JUDGMENT Honble Amitava Lala, J.—Since both the appeals are almost similarly placed arising out of the selfsame accident, the same are heard analogously and decided by this common judgment. 2. The aforesaid both the appeals have been preferred by the Uttaranchal State Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter in short called as the ‘Corporation’) against the judgment/s and order/s dated 28th January, 2008 passed by the concerned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Bijnor. In F.A.F.O. No. 1392 of 2008 the awarded amount of compensation is Rs. 4,58,300/- alongwith interest @ 6% per annum and in F.A.F.O. No. 1393 of 2008 it is Rs. 4,84,700/- alongwith similar rate of interest. 3. Learned Counsel appearing for the Corporation contended before this Court that it is a case of contributory negligence since the offending vehicle was seen by the motor cycle rider from the distance. To that extent he relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in 2006 (3) SCC 242 , Bijoy Kumar Dugar v. Bidya Dhar Dutta and others. By showing paragraph-12 therein he said that it is natural, as a prudent man, for the deceased to have taken due care and precaution to avoid head-on collision when he had already seen that the bus is coming from the opposite direction from a long distance. According to the learned Counsel appearing for the Corporation, eye-witness was present on the spot, who deposed that the offending vehicle was seen from a considerable distance. 4. According to us, in a case of contributory negligence normally first information report will be lodged and thereafter the police will prepare the site plan to establish before the Court as to what was the exact position when the collision took place. From both the impugned judgments it appears to us that firstly the driver of the offending vehicle ran away from the place of incident after committing the offence and secondly, in spite of the request he has not lodged any first information report. Therefore, the question of contributory negligence cannot arise. On the surrounding circumstances, eye-witness cannot develop the case, which independently can be seen from the record prepared by the police on the basis of the first information report. In such accident both the driver of the motor-cycle and the pillion rider have died. Therefore, contributory negligence cannot be said to be proved as alleged or at all. 5. On the surrounding circumstances, eye-witness cannot develop the case, which independently can be seen from the record prepared by the police on the basis of the first information report. In such accident both the driver of the motor-cycle and the pillion rider have died. Therefore, contributory negligence cannot be said to be proved as alleged or at all. 5. Learned Counsel appearing for the Corporation further contended that income of the deceased/s were not considered appropriately and wrong multipliers have been applied in the cases, particularly in the case of F.A.F.O. No. 1392 of 2008. According to him, the Supreme Court, in particular, in the judgments reported in 2005 (8) SCC 473 , Managing Director, TNSTC Ltd. v. K.I. Bindu and others, and (2007) 3 SCC 538 , New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Kalpana (Smt.) and others, held that in case of death of the deceased between the age group of 30 years to 35 years, multiplier of 13 will be made applicable. But in above case the tribunal has applied the multiplier of 17. So far as the income is concerned, though the deceased was income tax assessee and paying income tax but the tribunal held that no income tax return has been produced, on the basis of which the income can be assessed, and in absence of any income tax return, daily income between Rs. 100/- to Rs.125/- per day was considered as appropriate and ultimately fixed the daily income of the deceased at Rs. 110/- and accordingly assessed the income of the deceased, which is also wrong. Therefore, before going into any controversy in these two matters we have to go through the relevant judgments cited before this Court. In both the judgments in re: Managing Director, TNSTC Ltd. (supra) and New India Assurance Co. Ltd. (supra) we find that there is a common paragraph, being Paragraph 14 of the earlier judgment and paragraph-7 of the subsequent judgement. Such paragraph, as under Paragraph-14 of the Managing Director, TNSTC Ltd. (supra), is as follows : “14. The multiplier method involves the ascertainment of the loss of dependency or the multiplicand having regard to the circumstances of the case and capitalising the multiplicand by an appropriate multiplier. Such paragraph, as under Paragraph-14 of the Managing Director, TNSTC Ltd. (supra), is as follows : “14. The multiplier method involves the ascertainment of the loss of dependency or the multiplicand having regard to the circumstances of the case and capitalising the multiplicand by an appropriate multiplier. The choice of the multiplier is determined by the age of the deceased (or that of the claimants, whichever is higher) and by the calculation as to what capital sum, if invested at a rate of interest appropriate to a stable economy, would yield the multiplicand by way of annual interest. In ascertaining this, regard should also be had to the fact that ultimately the capital sum should also be consumed up over the period for which the dependency is expected to last.” 6. Therefore, the Supreme Court itself ascertained the loss of dependency or the multiplicand having regard to the circumstances of the case. Thus, the Supreme Court wanted to say that each and every material fact in the case before the tribunal is to be considered at the time of ascertainment of compensation. However, the learned Counsel appearing for the Corporation wanted to take benefit of a part of the proposition considered by the Supreme Court about applicability of the multiplier of 13 for the age group of 30 years to 35 years. It is significant to note that in one of the cases i.e. F.A.F.O. No. 1392 of 2008 the age of the deceased was 34 years. Hence, according to him, such ratio is applicable herein. He further contended that in Managing Director, TNSTC Ltd. (supra) the ratio of the judgment reported in 1994 SCC (Cri) 335, U.P.S.R.T.C. v. Trilok Chandra, was considered, whereunder it has been held by the Supreme Court that Second Schedule under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter in short called as the ‘Act’) is a guide but not ready reckoner. We have gone through the ratio of Trilok Chandra (supra) and found that in such judgment the Supreme Court held such structured formula as a guide because of some miscalculations. However, according to us, if the structured formula is guide and not a ready reckoner then it cannot be strictly followed but it will be followed on the basis of the facts and circumstances of each case. However, according to us, if the structured formula is guide and not a ready reckoner then it cannot be strictly followed but it will be followed on the basis of the facts and circumstances of each case. In further, according to us, accumulation of interest is a criteria but it cannot be the sole criterion. After an accident entire scenario of the family is changed due to shock and pain. Therefore, compensation should be assessed rationally and independently as per the case before hand. No straitjacket formula is available for the same. Moreover, the claim petitions were made under Section 166 of the Act to ascertain ‘just’ compensation. In the process of ascertainment of such compensation, the Court will consider the applicability of the guide, as far as practicable, but not as a rule. We have to be governed by the law laid down by the Parliament without departing ourselves in the facts and circumstances of the case. 7. So far as the second case i.e. F.A.F.O. No. 1393 of 2008 is concerned, the age group of the deceased was between 20 years to 25 years. So, even if we follow the judgment of Managing Director, TNSTC Ltd. (supra), the highest multiplicand is to be made applicable by applying the multiplier of 18. In any event, no much different case is involved in this appeal excepting the age of the deceased and the multiplicand applicable in such case. The assessment of income is similarly situated. In this case also the amount of compensation is Rs. 4,84,700/- relying upon the other facts and figures particularly the assessment of income in the similar manner that if daily income is Rs. 100-120/-, the average comes to Rs. 110 per day and ultimately assessed the income in absence of the income tax return even being income tax assessee. 8. Thus, in totality of the cases, we do not find any cogent reason to interfere with the impugned judgments and orders passed by the tribunal in arriving at compensation. Hence, both the appeals are dismissed at the stage of admission, however, without imposing any cost. 9. Incidentally, the appellant/s-Corporation prayed that the statutory deposit/s of Rs. 8. Thus, in totality of the cases, we do not find any cogent reason to interfere with the impugned judgments and orders passed by the tribunal in arriving at compensation. Hence, both the appeals are dismissed at the stage of admission, however, without imposing any cost. 9. Incidentally, the appellant/s-Corporation prayed that the statutory deposit/s of Rs. 25,000/- made before this Court for preferring these appeals shall be remitted back to the concerned Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal as expeditiously as possible in order to adjust the same with the amount of compensation to be paid to the claimants in the respective appeals, however, such prayer is allowed. Honble Shishir Kumar, J.—I agree. ————