ORDER As per Hon'hle Shri Sunil Kumar Sinha, J. : - 1. Being aggrieved with the order dated 31.3.200 I passed in M.A.C.CNo.62/1999 by the 11 Additional Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Raigarh, the appellant/claimant has preferred this appeal U/S 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. 2. Short questions raised for consideration are (i) Whether the provisions of sub-rule (3) of Rule 220 of the M.P. (C.G) Motor Vehicles Rules 1994 (herein after referred to as the Rules 1994) are mandatory or directory? and (ii) Whether its non-compliance has an automatic consequence of leading to dismissal of the claim petition? 3. The brief facts are that the appellant/claimant, on account of his personal injuries sustained in the motor accident, filed a claim before the concerned Tribunal on 15.4.1998. The claim was filed in Form M.P.M.Y.R.-75 (Comp.A) prescribed under sub-rule (I) of Rule 220 of the M.P. (C.G.) Motor Vehicles Rules, 1994. 4. Learned counsel for the claimant was heard on the claim and it was directed to be registered on the same day i.e., 15.4.1998 and notices were directed to be issued to the opposite side for filing their written statements and the matter was fixed for framing of issues on 04.7.1998. On 04.7.1998, counsel or the respondents caused his appearance and sought time to file written statement. The time was allowed and further time for filing written statement was allowed on various subsequent dates and the written statement was filed on 02.9.1999. Thereafter, the matter was listed for framing of issues on 08.10.1999 and the issues were framed on the said date and it was fixed for evidence on 8.1.2000. On 8.1.2000, the evidence could not be taken, thereafter, the matter was adjourned to various subsequent dates and ultimately an application under Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure was filed which was allowed and notices were directed to be issued to the newly added respondent and again the matter was fixed for written statement of the said respondent on 31.3.2001. On 31.3.2001, all of a sudden, learned Claims Tribunal dismissed the claim petition of the claimant saying that since the provisions of Rule 220 (1)(3) of the aforesaid Rules of 1994 were not complied, therefore, the claim petition is dismissed. It is against this order; the appellant/claimant has filed this appeal. 5. On 31.3.2001, all of a sudden, learned Claims Tribunal dismissed the claim petition of the claimant saying that since the provisions of Rule 220 (1)(3) of the aforesaid Rules of 1994 were not complied, therefore, the claim petition is dismissed. It is against this order; the appellant/claimant has filed this appeal. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant argued that the course adopted by the Tribunal for dismissal of the claim petition on account of non-compliance of provisions of Rule 220(3) of the Rules ofl994 is not in accordance with law. He submitted that when the claim petition was admitted for hearing, written statement were taken on record and issues were framed, the Tribunal was not justified in dismissing the claim petition on the above grounds. He further argued that the provisions of sub-rule (3) of Rule 220 are not mandatory especially in view of the provisions of Sub-Rule (4), as there is no automatic consequence of its noncompliance; therefore, on this ground also the order passed by the Tribunal is totally unjustified. 6. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State/respondents No.1 & 2 opposed these arguments and supported the order passed by the Claims Tribunal. He argued that the legislature has deliberately used the word like "shall" in sub rule (3) of Rule 220 which makes the provision imperative and non-compliance of the same would lead to a definite consequence which has to be followed in each case. 7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and have also perused the records of the claim case. 8. The rules of 1994 have been framed in exercise of powers conferred by sections 28, 38, 65, 95, 96, 107, 111, 138, 159, 176,211 & 213 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Chapter IX in which rule 220 is there deals with the provisions of the Claims Tribunal. Rule 220 reads as under: 220. Application/or compensation arising out of an accident. (1) An application for compensation arising out of an accident of the nature specified under the act shall be in form M.P.M.V.R.-75 (CAMP-A). (2) Every such application shall be sent to the Claims Tribunal by registered post or may be presented to such Claims Tribunal and shall, unless the Claims Tribunal otherwise directs be made in duplicate and shall be signed by the applicant. (2) Every such application shall be sent to the Claims Tribunal by registered post or may be presented to such Claims Tribunal and shall, unless the Claims Tribunal otherwise directs be made in duplicate and shall be signed by the applicant. (3) There shall be appended to every such application, the following documents, namely: (i) Injury certificate in form MPMVR -7 6 (CAMP -B) or in case of death certificate; (ii) First Information Report in respect of the accident; and (iii) Certificate regarding ownership and insurance particulars of the vehicle involved in the accident obtained from Registering Authority or Accident Information Report in Form 54 of the Central rules obtained from the Registering Authority or the Police. (4) If any of the documents specified in clause (c) of sub-rule (3) are not appended to the application the reasons for not appending them shall be stated, and if the tribunal is satisfied, it may proceed with the application and require production of such document at a later stage. 9. The source of framing of rules 220 to 242 which fall in Chapter IX is attributed to section 176 of the Act 1988. Section 176, which falls in Chapter XII of the Act 1988 and deals with the constitution and various other provisions regarding Claims Tribunals, provides that "A State Government may make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of sections 165 to 174, and in particular. such rules may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely: (a) the form of application for claims for compensation and the particulars it may contain, and the fees, if any, to be paid in respect of such applications; (b) the procedure to be followed by a Claims Tribunal in holding an inquiry under this Chapter; (c) the powers vested in a Civil Court which may be exercised by a Claims Tribunal; (d) the form and the manner in which and the fees (if any) on payment of which an appeal may be preferred against an award of a Claims Tribunal; and . (e) any other matter which is to be, or may be, prescribed." This clearly indicates that these rules have been framed for the purpose of carrying into effect of the provisions regarding filing of the claim petition before a duly constituted Tribunal, its manner of filing and hearing of such petitions and thereafter passing of appropriate awards by such Tribunals. 10. The Motor Vehicles Act is a statute which creates rights and liabilities and prescribes an elaborate procedure for their regulation. The Act is a social welfare legislation under which the people who sustain injuries or whose kith and kin are killed in motor accidents are to be provided relief by way of award in a short shall of time and the procedural technicalities cannot be allowed to defeat the just purpose of the Act. Under the Motor Vehicles Act 1988, the Tribunals are under obligation to award just and reasonable compensation to the genuine claimants after determining the factum of accident as also the factum of rash and negligent act on the part of driver of the offending vehicle. Therefore, while interpreting the provisions of the Act or the rules framed there under, primary object and the reasons to bring the legislation cannot be overlooked and the use of specific words by the Legislature at different places in the legislation has to be given a meaning which shall achieve the object and reasons of the legislation. Sub-Rule (3) of Rule 220 uses the word "shall" and provides that certain documents shall be appended to every application filed for compensation arising out of the accident, therefore, what meaning should be given to this word "shall" in sub-rule (3) has to be 11. In the matter of State of UP. Vs. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava , the Apex Court held that the use of word "shall" in a statute, though generally taken in a mandatory sense, does not necessarily mean that in every case it shall have that effect that is to say, that unless the words of the statute are punctiliously followed, the proceeding or the outcome of the proceeding, would be invalid. On the other hand, it is not always correct to say that where the word "may" has been used, the statute is only permissible or directory in the sense that non-compliance with those provisions will not render the proceeding invalid. 12. On the other hand, it is not always correct to say that where the word "may" has been used, the statute is only permissible or directory in the sense that non-compliance with those provisions will not render the proceeding invalid. 12. In the matter of State of Uttar Pradesh and others Vs. Baburam Upadhya the Apex Court further held that the rules made under a statute must be treated for all purposes of construction or obligation exactly as if they were in the Act and are to be of the same effect as if contained in the Act, and are to be judiciously noticed for all purposes of construction or obligation. 3. Further in the matter of M/s. Sainik Motors, Jodhpur and others Vs. State of Rajasthan, the Apex Court again held that ordinarily the word "shall" is mandatory and it cannot be interpreted as directory, unless the context or the intention otherwise demands. 14. Again in the matter of Govind Lal Chaggan Lal Patel Vs. The Agriculture Produce Market Committee and others, the Apex Court, while considering whether the provisions are directory or mandatory, held that the governing factor is the meaning and intent of the legislature, which should be gathered not merely from the words used by the legislature but from a variety of other' circumstances and considerations. In other words, the use of the word 'shall' or 'may' is not conclusive on the question whether the particular requirement of law is mandatory or directory. But the circumstances that the legislature has used a language of compulsive force is always of great relevance and in the absence of anything contrary in the context indicating that a permissive interpretation is permissible, the statute ought to be construed as peremptory. The Apex Court has also referred the decisions rendered in the matters of Shriram Vs. State of Maharashtra; Khub Chand and others Vs. State of Rajasthan and other Haridwar Singh Vs. Bagun Sumbrui and In reo Presidential Election 1974. 15. Therefore, on the above principles, it is clear that the use of word 'shall' in a statute raises a presumption that the particular provision is imperative but this prima facie inference may be rebutted by other considerations such as object and scope of the enactment, the consequences flowing from such construction, the purpose for which the provision has been made, and the very nature of the provision. In the rules of procedure the underlying principle is to advance the cause of justice and not to defeat it. The constitution of the rule or procedure which promotes justice and prevents injustice or miscarriage of justice has to be preferred. 16. Admittedly, Chapter IX of the Rules 1994 beginning from Rule 220 and ending at Rule 242 provides rules of procedure to be adopted by the Claims Tribunals for decision of a claim petition and appeal against the award thereafter and for all purposes of construction or obligations, they are to be treated exactly as if they were in the Act and are to be given the same effect as if contained in the Act. Sub-Rule (3) of Rule 220 though uses the word "shall" for appending some documents specified in this sub-rule, but it does not say about the consequences of not appending such documents along with claim petition. It has never been said in the rules that if the documents specified in sub-rule (3) are not appended with the claim petition, necessarily the claim petition shall be dismissed by the concerned Tribunal on the said ground. Rather sub-rule (4) of rule 220 gives discretion to the Tribunal that if the specified documents referred to in sub rule (4) are not appended to the application, the reasons for not appending them shall be stated and if the Tribunal is satisfied it may proceed with the application and require production of such documents at a later stage. This is an indication by the legislature that word 'shall' uses in the opening line of sub-rule (3) of rule 220 is not imperative and a liberal construction is to be given while interpreting the said sub-rule. It is more reasonable to say like this, because, the legislature in all its wisdom has not provided for an automatic consequence of the failure of a party in appending the documents particularly specified in this sub-rule. Another reason for holding like this is further reflected from the provisions of rules 223 & 224. Rule 223 provides for examination of the applicant. It provides that on receipt of an application under rule 220 the claims Tribunal may examine the applicant on oath and the substance of such examination shall be reduced into writing. Another reason for holding like this is further reflected from the provisions of rules 223 & 224. Rule 223 provides for examination of the applicant. It provides that on receipt of an application under rule 220 the claims Tribunal may examine the applicant on oath and the substance of such examination shall be reduced into writing. Further rule 224 provides for summary dismissal of the application saying that the claims Tribunal may after considering the application and the statement ofthe applicant recorded under rule 223 dismiss the application summarily, if for reasons to be recorded in writing the claims tribunal is of the opinion that there are no sufficient grounds for proceeding therewith. A proviso to this rule has also been added in which it is provided that the claims tribunal shall not reject the application made for compensation u/s 140 on the grounds of any technical defects but shall give notice to the applicant and get the defects rectified these to provisions also lead to the inference that an automatic dismissal of the application on account of non-compliance of the preceding rules in this chapter is never intended by the legislature. If a summary dismissal of the application has to take place it may take place in the manner provided in rules 223 & 224. What are the reasons for making such rule of procedure and insisting upon filing of an injury certificate in Form M.P.M.V.R.-76 (Comp. '8') or the death certificate would also be a factor for consideration. The form prescribed is in the following manner : FORM M.P.M.V.R.-76 (Comp. 'B') [See Rule 220(3)(1)] Original No.A. No . ......... Hospital. Date …………… . I rectify that I have this day ……examined………. who staties he was accidentally injured on ………. and was admitted to this Hospital on ……… And discharge on ………. and treated in the O.P.D. from ..................... to ………… In my opinion, the injury or injuries which he has suffered by reasons of the accident involve ………… . (a) permanent privation of the sight of either eye or the hearing of the either ear or privation of any member or joint; (b) destruction or permanent impairing of the power of any member or joint; or (c) permanent disfiguration of the head or face. (a) permanent privation of the sight of either eye or the hearing of the either ear or privation of any member or joint; (b) destruction or permanent impairing of the power of any member or joint; or (c) permanent disfiguration of the head or face. Medical Officer In-charge Signature or thumb Impression of the applicant A perusal of the contents of the Form would show that the intention is to gather more and more information regarding injuries sustained by the claimant so as to reach to a definite conclusion about the nature of injuries sustained by him and the period during which he was admitted in the hospital and the other informations which may be relevant for just and proper decision of his claim case. These are not the facts which can only be proved by producing the certificate in the above Form but many of them can also be proved by other relevant evidence admissible under the Evidence Act. Therefore, it cannot be said that the non-production of such document would defeat the claim, because, if from other admissible evidence, the facts required in the document are established by the claimant, admittedly his claim may not be defeated. Therefore, a compulsive meaning of the word 'shall', used by the legislature for the purpose of getting such document, cannot be interpreted, otherwise, if such interpretation is made it shall defeat the very purpose of legislation. As stated above, in the rules of procedure, the underlying principle is to advance the cause of justice and not to defeat it and if the mandatory character is given to this sub-rule, it shall defeat the very purpose ofthe rule which is meant for advancement of justice. 17. In the matter of Salem Advocates Bar Association TN. Vs. Union of India, the Apex Court while interpreting the provisions of Order 8 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act 22 of2002 w.e.f. 01.07.2002, by referring to 3 earlier decisions namely Raza Buland Sugar Co. Ltd. Vs. Municipal Board, Rampur1o; Sangam Singh vs. Election Tribunal, Kotah, and Topline Shoes Ltd. Vs. Corpn. Vs. Union of India, the Apex Court while interpreting the provisions of Order 8 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act 22 of2002 w.e.f. 01.07.2002, by referring to 3 earlier decisions namely Raza Buland Sugar Co. Ltd. Vs. Municipal Board, Rampur1o; Sangam Singh vs. Election Tribunal, Kotah, and Topline Shoes Ltd. Vs. Corpn. Bank held that the rules of procedure are the handmaid of justice and not its mistress and if strict interpretation is given to the said rule dealing with closure of right to file written statement, it would defeat the justice and ultimately it held that the said provisions were not 'mandatory' and were 'directory' in nature. 18. For the foregoing discussions, it is apparent that if strict interpretation is given to the word "shall" used in sub-rule (3) of rule 220 of the Rules of 1994 and the provisions are held mandatory it shall defeat the very purpose of this procedural legislation and also the main legislation on the subject. Therefore, we hold that the provisions of sub-rule (3) of rule 220 of the rules of 1994 are not mandatory and they are directory and the non-compliance of sub-rule (3) of rule 220 has not an automatic consequence of leading to the dismissal of the claim petition. 19. Therefore, the impugned order dated 31.3.2001 deserves to be and is accordingly set aside. The matter is remanded back to the Claims Tribunal for its disposal in accordance with law. The records of the Tribunal be sent back forthwith. The parties present here are directed to appear before the Tribunal on 5th of May 2008. 20. No order as to costs. Case Remanded.