JUDGMENT :- K. Chandru, J. Heard the arguments of Mr. R.S. Ramanathan, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Mr. M.T. Arunan, learned Additional Central Government Standing Counsel representing the respondents 2 to 4 and have perused the records. 2. The petitioner challenged the charge-memo dated 26. 2004 issued under Rule 14 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules 1965 [for short, CCS Rules) before the Tribunal. At the relevant time, the petitioner was working as an Income Tax Officer at Thirunelveli. During the year 2002-2003, he committed a gross misconduct and harassed one assessee and his wife. He illegally initiated wrongful income tax procedures against one assessee and addressed the Valuation Officer of the Income Tax [for short, IT] Department at Madurai for determination of cost of construction of a house belonging to the assessee. On this pretext, the IT officials demanded bribe from the assessee and they were caught red-handed by the CBI on 28. 2003 As soon as the arrest came to the light of the petitioner, he dropped the proceedings initiated under Section 148 of the IT Act against the said assessee and withdrew the reference. 3. That act was considered as the petitioner having failed to maintain devotion to duty and acted in the manner unbecoming of a Government servant. The petitioner sent elaborate explanations to the charge-memo on 17. 2004 and 18. 2004. But, however, without waiting for further action, he chose to question the charge-memo itself. The ground taken before the CAT was that the charge-sheet was contrary to the CCS Rules and that no concrete opinion was found while framing the charge-memo. The Tribunal dismissed the said Application on the ground that an enquiry had been initiated and the petitioner can very well participate in the same. Aggrieved by the order of the Tribunal dated 14. 2005, the present writ petition has been filed. 4. This Court at the time of admission of the writ petition granted an interim stay on 05. 2005. It is for the first time in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, a ground was taken that he had exercised a statutory function under Section 147 of the I.T. Act and no exception can be taken. Because of the interim order granted, no further proceedings were initiated. 2005. It is for the first time in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, a ground was taken that he had exercised a statutory function under Section 147 of the I.T. Act and no exception can be taken. Because of the interim order granted, no further proceedings were initiated. Since the petitioner had reached the age of superannuation on 30.4.2005, he was allowed to retire from service by an order dated 24. 2005 passed by the third respondent. Therefore, a further argument was advanced that no further disciplinary proceedings can be taken against him since the petitioner had already reached the age of superannuation and was also permitted to retire. 5. However, Mr. M.T. Arunan, learned Additional Central Government Standing Counsel brought to the notice of this Court the proceedings dated 24. 2005 issued by the second respondent on the very same date which reads as follows: "The disciplinary proceedings initiated under Rule 14 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 with the above charge sheet shall continue under Rule 9 of the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972." 6. A counter affidavit was also filed by the respondents in the Miscellaneous Petition with a prayer to vacate the stay. 7. Mr. R.S.Ramanthan, learned counsel for the petitioner made the following submissions: The petitioner being an Income Tax Officer and a quasi-judicial authority, no exception can be taken to the action initiated by him and he also relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in 1999 (7) SCC 409 [Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar v. Union of India and others] as well as the Division Bench judgment of this Court reported in 2006 Writ L.R. 670 [The Special Commissioner and Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Chennai v. N. Sivasamy and another]. 8. Alternatively, he submitted that since the petitioner was allowed to retire by an order dated 24. 2005, no further proceedings can be initiated against him and his superannuation will terminate all further proceedings. For this purpose, reliance was placed on the following three Division Bench judgments of this Court:- (a) N.M. Somasundaram v. The Director General of Police, Madurai – 4 and others [1997 W.L.R. 120]; (b) State of Tamil Nadu v. R. Karuppiah [2005 (3) CTC 4]; and (c) P. Muthusamy v. Tamil Nadu Cements Ltd. [ 2006 (4) M.L.J. 504 ] 9. First of all, it must be stated that the petitioner had given his explanation to the charge-memo and as rightly contended in paragraph 7 of the counter affidavit that in the departmental enquiry initiated under Rule 14 of the Rules, the petitioner will be given sufficient opportunities to defend himself. On this ground, the writ petition is liable to be rejected. 10. It must be stated that on the first contention based upon the discretion being exercised by a statutory authority, reliance was made on the Nagarkars case (cited supra) as well as the Division Bench judgment in Sivasamys case (cited supra). However, the issue cannot be concluded with these judgments alone without looking into the subsequent pronouncements. 11. The judgment of the Supreme Court in Nagarkars case (cited supra) was considered to be contrary to the view expressed by the Supreme Court in Union of India v. K.K.Dhawan [ 1993 (2) SCC 56 ] and by a subsequent three Judges Bench in Union of India and others v. Duli Chand [ 2006 (5) SCC 680 ]. The relevant passage found in paragraph 9 of the Duli Chands case (cited supra) is as follows: Para 9: "In our opinion, Nagarkar case was contrary to the view expressed in K.K. Dhawan case. The decision in K.K. Dhawan being that of a larger Bench would prevail. The decision in Nagarkar case therefore does not correctly represent the law. Inasmuch as the impugned orders of the Tribunal and the High Court were passed on the law enunciated in Nagarkar case this appeal must be allowed." 12. Therefore, it is relevant to refer to the decision rendered by the three Judges Bench in K.K. Dhawans case (cited supra) wherein it was noted that the view that no disciplinary action could be initiated against an officer in respect of judicial or quasi-judicial functions was wrong. It was further said that the officer who exercises judicial or quasi-judicial powers acting negligently or recklessly could be proceeded against by way of disciplinary action. It was further said that the officer who exercises judicial or quasi-judicial powers acting negligently or recklessly could be proceeded against by way of disciplinary action. The Court listed six instances when such action could be taken and the relevant passage found in paragraph 28 of the judgment is extracted below: Para 28: "(i) where the officer had acted in a manner as would reflect on his reputation for integrity or good faith or devotion to duty; (ii) if there is prima facie material to show recklessness or misconduct in the discharge of his duty; (iii) if he has acted in a manner which is unbecoming of a government servant; (iv) if he had acted negligently or that he omitted the prescribed conditions which are essential for the exercise of the statutory powers; (v) if he had acted in order to unduly favour a party; (vi) if he had been actuated by corrupt motive, however small the bribe may be because Lord Coke said long ago ‘though the bribe may be small, yet the fault is great’.” 13. In fact, subsequently, the K.K. Dhawans case came to be considered by the Supreme Court in Government of Tamil Nadu v. K.N. Ramamurthy [ 1997 (7) SCC 101 ] wherein the Supreme Court set aside the order of the Tribunal in quashing the punishment of an officer, who was discharging quasi-judicial function and the Supreme Court held that the order of the Tribunal was contrary to several decisions of the Supreme Court. 14. Ultimately, such matters will have to be decided depending on the facts of the particular case and normally, we would have had no hesitation in setting aside the order of the Tribunal on the strength of the order of the three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court in Duli Chand case (cited supra). But, however, subsequent to the Duli Chand case, the Supreme Court in two occasions, considered the effect of the Nagarkars case. 15. In Ramesh Chander Singh v. High Court of Allahabad and another [ 2007 (4) SCC 247 , the Nagarkars case came to be considered. Speaking for the three Judges Bench, K.G. Balakrishnan, CJ held in paragraph 12 of the judgment as follows: Para 12: "This Court on several occasions has disapproved the practice of initiation of disciplinary proceedings against officers of the subordinate judiciary merely because the judgments/orders passed by them are wrong. Speaking for the three Judges Bench, K.G. Balakrishnan, CJ held in paragraph 12 of the judgment as follows: Para 12: "This Court on several occasions has disapproved the practice of initiation of disciplinary proceedings against officers of the subordinate judiciary merely because the judgments/orders passed by them are wrong. The appellate and revisional courts have been established and given powers to set aside such orders. The higher courts after hearing the appeal may modify or set aside erroneous judgments of the lower courts. While taking disciplinary action based on judicial orders, the High Court must take extra care and caution." 16. In referring to Nagarkars case, in paragraph 17, it was observed as follows: Para 17: "In Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar v. Union of India this Court held that wrong exercise of jurisdiction by a quasi-judicial authority or mistake of law or wrong interpretation of law cannot be the basis for initiating disciplinary proceeding. Of course, if the judicial officer conducted in a manner as would reflect on his reputation or integrity or good faith or there is a prima facie material to show recklessness or misconduct in discharge of his duties or he had acted in a manner to unduly favour a party or had passed an order actuated by corrupt motive, the High Court by virtue of its power under Article 235 of the Constitution may exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. Nevertheless, under such circumstances it should be kept in mind that the Judges at all levels have to administer justice without fear or favour. Fearlessness and maintenance of judicial independence are very essential for an efficacious judicial system. Making adverse comments against subordinate judicial officers and subjecting them to severe disciplinary roceedings would ultimately harm the judicial system at the grassroot level." But there is no reference to Duli Chand case in this judgment. 17. Once again, another two Judges Bench in Inspector Prem Chand v. Government of NCT of Delhi and others [ 2007 (4) SCC 566 ] considered the decision in Nagarkars case. In referring to Nagarkars case, the latter judgment of the two Judges Bench in Inspector Prem Chands case (cited supra), in paragraph 15, observed as follows: Para 15: "A finding of fact was arrived at that the accused did not make demand of any amount from the complainant and thus no case has been made out against him. In referring to Nagarkars case, the latter judgment of the two Judges Bench in Inspector Prem Chands case (cited supra), in paragraph 15, observed as follows: Para 15: "A finding of fact was arrived at that the accused did not make demand of any amount from the complainant and thus no case has been made out against him. This Court in Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar v. Union of India has categorically held: “42. Initiation of disciplinary proceedings against an officer cannot take place on information which is vague or indefinite. Suspicion has no role to play in such matter. There must exist reasonable basis for the disciplinary authority to proceed against the delinquent officer. Merely because penalty was not imposed and the Board in the exercise of its power directed filing of appeal against that order in the Appellate Tribunal could not be enough to proceed against the appellant. There is no other instance to show that in similar case the appellant invariably imposed penalty.” 18. Once again, in this matter also, there was no reference to the earlier three Judges Bench of the Duli Chand case. Nagarkars case was found to be contrary to the earlier judgment of the Supreme Court in K.K. Dhawan case wherein the Supreme Court had laid down six instances wherein a Government servant discharging quasi-judicial function can be proceeded in a disciplinary action which passage was already extracted. In the subsequent judgment in Ramesh Chander Singh case (cited supra), K.G. Balakrishnan, CJ had referred to Nagarkars case and quoted with approval the said precedent. 19. Therefore, even if all the judgments in K.K.Dhawan case, Nagarkar case, Duli Chand case, Ramesh Chander Singh case and Inspector Prem Chand case are read together, it is necessary that before initiating disciplinary action, the Department must have prima facie material to show recklessness and the officer had acted negligently or his order unduly favoured a party and his action was actuated by corrupt motive. 20. Even the Sivasamys case (delivered by this Court) relied upon the Nagarkars case and did not deal with the other cases of the Supreme Court on this subject. In the light of the clear pronouncements of the Supreme Court noted above, the first contention of the petitioner must necessarily fail. 21. 20. Even the Sivasamys case (delivered by this Court) relied upon the Nagarkars case and did not deal with the other cases of the Supreme Court on this subject. In the light of the clear pronouncements of the Supreme Court noted above, the first contention of the petitioner must necessarily fail. 21. With reference to the second contention regarding the bar on taking disciplinary action, we must consider the relevant rule before proceeding to deal with the legal submissions. As per the proceedings dated 24. 2005 issued by the second respondent, a decision was taken to deal with the case in terms of Rule 9 of the CCS (Pension) Rules. Rule 9 of the said Rules reads as follows: "9. Right of President to withhold or withdraw pension [(1) The President reserves to himself the right of withholding a pension or gratuity, or both, either in full or in part, or withdrawing a pension in full or in part, whether permanently or for a specified period, and of ordering recovery from a pension or gratuity of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to the Government, if, in any departmental or judicial proceedings, the pensioner is found guilty of grave misconduct or negligence during the period of service, including service rendered upon reemployment after retirement : Provided that the Union Public Service Commission shall be consulted before any final orders are passed : Provided further that where a part of pension is withheld or withdrawn the amount of such pensions shall not be reduced below the amount of rupees three hundred and seventy-five (Rupees One thousand nine hundred and thirteen from 1-4-2004 – see GID below Rule 49) per mensem.] (2)(a) The departmental proceedings referred to in sub-rule (1), if instituted while the Government servant was in service whether before his retirement or during his reemployment, shall, after the final retirement of the Government servant, be deemed to be proceedings under this rule and shall be continued and concluded by the authority by which they were commenced in the same manner as if the Government servant had continued in service : Provided that where the departmental proceedings are instituted by an authority subordinate to the President, that authority shall submit a report recording its findings to the President. (b) The departmental proceedings, if not instituted while the Government servant was in service, whether before his retirement, or during his re-employment, - (i) shall not be instituted save with the sanction of the President, (ii) shall not be in respect of any event which took place more than four years before such institution, and (iii) shall be conducted by such authority and in such place as the President may direct and in accordance with the procedure applicable to departmental proceedings in which an order of dismissal from service could be made in relation to the Government servant during his service. (3) 1 Deleted (4) In the case of Government servant who has retired on attaining the age of superannuation or otherwise and against whom any departmental or judicial proceedings are instituted or where departmental proceedings are continued under sub-rule (2), a provisional pension as provided in Rule 69 shall be sanctioned. (5) Where the President decides not to withhold or withdraw pension but orders recovery of pecuniary loss from pension, the recovery shall not ordinarily be made at a rate exceeding one-third of the pension admissible on the date of retirement of a Government servant. 6) For the purpose of this rule, - (a) departmental proceedings shall be deemed to be instituted on the date on which the statement of charges is issued to the Government servant or pensioner, or if the Government servant has been placed under suspension from an earlier date, on such date ; and (b) judicial proceedings shall be deemed to be instituted - (i) in the case of criminal proceedings, on the date on which the complaint or report of a police officer, of which the Magistrate takes cognizance, is made, and (ii) in the case of civil proceedings, on the date the plaint is presented in the court. In the light of the above Rule, there will be no difficulty for the respondents to proceed with the enquiry. 22. Of the three Division Bench judgments cited by the petitioner, the first decision went on the interpretation to Rule 56(1)(c) of the Fundamental Rules made by the Tamil Nadu Government. The third decision related to an employee working in a Government company. 23. 22. Of the three Division Bench judgments cited by the petitioner, the first decision went on the interpretation to Rule 56(1)(c) of the Fundamental Rules made by the Tamil Nadu Government. The third decision related to an employee working in a Government company. 23. In the second decision, while dealing with F.R. 56 (1)(c), this Court also relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in 1999 (3) SCC 666 [Bhagirathi Jena v. B.D.O.S.F. Corporation] and after referring to paragraphs 6 and 7, came to the conclusion that if an employee was permitted to retire on attaining the age of superannuation, then there was no power vested in the authority to proceed against an employee after attaining the age of superannuation until he was suspended from service pending further action. 24. But on a careful reading of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Bhagirathi Jena case (cited supra), it can be seen that the said case proceeded on the basis that in the absence of any specific provision in the relevant rule, the authority will have no legal power to reduce the retiral benefit or conduct of a disciplinary proceeding. 25. The Bhagirathi Jenas case was subsequently considered by the Supreme Court in Ramesh Chandra Sharma v. Punjab National Bank [ 2007 (9) SCC 15 ]. The following passages found in the paragraphs 16, 17 and 19 to 22 may be usefully extracted below: Para 16: "The question, thus, as to whether continuation of a disciplinary proceeding would be permissible or the employer will have to take recourse only to the pension rules, in our opinion, would depend upon the terms and conditions of the services of the employee and the power of the disciplinary authority conferred by reason of a statute or statutory rules. Para 17: We have noticed hereinbefore that the Bank has made Regulations which are statutory in nature. Regulation 20(3)( iii ) of the said Regulations reads thus: “20. (3)( iii ) The officer against whom disciplinary proceedings have been initiated will cease to be in service on the date of superannuation but the disciplinary proceedings will continue as if he was in service until the proceedings are concluded and final order is passed in respect thereof. The officer concerned will not receive any pay and/or allowance after the date of superannuation. The officer concerned will not receive any pay and/or allowance after the date of superannuation. He will also not be entitled for the payment of retirement benefits till the proceedings are completed and final order is passed thereon except his own contribution to CPF.” The said Regulation clearly envisages continuation of a disciplinary proceeding despite the officer ceasing to be in service on the date of superannuation. For the said purpose a legal fiction has been created providing that the delinquent officer would be deemed to be in service until the proceedings are concluded and final order is passed thereon. The said Regulation being statutory in nature should be given full effect." 26. It was further observed in the said judgment after reviewing all the case laws that in case of a pension retiree, the power always lies with an employer to take further action even after retirement. The following passages found in paragraphs 19 to 22 of the said judgment may be extracted: Para 19: "The issue is, thus, no longer res integra, which as would be evident from the ratio laid down by this Court from time to time. Para 20: In State Bank of India v. C.B. Dhall 6 it was held as under: (SCC p. 553, para 17) “17. Under Rule 20-B disciplinary proceedings if initiated against an employee before he retires from service could be continued and concluded even after his retirement and for the purpose of conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings, the employee is deemed to have continued in service but for no other purpose.” Para 21: In Harihar Bhole Nath upon considering Regulations 351-A and 470 of the Civil Services Regulations, this Court following Brahm Datt Sharma opined as under: “21. The right to withhold or withdraw the pension may arise in different situations. Two different contingencies are clearly envisaged under the Regulations viz. if the pensioner is found guilty of misconduct either in departmental proceedings or in judicial proceedings. Although, prima facie , the proviso appended to Regulation 351-A does not envisage continuation of the proceedings, the same must be held to be existing on a plain reading thereof. Regulations 351-A and 470 provide for a composite scheme; by emphasising that payment of pension is not automatic it can be withheld if the conditions laid down therein are satisfied. Although, prima facie , the proviso appended to Regulation 351-A does not envisage continuation of the proceedings, the same must be held to be existing on a plain reading thereof. Regulations 351-A and 470 provide for a composite scheme; by emphasising that payment of pension is not automatic it can be withheld if the conditions laid down therein are satisfied. Undoubtedly, before an order of withholding the amount of pension or a part thereof is passed, the procedures laid down under the statute are required to be complied with. The procedural safeguards must be kept in mind. Limitations of application of the Rules again have to be borne in mind. 22. But the said Rules read with the proviso and the Explanation appended thereto construed in their entirety clearly postulate that the proceeding initiated before the delinquent officer reached his age of superannuation would be valid.” This Court therein distinguished this decision in State of U.P. v. Shri Krishna Pandey and Bhagirathi Jena v. Board of Directors, O.S.F.C. in the following terms: ( Harihar Bhole Nath case, SCC pp. 468-70, paras 20 & 25) “20. The High Court has placed strong reliance on State of U.P. v. Shri Krishna Pandey 7 wherein the departmental enquiry was initiated after the delinquent officer reached his age of superannuation. Noticing Regulation 351-A of the Civil Services Regulations and that the departmental proceeding was initiated after the retirement of the employee, the same was held to be impermissible in law. Although it was not necessary to pronounce upon the construction of Regulation 351-A involving a case where a departmental proceeding was initiated prior to reaching of the age of superannuation by the delinquent officer, it was observed that as the officer had retired on 31-3-1987 and proceedings were initiated against him on 12-4-1991, proviso appended to the rule would be applicable. 25. Reliance has also been placed on Bhagirathi Jena v. Board of Directors, O.S.F.C. 8 wherein this Court was concerned with interpretation of Regulation 17 of the Orissa State Financial Corporation Employees Provident Fund Regulations, 1959.” To the same vein is the decision of this Court in State of U.P. v. R.C. Misra. 25. Reliance has also been placed on Bhagirathi Jena v. Board of Directors, O.S.F.C. 8 wherein this Court was concerned with interpretation of Regulation 17 of the Orissa State Financial Corporation Employees Provident Fund Regulations, 1959.” To the same vein is the decision of this Court in State of U.P. v. R.C. Misra. Para 22: We are, therefore, of the opinion that it was permissible for the Bank to continue with the disciplinary proceedings relying on or on the basis of Regulation 20(3) (iii) of the Punjab National Bank (Officers) Service Regulations, 1979." 27. Therefore, in the light of the above, it has to be held that even after retirement, if there are statutory Rules providing for continuation of the disciplinary proceedings, no exception can be taken for continuing a disciplinary action by an employer. 28. In the present case, Rule 9 is a complete answer for the contention raised by the petitioner. It must also be noted that very recently, the Supreme Court in the judgment reported in U.P. State Sugar Corporation Ltd. and others v. Kamal Swaroop Tondon [ 2008 (2) SCC 41 ] dealt with a case of the employers right to initiate action even after retirement. The following passages found in paragraphs 27 and 28 may be usefully reproduced: Para 27: "In UCO Bank v. Sanwar Mal [ 2004 (4) SCC 412 ], the Court held that two concepts: (i) resignation; and (ii) retirement were different and employed for different purposes and in different contexts. Resignation brings about complete cessation of master and servant relationship, but retirement does not do so. In case of retirement, master and servant relationship continues for grant of retiral benefits. Para 28: If it is so, the appellant Corporation, in our opinion, is right in submitting that the proceedings could have been continued after the retirement of the respondent employee as far as the financial loss caused to the Corporation because of negligence on the part of employee and the benefit claimed by the respondent workman on his terminal benefits are concerned." 29. In the light of the above, even the second contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner must fail. It is for the petitioner to participate in the enquiry and establish his innocence. 30. The writ petition is misconceived and devoid of merits and accordingly, will stand dismissed and the interim stay granted will stand vacated. In the light of the above, even the second contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner must fail. It is for the petitioner to participate in the enquiry and establish his innocence. 30. The writ petition is misconceived and devoid of merits and accordingly, will stand dismissed and the interim stay granted will stand vacated. However, there will be no order as to costs. Connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed.