JUDGMENT Per Bhaskar Bhattacharya, J. :- This First Miscellaneous Appeal is at the instance of a claimant in a proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act Workmen's Compensation, West Bengal, in Claim Case No. 15/2000 thereby dismissing the application under Section 3 of the Act. Being dissatisfied, the claimant has come up with the present appeal. It appears from records that one Sk. Kalloo, the husband of the appellant, was engaged in the vessel named M. T. Jaynarayan Vyas under the employment of the Shipping Corporation of India Limited, the respondent herein. On 4th July, 1991 the said Sk. Kalloo, working as the second cook in the said vessel, had fallen down from the staircase of the ship and sustained fracture injury on his left rib. He was immediately attended to by the Medical Officer of the said vessel who advised hospitalization of the victim in the National Hospital at Madras. He was treated in the said hospital from 4th July, 1991 to 16th July, 1991 and thereafter, was sent to Kolkata for further treatment. The victim was subsequently treated at Kolkata under the supervision of the Medical Officer of the Shipping Corporation of India and was declared fit to resume duty on August 9, 1991. Ultimately, on 16th September, 1991 the said Sk. Kalloo died. On 17th September, 1991 the General (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and is directed against the award dated 24th June, 2003 passed by the learned Commissioner, Secretary, Forward Seamen's Union reported the death of Sk. Kalloo to the Shipping Corporation of India and the General Manager of Shipping Corporation of India made reply to the General Secretary of the said Union intimating that all the dues of Sk. Kalloo had already been settled on 4th September, 1991. Thereafter, there were series of exchange of communications and ultimately, the widow of the victim, the appellant before us, on 2nd February, 2000 filed an application under Section 3 of the Act claiming compensation on the allegation that the death of the victim occurred due to accident in course of his employment under the Shipping Corporation of India. Thereafter, there were series of exchange of communications and ultimately, the widow of the victim, the appellant before us, on 2nd February, 2000 filed an application under Section 3 of the Act claiming compensation on the allegation that the death of the victim occurred due to accident in course of his employment under the Shipping Corporation of India. The claim - application was opposed by the Shipping Corporation of India by filing written statement thereby alleging that after the injury of the victim in the ship, he was immediately removed to the Presidency Hospital in Madras and was subsequently treated in Kolkata by the Medical Officer of the Shipping Corporation. It was further alleged that on such treatment, the victim was totally cured and on 9th August, 1991, he was declared fit for duty. According to the Shipping Corporation of India, the subsequent death of the victim due to heart attack had nothing to do with the injury suffered by him on 4th July, 1991 and the victim had totally recovered from such injury as would appear from the fact that he was declared fit to resume duty on August 9, 1991. At the time of hearing of the said proceedings, the widow of the victim alone gave evidence in support of her claim while the Assistant General Manager of the Shipping Corporation of India deposed on behalf of the respondent in opposing the claim. As indicated earlier, learned Commissioner, by the order impugned herein, has rejected the claim application on the ground that the appellant failed to prove that the victim died due to the injury arising out of accident in course of his employment. Mr. Banik, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant, fervently contended before us that the learned Commissioner of Workmen's Compensation totally misread the materials on record in arriving at the conclusion that there was no connection between the death and the accident occurred on 4th July, 1991. Mr. Banik contends that due to the serious injury on the rib of the victim, his heart was damaged and consequently, he died of the heart attack. Mr. Banik, therefore, prays for passing necessary direction for compensation in accordance with the agreement entered into between the employer and deceased employee. Mr. Bhattacharya, the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the Shipping Corporation of India has, however, opposed the aforesaid contention advanced by Mr. Mr. Banik, therefore, prays for passing necessary direction for compensation in accordance with the agreement entered into between the employer and deceased employee. Mr. Bhattacharya, the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the Shipping Corporation of India has, however, opposed the aforesaid contention advanced by Mr. Banik and has contended that the victim was totally cured as would appear from the fitness certificate granted by the medical officer of the employer and thus, for the subsequent death arising out of heart attack, his client cannot be held responsible for compensation. He, therefore, prays for dismissal of the appeal. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and after going through the materials on record we find that the Assistant General Manager of the Shipping Corporation of India has produced all the documents relating to injury till the victim was declared to be fit for resumption of duty. In his cross-examination, no suggestion was given to the said witness that the documents filed by the Shipping Corporation of India were manufactured one or that no order was passed declaring the victim to be fit for service on 9th August, 1991. Even in her own evidence, the appellant has not alleged that no fit certificate was given by the employer to her husband on August 9, 1991 or that such certificate of fitness granted by the medical officer was challenged by her husband at any point of time. In such circumstances, we are of the view that the Commissioner, Workmen's Compensation, rightly concluded that the victim was totally cured of the injury sustained by the victim on 4th July, 1991 and the death of the victim was not the outcome of the said injury arising of the accident. Mr. Banik lastly contended that the appellant was at least entitled to get compensation for the injury suffered by her husband arising out of the accident in course of employment even if it is proved that the death was not the reason of the injury and the learned tribunal below erred in law in denying any amount of compensation whatsoever. In our opinion, the last branch of argument is equally devoid of any substance for the simple reason that in the application for compensation, the appellant did not claim any amount for the injury but maintained her claim only for the death. In our opinion, the last branch of argument is equally devoid of any substance for the simple reason that in the application for compensation, the appellant did not claim any amount for the injury but maintained her claim only for the death. Moreover, according to the rule 70 of the agreement between the parties relating to payment of compensation for injury, a seaman discharged injured at any Port in India including his Port of engagement after the date of original engagement shall be entitled to basic wages until declared fit or permanently unfit commencing from the day following the date up to which wages are paid in case where the injury has arisen out of and in course of his employment and is not the result of his own willful act or neglect, provided that such an injured seaman is under the supervision of the Company's Medical Officer throughout. In the case before us, the victim was declared fit on August 9, 1991 and was therefore, entitled to get basic wages till that day. It is not the case of the Appellant that such amount was not paid and it is the definite case of the respondent that all the dues of the employee was paid to the victim. Thus, there is no scope of passing any order of further compensation for the injury when such amount was not even claimed and at the same time, it is not in dispute that the basic wage was paid till the date of declaration of fitness to resume duty. We, therefore, find no merit in the aforesaid desperate submission of Mr. Banik. We, thus, find that there is no substantial error of law committed by the Commissioner justifying interference in this appeal under Section 30 of the Act. This appeal is thus devoid of any substance and is dismissed. No costs. I agree.