Research › Search › Judgment

Punjab High Court · body

2008 DIGILAW 1031 (PNJ)

Ramesh Saggar v. Satya Pal

2008-05-14

RANJIT SINGH

body2008
Judgment Ranjit Singh, J. 1. Petitioners are aggrieved against the order passed by Addl. Civil Judge (Senior Division), Amloh dated 11.3.2006 allowing application under Section 340 read with Section 195(1)(b) Cr.P.C. 2. The facts, in brief, are that respondent No. 1 filed a civil suit for recovery for sum of Rs. 4,20,000/-, which was decreed on 1.10.2003. An application under Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 CPC for restraining the petitioners from alienating the property specified therein during the pendency of the suit was also filed and the court vide its order dated 20.3.2003 directed the petitioners to maintain status-quo with regard to the suit property. Subsequently, it was learnt that the property in respect of which status-quo order was passed was already hypothecated with Oriental Bank of Commerce. It was accordingly brought to the notice of the court that the property would be sufficient only to exhaust the charge created thereon in favour of the Bank to the tune of Rs. 1.5 crores and the respondent would be totally insecure. Application, thus, was filed for issuing direction to the petitioners to furnish a Bank guarantee for the suit amount. At that time, one of the petitioners, namely, Ritesh Saggar made a statement before the court that the crane specified in order dated 20.3.2003 is free from all encumbrances and charges and on this basis, the order dated 20.3.2003 was modified on 14.6.2003 and the application was accordingly disposed of. 3. It was later learnt that the statement made by Ritesh Saggar, leading to passing of the order dated 14.6.2003, was false. In fact, the crane had also been hypothecated with the Bank vide a deed dated 12.8.2002. Thereafter the respondent had filed application under Order 38 Rule 5 seeking attachment of some unencumbered property. In the reply filed, stand in regard to the crane was again reiterated by stating that the crane is unencumbered. It is, thus, urged that the petitioners have committed an offence of perjury second time and thus a prayer was made for filing of a complaint under Section 340 read with Section 195(1)(b) of the Cr.P.C. 4. Mr. R.S.Bajaj, appearing for the petitioners would submit that the decree which was being executed has been satisfied and there is no liability now standing against the petitioners. Mr. R.S.Bajaj, appearing for the petitioners would submit that the decree which was being executed has been satisfied and there is no liability now standing against the petitioners. He accordingly submits that the present application has unnecessarily been filed, which, according to the petitioners is false, frivolous and fictitious. The counsel would also submit that this statement was only made by Ritesh Saggar not with any intention but only on account of lack of proper information with him and as such it would not attract the offence of perjury as is being alleged for which the present application was allowed. In addition, the counsel would also submit that all the petitioners cannot be made liable for perjury as the statement was made only by Ritesh Saggar and they did not make any such statement before the court. 5. During the course of arguments and in response to specific query by the court, the counsel conceded that the crane was hypothecated with the Bank and also the fact that statement indeed was made by Ritesh Saggar that it was free from any encumbrance. There is also no dispute that status quo order was passed by the court in regard to the property specified in the order. It is, thus, seen that false statement indeed was made before the court. It would be the defence which the petitioners can raise that this false statement was not intentionally made or was made on account of some misunderstanding or mis-information. This fact cannot be determined at this stage without giving opportunities to the parties to prove the allegations and for the petitioners to prove their innocence in this regard. In view of the conceded position that statement was false, the prima-facie offence of perjury certainly would be made out. 6. The submission that the statement was made alone by Ritesh Saggar and not by the remaining petitioners would also have to be seen by the trial court. The perusal of the impugned order would show that initially Ritesh Saggar had made a statement on behalf of the respoindent that the crane was free from all encumbrances. However, during the subsequent stage when the application was filed under Order 38 Rule 5 CPC seeking attachment of some other unencumbered property owned by the petitioners, the reply appears to have been filed on behalf of all the petitioners. However, during the subsequent stage when the application was filed under Order 38 Rule 5 CPC seeking attachment of some other unencumbered property owned by the petitioners, the reply appears to have been filed on behalf of all the petitioners. Thus, the false statement in regard to this aspect that the crane was unencumbered may also be attributed to all the petitioners, who either filed reply or reply was so filed on their behalf. It would not be, thus, possible at this stage to say that they would not incur responsibility for making false statement. 7. The counsel has drawn my attention to the case of B.K. Gupta v. Damodar H. Ba-jaj and Ors., to urge that there are two conditions which are required to be fulfilled for which a complaint can be filed against a person who is alleged to have given a false affidavit or evidence. The first condition to be satisfied is that a person has given a false affidavit in a proceeding before the court. The second is the opinion of the court that it is expedient in the interest of justice to make an inquiry against such a person in relation to the offence committed by him. In my view, these conditions are satisfied in the present case. The statement, affidavit or evidence which is stated to be false is given in a proceeding before the court and the court while allowing the application has impliedly applied its mind that it is expedient to have an inquiry against the offence committed. 8. The court while allowing the application has clearly observed that party cannot be allowed to make a false statement before the court and it would not matter if the suit in which the offence has been committed was decreed through compromise. The court has further observed that the petitioners cannot be allowed to make mockery of law and that they have committed the offence of perjury. This would clearly show that the court has applied its mind that it is expedient to have an enquiry. The case of Iqbal Singh Marwah and Anr. v. Meenakshi Marwah and Anr., relied upon by the counsel is basically dealing with competency of a person to file complaint. This would clearly show that the court has applied its mind that it is expedient to have an enquiry. The case of Iqbal Singh Marwah and Anr. v. Meenakshi Marwah and Anr., relied upon by the counsel is basically dealing with competency of a person to file complaint. No doubt, it is observed in the case of Iqbal Singh (supra) that court will adopt such a course only if the interest of justice requires, but in the instant case court apparently is well aware of this aspect as can be reflected from the part of order referred to above where the court has observed that it cannot be allowed to be taken for a ride by a litigant. The case of Pritish v. State of Maharashtra 2002(1) R.C.R. (Criminal) 92, as cited by the counsel for the petitioners, would show that the court at this stage is not deciding the guilt or innocence of the party against whom the proceedings are taken and at this stage the court only considers whether it is expedient in the interest of justice that an inquiry should be made into any offence affecting the administration of justice. The petitioners have made an attempt to either pollute or affect the administration of justice by making false statement. It would be immaterial if they have succeeded in this attempt as ultimately the issue was decided on the basis of a compromise. The observation by the court made in the case of Mangat Singh v. Rakha Singh 1995(3) Recent Criminal Reports 312 that every statement which is found not to be truthful cannot be subject matter of Section 340 Cr.P.C. may also not assist the case of the petitioners much. The court has found it expedient in the interest of justice that the complaint is required to be made. Moreover, a difference between a statement which is not truthful or which is false is also required to be appreciated. I also do not see much in the submissions made by the learned Counsel on the basis of observation made in the case of Jaswinder Singh v. Smt. Paramjit Kaur 1986(1) R.C.R. (Criminal) 97 that court should never become tools at the hands of the parties to satisfy private vendetta. I also do not see much in the submissions made by the learned Counsel on the basis of observation made in the case of Jaswinder Singh v. Smt. Paramjit Kaur 1986(1) R.C.R. (Criminal) 97 that court should never become tools at the hands of the parties to satisfy private vendetta. There is no indication from the record which would show that court has allowed itself to be a tool or instrument in the hands of the respondents while passing the impugned order. 9. Accordingly, I do not find any merit in the submissions made by the counsel for the petitioners and would, thus, dismiss the revision petition.