain unchallenged. 5. In this context, it is relevant to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Premier Tyres Ltd v. Kerala State Road Transport corporation [1993 Supp (2) SCC 146] wherein it was held that if two connected suits are filed together and when the finding recorded in one suit became final in the absence of any appeal, the appeal preferred against the finding recorded in the other suit will be barred by res judicata. The following passage found in paragraphs 4 and 6 of the said judgment may be usefully extracted below:- Para 4: "Although none of these decisions were concerned with a situation where no appeal was filed against the decision in connected suit but it appears that where an appeal arising out of connected suit is dismissed on merits the other cannot be heard, and has to be dismissed. The question is what happens where no appeal is filed, as in this case from the decree in connected suit. Effect of non-filing of appeal against a judgment or decree is that it becomes final. This finality can be taken away only in accordance with law. Same consequences follow when a judgment or decree in a connected suit is not appealed from." Para 6: "Thus the finality of finding recorded in the connected suit, due to non-filing of appeal, precluded the court from proceeding with appeal in other suit. In any view of the matter the order of the High Court is not liable to interference." On this point, Mr. Thennan had no answer and the writ petition is liable to be rejected on this short ground. 6. Even on merits, we find that when the petitioner had completed her probation only on 20.01.1982, the first respondent (Palanisamy) was appointed as Secondary Grade Teacher during 1974 and got his service regularised and he was six years senior to the petitioner. Thennan had no answer and the writ petition is liable to be rejected on this short ground. 6. Even on merits, we find that when the petitioner had completed her probation only on 20.01.1982, the first respondent (Palanisamy) was appointed as Secondary Grade Teacher during 1974 and got his service regularised and he was six years senior to the petitioner. It was also stated that during the year 1991, when the promotion to the post of Middle School Headmaster arose, the first respondent was fully qualified and instead of promoting him, undue promotion was given to the petitioner. The first respondent was also promoted subsequently. But when he was sought to be reverted, he had moved the Tribunal stating that he was not junior to the petitioner. The Tribunal also granted an interim order on 25. 2001 prohibiting his reversion. Consequent upon the said interim order, the petitioner was reverted on 19. 2002 and it is only against that order, the petitioner had preferred her Original Application before the Tribunal and she never had the benefit of any interim order. She had also failed in her attempt to stall the reversion before the Tribunal. Even in this writ petition, this Court refused to grant any interim relief vide order dated 20.9.2004. 7. We find from the records that the order passed by the Tribunal does not suffer from any infirmity which calls for any interference by this Court by exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Admittedly, the petitioner is junior to the first respondent and by no stretch of imagination, she can claim a match over her senior, who is also having necessary qualification for the said promotion. 8. In view of the above, the writ petition is devoid of merits and accordingly, stands dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.