Judgment Heard Mr. R.K.Deshpande, learned counsel for the petitioners, Mr. Harkare, learned counsel for respondent no.1 and Mr. D.B.Patel, learned A.G.P. for the respondent no.2. in all the petitions. 2. Rule in all the petitions. By consent heard forthwith. 3. These petitions are disposed of by common Judgment since the question of law as well as facts involved in all the petitions are almost similar. 4. By these petitions, the petitioners challenge the order dated 4.4.2007 passed by the Respondent no.2 by which the petitioners have been directed to pay interest on the amount of gratuity payable to the respondent no.1 in each of these petitions. The details of the interest payable by the petitioners have been mentioned in the operative part of the impugned order. 5. Briefly, the facts relevant for disposal of the present petitions are as follows: Respondent no.1 in each of these petitions filed applications claiming gratuity from the petitioners after superannuation. The respondent no.2 passed orders directing the petitioners to pay gratuity along with the interest at the rate of 10% p.a. from 8.12.1996 till the day of payment. As against the orders passed by the respondent no.2 the petitioners preferred appeals to the appellate authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as 'The Act') under Section 7(7) of the Act. The appellate authority disposed of the appeals preferred by the petitioners and maintained the order passed by the respondent no.2. However, in the operative part of the orders the appellate authority directed the payment of interest from the date of the order of the Controlling Authority till the date of actual payment of the amount. 6. It is not in dispute that when the petitioners preferred appeals against the orders passed by respondent no.2 the petitioners deposited the gratuity payable to respondent no.1 before the appellate authority on 1.3.2004. The appellate authority disposed of the appeals on 6.1.2006 and thereafter the gratuity payable to respondent no.1 was paid on 4.4.2006. 7. Respondent no.1 in each of the petitions claimed interest from the date of the order of Controlling Authority i.e. 22.12.2003 to 4.4.2006 i.e. the date of actual payment of gratuity. The claim was contested by the petitioners. However, by the impugned order dated 4.4.2007 the respondent no.2 held that the respondent no.1 in each petition was entitled to the interest from 22.12.2003 to 4.4.2006. The claim was contested by the petitioners. However, by the impugned order dated 4.4.2007 the respondent no.2 held that the respondent no.1 in each petition was entitled to the interest from 22.12.2003 to 4.4.2006. Since the petitioners had paid interest from 22.12.2003 to 1.3.2004 the respondent no.2 directed payment of balance amount to respondent no.1. 8. Mr. R.K.Deshpande, the learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that since the petitioners had deposited the gratuity amount before the Appellate Court on 1.3.2004 the respondent no.2 could not have directed the petitioners to pay interest at the rate of 10% p.a. from 22.12.2003 to 4.4.2006 since upon deposit of the gratuity amount the petitioners stood absolved of their liability to pay interest in terms of the orders passed by the appellate authority in appeals preferred by the petitioners. He submitted that Section 7 of the Act is a code by itself and as such the impugned order to the extent it directs the petitioners to pay interest from 1.3.2004 to 4.4.2006 is patently without jurisdiction and, therefore, deserves to be quashed and set aside. Learned counsel further submitted that by passing the impugned order the respondent no.2 has gone beyond the orders passed by the Appellate Authority and, therefore, the impugned order is without jurisdiction. 9. Per contra, Mr. Harkare, the learned counsel appearing for respondent no.1 in all the petitions submitted that mere deposit of the gratuity amount before the appellate authority does not absolve the petitioners from payment of interest as ordered by the appellate authority and since the actual gratuity was paid on 4.4.2006 the petitioners are liable to pay interest from 22.12.2003 to 4.4.2006. He, therefore, submitted that no interference is called for with the impugned order. In support of his submission Mr. Harkare relied upon the Judgment of the learned Single Judge of Allahabad High Court in Rajendra Deva vs. Additional Labour Commissioner, Kanpur reported in 1999(81)FLR 914. 10. Mr. Patel, learned A.G.P. appearing on behalf of respondent no.2 submitted that no interference is called for with the impugned order passed by the respondent no.2. 11. I have carefully considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 12. 10. Mr. Patel, learned A.G.P. appearing on behalf of respondent no.2 submitted that no interference is called for with the impugned order passed by the respondent no.2. 11. I have carefully considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 12. Under sub section (2) of Section 7 of the Act duty is cast upon the employer to determine the amount of gratuity no sooner it becomes payable and to give notice in writing to the person to whom gratuity is payable and also to the Controlling Authority specifying the amount of gratuity so determined. Sub section (3) of Section 7 provides that the employer shall pay the amount of gratuity within 30 days from the date it becomes due, to the person to whom gratuity is payable. Sub section 3A provides that in case gratuity payable in terms of sub section (3) is not paid by the employer within the period specified by sub section (3), the employer shall pay simple interest at such rate not exceeding the rate notified by the Central Government from time to time as the Government by notification may specify, from the date on which gratuity becomes payable to the date on which it is paid. 13. The above provisions clearly mandate the employer to pay gratuity to the person to whom it is payable whether such application claiming gratuity is made or not and further provides that such payment must be made within 30 days from the date it becomes payable and in case the payment is not made within 30 days the employer has to pay interest not exceeding the rate as may be notified by the Central Government. A bare reading of the above provisions clearly discloses that in the event the employer does not pay the gratuity payable under the Act, within the prescribed time, he is liable to pay interest thereon in terms of sub section (3 A) of Section 7 of the Act. I am, therefore, unable to accept the submission of Mr. Deshpande, learned counsel for the petitioners that the deposit of the gratuity amounts before the appellate court in appeals preferred by the petitioners would absolve them from the payment of interest from the date of deposit. I am, therefore, unable to accept the submission of Mr. Deshpande, learned counsel for the petitioners that the deposit of the gratuity amounts before the appellate court in appeals preferred by the petitioners would absolve them from the payment of interest from the date of deposit. Mere deposit of the amount before the Appellate Authority would not dis-entitle the person entitled to claim gratuity from claiming interest on the gratuity payable under the Act. I, therefore, find no merit in the submission of Mr. Deshpande. I am in respectful agreement with the view taken by the learned Single Judge of Allahabad High Court in Rajendra's case (supra) relied upon by Mr. Harkare in which it has been held that the deposit of the amount with the appellate authority would not absolve the employer from paying interest once it is established that the employer has failed to discharge the obligation cast upon it by sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 7 of the Act. In the present petitions, admittedly the petitioners have not discharged their obligation in terms of sub sections (2) and (3) of Section 7 of the Act. Therefore, there is no illegality or perversity in the order passed by the respondent no.2. 14. In so far as the submission of Mr. Deshpande that by passing the impugned order the respondent no.2 has practically gone beyond the orders passed by the Appellate Authority is concerned I find no merit therein. By the impugned order respondent no.2 has given effect to the provisions of Section 7 of the Act and the orders passed by the Appellate Authority and by no stretch of imagination it can be said that he has gone beyond the orders passed by the appellate authority in appeals preferred by the petitioners. 15. In view of the above, I find no merit in these petitions. Rule is discharged. There shall be no order as to costs.