JUDGMENT SHORT EPISODE A.S.No.1326 of 1995 is filed by defendants -1,2 and B in O.S.No.71 of 90 on the file of the learned Subordinate Judge, Ramachandrapuram. Likewise A.S. No, 1624 of 1 995 was preferred by defendants-3.to 6 in the said suit O.S.No.71 of 90 on the file of the learned Subordinate Judge, Ramachandrapuram. The first appellant in A.S.No.1624 of 1995, who is the third defendant in the suit died and appellant No.5 was brought on record as the legal representative of the deceased appellant NO.1 by an order dated 27.10.2005 made in A.S.M.P. No.219B of 2005, The first respondent in both these appeals IS the plaintiff in the said suit. The said suit was instituted praying for the relief of partition of the plaint schedule properties into two equal shares if necessary after setting aside the various alienations made by Yarlagadda Padmarajamma and others from 1.9.1957 and allot one such share to the plaintiff and deliver vacant possession of the same and for future profits and also for costs. 2.The learned Subordinate Judge, Ramachandrapuram, in the light of the respective pleadings of the parties, having settled the issues, recorded the evidence of P.W.1, the plaintiff Yarlagadda Parthasarathi and D.W.1, defendant No.3 Yarlagadda Ammanamma and also marked Exs.A-1 to A-17 and EX.B-1 and after recording the findings, came to the conclusion that the suit filed being within the limitation and inasmuch as the plaintiff is entitled to a share, a preliminary decree for partition to be passed and accordingly granted preliminary decree for partition of plaint schedule properties into two equal shares and one such share to the plaintiff and further held that the plaintiff is also entitled to future profits from the date of the suit till the date of delivery of his share and the actual partition by metes and bounds that takes place in the final decree proceedings, But, however, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties were directed to bear their own costs, Hence, the present appeals. 3. Both these appeals are being disposed of by a common judgment since certain of the defendants as aforesaid being aggrieved by the decree and Judgment made in O.S. NO.71 of 1990 specified supra had preferred A.S. NO.1326 of 1995 and certain others preferred A.S.No.1624 of 1995 as against the self same decree. CONTENTIONS OF SRI C.SUBBA RAO 4. 3. Both these appeals are being disposed of by a common judgment since certain of the defendants as aforesaid being aggrieved by the decree and Judgment made in O.S. NO.71 of 1990 specified supra had preferred A.S. NO.1326 of 1995 and certain others preferred A.S.No.1624 of 1995 as against the self same decree. CONTENTIONS OF SRI C.SUBBA RAO 4. Sri C. Subba Rao, learned counsel, representing appellants in A.S.No.1326 of 1995 had taken this Court through the respective pleadings of the parties and the oral and documentary evidence available on record and would point that one Yarlagadda Amrnanamma shown as second respondent In A.S.No.1326 of 1995 died and R-9, her legal representative was brought on record by Virtue of an order made in A.S.M.P. NO.1910 of dated 25.9.2006. The learned counsel would also point out that the said Ammanamma who is no more and shown as second respondent in A.S.No.1326 of 1995 is the first appellant in A.S.No.1624 of 1995 and the first appellant having died, the 5th appellant was brought on record as her legal representative. 5. The learned counsel would maintain that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief of partition whatsoever in the plaint schedule properties since the rights of late Yarlagadda Padmarajamma though specified to be that the life interest became absolute by virtue of operation of Section 14 (1) of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred as Act for the purpose of convenience) and therefore, the findings recorded by the trial court in this regard cannot be sustained. The learned counsel would point out to the additional issues framed on 4.8.1995 and the findings recorded in relation thereto and would maintain that the lease granted in favour of the 8th defendant relating to items 4 to 6 are valid and binding on the plaintiff. The Civil Court cannot grant a decree for eviction and even if any remedy is available to such parties it is only before the tenancy Court. The learned counsel would maintain that the trial Court had not correctly interpreted the effect of Exs.A-4, A-5 and A-6 in a proper perspective. The learned counsel also would point that admission was made in EX.A-12 registered notice issued on 21.3.90 to the effect that the properties are ancestral properties and P.W.1 also admitted in his evidence to the effect that the contents of EX.A-12 are true and correct. The learned counsel also would point that admission was made in EX.A-12 registered notice issued on 21.3.90 to the effect that the properties are ancestral properties and P.W.1 also admitted in his evidence to the effect that the contents of EX.A-12 are true and correct. But, ignoring such admissions, the trial Court had recorded certain contra findings and therefore, they cannot also be sustained. The learned counsel would also point out as to the age of the plaintiff and certain findings recorded by the trial Court in this regard. The leaned counsel made elaborate submissions relating to EX.A-3 and also had taken this Court through the findings recorded by the trial Court relating to the applicability of Section 14 (1) and (2) of the Act. The learned counsel had taken this Court through the oral and documentary evidence available on record i.e., the evidence of P.W.1 and DW.1 and also Exs.A-1 to A-17 and Ex. B-1 as well and would contend that in the light of the facts and circumstances both in law and also in equity, the plaintiff who approached the Court after a long lapse of time, ought not to have been granted the relief and the findings of the trial Court being erroneous, the said findings are liable to be set aside. The learned counsel placed strong reliance on several decisions to substantiate his submissions. CONTENTION OF SMT ANASUYA 6. Smt. Anasuya, the learned counsel representing the appellant in A.S. 1624 of 1995 while making elaborate submissions explained the relationship between the parties and also further explained Ex. A-1 registration extract of the will, dated 20.9.1925 executed by Yarlagadda Manikyamba in favour of her three sons. The learned counsel would also point out as to the partition of Ex. A-2, dated 9.7.1937, the partition deed executed between the plaintiff’s father and his two brothers and allotment of plaint schedule properties to the share of the plaintiff's father. The learned counsel would further point out as to the recitals made in Ex.A-3 the registered sale deed, dated 25.11.1940 and further explained Ex.A-4 to A-6 as well and how the items had been parted with. The learned counsel would further point out as to the recitals made in Ex.A-3 the registered sale deed, dated 25.11.1940 and further explained Ex.A-4 to A-6 as well and how the items had been parted with. While further elaborating her submissions, the learned counsel pointed out as to the date of death of Padmarajamma and further contended that after the death of Padmarajamma, the plaintiff had chosen to issue notice under Ex.A-12 and D-1 and D-2 had given a reply under Ex.A-13 and certain other defendants had given a reply under Ex.A-14 and D-7 had not chosen to give any reply whatsoever. While pointing out Ex. B-1, the learned counsel would also maintain that it is true that some property was given to Padmarajamma and would maintain that these factual aspects had not been appreciated by the trial Court in a proper perspective. The learned counsel also laid emphasis on the applicability of Section 14 (1) of the Act and further pointed out that the findings recorded by the trial Court in this regard cannot be sustained. The learned counsel while further elaborating her submissions would maintain that the appreciation of evidence in the context of EX.A-3 especially in the light of Exs.A-4, A-5 and A-6 by the trial Court being erroneous definitely cannot be sustained. 7. Learned counsel also further pointed as to EX.A-12, registered notice to the effect that when a member of a family had issued such notice through an Advocate the nature of the properties should be taken as specified thereunder. Learned counsel while further elaborating her submissions had taken this Court through the relevant portion of the evidence of P.W.1 and D.W.1 and would maintain that the rate of maintenance of Padmarajamma being personal obligation of the husband and in the light of the language employed Hindu women or a Hindu widow, the mere fact of the husband would not seriously alter the situation. The husband died subsequent to the death of Padmarajamma. But, however, as far as right to claim maintenance is concerned the right being available at the relevant point of time. It may have to be taken that what had taken under Ex.A-3 cannot be taken as a life interest even in the light of the language employed in the said document. But, however, as far as right to claim maintenance is concerned the right being available at the relevant point of time. It may have to be taken that what had taken under Ex.A-3 cannot be taken as a life interest even in the light of the language employed in the said document. Even otherwise, by operation of law, the estate enlarged itself into an absolute one and hence, the parting of the property by Padmarajamma to be held to be valid and alienations of Padmarajamma being binding. The relief of partition should have been negatived as well. The learned counsel would also point that some element of Stridhana as well is restricted from the evidence available on record. Incidentally, the learned counsel would have taken to Section 18 of Hindu Adoptions and Minors (sic. Maintenance) Act as well when such right was available to Padmarajamma and in the light of the provisions of the Act, the finding that Section 14 (1) of the Act is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case is definitely an erroneous one. After making elaborate submissions relating to the applicability of Section 14 (1) and (2) of the Act aforesaid, the learned counsel also made certain submissions as to the plaintiff attaining majority and the date of alienations and how the suit is hopelessly barred by limitation. The learned counsel would maintain that Article 108 of the present Limitation Act corresponding to Article 125 of the Old Limitation Act to be made applicable. These documents are being challenged after a long lapse of time. The suit itself having been instituted in the year 1990, the plaintiff having attained the majority in the year 1958, kept quiet for a sufficient long time and instituted the suit claiming the right of partition on the ground that his rights are left unaffected by virtue of such alienations. The learned counsel would also point out that in the facts and circumstances it cannot be said that Article 113 of the present Limitation Act would be applicable without specifying Article 108 of the Limitation Act. The learned counsel also point out that the findings recorded by the trial Court as to the right to accrue on the death of Padmarajamma, also cannot be sustained. The learned counsel also point out that the findings recorded by the trial Court as to the right to accrue on the death of Padmarajamma, also cannot be sustained. Even otherwise, in the light of the facts and circumstances, to challenge the alienations after attaining the majority, the suit ought to have been instituted within three years. Even if either of the stands to be taken from the date of alienations, the said alienations had not been challenged within a period of 12 years and even otherwise even after attaining the majority the suit had not been instituted with a period of three years in either way. The alienations not having been challenged within a period of limitation the suit is hopelessly barred by limitation and hence, the relief of partition granted by the trial court in the light of the facts and circumstances bring unsustainable, the same is liable to be set aside both in law and also on the ground of equity as well. 8. The counsel also placed strong reliance on certain decisions to substantiate her submissions. CONTENTIONS OF Sri V.L.N.G.K. MURTY 9. Sri V.L.N.G.K. Murthy the learned counsel representing the first respondent plaintiff would maintain that the plaint schedule property was stated to be self acquired property of Ramayya Chowdary in the averments made in the plaint and in the written statement filed by the defendant it was averred as joint family property. The finding recorded by the trial court is that this was the separate property of the said Ramaiah Chowdary. The learned counsel had taken this Court through the contents of Ex.A-3 and also pointed out to Ex.A-17. The learned counsel would maintain that when it is not the document, which may have to be looked into, the surrounding circumstances may have also to be appreciated. Even otherwise if the recitals of Ex.A-3 have to be carefully analyzed it cannot be said that these properties had been given to Padmarajamma in lieu of maintenance in the absence of any acceptable evidence especially in the light of Ex.A-17. The stand taken by the other side that this property had been given to her, is to be negatived and the probabilities may have also to be appreciated. The learned counsel had taken this Court through the contents of Ex.A-1 to A-17. The stand taken by the other side that this property had been given to her, is to be negatived and the probabilities may have also to be appreciated. The learned counsel had taken this Court through the contents of Ex.A-1 to A-17. While elaborating the submissions, the learned counsel had taken this Court through the evidence of D. W.1 and would maintain that in the light of evidence of D.W.1 who had deposed contrary to the entire claim or relating to the maintenance, it cannot be said that the life interest given in Ex.A-3 is in any way enlarged into absolute estate by virtue of Article 113 of the Act and the findings recorded in the facts and circumstances of the case that Section 14 (2) of the Act is made applicable, are sustainable findings. While further elaborating his submissions, the learned counsel emphasized that the mere existence of the right to claim maintenance may not be sufficient and something more to be proved to invoke the benefit of Section 14 (1) of the Act. While elaborating his submissions, the learned counsel would contend that these alienations are unauthorized alienations and inasmuch as life interest had been given to Padmarajamma, till the death of Padmarajamma there was no cause of action for the plaintiff to challenge such alienations if any, which would be valid during the life time of Padmarajamma and there was no need to question such alienations and after the death of Padmarajamma, the plaintiff had instituted the suit within the period of limitation. The learned counsel also would maintain that the mother made these alienations as though these properties are her properties and the counsel also pointed out to certain of the findings recorded by the trial court m this regard and when unauthorized alienations had been made by the interest holder and inasmuch as after the death of life interest holder, the right to sue accrued to the son rightly to challenge these alienations. The learned counsel also would point out to certain decisions which had been relied upon and would maintain that these decisions are concerned with the limited estate and hence, the facts of these decisions are distinguishable. While pleading his submissions, the learned counsel strongly relied upon certain decisions to substantiate his submissions. CONTENTIONS OF SRI LAKSHMANA SARMA 10. The learned counsel also would point out to certain decisions which had been relied upon and would maintain that these decisions are concerned with the limited estate and hence, the facts of these decisions are distinguishable. While pleading his submissions, the learned counsel strongly relied upon certain decisions to substantiate his submissions. CONTENTIONS OF SRI LAKSHMANA SARMA 10. Sri Lakshmana Sarma representing certain of the respondents had taken through the recitals of Ex.A-3 and explained that if the language used in Ex.A-3 is carefully examined it cannot be said that this grant was made under Ex.A-3 not for the purpose of maintenance. Definitely, the recitals would point out that this life interest was given to Padmarajamma only for the purpose of maintenance and no other interpretation is possible to be given to such recitals as can be seen from Ex.A-3. 11. Heard the learned counsel on record. 12. Perused the oral and documentary evidence available on record and the findings recorded by the trial Court as well. In the light of the submissions made by the learned counsel on record, the following points arise for consideration in this appeal. 1. Whether the findings recorded by the trial court relating to the rights of Padmarajamma m the light of Section 14 (1) and (2) of the Act to be confirmed or to be disturbed in the facts and circumstances of the case? 2. Whether the findings recorded by the trial Court granting relief of partition In favour of the plaintiff to be confirmed or to be disturbed in the facts and circumstances of the case? 3. Whether the findings recorded by the trial Court relating to the question of limitation to be confirmed or to be set aside in the facts and circumstances of the case? 4. If so, to what relief the parties are entitled to? POINT Nos.1 to 3: 13. For the purpose of convenience, these points are being discussed together to avoid repetition before taking up the further discussion of these points, in the light of the oral and documentary evidence available on record, it may be appropriate to have a glance at the respective pleadings of parties and the evidence available on record and the findings recorded by the trial Court in nutshell: 14. For the purpose of convenience, the parties hereinafter would be referred to as shown in O.S.No.71 of 1 990 on the file of the learned Subordinate Judge-cum-Assistant Sessions Judge, Ramachandrapuram. 15. The first respondent-plaintiff filed the suit for partition of the plaint schedule properties into two equal shares, if necessary after setting aside the various alienations that are made by Yarlagadda Padmarajamma and others from 1.9.1957 and allot one such share to the plaintiff and deliver vacant possession of the same, for future profits and for costs. 16. The averments made in the plaint are as hereunder: The averments in the plaint, in brief, are as follows: The plaintiff is the 2nd son and the 7th defendant is the 1st son of one Yarlagadda Ramayya Chowdari, who had two brothers viz., Srikrishna Venugopala Ankineedu and Sarvaraidu. The 1st defendant is the wife of Ankineedu and 2cd defendant is his adopted son. The 3rd defendant is the wife of the said Sarvaraldu. The 4th defendant is his daughter and defendants 5 and 6 are his sons. Plaintiff's father is the eldest among his brothers. Sarvaraidu and Ankineedu, the brothers of plaintiff's father died. The plaint schedule properties and some other properties originally belonged to the paternal grand mother of the plaintiff. Smt Yarlagadda Manikyamba, who executed a Will dt.20.09.1925 bequeathing all the plaint schedule properties and her properties in favour of her three sons. Ramayyachowdari, Sarvaraidu and Ankmeedu to be enjoyed in equal shares with absolute rights. Thereafter, under the registered partition deed dt.9.7.1937 among the three brothers of plaintiff's father, the plaint schedule property was allotted to the share of plaintiff's father. The plaint schedule property is the self acquired property of late Ramayya Chowdary. The plaintiff was born on 17.5.1940. His father executed a registered settlement deed dt.25.11.1940 setting the entire plaint schedule property in favour of his wife, Yarlagadda Padmarajamma to be enjoyed by her with life interest and without any right of alienation and vested remainder right is given in favour of the plaintiff and the 7th defendant, at age of six months of plaintiff, and also to his other male issues that may be born to him in future. Late Ramayya Chowdary had no male issues. Therefore, the half share in the plaint schedule property is the self acquired property of the plaintiff. Late Ramayya Chowdary had no male issues. Therefore, the half share in the plaint schedule property is the self acquired property of the plaintiff. During the minority of the plaintiff, his mother executed a registered settlement deed dt.2.9.1957 gifting items 1 to 4 and 6 and 7 of the plaint schedule property to Yarlagadda Ankineedu, her husband's brother with absolute rights. She also executed another gift deed dt.1.9.1957 gifting item 8 of the plaint schedule property to the 4th defendant with absolute rights and another gift deed dt. 1.9.1957 gifting item 5 of the plaintiff schedule property to Yarlagadda Sarvaraidu, her husband' s brother, with absolute rights. As Padmarajamma has got only life interest in the plaint schedule property she cannot convey better rights than what she has. Therefore, she has no right to convey the interest of her sons without the prior sanction of the District Court and such alienations are not valid and binding on the plaintiff. Therefore, the three settlement deeds executed by plaintiff's mother are not valid beyond her life time and do not also effect the rights of the plaintiff and his brother in those properties. Subsequently, Yarlagadda Ankineedu executed a sale deed dt.31.3.1965 conveying items 1 to 3 of the plaint schedule properties in favour of Totakura Pullamma alias Varahalamma of Chodavaram, who died intestate in 1984 and the said properties devolved upon her four daughters viz., defendants 9 and 10 and two other sisters viz., Mudunuri Veeravenkafa Ananthalakshmi Satyavathi and Satyaparaju Subbalakshmi. Later, the said S. Subbalakshmi gifted her half share in items 1 and 3 of the plaint schedule in favour of 9'h defendant under registered gift deed dt28.5.1987 and Mudunuri Veera Venkata Ananta Lakshmi Satyavathi gifted her half share in item 2 under registered gift deed dt.28.5.1986 in favour of 9'h defendant. After the death of Yarlagadda Ankineedu, his adopted son, the 2nd defendant leased out Items 4,6 and 7 of the plaint schedule property to the 8th defendant for a period of five years along with other properties commencing from 15,6,1985 to 14,6,90, under a registered lease deed dt15.6.85. Hence this defendant is added. D9 and D10 are added in the suit as they are the subsequent alienees in respect of items 1 to 3 of the plaint schedule properties. Therefore, the said transactions are absolutely invalid and they are subject to the rights of the plaintiff and 7th defendent. Hence this defendant is added. D9 and D10 are added in the suit as they are the subsequent alienees in respect of items 1 to 3 of the plaint schedule properties. Therefore, the said transactions are absolutely invalid and they are subject to the rights of the plaintiff and 7th defendent. The said alienations are not valid, and binding on the plaintiff's half share in the plaint schedule properties. Item 8 of the plaint schedule property is in the possession of the 4th defendant and item 5 was devolved upon defendants 3 to 6. Tile mother of the plaintiff died on 21.1.1990. Therefore the cause of action for the plaintiff to seek his remedies has arisen only on the death of his mother. It is open for the plaintiff to question the three settlement deeds dt.1.9.1957 and 2.9.1957 executed by his mother in her individual capacity and also representing the plaintiff and 7th defendant the then minor sons. The mother cannot represent the minor sons in those documents while his father is alive and they do not bind 'he plaintiff. The plaintiff got Issued a registered notice dt.21.3.1990 to the defendants 1 to 7 for partition of the plaint schedule properties into two equal shares and for allotment of one such snare to him. The 7th defendant did not raise any issue nor given any reply. The defendants 1 and 2 got issued a reply dt.1.6.1990 and the defendants 3 to 6 together got Issued a reply notice dated 17.4.1990 with false allegations. The 7th defendant IS colluding with defendants 1 to 6. It is also alleged in the reply notices that Padmarajamma acquired absolute interest in the plaint schedule property by virtue of Section 14 (t) of the Hindu Succession Act. 1956 and that the claim of the plaintiff is barred by limitation. It was mistakenly mentioned in the plaintiff's registered notice that the plaint schedule property is the ancestral property but from the recitals in the registered partition deed dt.9.7.1937 it clearly establishes that it IS the self acquired property of the plaintiff's father and his two brothers. Therefore, by virtue of the registered settlement deed dt.25.11.1940 the said property is also the self acquired property of the plaintiff and the 7th defendant. Therefore, by virtue of the registered settlement deed dt.25.11.1940 the said property is also the self acquired property of the plaintiff and the 7th defendant. The life interest that was given to Padmarajamma does not enlarge into an absolute Interest as it squarely comes within Section 14 (2) of Hindu Succession Act, t 956. But for this settlement deed, Padmarajamma has no right in the plaint schedule properties. So for the first time the life interest was given to Padmarajamma in the plaint schedule property by her husband and vested remainder right was given to plaintiff and 7th defendant. The plaintiff need not file a suit within three years after he attained majority and he can as well file the suit within three years after the death of Padmarajamma. Hence the Suit. 7. The defendants 1 and 2 filed a separate written statements. However, the respective stands taken by the parties substantially being the same, the said stand taken by these parties is as hereunder. "The suit is not maintainable either under law or on facts. The relationship as stated in the plaint is true. The plaintiff's father Ramayya and his two brothers, Sarvarayudu and Sri krishna Venugopala Ankineedu constituted a joint Hindu family, till they divided by executing a partition deed dt.9.7.1937. The plaint schedule properties do not originally belonged to the plaintiff's paternal grand mother Yarlagadda Manikyamba. The allegation that she executed a Will dated 20.9.1925 and that she bequeathed under the alleged will the plaint schedule properties to plaintiff's father Ramayya are not true. The plaint schedule properties and some other properties covered by the partition deed dt.9.7.1937 belonged to the joint family of the plaintiff's father. Ramayya and his two brothers, Sarvaraayudu and Sri Krishna Venugopala Ankineedu. They constituted the joint family properties of the said three brothers. In any case, the said properties were treated and dealt with as ‘Joint properties of the plaintiff's father Ramayya and his two brothers. Plaintiff's paternal grand mother Yarlagadda Manikyamba never enjoyed either the plaint schedule properties or some other properties as properties belonging to herself alone, nor did the plaintiff's father and his two brothers ever enjoyed any properties as bequeathed to them by their mother. It is false to allege that the plaint schedule property is the self-acquired property of plaintiff's father. Plaintiff's paternal grand mother Yarlagadda Manikyamba never enjoyed either the plaint schedule properties or some other properties as properties belonging to herself alone, nor did the plaintiff's father and his two brothers ever enjoyed any properties as bequeathed to them by their mother. It is false to allege that the plaint schedule property is the self-acquired property of plaintiff's father. Plaintiff's father Ramayuya got towards his share in partition with his brothers large extents of lands and extensive properties. But in view of his conduct and management of the properties, the maintenance of his wife Padmarajamma was not secured and there were apprehensions whether she would be properly maintained by her husband. Ramayya has legal obligation to maintain his wife, either from out of his self acquired or joint family properties. In case the properties were separate and self acquired properties of Ramayya though in the inception the obligation to maintain his wife Padmarajamma arose as a moral obligation, it turned into a legal obligation especially when the properties were in the hands of his sons. It is with this object to provide maintenance permanently to Padmarajamma, the plaintiff's father. Ramayya, for himself and as guardian of his the then two minor sons, plaintiff and 7'h defendant, executed a registered deed dated 25.11.1940 though styled as a settlement deed in effect it was a maintenance deed. Thus, the document dt.25.11.1940 was executed by the plaintiff's father Ramayya for himself and as guardian of his the then two minor sons in lieu of the pre-existing fights of the plaintiff's mother, Padmarajamma. Though the rights of the plaintiff's mother Padmarajamma in the plaint schedule properties are limited to as per the recitals in the document dated 25.11.1940 it augmented into absolute rights after the coming into force of the Hindu Succession .Act. Though the rights of the plaintiff's mother Padmarajamma in the plaint schedule properties are limited to as per the recitals in the document dated 25.11.1940 it augmented into absolute rights after the coming into force of the Hindu Succession .Act. Thus Padmarajamma became the absolute owner of the properties covered by the document dt.25.11.1940 since she continued to be in possession thereof as on the date of coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act So even though the document dt.25.11.1940 recites that the plaintiff's mother Padmaraiamma was entitled to enjoy the said properties only during her life time and that the plaintiff and the, defendant are entitled to the vested remainder thereof since the rights of Padmarajamma in the said properties are augmented into absolute rights by virtue of the Hindu Succession Act, there is no more remainder to be vested either in favour of the plaintiff or 7th defendant. Plaintiff's mother exercising her absolute rights in the plaint schedule properties rightfully executed the gift deeds dt.2.9.57 with absolute rights. By the time of the gift deeds the 7th defendant was a major. Since the said gift deeds were executed by Padmarajamma also at the instance of her husband and her sons, her eldest son the 7th defendant joined in execution thereof and she executed the said gift deeds not only for herself but also on behalf of the plaintiff who was then a minor. By the time of the gift deeds dt.1.9.57 and 2.9.57. Padmarajamma rights in the plaint schedule properties augmented into absolute rights her sons need not have Joined In the execution of the gift deeds. Since the sons of Padmarajamma were made as parties to the said deeds it does not create any rights either in the plaintiff or in the 7th defendant. The said gift deeds are perfectly valid under law and binding on the plaintiff and the 7th defendant. It is true that late Ankineedu and Sarvaraidu executed sale deed dt.31.3.06 conveying items 1 to 3 of the plaint schedule properties in favour of Totakura Pullamma alias Varahalamma of Chodavaram. These defendants do not know as to who are the persons that are actually in possession of those lands at present. It is also true that after the death of his adoptive father the 2nd defendant leased out items 4. These defendants do not know as to who are the persons that are actually in possession of those lands at present. It is also true that after the death of his adoptive father the 2nd defendant leased out items 4. 5 and 7 of the plaint schedule properties along with some other properties to the 8th defendant and they executed registered lease deed dt.15.6.1965. Plaintiff has no right to question the gilt deeds executed by his mother and the subsequent alienations and as such the date of death of plaintiff's mother or the date of the plaintiff attaining majority are not relevant. If at all the plaintiff and his brother have any right in the plaint schedule properties it is by virtue of the fact that the plaint schedule properties constituted part of the joint family properties of the plaintiff and 7th defendant and their father, of which plaintiff's father was the manager. In such a case plaintiff should have questioned the settlement deed dt.25.11.1940 executed by his father for himself and as guardian of plaintiff and 7th defendant who were then minors in favour of plaintiff's mother either during the minority of plaintiff by his father who is still alive and who is the natural and legal guardian of his two sons or at least by the plaintiff within three years of his attaining majority. Since no action was taken within that period the claim of the plaintiff if any in the plaint schedule property is barred by limitation Even assuming merely for the sale of argument that the plaintiff has got right in the plaint schedule properties as set lip by him even such right is now barred by time under law. The plaintiff attained majority by 17.5.1958. But knowingly plaintiff kept quiet. Plaintiff to get travel the hurdle of bar of limitation set up that as if the cause of action arose from 21.1.1990. The relief of declaration for setting aside the alienations particularly the settlement deed dt.25.11.1940 and the gift deeds dt.1.9.57 and 2.9.57 is barred by time. Neither the plaintiff nor the 7th defendant ever wanted to dispute either the settlement deed dt.25. 11.40 or the gift deeds dated 1.9.57 and 2.9.1957 or dispute the absolute nights of their mother or lay any claim against the properties. The suit is filed speculatively. Neither the plaintiff nor the 7th defendant ever wanted to dispute either the settlement deed dt.25. 11.40 or the gift deeds dated 1.9.57 and 2.9.1957 or dispute the absolute nights of their mother or lay any claim against the properties. The suit is filed speculatively. The persons in possession have perfected their right to the properties in their possession of the plaint schedule properties also by adverse possession. Those defendants and late Ankineedu improved the properties covered by items 1 to 4 and 6 and 7 by spending huge amounts. The settlement deed dt.25.11 .1940 falls within the ambit of Section 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act. Even assuming that the plaint schedule properties are the self acquired properties of Ramayya. Plaintiff and the 7th defendant cannot claim any right in them by virtue of the settlement deed dt.25.11.1940 as it was not executed in their favour. Even before the Hindu Succession Act came into force and by virtue of the settlement deed 25.11.1940 only limited rights were created in favour of plaintiff's mother, no remainder right can be vested in plaintiff without executing the said settlement deed in their favour also. It is only when the plaint schedule properties form part of the joint family properties of the plaintiff and 7th defendant and their father, then only it is possible under law to reserve the vested remainder rights in favour of plaintiff and 7th defendant. In this view also it clinches that the plaint schedule properties must have been in fact constituted joint family properties of plaintiff and 7th defendant and their father either by origin or by treatment. The plaintiff is not entitled either for partition of the plaint schedule properties or for setting aside the alienations or for allotment of any share therein for delivery of possession of any part thereof or for profits. Hence, the Suit is to be dismissed with exemplary costs. 18. The defendants 3 to 6 filed a separate written statement and the allegations therein, In brief, are as follows: “Except the relationship mentioned in the plaint the other material allegations are not true and valid. The claim of the plaintiff that the plaint schedule properties are his self-acquired properties is not correct and they are not admitted. 18. The defendants 3 to 6 filed a separate written statement and the allegations therein, In brief, are as follows: “Except the relationship mentioned in the plaint the other material allegations are not true and valid. The claim of the plaintiff that the plaint schedule properties are his self-acquired properties is not correct and they are not admitted. The document dated 25.11.1940 executed by plaintiff's father is styled as a gift deed but in fact the purpose is to provide and secure the maintenance for Padmarajamma which was necessitated then. It was executed by the said Ramayya Chowdary for self and also as a guardian of the plaintiff and the 7th defendant who are minors. Neither the plaintiff nor the 7th defendant ever questioned the said document within the period of limitation allowed under law and the said document is a perfectly valid document. The constructions sought to be placed by the plaintiff on the said document is not fully correct. The intention of Ramayya Chowdary in executing the said gift deed dt.25.11.1940 was to provide permanently for the maintenance of Padmarajamma, the mother of the plaintiff. Ramayya Chowdary as well as his sons (Plaintiff and 7th defendant) all have got a preexisting legal liability to provide her maintenance and this claim should be satisfied from some property and It was for that reason the said document was executed. Though at that lime It was recited in the document that Padmarajamma is given a right to enjoy the property for her life time only, such right got itself enlarged into full right on the passing of the Hindu Succession Act of 1956 and therefore, she became absolute owner for the said property as the document was executed in lieu of the pre-existing liability to provide for maintenance. Once Padmarajamma became the full owner there can be no question of any vested rights for the plaintiff or any body. Padmarajamma did not die possessed of the said property. In fact, the plaintiff and the 7'h defendant need not have been made parties to the said documents. In such circumstances simply because they were made parties to the documents, that does not clothe them with any rights or entitle them with any rights or entitled them to claim any rights. The plaintiff has no right to question any of the transactions. In such circumstances simply because they were made parties to the documents, that does not clothe them with any rights or entitle them with any rights or entitled them to claim any rights. The plaintiff has no right to question any of the transactions. The third defendant is concerned with item-5 and 4'h defendant with item 8 of the plaint schedule properties. By the date of the suit defendants 4 to 6 are not in possession of any property as alleged in the plaint. It is the 3rd defendant that is in possession of the item 5 of the plaint schedule in her own right 4th defendant sold away her land of item 8 of the plaint schedule. Plaintiff is fully aware about these facts. Assuming that the plaintiff and his brother have right to question the same as contended by him, such a right is barred under the law of limitation as the plaintiff or his brother, are bound under law to question the said document within the period allowed as per law. But neither the plaintiff nor the 7th defendant have chosen to question the same and therefore the said right, if any, became barred by time as the plaintiff himself admits in the plaint that his mother was not competent to represent the minor as their guardian when their father Ramayya Chowdary was alive. There is no cause of action to file the suit. Plaintiff cannot try to avoid the bar of limitation by making such a pleading. The very fact that the 7th defendant has not joined in the suit along with the plaintiff itself shows that plaintiff's claim is not true or valid. Plaintiff has forgotten the fact that Padmarajamma had the right to be maintained by the family from out of properties and it is an accrued and existing right to her. Therefore, the said right being a pre-existing right to her even by the date of the settlement deed dt.25.11.1940. Under law the life estate given in lieu of the maintenance guts and got enlarged into a full estate. Therefore, the said right being a pre-existing right to her even by the date of the settlement deed dt.25.11.1940. Under law the life estate given in lieu of the maintenance guts and got enlarged into a full estate. The mere fact that Padmarajamma executed the documents of the year 1957 representing the plaintiff and the 7th defendant as guardian does not in any way niter the situation as the plaintiff wants to contend because those documents were executed very shortly after the Hindu Succession Act of 1956 by which tie the parties were unaware about their rights. Simply because the plaintiff and the defendant figured in those documents it does not entitle them to contend contra to the established legal position laid down by the Supreme Court of India and various other High Courts. Section 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 applies to this case. The plaintiff who is now aged 50 years is now stating that if necessary the documents of September, 1957 may be set aside. This itself implies that the plaintiff is fully conscious of the fact that the said documents are binding upon him. If the plaintiff contends that they are not binding upon him and he wants them to be set aside, he should have questioned the said documents within three years after he attained majority. Question of setting aside the document after the death of the plaintiff's mother and after expiry of time does not and cannot arise In any view of the matter, the persons in possession of the concerned properties perfected their right to the same by adverse possession also. D-4 to D-6 are not necessary or proper parties to the Suit. Plaintiff has no right to tile this Suit for the reason that his brother. 7th defendant who is elder 10 him did no choose to question the same. Plaintiff is not entitled to seek partition of the plaint schedule properties and he is not entitled to any relief. The cause of action mentioned in the plaint is not correct and there is no cause of action for this suit. Therefore the suit may be dismissed with costs. 19. Plaintiff is not entitled to seek partition of the plaint schedule properties and he is not entitled to any relief. The cause of action mentioned in the plaint is not correct and there is no cause of action for this suit. Therefore the suit may be dismissed with costs. 19. The 8th defendant filed his written statement with the following averments: It is true that the 2nd defendant who has been managing the properties of the family consisting of himself and his mother, the P defendant leased out AC.12.17 cents of land including AC.6.08 cents of land comprised in items 4.6 and 7 of the plaint schedule under registered lease deed dt.15.6 1985. Though the lease was for five years, he is entitled to protection under the Andhra Tenancy Act as amender upto date. This defendant has been regularly paying the rents to the 2nd defendant for the entire lease hold land. He is entitled to continue in possession and cultivate the said items 4, 6 and 7 of the plaint schedule property as provided under the Andhra Tenancy Act and so 10 any case the plaintiff cannot recover possession of those items of lands from this defendant. The said lease in favour at this defendant is valid under law and cannot be questioned by the plaintiff. It does not amount to an alienation and so it cannot be set aside This Court has no Jurisdiction to direct this defendant to deliver possession of those items of land to the plaintiff. Therefore, the suit for recovery of possession of Items, 4, 6 and 7 of plaint schedule by the plaintiff IS liable to be dismissed with costs. 19-A. The defendants 9 and 10 filed a separate written statements and the allegations therein, in brief, are as follows: These defendants are the daughters of one Totakura Pullamma alias Varahalamma of Chodavaram. Their mother purchased items 1 to 3 of the plaint schedule from one Yarlagadda Sri Krishna Venugopala Ankineedu by a registered sale deed dt.31.3.1965 for a valuable consideration of Rs.8.000/-. After the death of the mother' of these defendants, in the year 1985, the lands were shared among the tour daughters of Varahalamma and later the said properties were gifted to these defendants by the other two sisters, under the gift deeds dt.28.5.1986 and 28.5.1986. Ever since the lands are in possession and enjoyment of those defendants. After the death of the mother' of these defendants, in the year 1985, the lands were shared among the tour daughters of Varahalamma and later the said properties were gifted to these defendants by the other two sisters, under the gift deeds dt.28.5.1986 and 28.5.1986. Ever since the lands are in possession and enjoyment of those defendants. The plaintiff with a view to cause wrongful loss filed the suit. The plaintiff is a neighbouring landlord of items 1 to 3 of the plaint schedule properties and is a resident of Chodavaram. Since 1965 the land is in the possession and enjoyment of the said Varahalamma and later these defendants. The pucca sale deeds and tax receipts will prove the same the suit is bad for mis-joinder of parties. The suit is barred by limitation. The plaintiff might have filed a protest petition at the time of execution of the registered sale deed in favour of Varahalamma in 1965 or after subsequent transactions. No notice was served on these defendants. The plaintiff never raised his little finger with regard to purchase of Items 1 to 3 of the plaint schedule lands by late Varahalamma and subsequent owners. The purchase of the said Items of land by Varahalamma is legal and valid and binding upon her. Therefore, the suit may be dismissed with exemplary costs. 19-B. The 7th defendant had not chosen to contest the matter. 20. On the strength of the respective pleadings of the parties, the following issues and additional issues have been settled. 1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to partition and other reliefs prayed for? 2. To what relief? Additional issues framed on 14.7.1994. 1. Whether the limited rights of Y. Padmarajamma are enlarged into full rights under Section 14 (1) of Hindu Succession Act? 2. Whether the suit is barred by time? Additional issue framed on 4.8.1995 (1) Whether the lease granted by D-2 in favour of D-8 in respect of items 4, 6 and 7 of the plaint schedule property is binding on the plaintiff? If so, the plaintiff is entitled to recover possession of the half share in those properties from D-8 in a civil Court? 21. On behalf of the Plaintiff, the plaintiff behalf was examined as P.W.1 and Exs.A-1 to A-17 were marked. On behalf of the defendants, D.W.1 was examined and EX.B-1 was marked. If so, the plaintiff is entitled to recover possession of the half share in those properties from D-8 in a civil Court? 21. On behalf of the Plaintiff, the plaintiff behalf was examined as P.W.1 and Exs.A-1 to A-17 were marked. On behalf of the defendants, D.W.1 was examined and EX.B-1 was marked. 22 The trial Court on appreciation of the evidence available on record, after referring to the evidence of P.W.1 and D.W.1 and also Exs.A-1 to A-17 and also Ex.B-1, in particular, recorded reasons in detail and came to the conclusion that the alienations are un-authorized since the mother Padmarajamma had no "grit to make such alienations and also specifically referred to the recitals in Ex. B-1 and came to the conclusion that inasmuch as the alienations made by Padmarajamma being unauthorized, after the death of Padmarajamma, the plaintiff had challenged the same within the time and further in the light of evidence of P.W.1, the suit being within the time of limitation, the plaintiff is entitled to half share in the plaint schedule properties and accordingly, granted preliminary decree for partition and certain appropriate further reliefs. 23. Before taking up further discussion it may be appropriate to have a glance at the contents of Ex.A-3. The contents of Ex.A-3 read as hereunder: (Telugu Matter - Omitted) 24. The recitals or Ex.A-3 being self-explanatory, the same need not be elaborated. Elaborate submissions had been made in the light of evidence of P.W. 1 and D.W.1 and it had been specifically pointed out that the evidence of D.W.1, in any way would negative the stand taken by the contesting defendants relating to the applicability of Section 14 (1) of the Act i.e., enlargement of the life interest into absolute estate. 25. Learned counsel representing the 1st respondent placed strong reliance on Sharad Subramanyam v. Soumi Mizumdar wherein the Apex Court at paragraph Nos.16 and 17 held as under: "Mr. Bhaskar P.Gupta, learned Senior Counsel for the respondents, rightly distinguished all these cases, as it was clearly proved therein that the properties had been given to a female Hindu, either in recognition of or in lieu of her right to maintenance under the Shastric Hindu Law or under the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act 1956. Bhaskar P.Gupta, learned Senior Counsel for the respondents, rightly distinguished all these cases, as it was clearly proved therein that the properties had been given to a female Hindu, either in recognition of or in lieu of her right to maintenance under the Shastric Hindu Law or under the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act 1956. Consequently, these were instances where the dispositions of property albeit as a limited estate, would blossom into a full Interest by reason of sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act. Learned counsel further contended that there is no absolute rule that all properties demised to a female Hindu were necessarily in recognition of or in lieu of her right to maintenance. It was possible even after the Act came into force to create a limited estate by reason of a gift or Will. Such a situation would fall within the ambit of subsection (2) of Section 14 of the Act as long as it was not in a recognition of or in lieu of a right to maintenance under the Shastric Hindu Law or under a statute. Learned Senior counsel relied on Section 30 of the Act. which recognizes the light of a Hindu to dispose of self-acquired property by will Mr. Gupta relied on the judgment of this Court in Bhura and others v. Kashi Ram which was also a case of, limited estate conferred on a female Hindu by a Will. This Court held that, upon a proper construction of the Will, the bequeathal in favour of the female Hindu was clearly Indicative of: “……….the testator's intention of only creating a life Interest In her and nothing more and the various expressions used therein are indicative of and are reconcilable only with the hypothesis that the testator was creating an estate In favour of .. (the female Hindu), Only for her lifetime and not an absolute estate." Thus, in view of the fact that there were no indications, either in the will or externally to indicate that the property had been given to the female Hindu in recognition of or In lieu of her right to maintenance, it was held that the situation fell within the ambit of subsection (2) of Section 14 of the Act and that the restricted life estate granted to the female Hindu could not be enlarged into an absolute estate. Learned counsel for the respondents relied strongly on this judgment and contended that there was no proposition of law that all dispositions of property made to a female Hindu were necessarily In recognition of her right to maintenance whether under the Shastric Hindu Law or under the statutory law, Unless the said fact was independently established to the satisfaction of the court, the grant of the property would be subject to the restrictions contained therein, either by way of a transfer, gift or testamentary disposition. Learned counsel also distinguished the three cases Cited by the learned counsel for the appellant that in each, the circumstances clearly indicated that the testamentary disposition was in lieu of the right of maintenance of the female Hindu, We think that this contention is well merited and needs to be upheld." 26, The learned counsel also pointed out the recitals made in Ex.A-17 and made certain submissions that the recitals in EX.A-17, if carefully examined, would negative the stand taken by the contest in defendants that Ex. A-3, In fact, 'NGS executed in lieu of maintenance. The contents of Ex.A-17 being relevant, the same may be glanced at and the contents of Ex.A-17 read as under: (Telugu Matte, -- Omitted) 27. Incidentally, Ex.A-4 to A-6 also "ad been referred to. Further strong reliance was placed on the decisions of this Court in Guduru Sriramaiah and others v. Kallam Venkata Reddy and others wherein the learned Judge of this Court at paragraph Nos.9 and 14 observed as under: "It is implicit from the above exposition of the provisions embodied in Section 14, the Hindu woman shall not suffer any disability merely by virtue of restricted estate prescribed by the written instrument or the decree under which she came into possession of the property. The prescription of the restricted estate may be merely by way of reiteration or re-statement of the then existing Hindu Law principle; even where the property was intended to be given to her in recognition of the preexisting right which she had. But, if no pre-existing right can be reasonably inferred and the intention of the settlor was to deliberately leave a restricted estate to a Hindu woman, subsection (2) comes into play. But, if no pre-existing right can be reasonably inferred and the intention of the settlor was to deliberately leave a restricted estate to a Hindu woman, subsection (2) comes into play. Viewed in the light of the settled legal position as enunciated above, there can be no doubt that Radhamma had a right to claim maintenance against her husband and there was a corresponding obligation on Parandhamaiah to provide for the support and maintenance of his wife. If he failed to do so, the properties of Parandhamaiah either in his hands or in the hands of his heirs should have been subject to the paramount claims of Radhamma for maintenance. There is no evidence to the effect that Radhamma was otherwise taken care of by Parandhamaiah by making an adequate provision for her maintenance before executing the settlement deed. It is true that Sri Parandhamaiah while executing the settlement deed was dictated by an inclination to give away the properties to his wife's brother Sri Ramaraidu after the life-time of his wife Radhamma for certain substantial reasons. But it is equally true that Parandhamaiah was very much conscious of the need to provide for support and maintenance of his wife which was his foremost obligation. In the circumstances, the reasonable inference or presumption to be drawn is that Sri Parandhamaiah settled the properties on his wife with rights of enjoyment during her life time in recognition of her pre-existing right to maintenance. The legal and moral obligation to maintain his wife was uppermost in his mind. If Sri Parandhamaiah had omitted to do that, it could very well be that Radhamma would have laid claims for maintenance by proceeding against the properties either during or after the life time of her husband. It is in this back ground that the settlement deed of 1921 has to be understood. The mere fact that there was no express reference in the settlement deed to the maintenance of the wife or her pre-existing right to claim maintenance is not a material factor. I am fortified in the conclusion which I have reached from the judgment of the Supreme Court in Maharaja Pillai Ammal's case (3 supra). The mere fact that there was no express reference in the settlement deed to the maintenance of the wife or her pre-existing right to claim maintenance is not a material factor. I am fortified in the conclusion which I have reached from the judgment of the Supreme Court in Maharaja Pillai Ammal's case (3 supra). The following observations of Jagannatha Shetty, J. at Paragraph 6 are most apposite: "The deed or any other arrangement by which the husband gives the property to his wife for maintenance need not specifically state that it is given in lieu of maintenance; it is not an act of charity the husband does. It is out of his personal obligation to maintain her. The right to maintenance of a Hindu woman is a personal obligation of the husband. If, therefore, the wife is put in exclusive possession of the property with the right to take the income for her maintenance, it must be presumed that the property is given to her in lieu of maintenance. The very right to receive maintenance which is inherent in her, is itself sufficient to enable the ripening of possession of any property into full ownership under Section 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act..." The above observations of the Supreme Court furnish a complete answer to the contentions advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioners Mr.B.V. Subbaiah. In that case the Supreme Court rejected the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that the properties not having been given to the wife 'in lieu of maintenance', Section 14 (1) read with Explanation thereto does not apply. No doubt, in the present case there are no express words that the income which Radhamma would get from the lands was meant for her maintenance. But it is implicit that one of the objects of settlement was only to provide sufficient income to Radhamma for her maintenance. It cannot be said that the property given to Radhamma was de hors her antecedent right to get maintenance." 28. But it is implicit that one of the objects of settlement was only to provide sufficient income to Radhamma for her maintenance. It cannot be said that the property given to Radhamma was de hors her antecedent right to get maintenance." 28. The learned counsel relied upon the Division Bench Judgment of this Court in –T.K.Subhash v. Kamala Bal wherein the Division Bench, after referring to the various decisions, observed at paragraph No.21, which reads as hereunder: "The contention of the learned senior counsel appears to be sound on first blush, but on close scrutiny of the covenants of the will dated 23.3.2005 executed by Krishnachar, we do not detain ourselves long to reject the same. The covenants in respect of the suit property have been detailed in the aforesaid paras of this judgment. The intention of the testator is very clear and there is no scope for any ambiguity that what he conveyed to the first defendant is only restricted rights which mean that she can enjoy the ground and first floors of the suit house during her life time. The three judge bench of the Supreme Court in Mrs.Karmi v. Amru held that where only life estate is conferred on a Hindu woman under the Will, she cannot claim to have become absolute owner under the Hindu Succession Act. The proposition of law laid down in Mrs. Karmi's case carne to be followed by a Division Bench of our High Court in P. Achuta Rao's case (3 supra). Para 5 of the judgment in P. Achuta Rao's case (3 supra) needs to be noted and it is thus: "The facts in the present case are exactly similar to the facts in the Supreme Court case discussed above. China Mahalakshmamma having been given the life estate in the suit property under the will of her father-in-law her right would be governed only by the terms of the will as provided under sub- section (2) of Section 14 and sub section (1) of Section 14 is not attract. In view of the Supreme Court decision the Bench decision of this Court referred to above is no longer good law. Following the Supreme Court decision, we hold that the life estate given to China Mahalakshmamma under EX.B-21 will is not enlarged to an absolute estate on coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act. In view of the Supreme Court decision the Bench decision of this Court referred to above is no longer good law. Following the Supreme Court decision, we hold that the life estate given to China Mahalakshmamma under EX.B-21 will is not enlarged to an absolute estate on coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act. Therefore, the appellants cannot claim any title to the suit property on the basis of the will EX.A-5 executed by China Mahalakshmamma." 29. The decision of the Division Bench Kusumgauri v. Umiben and others" had strongly been relied upon, wherein at paragraph Nos.4, 6 and 7, the learned vision Bench observed as under: "Having considered the provisions of Section 14 we shall consider what is the right of a Hindu widow whose husband has died prior to the Act of 1937 in the coparcener property or in the separate property of her husband. The law on the point is well settled. Justice Westropp in his classical judgment in Lakshman Ramchandra v. Satyabhamabai, (1871) ILR 2 Bom 494, observed as under: "This right of survivorship, on the other hand, is fully recognized by the Mitakhara as excluding the widow and other heirs in the enumeration of Yajnavalkya, when there are undivided coparceners to take the estate. The rule is a consequence of the doctrine that the right of each coparcener extending to the whole estate, it is fully owned as to every part notwithstanding the death of one of the joint tenants. If the coparceners of the deceased were his sons, they, as in Bengal take in preference to all other pretenders. If they make a division of the estate, they must allot to their mother an equal share, and the same to any sonless widow of their father; but this does not of necessity invest the widows here, any more than in Bengal, with a proprietorship in the estate before its partition. The sons must from the moment of their father's death, be regarded as sale owners, yet with a liability to provide for the widow's maintenance, and with a competence, on the widow's part to have the estate made answerable'. The sons must from the moment of their father's death, be regarded as sale owners, yet with a liability to provide for the widow's maintenance, and with a competence, on the widow's part to have the estate made answerable'. " The widow set up a claim to a moiety of the dwelling, but the Shastri's answer is: 'A son, after me death of his father, acquires a perfect right to the property, and while sons are alive the widow has no claim to his property. She cannot, therefore, claim any share of the house'. It seems opposed, therefore, both to the text of the Mitakshara and to the construction of the local interpreters to regard the widow's maintenance as 'a charge on the inheritance' taken by the son in the sense of a perfect right in re." Further observations of the learned Judge on this point are: "The widow's claim being strictly to maintenance and maintenance only, without any defined share in the estate even on partition, and the kind of maintenance even that she can claim being dependent on the perhaps fluctuating circumstances of the joint family, it appears that although she may at her will, get her claim recognized as chargeable on the estate in the hands of the coparceners, reduced to certainty, and secured as a specific charge on the estate, or, as Katyayana says, by 'the allotment of a share for her life', yet if she should refrain from that course in the hope of sharing the improving circumstances of the family or through mere carelessness, she leaves to the coparceners as unlimited estate to deal with at their discretion, and must share their ill as well as their good fortune". This case was considered by Full Bench of Madras High Court in Ramanadan v. Rangammal (1889) ILR 12 Mad 260 (FB). This case was considered by Full Bench of Madras High Court in Ramanadan v. Rangammal (1889) ILR 12 Mad 260 (FB). The learned Judges of the Madras High Court were considering the claim of right of residence of Hindu female in a dwelling house as against a purchaser thereof and relying on the aforesaid Bombay judgment, Muttusami Ayyar, J. observed as under: "It must be observed here that, though the mother living with and under thee protection of her sons submits to their dealing with ancestral property, the submission is under Hindu law subject to this condition, viz., that the managing coparcener who deals with the property must act, either really or to the purchaser's knowledge, within the scope or his authority as the manager of a joint fund. As to the mother's right of residence in the family house, it is a right inherent in her and an incident of her status as mother and the son cannot arbitrarily eject her from it. There is no indefiniteness as to the specific property to which it is referable and as the residence of Hindu females in family houses is a fact well known in this country, a purchaser was held not entitled to eject her, unless he showed that the sale bound that interest. The reason for the distinction between a jus in re over a general fund and a charge on a specific part of that fund did not extend to the right of residence in the family house, and it was therefore held with special reference to the mode in which the theory of a charge in the nature of an existing proprietary right was developed, that the equity of a purchaser for value did not extend to the mother's right of residence in specific property, viz., the family house, unless the sale was binding on her". The Privy Council in Pratapmull Agarwalla v. Dhanabati Bibi, 63 Ind App 33: (AI R 1936 PC 20) has also considered the right of a Hindu female governed by Mitakshara Law prior to the Act of 1937. The Privy Council in Pratapmull Agarwalla v. Dhanabati Bibi, 63 Ind App 33: (AI R 1936 PC 20) has also considered the right of a Hindu female governed by Mitakshara Law prior to the Act of 1937. After referring to various decisions of the Courts on the point, it was held that according to the Mitakshara law the wife, mother or grand-mother is entitled to a share when there is a partition by division of the family estate between coparceners, but she cannot be recognized as the owner of such share until the partition is actually made as she has no preexisting right in the estate except a right of maintenance. There is nothing in the Mitakshara law from which it can be inferred that upon a mere severance of the joint status of the family, any of the abovementioned females can claim a share. It will not be necessary to refer to other decided cases which repeat the said legal position. Thus it is clear that in the Mitakshara law a widow was entitled to a share on partition between the sons, but she was not entitled to claim her share till partition was effected. She was entitled to maintenance and residence but she got no ownership in the property of her husband until it was actually divided. Till then the right of widow was inchoate or imperfect. A complete right of maintenance includes in it the right of residence. Various Courts have also considered cases in which a last male holder leaves behind him amongst other properties a dwelling house or a dwelling house alone. So far as a dwelling house belonging to a Hindu family is concerned, the general rule of law is enunciated in Bai Devkore v. Sanmukhram, (1889) ILR 13 Bom 101. The Court in that case held that under the general rule of Hindu law prevailing in the Bombay Presidency a coparcener's widow was in the absence of any special circumstances, entitled to residence in the family dwelling house. The right of residence given to a widow in the dwelling house belonging to Hindu joint family is the general right of residence. The right of residence given to a widow in the dwelling house belonging to Hindu joint family is the general right of residence. In the case of Ramanadan (supra) the Full Bench of the Madras High Court was considering the extent of right of a Hindu widow as against a stranger and it is in this light that the Court had made the observations cited hereinbefore. The said decision laid down a rule of evidence and pointed out that the purchaser shall be deemed to have knowledge of right of residence of a Hindu widow in the family house. This decision does not lay down any other principle of law. Even in a case where a Hindu dies leaving a sole dwelling house and his heirs, namely, a widow and a son, the widow has a right of residence but her right of residence is a general right. The right of residence of a Hindu widow is curtailed (1) by restricting to cases where the debt for which the property is sold is not contracted for necessity; (2) by the rule that she cannot claim a right of residence in the whole of the premises if a portion of the house could be set apart for her and would afford reasonably sufficient accommodation, and (3) that if other reasonable accommodation even outside the family dwelling house is offered, she may be bound to accept such a substitute, atleast in certain circumstances, vide P. Suryanarayana Rao v. Bhalasubramania, ILR 43 Mad 635: (AIR 1920 Mad 106). After death of her husband if the widow resides with her son, she does so in exercise of her general right of residence. The net effect of these decisions is that so far as the right of residence of a Hindu widow in a dwelling house is concerned it stands on the same footing as her right of maintenance out of her husband's property. Both these general rights of a Hindu female are inchoate, indefinite and imperfect. But the question that arises is whether when a particular property is allocated to a Hindu widow or other female in lieu of her right of maintenance or right of residence, and proprietary interest is created therein. This allocation to her may be by contract or by reason of a decree of the Court. But the question that arises is whether when a particular property is allocated to a Hindu widow or other female in lieu of her right of maintenance or right of residence, and proprietary interest is created therein. This allocation to her may be by contract or by reason of a decree of the Court. The allocation of a particular property in lieu of the right of maintenance or residence of a Hindu widow or other female may be established by documentary evidence or oral evidence or the circumstances of the case may lead to that conclusion. In the case of Pirdhandas Parsumal v. Hajrabai Mahomad, (1968) 9 Guj L R 24, a Division Bench of this Court considered the said question while dealing with the case of parties who were Cutchi Memons governed by Hindu Law. The facts of the case are that one Shakur Haji Suleman was the owner of the suit house. He died in the year 1947 leaving behind him his son Sitar Haji Shakur and his widow Hajrabai. On partition of India, Sita left for Pakistan and was declared as an evacuee. His properties including suit property were declared as evacuee property by the Assistant Custodian of the Evacuee Property. Hajrabai thereupon preferred an appeal to the Custodian of the Evacuee Property. The Custodian of the Evacuee Property held that Hajrabai's claim to the suit property of Shakur Haji was only that of a right of residence. At the date when Sitar migrated to Pakistan, Hajrabai was residing in 2 rooms and the right of residence of Hajrabai to reside in the said two rooms as the widow of Shakur Haji Suleman was recognized by the Custodian of Evacuee Property. Hajrabai continued to occupy the said rooms and on November 14, 1953, the Assistant Custodian of the Evacuee Property issued an order fixing the Evacuee Property issued an order fixing the rent of the premises in possession of Hajrabai at RS.20 per month and required her to pay RS.680 as and by way of arrears of rent. Hajrabai appealed against the said order and in appeal it was held that it was not proper to ask Hajrabai to pay rent for the portion of the house in her possession because she was granted a right of residence in the premises. Hajrabai appealed against the said order and in appeal it was held that it was not proper to ask Hajrabai to pay rent for the portion of the house in her possession because she was granted a right of residence in the premises. On June, 8, 1955 the Central Government in exercise of its power under Section 12 (1) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 issued a notification to the effect that the Central Government had decided to acquire the Evacuee Property mentioned therein which included all urban immovable properties situated within the limits of a Municipality. By virtue of this notification the right, title and interest of Sitar in the suit house vested absolutely in the Central Government free from all encumbrances under Section 12 (2) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954. The Central Government thereafter in exercise of power sold the suit house by public auction and the same was purchased by defendants Nos.5 and 6 of that suit. The Central Government was of the view that acquisition of the suit house by the Central Government had an effect of extinguishing the right of residence and maintenance of Baj Hajrabai. Hajrabai, therefore, filed a civil suit in the Court for a declaration that she had a right of maintenance and residence in the suit house for her lifetime and the action of the Government in issuing notification and orders was illegal. It clearly appears from the facts that Hajrabi was in exclusive possession of the suit house in lieu of her right of residence and maintenance. To put in short the suit house was allotted to Hajrabai in lieu of her right of maintenance and residence and in these circumstances that the Court held that she had the proprietary interest in the suit house. The Court considered the Full Bench case of Madras High Court in (1889) ILR 12 Mad 260 (FB) (supra and observed as under: The right of residence of the widow in the family dwelling house is, therefore, enforceable against whoever is the owner of the house and it is no defence for a transferee of the house from the heirs to say that he is a bonafide purchaser of the house for value without notice of the said right. If the widow is disturbed in the exercise of her right of residence in the family house by anyone, she can enforce that right against the person causing the disturbance and she can conceivably sue a trespasser in the portion of the dwelling house in her occupation for injunction or damages. The right of residence of the widow in the family dwelling house is, therefore, a right available against the world at large and is a right in rem and must, therefore, be held to be an interest in the house. If the right of residence were enforceable only against the heirs or against purchasers for value from the heirs without notice of the right, the right would have been of the nature of jus in rem which is a right in personam. In that event the right of residence would have come within the same class of legal rights in which, for example, a charge falls and that would not have amounted to an interest in the house. But since the right of residence is enforceable against all, it is an interest in the house. As a matter of fact the right to enjoy possession of the house is one of the rights which goes to make up the bundle of ownership and when that right belongs to the widow, owner of the house is excluded, provided of course he is not a member of the family, from the enjoyment of that right and that barrier is removed only on the death of the widow or the widow giving up her right of residence." Thus this Court has taken the view that when specific property is allotted to a Hindu widow in lieu of her right of maintenance and residence she gets proprietary interest therein. The same view is taken in Lakshmi Chand v. Smt. Sukhdevi, AIR 1970 Raj 285 and B.a. Patil v. Smt Gangabai, AIR 1972 Bom 16 . The consequence is that in the case where a specific property is allotted to a Hindu widow in lieu of her right of maintenance and residence, she acquires proprietary interest therein. She cannot be evicted and thus has an exclusive right of residence during her life time; she can reside in the house but has no right of alienation. Thus the widow has got a limited ownership- a concept not unknown to Hindu law. She cannot be evicted and thus has an exclusive right of residence during her life time; she can reside in the house but has no right of alienation. Thus the widow has got a limited ownership- a concept not unknown to Hindu law. This limited right of the Hindu widow becomes an absolute interest in view of Section 14 (1) and the explanation appended to it. There is an alternative angle from which the question may be considered. Now the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 has been enacted to amend and codify the law relating to intestate succession amongst the Hindus. Section 4 there of provides that save as otherwise expressly provided in the Act any text, rule or interpretation of Hindu law or any custom or usage as part of that law in force immediately before the commencement of the Act shall cease to have effect with respect to any matter for which provision is made in the Act. This Act has made far-reaching changes in the structure of the Hindu Law of Succession. The traditional restricted power of a Hindu widow or other females in respect of disposition, no longer exists and the Act confers upon a Hindu female of full right of ownership. By enacting Section 4 the legislature intended to supersede the Hindu law in all matters in respect of which there is made an express provision in the Act and it is from this point of view that explanation 1 to subsection (1) of Section 14 requires to be noticed. The explanation provides that in the sub-section 'property' includes both movable and immovable acquired by a Hindu female by inheritance or devise or partition or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance or by gift from any person or by her own skill, exertion or by purchase or by prescription or in any other manner whatsoever, meaning thereby that a Hindu female gets proprietary interest in the property given to her in lieu of maintenance. To put in short the effect of the explanation is that when a property is allotted to a Hindu female in lieu of maintenance n she is regarded as holding a proprietary interest therein. So also when a female is given by an act of parties or a decree of the Court certain property for residence in lieu of her right of residence she gets proprietary interest therein. So also when a female is given by an act of parties or a decree of the Court certain property for residence in lieu of her right of residence she gets proprietary interest therein. This is so because of the' expression "in any other manner whatsoever" used in the explanation. The proprietary interest which a Hindu female thus gets is undoubtedly a limited interest because if it is regarded that she gets absolute interest there was no purpose in enacting the explanation. Even in cases where a Hindu female may not be held to be a limited owner of the property in lieu of maintenance or residence still because of the inclusive definition of the word 'property' given in the explanation, she will be a limited owner for the purpose of sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act. The explanation recognizes that when a property is assigned to a female Hindu in lieu of maintenance or residence she would be regarded as holding the property allocated to her as a limited owner. This being the specific provision in the explanation the entire house and no specific part of the property was allocated to her. Her possession was not exclusive, and her right of residence was general. Hence the provisions of Section 14 (1) cannot apply to the case, and it cannot be said that she became the absolute owner of the property. The provisions of the Act of 1937 were inapplicable as Thakordas had died before coming into force of the said Act. The learned District Judge was in error in holding that Devkorben got a share in the suit property by virtue of the provisions of the Act of 1937. For the reasons aforesaid decree passed by the appellate Court for partition cannot be sustained and has to be set aside. The decree of the trial Court dismissing the suit of the plaintiff is restored." 30. Further, in all fairness, learned counsel representing the first respondent would point out the decision of the Division bench of Gurajat, is prior to the case in V. Tulasamma v. Sesha Reddy. The decree of the trial Court dismissing the suit of the plaintiff is restored." 30. Further, in all fairness, learned counsel representing the first respondent would point out the decision of the Division bench of Gurajat, is prior to the case in V. Tulasamma v. Sesha Reddy. However, learned counsel representing the respective appellants in these appeals placed strong reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Palchuri Henumayamma v. Tadikamalla Kotlingam, wherein the Apex Court observed at paragraph Nos.7, 8, 9 and 10, sunder: "We have heard the parties in extenso and, in our opinion, the entire issue involved in this case depends upon the nature of bequeath made by the testator, to be gathered from the recitals of the Will dated 19-3-1929 as also the Codicil referred to hereinabove. A perusal of the Will shows that the testator had desired that after his death, Ramamma should take possession of all his movable and immovable properties and she should be guardian of har minor daughters till they attain majority. It is relevant to note at this stage that the testator has not desired that the share in his property should be conveyed or transferred to his daughters on their attaining majority. On the contrary, the recital proceeds to say that Ramamma shall enjoy all the movables and immovable properties till her death without making alienations, and after her death his eldest daughter shall take two shares in Item No. 1 of the schedule to the Will; her husband would take one share therein and second item in the schedule should be taken by the second daughter (appellant's mother) and, similarly, the third daughter was also provided for. The Will also provided for the family expenses to be incurred in tile marriages of the daughters and the amounts to be paid to them at the time of their marriage. The recitals in the said Will also show at more that one place that the testator had desired that Ramamma should enjoy the property during her life-time and it is only after her death that he had desired that the property be divided and handed over to the three daughters in the manner stated therein. The recitals in the said Will also show at more that one place that the testator had desired that Ramamma should enjoy the property during her life-time and it is only after her death that he had desired that the property be divided and handed over to the three daughters in the manner stated therein. Thus it is clear from the recitals that though the testator has not used the words 'in lieu of maintenance' he has certainly intended that the properties settled under the Will were left for the enjoyment of Ramamma during her life-time towards her maintenance. The fact that Ramamma was made a guardian of the minors would not in any manner deviate from the fact that the property under the Will was given to Ramamma for her enjoyment in lieu of her maintenance. The wording "My wife, Ramamma shall enjoy all my moveable and immoveable properties till her death" clearly shows that no arrangement was made by the testator for vesting of the properties in his daughters. It is only after the death of said Ramamma that he had desired that the property should be divided equally amongst his three daughters but then, as things would have it before the property could be said to have vested in the mother of the appellant, two circumstances intervened. Firstly, in the year 1944 itself, the appellant's mother died, and secondly by virtue of enactment of Section 14(1) of the Act in the year 1956, the estate of Ramamma got enlarged making her as the absolute owner of the property. The fact that Ramamma settled the properties almost in similar terms as those stated in the Will by the Settlement Deed of 1952 also, will not in any manner affect the operation of Section 14(1) of the Act and that part of the share retained by Ramamma which having continued to be in her possession as the property given to her in lieu of maintenance enlarged into her absolute estate on the coming into force of the 1956 Act. Mr. Nagaraja next contended that from the conduct of Ramamma it is clear that she herself understood the intention of her husband to be that he wanted his properties to be divided amongst his 3 daughters and she was only to manage the said property for and on behalf of the said daughters till her life time. Mr. Nagaraja next contended that from the conduct of Ramamma it is clear that she herself understood the intention of her husband to be that he wanted his properties to be divided amongst his 3 daughters and she was only to manage the said property for and on behalf of the said daughters till her life time. In support of this contention. He relied on certain circumstances which according to him show the intention of the testator as well as how Ramamma herself understood the Will. Firstly, he submitted than the Will in question hap demarcated specific shares to be allotted to the three daughters after the death of Ramamma. It is pursuant to this desire of the testator that Ramamma entered into a settlement in the year 1952 and thereafter a Partition Deed in the year 1955 according to which Ramamma allotted the very same properties to two of her daughters as was earmarked for them in the Will while retaining the share earmarked for appellant's mother with herself. He also relied upon as averment made by Ramamma in her written statement filed in an earlier proceeding marked in the present suit as Ex. A-6 wherein she had stated : "This defendant retained with her at the request of the plaintiff all the items as per the Will and the partitioned joint properties as per the deed 24-9-1955 to which the plaintiff is entitled to 1/3 rd share after the death of this defendant as per the above document." From the above circumstances, it is contended that even Ramamma understood tile Will to mean that she was only to manage the property for and on behalf of her daughters. Therefore, since the appellant's mother's share was specifically earmarked by the testator, on the death of Ramamma the same would have reverted to the appellant's mother if she were to be alive and since she is not alive, the appellant being the sale heir she is entitled to the said share. We are unable to accept this argument of Mr. Nagaraja. If the intention of the testator was to divide the property amongst his three daughters then nothing prevented him from doing so at the time the Will become operative. He need not have postponed that date till after the death of Ramamma. We are unable to accept this argument of Mr. Nagaraja. If the intention of the testator was to divide the property amongst his three daughters then nothing prevented him from doing so at the time the Will become operative. He need not have postponed that date till after the death of Ramamma. It is to be noted that the first daughter of the testator was major at the time the Will was executed and was married. If really the testator intended to give shares to the beneficiaries, he would have done so without creating a life interest for Ramamma to enjoy the entire property. The very fact that the Will specifically stated that Ramamma is entitled to enjoy the entire property during her life-time, in itself, is sufficient to hold that the property in question was given to Ramamma in lieu of maintenance during her life-time. It is only after the death of Ramamma that right, if any, would devolve on the daughters under the Will. The next circumstance relied upon by Mr. Nagaraja also does not support his case i.e. the manner in which Ramamma dealt with the property during her life-time. It is to be noted that till the year 195G. Ramamma had no absolute right over the property in question because the same was given to her in lieu of maintenance during her life-time only. In that situation, if Ramamma had entered into a settlement and a partition with two of her daughters this act would not lead to the conclusion that Ramamma was acting in accordance with the intention of the testator. It is possible knowing that she had no absolute right over the property and to buy peace in the family, she might have decided to divide the property and give the shares to two of her daughters and retain with her one share with an intention of subsequently transferring the same to the appellant. But then on coming into force of the 1956 Act, having realised that she had become the absolute owner of the property at least to the extent of the share retained by her, she decided to act in a manner she wanted and in this process she gifted the property to her third daughter, her husband and their children. But then on coming into force of the 1956 Act, having realised that she had become the absolute owner of the property at least to the extent of the share retained by her, she decided to act in a manner she wanted and in this process she gifted the property to her third daughter, her husband and their children. By the time in law, there was no prohibition on her to gift the said property, therefore, even this circumstance does not help the stand taken by Mr. Nagaraja on behalf of the appellant." 31. Learned counsel also placed strong reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Maharaja Pillai Lakshmi Ammal v. Maharaja Pillai Thillanayakom7, wherein the Apex Court at paragraph Nos. 8, 9, 10 observed as under: The property possessed by a female referred to under Section 14 (1) includes property both movable and immovable property. It may be acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise or at a partition or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance etc. The deed or any other arrangement by which the husband gives the property to his wife for maintenance need not specifically state that it is given in lieu of maintenance. It is not an act of charity the husband does. It is out of his personal obligation to maintain her. The right to maintenance of a Hindu woman is a personal obligation of the husband. If, therefore, the wife is put in exclusive possession of the property with the right to take the income for her maintenance, it must be presumed that the property is given to her in lieu of maintenance. The very right to receive maintenance which is inherent in her, is itself sufficient to enable the ripening of possession of any property into full ownership under Section 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act. It was, however, urged for the respondents that Section 14 (1) does not take within its fold every property that comes into possession of the widow. It must be a limited estate in the sense of ownership without the right of disposal. It should be a specific property given to her in lieu of her right to maintenance. 32. It was, however, urged for the respondents that Section 14 (1) does not take within its fold every property that comes into possession of the widow. It must be a limited estate in the sense of ownership without the right of disposal. It should be a specific property given to her in lieu of her right to maintenance. 32. In Nazar Singh and others v. Jagjit Kaur and others' while following the decision in Vaddeboyina Tulasamma and others v. Vaddeboyina Sesha Reddi (dead) by LRs (5 supra), and distinguishing the decision in Gumpha v. Jaibal the Apex Court at paragraph Nos.8, 9 and 10 observed as under: " Section 14 and the respective scope and ambit of sub-sections (1) and (2) has been the subject matter of a number of decisions of this Court, the most important of which is the decision V. Tulasamma v. V. Sesha Reddi (1977) 3 SCC 99 : ( AIR 1977 SC 1944 ). The principles enunciated in this decision have been reiterated in a number of decisions later but have never been departed from. According to this decision, sub-section (2) is confined to cases where property is acquired by a female Hindu for the first time as a grant without any preexisting right under a gift, 'will instrument decree', order or award, the terms of which prescribe a restricted estate in the property. It has also been held that where the property is acquired by a hindu female in lieu right of maintenance inter alia, it is in virtue of a pre-existing right and such an acquisition would not be within the scope and ambit of sub-section (2) even if the instrument, decree, order or award allotting the property to her prescribes a restricted estate in the property. Applying this principle it must be held that the suit lands, which were given to Harmel Kaur by Gurdial Singh in lieu of her maintenance, were ~eld by Harel Kaur as full owner there of and not as a limited owner notwithstanding the several restrictive covenants accompanying the grant. (also see the recent decision of this court in Mangat Mal v. Punni Devi (1955) 6 SCC 88 (1995 AIR SCW 3885) where a right to residence in a house property was held to attract sub-section (1) of Section 14 notwithstanding the fact that the grant expressly conferred only a limited estate upon her. (also see the recent decision of this court in Mangat Mal v. Punni Devi (1955) 6 SCC 88 (1995 AIR SCW 3885) where a right to residence in a house property was held to attract sub-section (1) of Section 14 notwithstanding the fact that the grant expressly conferred only a limited estate upon her. According to subsection (1) where any property is given to a female Hindu in lieu of her maintenance before the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, such property becomes the absolute property of such female Hindu on the commencement of the Act provided the said property was "possessed" by her. Where however the property is given to a female Hindu towards her maintenance after the commencement of the Act, she becomes the absolute owner thereof the moment she is placed in possession of the said property (unless, of course, she is already in possession) notwithstanding the limitations and restrictions contained in the instrument grant or award there under the property is given to her. This proposition follows from the words in sub-section (1) which insofar as is relevant read. "Any property possessed by a female Hindu ... after the commencement of this Act shall be held by her as full owner and not as a limited owner". In other words, though the instrument grant, award or deed creates a limited estate or a restricted estate, as the case may be, it stands transformed into an absolute estate provided such property is given to a female Hindu in lieu of maintenance and is placed in her possession. So far as the expression "possessed" is concerned it too has been the subject matter of interpretation by several decisions of this Court to which it is not necessary to refer for the purpose of this case. Reference may also be had to the decision in Jagannathan Pillai v. Kunjithapadam Pillai, (1987) 2 SCC 572 : ( AIR 1987 SC 1493 ) which deals with post -Act acquisition of property by a female Hindu. The learned counsel for the respondents-plaintiffs relied upon a recent decision of this Court in Gumpha v. Jaibai (1994) 2 SCC 511 in support of his contention that in the facts of this case, it is sub-section (2) of Section 14 and not sub-section (1) that is attracted. But that was a case where certain property was given to a Hindu female under a Will. But that was a case where certain property was given to a Hindu female under a Will. The Bench held that since Will is referred to only in sub-section (2) and not in subsection (1) it is sub-section (2) that is attracted in the case of a property bequeathed under a Will. Since, the suit lands were given to Harmel Kaur under a compromise-and not under a Will-the principle of the said decision has no application herein. For the above reasons, we hold that the said lands became the absolute property of Harmel Kaur the moment she was placed in possession thereof, (It is not disputed that the said property was indeed placed in her possession and that she was in possession and enjoyment thereof from the date of the aforesaid compromise). Once this is so the suit must fail. The Courts below ere in error in holding that because the compromise whereunder the said lands were given to Harmel Kaur towards her maintenance created a life estate and a restricted estate sub-section (1) of Section 14 is not attracted and that it is sub-section (2) that is attracted here." 33. P.W.1 deposed that 7th defendant is his elder brother and his father's name is Ramayya Chowdary and his mother's name s Padmarajamma. His father had two brothers namely Sarvarayudu and Ankineedu. His father and his brothers are all dead. First defendant is the wife, 2nd defendant is the adopted son of his paternal uncle Anikneedu. 3rd defendant is the wife of his paternal uncle Sarvarayudu. 4th defendant is the daughter of Sarvarayudu. 5th and 6th defendants are the sons of Sarvarayuydu. His paternal grand mother's name is Manikyamba. On 20.09.1925 his paternal grand mother Manikyamba executed a registered will. He is not in possession of the said will. He has filed the certified extract obtained from the Registering authority EX.A-1. The scribe and attestors of EX.A-1 are not alive. According to EX.A-1 all the three sons are entitled to her properties. The suit schedule property is covered by EX.A-1. His father and his brothers partitioned their properties covered by EX.A-1 in the year 1937. In the said partition, the suit schedule properties fell to the share of his father. The partition among his father and his brothers is evidenced by a registered partition deed dated 9.7.1937. The suit schedule property is covered by EX.A-1. His father and his brothers partitioned their properties covered by EX.A-1 in the year 1937. In the said partition, the suit schedule properties fell to the share of his father. The partition among his father and his brothers is evidenced by a registered partition deed dated 9.7.1937. As original is not available he has obtained certified extract from the Registering authorities-Ex.A-2. This witness also deposed that his date of birth is 17.5.1940. His father executed a registered settlement deed dated 25.11 .1940 settling the properties in favour of his mother, himself and his brother. The original document is not available, hence the certified extract is obtained from the registering authorities EX.A-3.his mother the settlement deed EX.A-3 his mother was given limited right of enjoyment in her life time and after her demise himself and his brother are entitled for the entire property. Himself and his brother have got vested remainder rights. His mother was having 7 or 8 acres of land at Gandredu Village given by her parents. But for Ex.A-3, his mother has no right in the properties covered by EX.A-3 whether limited rights or absolute rights. His mother had no right to either alienate the property or bequeath in favour of the 3rd parties. His mother in her life time executed a settlement deed on 2.9.1967 with regard to plaint schedule items 1 to 4, 6 and 7 in favour of his paternal uncle Ankineedu with absolute rights. The certified registration extract of the said settlement deed executed by his mother is EX.A-4. His mother executed a settlement deed on 1.9.1957 in respect of item NO.8 of plaint schedule. property in favour of the 4th defendant. The registration extract of the said settlement deed is EX.A-5. She executed a settlement deed in favour of Sarvarayudu on 1.9.1959 in respect of item No.5 of plaint schedule property and certified extract is Ex.A-6. She executed All the documents in her own capacity and also representing him as natural guardian. His mother has no right to execute settlement deeds Exs.A-4 to A-6 beyond her life time. Ankineedu out of the property settled in his favour by his mother, he sold away items 1 to 3 of the schedule property in favour of one Totakura Varahalamma under the registered settlement deed elated 31.3.1965 marked as EX.A-7. The said Varahaiamma died in the year 1984. Ankineedu out of the property settled in his favour by his mother, he sold away items 1 to 3 of the schedule property in favour of one Totakura Varahalamma under the registered settlement deed elated 31.3.1965 marked as EX.A-7. The said Varahaiamma died in the year 1984. She had four daughters. Defendants 9 Find 10 are the daughters of said Varahalamma. The other two daughters are Ananta Lakshmi, Satyavathi and Subbalakshmi. They relinquished their right in the property by way of gift deeds in favour of defendants 9 and 10 in respect of the suit schedule property purchased by their mother Totakura Varahalamma under two gift deeds Exs.A-8 and A-9, dated 28.5.1986. The items 1 to 3 of plaint schedule are now in possession of the defendants 9 and 10. 2nd defendant leased out the suit schedule items 3,6 and 7 in favour of the 8th defendant by way of registered lease deed dated 16.5.1986, it is EX.A-10. Therefore, he filed the suit contending that the settlement deeds, subsequent sale deeds are not valid and the suit schedule property be partitioned between himself and his brother. EX.A-11 is the death extract of his mother. After the death of his mother, he got issued notice to D-1 to D-6. The office copy of notice is EX.A-12. D-1 and D-2 have issued a reply notice EX.A-13. D-3 to D-6 also have issued reply notice-Ex.A-14. Therefore, he field the suit for partition of entire suit schedule properties and also for future profits. 34. After re-call of this witness, he further stated that certified copy of extract from R.S.R pertaining to the suit land from Chowdavaram is EX.A-15. It shows the old survey numbers corresponding to new., survey numbers. His father and mother lived jointly until they died. In the cross examination, this witness specifically deposed that the contents of EX.A-12 notice are correct. Paragraph No.1 of the EX.A-12 notice, it was specifically mentioned as hereunder: 35. Our client and one Yarlagadda Kondalarao are brothers and they are the sons of Yarlagadda Ramayya and his wife Padmarajamma. Our client is the second son to his parents. Our client's father Ramayya has two other brothers by name Sri Krishna Venugopala Ankineedu who is the husband of NO.1 and father of NO.2 among you and another Yarlagadda Sarvaraidu, who is the husband of No.4 and father of Nos.3, 5 and 6 among you. Our client is the second son to his parents. Our client's father Ramayya has two other brothers by name Sri Krishna Venugopala Ankineedu who is the husband of NO.1 and father of NO.2 among you and another Yarlagadda Sarvaraidu, who is the husband of No.4 and father of Nos.3, 5 and 6 among you. Our client was born on 17.5.1940. Our client's father has ancestral property which is mentioned in the schedule annexed to this notice which was allotted to him in partition between him and his two brothers under the registered partition deed dated 9.7.1937. As our client's father, our client and his elder brother Kondalarao were living as members of a joint family of which our client's father was the manager, the schedule property is the joint family property belonging to this family." 36. It is needless to say in paragraph No.1, it was specifically stated that our client's father has ancestral property which is mentioned in the schedule annexed to this notice which was allotted to him in partition between him and his two brothers under the registered partition deed dated 9.7.1939. This witness came to know about the execution of Will by his paternal grand mother Manikyamba through EX.A-2. His father, this witness and his brother were living jointly. Between the year 1960 and 1965 his father, this witness, and his brother partitioned the property other than the plaint schedule properties. This witness does not know whether there is any partition deed and whether there is any documentary evidence to show that his father and his sons have partitioned the other properties. This witness while admitting the recitals in EX.A-12 stated that it is true that the plaint schedule properties are joint family properties and that his father got his share under EX.A-2 partition deed viz., an extent of 40-00 acres of Nimmakayala Kothapalli land and 10-00 acres of Uppalaguptam land. He does not know what happened to that land. Their family was having 30-00 acres of land at Chollangi prior to partition. He does not know as to how his family got property at Chollangi. His father got it and he does not know how he got it. The lands at Chollangi are not shown in EX.A-2. The lands said to be at Chollangi do not belong to his paternal grand mother. He does not know as to how his family got property at Chollangi. His father got it and he does not know how he got it. The lands at Chollangi are not shown in EX.A-2. The lands said to be at Chollangi do not belong to his paternal grand mother. He does not know whether the lands situated at Nimmakayala Kothapalli and Uppala Guptam lands were sold away in Court auction in execution of decrees obtained against his father. He denied the suggestion that his father executed EX.A-3 towards maintenance of his mother. He admits that Exs.A-1 (sic. 4), A-5 and A-6 gift deeds were executed by his mother for herself and as a guardian representing him. He came to know about Exs.A-1 (sic. 4), A-5 and A-6 in the year 1958 after he became major. Learned counsel also made certain submissions relating to 7th defendant attaining majority and the transaction that took place with the consent of the 7th defendant. This witness further deposed when he was cross-examined on 15.9.1994, that he was aged 54 years and his date of birth is 17.5.1940 and he does not know the details of the properties got by his father from his father. His mother got 8-00 acres land from her parents situated in Grandredu Village. He does not know when that land was sold away by his mother. He does not know whether he sold away 7-95 cents situated in Gandredu village under a registered sale deed dated 13.9.1940. EX.B-1 is the sale deed (registration extract) dated 13.9.1940 executed by his mother in respect of her property of Ac.7-95 cents situated in Gandredue Village. Immediately after EX.B-1-sale deed, his father purchased 7-50 cents of land in Chowdavaram Village. He does not know from whom he purchased. He does not know when he purchased (the date of purchase) the lands in Chowdavaram. It is not the property covered by EX.A-3, dated 25.11.1940. He does not know about the partition effected between him and his brother and his father in 1958. He does not know when they partitioned their property in writing. This witness was also cross-examined by 0-8, further cross examined by 0-9 and 0-10. Several suggestions put to this witness had been specifically denied. He does not know about the partition effected between him and his brother and his father in 1958. He does not know when they partitioned their property in writing. This witness was also cross-examined by 0-8, further cross examined by 0-9 and 0-10. Several suggestions put to this witness had been specifically denied. This witness was recalled by virtue of an order in I.A NO.1237 of 1994 and in further chief-examination, this witness deposed that on 5.5.1935 an extent of 7-04 cents was purchased in the name of his mother and father in Chodavaram Village under registered sale deed. The registration extract of the sale deed is EX.A-16. The money which was invested to purchase the said land was of his mother. On 26.11 .1940 his father executed a relinquishment deed in favour of his mother in respect of his share in the lands covered by EX.A-16. The registration extract of the relinquishment deed is EX.A-17. By the date of EX.A-3 his mother was in possession of land covered by Exs.A-16 and A-17. EX.A-3 and A-17 was simultaneously registered. In the cross-examination of this witness by 0-1 and 0-2, he deposed that he was not born in 1935. He does not know personally whether the property covered by EX.A-16 was purchased by the money of his mother (Streedhana income). This witness further deposed that it is not true to suggest that with an intention to provide maintenance the land covered by A-16 was purchased in the name of his parents and subsequently EX.A-17 the relinquishment deed was executed by his father in favour of his mother. This witness further deposed that he does not know the details of the properties possessed and stood in the name of his mother by the date of EX.A-16 and he did not go through EX.A-16 but he knew that it was in the name of his parents. He does not know who is the vendor under EX.A-16 and the amount of consideration paid and the mode of payment and by whom the money was paid. By the year 1935 his father was having about 30-00 or 40-00 acres of land. He cannot S8Y to whom the amount of consideration under A-16 belongs to whether to his father or his mother. He cannot say the reason as to why EX.A-16 was obtained in the name of his father or his mother. By the year 1935 his father was having about 30-00 or 40-00 acres of land. He cannot S8Y to whom the amount of consideration under A-16 belongs to whether to his father or his mother. He cannot say the reason as to why EX.A-16 was obtained in the name of his father or his mother. He does not know whether both the documents EX.A-3 and A-17 were drafted on the same day but given different dates and executed on the same day before registering authority. Certain other questions posed in regard to EX.A-16 and EX.A-17 had also been answered by this witness. 37. As against this evidence of P.W.1 and the documentary evidence referred to above, D.W.1-3rd defendant in the suit, deposed that 4th defendant is his elder daughter. 5th and 6th defendants are her sons. This witness deposed further relationship of other parties. This witness specifically deposed that the land given to Padmarajamma by her parents was sold away by them to discharge the loans incurred by Ramayya, her husband. The gold and jewellery was also sold away to discharge the debts incurred by Ramayya. Ramayya since sold away the land of Padmarajamma along with gold and jewellery in turn he had given 17-00 acres of land of his own to Padmarajamma situated in Chodavaram. The selling of the land belonging to Padmarajamma and giving away the land to her belonging to Ramayya took place simultaneously. 38. In the light of this evidence of D.W.1, certain submissions were made by the learned counsel representing first respondent plaintiff that in the light of such evidence of D.W.1, the findings recorded by the trial court relating to the non-applicability of Section 14 (1) of the Act cannot be found fault with. 39. D.W.1 further deposed that Padmarajamma gave Ac. 7 -00 of land at the time of her daughter's marriage. Out of the balance, Ac-10-00 of land her husband purchased about 21/2 acres of land. Out of 21/2 acres purchased from Padmarajamma about 1-00 acre of land or more than that was purchased in the name of his elder daughter. The balance land out of 2% acres purchased from Padmarajamma was purchased in the name of her husband. Since the time of purchase the land purchased in the name of her elder daughter is in her possession and the land purchased in the name of her husband is in his possession. The balance land out of 2% acres purchased from Padmarajamma was purchased in the name of her husband. Since the time of purchase the land purchased in the name of her elder daughter is in her possession and the land purchased in the name of her husband is in his possession. Her younger daughter's name is Boddu Satyavathi. Ankeenedu the husband of 1st defendant also purchased some land from Padmarajamma. By the time of the purchase of land by her husband and her brother-in law Ankeenedu, her father-in-law was alive. Therefore, the suit is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed. 40. In the cross examination by plaintiff, D.W.1 deposed about the relationship between the parties. This witness also deposed the suit schedule property originally belongs to her mother-in-law. She got the property through her mother. She cannot say in which year Padmarajamm sold away the land in Gandredu Village. She did not see the sale deed. The said deed EX.B-1 pertaining to the Gandredu land was filed in the Court. Her son is looking after the litigation on her behalf. She knows the reason for selling the land under Ex. B-1. It was for discharge of the loans incurred by Ramayya. Padmarajamma had no loans incurred by herself. He does not know about the recitals in EX.B-1 but those lands are not sold as they were situated in another village and not fit for cultivation. The witness added as she knows the lands were sold to discharge the debts incurred by the husband of Padmarajamma. She cannot say the extent of loans and details and particulars to whom Ramayya was indebted by the time the land was sold away under Ex. B-1. She cannot say what are the loans and to whom the loans were discharged by Ramayya with the amounts realized under Ex. B-1 sale transactions. There were cases also against Ramayya filed by the creditors. She does not have any documents to show that he was indebted to others and there was litigation in respect of the loans taken by him. She denied the suggestion that Ramayya was not having loans and that the lands under Ex.B-1 was not sold to discharge the debts incurred by Ramayya. She does not have any documents to show that he was indebted to others and there was litigation in respect of the loans taken by him. She denied the suggestion that Ramayya was not having loans and that the lands under Ex.B-1 was not sold to discharge the debts incurred by Ramayya. She knows that Ramayya executed registered settlement deed in respect of suit schedule land stating that his wife Padmarajamma will enjoy with limited rights and subsequently it will devolve on her sons. Ramayya executed a gift deed in favour of her wife in respect of 17-00 acres of land in Chodavaram. The land purchased in the name of her elder daughter and in the name of her husband from Padmarajamma was not conveyed by way of sale deeds, but by way of gift deeds. She does not know how much consideration was paid towards the purchase of 21/2 acres by her husband to Padmarajamma. She does not have any documentary evidence to show that 21/2 acres of land from Padmarajamma was purchased by paying consideration. She denied the suggestion that Ankeenedu did not purchase the land by paying consideration to Padmarajamma. 41. Perused the evidence available on record. Relating to the nature of the properties to be either in ancestral or joint family, there are certain admissions made by P. W.1. However, the evidence of D. W.1 also would go to show that originally these properties belong to her mother-in-law. 42. Be that as it may, in the light of the evidence available on record, it appears that the family properties belonging to Padmarajamma had been disposed of and no doubt, certain submissions were made in a way that in the light of this fact, the element of stridhana, has to be inferred in relation to the properties covered by EX.A-3. It is no doubt true that the evidence available on record is not sufficient to establish the respective stands taken by the parties. But, however, for the reasons best known to them, the evidence of P.W.1 and D.W.1 alone is available on record. Article 108 of the limitation Act, 1963 reads as hereunder: Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run 108. Suit during the life of Three years when the right to sue accrues. But, however, for the reasons best known to them, the evidence of P.W.1 and D.W.1 alone is available on record. Article 108 of the limitation Act, 1963 reads as hereunder: Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run 108. Suit during the life of Three years when the right to sue accrues. a Hindu or Muslim female by a Hindu or Muslim, who if the female died at the date of instituting the suit, would be entitled to the possession of land, to have an alienation of such land made by the female declared to be void except for her life or until her re-marriage Likewise Article 113 of the said Act reads as hereunder: Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run 113. Any suit for Three years When the right to sue accrues which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this schedule. 43. On the aspect of question of limitation, strong reliance was placed On the decision of the Apex Court in Vaddeboyina Tulasamma and others v. Vaddeboyina Sesha Reddi (dead) by LRs (7 supra), Kappara Kotaiah v. Kappara Venkata Sesha Lalithamma (8 supra), Gaddam Venkayamma v. Gaddam Veerayya (died) and others (9 supra) . 44. In Ex.A-12, the properties were specified as the joint family properties. Certain submissions were made on the origin of this property. But, however, a careful analysis of Exs.A-1, A-2 and A-3 as wel1 discloses that inasmuch as Ramayya Chowdari and his brothers treated these properties as family properties, they have partitioned the same. and subsequent thereto. Ramayya Chowdary thought of executing Ex.A-3, no doubt. specifically with life interest under EX.A-3. what had been recited in Exs.A4 to A6 and A 17 had been strongly relied upon by Sri V.L.N.GK Murthy to substantiate his submission that Section 14 (1) of the Act cannot be made applicable since some more acceptable evidence need to be adduced. In the absence of the same, the findings recorded by the trial Court cannot be found fault with. This Court is not inclined to accept the said submission in the light of the recitals made in EX.A-3. The object of Section 14 (1) of the Act had also to be kept in mind. The fact that Ramayya Chowdary was alive during that time, may not seriously alter the situation. This Court is not inclined to accept the said submission in the light of the recitals made in EX.A-3. The object of Section 14 (1) of the Act had also to be kept in mind. The fact that Ramayya Chowdary was alive during that time, may not seriously alter the situation. Even otherwise, the ratio laid down in Vaddeboyina Tulasamma and others v. Vaddeboyina Sesha Reddi (dead) by LRs (5 supra), is being allowed and in the light of the specific view, which is followed sufficiently, for a long time establishing the language employed in EX.A-3, even if the recitals of EX.A-17 are to be read carefully, it cannot be said that Section 14 (1) of the Act shall not be applicable to the facts of the case. Hence, the findings recorded by the trial Court that the life interest continues to be a life interest only and it had been enlarged itself into an absolute one by virtue of operation of Section 14 (2) (sic. 14(1)) of the Act, cannot be sustained. 45. It may be true that the admissions were made by P.W.1 in relation to EX.A-12. But, the nature of the property had been lost sight. On this aspect of the matter, this Court also is satisfied that either from the date of alienations or at least after attaining the majority, the plaintiff had not chosen to challenge the said actions within a period of limitation. Yet, another interesting point is that the 7th defendant-the elder brother of the plaintiff, who had attained majority and who was a consenting party to prior transactions in a way had not chosen to deny the alienations at any point having kept quite. May be that, the plaintiff at the instance of the elder brother, might have thought of challenging alienations after a long lapse of time both in law and equity. The Court has as well specified that the suit instituted by the plaintiff cannot be said to be within the limitation. In any view of the matter, this court has already specified the view expressed by the trial Court in relation to the approval of cause of action and the commencement of the limitation cannot also be sustained. Even otherwise, this Court is I thoroughly satisfied that the limitation is not a bona fide one. 46. In any view of the matter, this court has already specified the view expressed by the trial Court in relation to the approval of cause of action and the commencement of the limitation cannot also be sustained. Even otherwise, this Court is I thoroughly satisfied that the limitation is not a bona fide one. 46. No doubt, several decisions were cited by the counsel representing appellants in relation to the limitation. The counsel representing first respondent made an attempt to distinguish these decisions. This aspect also need not detain this Court any further. 47. In the light of the facts and circumstances, this Court is thoroughly satisfied that by virtue of Ex.A-3, by operation of law, inasmuch as Section 14 (1) of the Act is applicable, the life interest, which had been given under Ex.A-3, in lieu of maintenance, had been enlarged into an absolute estate and Padmarajamma had parted with these properties and further alienations made by Padmarajamma had not been challenged, on both the grounds, the first respondent is bound to fail and the decree granted by the trial Court granting other appropriate reliefs, is totally unsustainable and accordingly the appellants are bound to succeed. 48. In the result, the decree and judgment made by the trial Court are hereby set aside and the appeals are hereby allowed and in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances, let the parties bear their own costs.