ANIL KUMAR J. 1. The petitioner, who is stated to be a retired Superintendent of Tis Hazari Courts, seeks contempt proceedings against the police officials who had arrested him pursuant to an FIR registered pursuant to the direction of Commissioner of Police on the complaint of Mr.Navin Soni, who is not a party to the present petition, being FIR No.270/2000 under Section 379/420/468 and 471 of Indian Penal Code on the ground that his arrest had interfered with the due course of judicial proceedings initiated by him under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act and because his arrest has also obstructed administration of justice. 2. Brief facts to comprehend the controversies are that Mr.Navin Soni resident of 3, DLF Industrial Area, Moti Nagar, on 5th October, 1996 had made a written complaint addressed to SHO, Police Station Kirti Nagar, New Delhi, that he had lost two signed blank cheques one of them bearing number 722832 of Punjab National Bank, Khari Baoli, and other cheque of its sister concern, M/s.Shobit Enterprises, of Punjab and Sind Bank, Fateh Puri, New Delhi, along with other documents. He had also sent a communication dated 6th October, 1996 to Punjab National Bank, Khari Baoli, Delhi, stating that he had lost the above-mentioned cheque in transit and requested the bank to stop the payment. Similar letter was also sent to Punjab and Sind Bank. The letter dated 6th October, 1996 is stated to have been received by the Bank on 7th October, 1996 by speed post. On receipt of complaint from Mr.Navin Soni, the Bank had sent a letter dated 8th October, 1996 raising various queries. Mr.Navin Soni replied to the queries raised by the Bank by his letter dated 12th October, 1996. 3. The said Mr.Navin Soni had received summons under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act and Section 403/406/420/120 of Indian Penal Code for dishonour of a cheque bearing No.722832 of Punjab National Bank, Khari Baoli, Delhi and a demand of Rs.15.00 lakh was made. 4. On 27th October, 1998, the said Navin Soni, who is not a party to the present petition made a complaint to the DCP West that the said cheques which were lost by him, were stolen by the petitioner and he has forged them and on the basis of the forged cheques, a forged agreement to sell dated 14th January, 1998 was also prepared by him. \ 5. \ 5. Since no FIR was registered on the complaint dated 27th October, 1998, he made a complaint to the Commissioner of Police detailing the facts and requested that an FIR be registered against the petitioner. The Commissioner of Police passed an order dated 12th May, 2000 directing that an FIR be registered and matter be investigated. The said order was endorsed by the Joint Commissioner of Police, Southern Range, on 12th May, 2000. The order came to ACP, Rajouri Garden, on 15th May, 2000 and reached the office of SHO, Kirti Nagar, on 16th May, 2000. Subsequently an FIR bearing No.270/2000 under Section 379/420/468/471 of IPC was registered against Shri R.P. Malik, the petitioner. On the registration of the FIR the matter was entrusted to respondent No.1, Shri Anil Sharma for investigation. In order to investigate the allegations made in the FIR, the respondent No.1 inspected the file of the complaint filed against Shri Navin Soni under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act on 23rd May, 2000 and on inspection it transpired that the original cheque bearing No.722832 of Punjab National Bank and alleged agreement to sell dated 14th January, 1998 were not on record. The respondents arrested the petitioner on 29th June, 2000 as it was deemed appropriate by them to have custodial interrogation of the petitioner. 6. According to the petitioner, an agreement to sell dated 14th January, 1998 was executed between him and Smt.Asha Soni, Proprietor of M/s.New Gayatri Cork Industry, 3 DLF Industrial Area, for the purchase of 450 sq.mtrs. of plot No.3 DLF Industrial Area, Moti Nagar, for a total sale consideration of Rs.30.00 lakh out of which Rs.15.00 lakh was paid in cash on 14th January, 1998. The seller, Smt.Asha Soni, had also appointed her son, Shri Navin Soni, as her attorney. Shri Navin Soni is also alleged to have signed the said agreement to sell. According to the petitioner, he received a call on 3rd March, 1998 from Shri. Navin Soni requesting him to receive back the Rs. 15.00 lakh he had paid in terms of the agreement as his mother was not in a position to sell the said plot on account of a family dispute that had arisen. Petitioner agreed to take back Rs.15.00 lakh and rescind the agreement. 15.00 lakh he had paid in terms of the agreement as his mother was not in a position to sell the said plot on account of a family dispute that had arisen. Petitioner agreed to take back Rs.15.00 lakh and rescind the agreement. According to the petitioner, on the ground of financial constraint, the sum of Rs.15.00 lakh was paid through a post-dated cheque which was filled in presence of Shri Devender Kumar and the cheque was dated 10th March, 1998. The cheque bearing No.722832 for Rs.15.00 lakh was drawn on Punjab and National Bank, Khari Baoli, Delhi-110006 and was issued out of the account No.CC-556 in the name of M/s.New Gayatri Cork Industries which could be operated by Shri Navin Soni as its Manager. The cheque on presentation was, however, returned with the endorsement exceeds arrangement consequent whereto a notice was given by the petitioner which is alleged to have been replied by a letter dated 27th May, 1998 wherein it was contended that the allegations made in the notice given on behalf of petitioner were incorrect and that a signed blank cheque bearing the same number as that in respect of which the demand is being made by the petitioner was lost by Shri Navin Soni in 1996. 7. Consequent to the reply given on behalf of Smt.Asha Soni, a complaint was filed under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act and under Sections 403/406/420/120 B of Indian Penal Code against M/s.New Gayatri Cork Industries, Smt. Asha Soni and Shri Navin Soni. The summons was issued by the concerned MM on 6th June, 1998. The summons was issued by the learned MM only under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, however, this order was not challenged by the petitioner because according to him he was interested only in getting his money back. 8. Shri Navin Soni and Smt.Asha Soni had filed an application on 3rd November, 1998 for recalling the summoning order. According to the petitioner, the grounds taken for recalling the summoning order were almost the same as the allegations made by them in FIR No.270/2000 registered at Police Station Kirti Nagar which was filed by them. The application for recalling the order for summoning was dismissed by the learned Magistrate by order dated 9th March, 1999. According to the petitioner, the grounds taken for recalling the summoning order were almost the same as the allegations made by them in FIR No.270/2000 registered at Police Station Kirti Nagar which was filed by them. The application for recalling the order for summoning was dismissed by the learned Magistrate by order dated 9th March, 1999. While considering the averments and pleas raised by the respective parties, the Magistrate had held that at the time of taking cognizance Court is only required to be satisfied whether prima facie case is made out under the provisions of law or not. It was further held that the Court is not supposed to go into the entire merits of the case meticulously and is also not to consider the defence likely to be put up by the accused and relied on Modi Cement v. Kunchil Kumar Nandi, 72 (1998) DLT 179 (Supreme Court). 9. The petitioners plea is that the order dated 9th March, 1999 dismissing the application for recalling the summons was not challenged by the accused Smt.Asha Soni and Shri Navin Soni and had become final. According to him, Shri Navin Soni mis-interpreted few lines of the pre-summoning statement of the petitioner and got an FIR No.270/200 under Section 379/420/468/471 of Indian Penal Code registered and the respondents, though could not have even registered the FIR, arrested him in collusion with them. The FIR has been registered, according to the petitioner, despite knowing the pendency of the proceeding under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act in which the application of Smt.Asha Soni and Shri Navin Son for recalling the summoning order had been dismissed by order dated 9th March, 1999. The petitioner is also alleged to have obtained a report of a hand-writing expert who had opined that the writer of the signature on the agreement dated 14th January, 1998 is the same as the writer of the piece of paper dated 5th October, 1996, a complaint addressed to SHO, Kirti Nagar, Delhi regarding loss of cheques. The petitioner has also filed another complaint which was registered as FIR No. 220/2000 with Police Station Preet Vihar, Delhi. The petitioner has also filed another complaint which was registered as FIR No. 220/2000 with Police Station Preet Vihar, Delhi. The further allegation of the petitioner is that his son-in- law, Shri Anoop Minocha, was intimidated and man-handled by Shri Navin Soni and Shri Vikas Soni, his brother, on 18th May, 2000 which had led to a complaint being filed which was registered as FIR No.187/2000 under Section 323/341/506/34 of Indian Penal Code. 10. The petitioner has invoked the jurisdiction under Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act on the ground that he is a victim of conspiracy of fraud at the hands of Shri Navin Soni, his mother, Smt.Asha Soni, and his father, Shri Badri Prasad, who caused him wrongful loss to the tune of Rs.15.00 lakh and that he was arrested on 29th June, 2000 by the respondents/contemnors in FIR No.270/2000 under Section 379/420/468/471 IPC of Police Station Kirti Nagar in blatant violation of various statutory provisions as well as the directions of the Honble Supreme Court. 11. The petitioner has alleged that the respondents had been hand-in-glove with the above-stated persons. According to the petitioner, the action was initiated against him under the said FIR No.270/2000 only to pressurize him to forego his hard-earned money and to cause humiliation and incalculable harm to his reputation and self-esteem. 12. The learned senior counsel for the petitioner has relied on 1978 Crl.L.J. 560, Hastings Mill Limited v. Hira Singh and Others; AIR 1970 Punjab and Haryana 331, Hoshiar Singh v. State; AIR 1968 SC 1513 , Govind Sahai and another v. State of U.P. and another; AIR 1962 SC 1172 , Pratap Singh and Another v. Gurbaksh Singh; (1980) 3 SCC 311 , Advocate-General, State of Bihar v. M/s. Madhya Pradesh Khair Industries and another; (1997) 6 SCC 642 , Dilip K. Basu v. State of W.B. and others and (1994) 4 SCC 260 , Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P. and Others and has contended that by arresting the petitioner, the respondents have interfered with due course and administration of justice and are therefore, liable for committing Criminal Contempt. 13. The respondents have rebutted the facts as has been alleged by the petitioner. They contended that no directions were received from any court against arrest of the petitioner and his arrest was on account of sufficient evidence warranting his arrest at that time. 13. The respondents have rebutted the facts as has been alleged by the petitioner. They contended that no directions were received from any court against arrest of the petitioner and his arrest was on account of sufficient evidence warranting his arrest at that time. The respondents have also submitted that they have highest regard for the Courts of law and they have not committed any illegal action causing any interference in the administration of justice. 14. According to the respondents the statements of complainant Mr.Navin Soni and others were recorded on 28th May, 2000. The statement of W/HC Smt. Sushila who had received the complaint lodged by Navin Soni regarding loss of Cheque in 1996 was also recorded. The IO had also verified whether said W/HC was on duty on the date and time when the complaint was lodged by Navin Soni regarding loss of his cheques or not. The IO had also recorded the statements of Manager of Punjab National bank and also seized various documents regarding complaints being made by Navin Soni to the bank in 1996 about the loss of cheques. According to the respondents the case was investigated for about 1 1/2 month and after being satisfied that the charges leveled against the petitioner were corroborated with the evidence gathered from the bank, arrested him on 29th June, 2000 and produced him before the learned Magistrate on 30th June, 2000. The bail application of the petitioner was considered and dismissed and police remand for one day was granted. The petitioner was, however, admitted to D.D.Upadhyay Hospital on that day after his medical examination. The petitioner was also assisted by one of his counsel during the police custody as was ordered by the learned Magistrate. The respondents further contended that on 1st July, 2000 after considering the medical report and admission record of the petitioner and after visiting him in the hospital, the learned Magistrate had ordered judicial custody of the petitioner till 3rd the June, 2000. On 3rd June, 2000 the investigation was transferred to district crime cell, West District, Delhi. The respondents contended that they acted in a completely impartial way and proceeded strictly in accordance with law. The respondents have denied that they had any malafide intentions to pressurize the petitioner so that he would forego his claim. On 3rd June, 2000 the investigation was transferred to district crime cell, West District, Delhi. The respondents contended that they acted in a completely impartial way and proceeded strictly in accordance with law. The respondents have denied that they had any malafide intentions to pressurize the petitioner so that he would forego his claim. The respondents denied that the petitioner was harassed or tortured while he was in police custody or that any document was got signed from him in blank. The respondents also denied that they were in collusion with anyone in arresting or taking any action against the petitioner or in registering the FIR or taking any action pursuant thereto. 15. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties in detail and have also perused the documents filed by the parties and the enquiry reports conducted by the police authorities. The learned counsel for the petitioner has laid emphasis on the judgments relied by him which shall be dealt first by us. In Hastings Mill Limited (supra), the respondents were initiating successive proceedings covering same grounds and on similar material facts which led to issuance of rule and grant of interim order to the prejudice of the petitioner. In these circumstances, it was held that such acts were acts of interference with due course of judicial proceedings and to that extent because of their consequences, such acts had resulted in interference with the administration of justice. In the said case, there was deliberate suppression of facts and the presentation of falsehood not once but successively. In these circumstances it was held that the petitioner had committed criminal Contempt and appropriate action was taken against him. 16. In Hoshiar Singh (supra), an inquiry was ordered by the State Government during the pendency of the trial. In the circumstances, the State Government was directed that the inquiry should be proceeded with only after the trial is over and during the pendency of the trial, the inquiry proceedings were stayed. It was held that inquiry was bound to interfere with the ordinary course of justice and, therefore, it was stayed. In the circumstances, the State Government was directed that the inquiry should be proceeded with only after the trial is over and during the pendency of the trial, the inquiry proceedings were stayed. It was held that inquiry was bound to interfere with the ordinary course of justice and, therefore, it was stayed. In Govind Sahai and another (supra), the Apex Court had held that expulsion of some members of the Congress Party on the basis of a party resolution which prohibited members from resorting to recourse of law in regard to party matters amounted to interference with due course of justice in pending proceedings as the suit for declarations was filed by the expelled members and the action of the Congress Party was held to amount to contempt of court. It was held that the respondent could not take shelter under the fact that the expulsion was pursuant to a resolution of the All India Congress Working Committee. 17. In Pratap Singh and another (supra), by an order of the Government certain amounts were ordered to be recovered from the salary of Shri Gurbaksh Singh, respondent, for the alleged loss suffered by the Government due to his certain actions. Pursuant to the order of the Government, Shri Gurbaksh Singh instituted a civil suit for declaration that the order for recovery is void and without effect. On the filing of the suit by Shri Gurbaksh Singh disciplinary action was initiated against him on the basis of a Government circular. The respondent, Shri Gurbaksh Singh, thereafter filed a petition and the High Court had held that the action of the Government in starting departmental proceeding amounted to contempt of court and officers conducting and ordering the inquiry were held to be guilty of an offence under Section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952. The Apex Court in appeal had held that the question was not whether the action in fact interfered but whether it had a tendency to interfere with the due course of justice. It was held that proceedings against him could have only one tendency to coerce him and force him to withdraw his suit or otherwise not press it. It was held that it clearly and unmistakably reflected that the official concerned had been guilty of contempt of courts even though they were merely carrying out the instructions contained in the circular letter. 18. It was held that it clearly and unmistakably reflected that the official concerned had been guilty of contempt of courts even though they were merely carrying out the instructions contained in the circular letter. 18. In Advocate-General, State of Bihar (supra), applications after applications were filed before the same single Judge designed to circumvent, defeat or nullify the effect of the orders of the Division Bench of that High Court as well as of the High Court having jurisdiction in the case. It was held that every application was a daring raid on the Court and each was an abuse of the process of the Court, calculated to obstruct the due course of a judicial proceeding and administration of justice which amounted to criminal Contempt of court. The Apex Court had also held that the court has the power to commit for contempt of court not only in order to protect the dignity of the court against insult or injury, as the expression Contempt of Court may seem to suggest, but also to protect and to vindicate the rights of the public and to ensure that the administration of justice is not prevented, prejudiced, obstructed or interfered with. In Dilip K. Basu (supra), the Supreme Court had directed for circulation of the requirements issued by the Apex Court to all police stations and for their dissemination through mass media. The requirements as had been circulated by the Apex Court are as under: 1. The police personnel carrying out the arrest and handling the interrogation of the arrestee should bear accurate, visible and clear identification and name tags with their designations. The particulars of all such police personnel who handle interrogation of the arrestee must be recorded in a register. 2. That the police officer carrying out the arrest of the arrestee shall prepare a memo of arrest at the time of arrest and such memo shall be attested by at least one witness, who may either be a member of the family of the arrestee or a respectable person of the locality from where the arrest is made. It shall also be countersigned by the arrestee and shall contain the time and date of arrest. 3. It shall also be countersigned by the arrestee and shall contain the time and date of arrest. 3. A person who has been arrested or detained and is being held in custody in a police station or interrogation center or other lock-up, shall be entitled to have one friend or relative or other person known to him or having interest in his welfare being informed, as soon as practicable, that he has been arrested and is being detained at the particular place, unless the attesting witness of the memo of arrest is himself such a friend or a relative of the arrestee. 4. The time, place of arrest and venue of custody of an arrestee must be notified by the police where the next friend or relative of the arrestee lives outside the district or town through the Legal Aid Organization in the District and the police station of the area concerned telegraphically within a period of 8 to 12 hours after the arrest. 5. The person arrested must be made aware of this right to have someone informed of his arrest or detention as soon as he is put under arrest or is detained. 6. An entry must be made in the diary at the place of detention regarding the arrest of the person which shall also disclose the name of the next friend of the person who has been informed of the arrest and the names and particulars of the police officials in whose custody the arrestee is 7. The arrestee should, where he so requests, be also examined at the time of his arrest and major and minor injuries, if any present on his/ her body, must be recorded at that time. The ``Inspection Memo` must be signed both by the arrestee and the police officer effecting the arrest and its copy provided to the arrestee and the police officer effecting the arrest and its copy provided to the arrestee. 8. The arrestee should be subjected to medical examination by a trained doctor every 48 hours during his detention in custody by a doctor on the panel of approved doctors appointed by Director, Health Services of the State or Union Territory concerned. Director, Health Services should prepare such a panel for all tehsils and districts as well. 9. 8. The arrestee should be subjected to medical examination by a trained doctor every 48 hours during his detention in custody by a doctor on the panel of approved doctors appointed by Director, Health Services of the State or Union Territory concerned. Director, Health Services should prepare such a panel for all tehsils and districts as well. 9. Copies of all the documents including the memo of arrest, referred to above, should be sent to the Illaqa Magistrate for his record. 10. The arrestee may be permitted to meet his lawyer during interrogation, though not throughout the interrogation. 11. A police control room should be provided at all district and State headquarters, where information regarding the arrest and the place of custody of the arrestee shall be communicated by the officer causing the arrest, within 12 hours of effecting the arrest and at the police control room it should be displayed on a conspicuous notice board. 19. In Joginder Kumar (supra), a young advocate was called by the SSP, Ghaziabad, in his office for making enquiries, He appeared before the SSP along with his brother and at about 12.55 PM, the brother of the petitioner, Joginder Kumar, sent a telegram to the Chief Minister apprehending the petitioners false implication and his death in fake encounter. The petitioner in that case was in the illegal custody of SHO who instated of producing him before the Magistrate asked the relatives to approach the SSP and on a writ petition being filed under Article 32, the SSP along with the petitioner appeared before the court and stated that the petitioner was not in detention at all and that his help was taken for detecting some cases relating to corruption. In these facts and circumstances, the Apex Court had held that there was no need to detain the petitioner for 5 days and if the petitioner was not in detention then why was the court not informed about it. In the circumstances, the District Judge, Ghaziabad, was directed to make a detailed inquiry and submit his report. It was under these circumstances that the Apex Court had held that no arrest can be made merely because it is lawful for the police officers to do so; the existence of the power to arrest is one thing and the justification for the exercise of it is quite another. It was under these circumstances that the Apex Court had held that no arrest can be made merely because it is lawful for the police officers to do so; the existence of the power to arrest is one thing and the justification for the exercise of it is quite another. It was further held that there must be some reasonable justification that such arrest is necessary and justified. 20. Apparently all these judgments relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner are distinguishable and on the basis of the same and applying their ratio it cannot be held that the respondents have committed any such act which would amount to criminal Contempt of Court. Jurisdiction of the Contempt Court is not to be invoked unless there is real interference with the due course of justice. 21. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents have relied on (1969) 1 SCC 181 , Security and Finance (P) Ltd. and another v. Dattarya Ragav Agge and others. The Apex Court in this case had held that jurisdiction in contempt proceedings cannot be invoked unless there is a real interference with the due course of justice. In this case, the disputes had arisen under a hire purchase agreement which contained an arbitration clause and consequently the matter was referred to the Arbitrator. In the meantime, other respondents had filed a suit for declaration that the hire purchase agreement was not binding on them and the notice of the suit was issued to the other parties and the Arbitrator, in an application filed under Section 34 for the stay of the suit. HHHowever, the Arbitrator continued to proceed with the arbitration proceedings and passed an award after recording the evidence. Thereafter, an application was filed under Section 3 of Contempt of Courts Act and the High Court convicted the Arbitrator and other parties who had initiated the arbitration proceedings for contempt and sentenced each to pay a fine of Rs.100/-. In appeal to the Supreme Court, it was held that Section 35 of the Arbitration Act does not expressly prohibit the Arbitrator from continuing the proceeding even after he accepts notice of the institution of a civil suit. In appeal to the Supreme Court, it was held that Section 35 of the Arbitration Act does not expressly prohibit the Arbitrator from continuing the proceeding even after he accepts notice of the institution of a civil suit. It was held that there is no bar under Section 35 to the Arbitrator carrying on the arbitration proceedings after receipt of notice and the only legal effect is that further proceedings before the Arbitrator will be rendered invalid. In these circumstances, the Supreme Court had held that the action of the parties who initiated the arbitration proceedings and the Arbitrator was not calculated to obstruct the course of justice or to prejudice the trial or offend the dignity of the civil court in any manner. 22. Apparently all the precedents cited by the petitioner and the respondents are distinguishable. The learned counsel for the parties have relied on various observations made in the precedents cited by them. However what is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made in it. A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. The ratio of any decision must be understood in the background of the facts of that case. It has been said long time ago that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides, and not what logically follows from it. It is well settled that a little difference in facts or additional facts may make a lot of difference in the precedential value of a decision. The Supreme Court in Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd and Anr. v. N.R.Vairamani and Anr., AIR 2004 SC 778 had observed:- `` Court should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of Courts are neither to be read as Euclids theorems nor as provisions of the statute and that too taken out of their context. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of Courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of Courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. 23. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases and disposing of a case by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper. In Ambica Quarry Works v. State of Gujarat and Ors. the Supreme Court had observed:-``The ratio of any decision must be understood in the background of the facts of that case. It has been said long time ago that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides, and not what logically follows from it.` Similarly in Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mills Pvt Ltd (2003) 2 SC 111 (vide para 59), the Supreme Court had observed:-`` It is well settled that a little difference in facts or additional facts may make a lot of difference in the precedential value of a decision.` In P.S.Rao Vs State, JT 2002 (3) SC 1, the Supreme Court had held as under: ``. There is always a peril in treating the words of judgment as though they are words in a legislative enactment and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances are made in setting of the facts of a particular case. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusion in two cases. In Rafiq Vs State, 1980 SCC (Crl) 946 it was observed as under: The ratio of one case cannot be mechanically applied to another case without having regard to the fact situation and circumstances obtaining in two cases. 24. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusion in two cases. In Rafiq Vs State, 1980 SCC (Crl) 946 it was observed as under: The ratio of one case cannot be mechanically applied to another case without having regard to the fact situation and circumstances obtaining in two cases. 24. The grievance of the petitioner is that in order to establish the falsity of the allegations made in the FIR No.270/2000 by Sh.Navin Soni, he produced the relevant documents not only to the investigating officer/respondent No.1 but also to the Station House Officer, P.S.Kirti Nagar/Contemnor No.2, Assistant Commissioner of Police, contemnor No.3 and Deputy Commissioner of Police (West), contemnor No.4 and also requested them not to arrest him till the investigation reached a reasonable satisfaction as to the genuineness and bonafide of the allegations regarding the commission of the offences by the petitioner. 25. Whether an accused is to be arrested or not is to be decided by the police official and not by an accused. Though the petitioner had produced some documents, however, he could not have insisted that he should not be arrested as in his opinion the investigation had not reached the final stage. He also could not resist arrest claiming to have established the falsity of the allegations of the complainant. The plea that the FIR in which he was arrested was filed against him as a counter blast to pressurize him to withdraw the legal proceedings, in the facts and circumstances will not tantamount to criminal Contempt committed by the Police Officials/respondents. It is pertinent to note that the present criminal contempt petition is not filed against Sh.Navin Soni and Smt.Asha Soni who had filed a complaint against the petitioner pursuant to which FIR No.270/2000 was registered on the direction of the police Commissioner. The criminal Contempt is rather filed against the investigating officer and other officials who had registered the FIR pursuant to the directions of the Commissioner of Police and investigated the matter and arrested the petitioner during the course of the investigation. 26. The petitioner has laid great emphasis on the letter dated 5th March, 1998 which according to him unequivocally reflected that the cheque was handed over to him and not stolen by him as alleged and by that letter the encashment of cheque was assured. 26. The petitioner has laid great emphasis on the letter dated 5th March, 1998 which according to him unequivocally reflected that the cheque was handed over to him and not stolen by him as alleged and by that letter the encashment of cheque was assured. The petitioner has also relied on another FIR being 220/2000 of P.S.Preet Vihar which was registered against Navin Soni and Smt.Asha Soni and Badri Prasad @ Badri Prakash Soni where it is stated that there is no entry in the daily diary of alleged complaint made by Navin Soni of loss of cheques and there is also no record of the complaint by Sh.Navin Soni dated 5th October, 1996 with the Police Station Kirti Nagar, New Delhi. 27. The mere fact that another FIR was also filed by the petitioner, does not reflect conclusively that the allegation made in his FIR filed against Navin Soni and others should have been accepted as true and the allegations made against him should have been held to be untrue. No such conclusive inference could be drawn in the circumstances by the police official in June, 2000 nor could it be concluded by the respondents not to investigate the matter any further and not to arrest the petitioner. The main basis of the petitioner seems to be that he being a respectable person could not be arrested and as he had produced all the relevant documents before the contemnors to demonstrate his innocence his version should have been accepted. Despite the allegation of his respectability and his plea that he had prima facie established his innocence, if the petitioner was arrested by the police officials in the present facts and circumstances to investigate the matter further, such a decision of the respondent can only be construed as an error of judgment and cannot be termed mala fide or lacking in good faith. 28. The learned senior counsel for the petitioner has laid emphasis on the fact that the investigating officer had inspected the file of the proceedings initiated by the petitioner under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and had also sought documents for further investigation. Perusal of the record, however, reveals that during the investigation when the record was inspected, the original documents sought were not on record and therefore the respondents were not able to peruse the same. Perusal of the record, however, reveals that during the investigation when the record was inspected, the original documents sought were not on record and therefore the respondents were not able to peruse the same. The petitioner has also contended that the copies of the bank statement of the petitioner for the period 1st January, 1998 to 31st March, 1998 shows withdrawal of an amount of Rs.15 lakhs and the balance sheet of the petitioner regarding New Gyatri Cork Industry along with 52 documents were placed on the record. The non-consideration these documents with the perspective as alleged by the petitioner will not show malice or mala fide on the part of the respondents. Therefore the plea of the petitioner that his arrest reveals lack of bona fide and malice on the part of the respondents cannot be accepted. It has to be noticed that the FIR was registered pursuant to the direction of the Commissioner of Police on the complaint of Sh.Navin Soni. Consequently, it cannot be inferred that the FIR was falsely and corruptly registered on account of collusion between the respondents and Navin Soni and others. The plea of the petitioner that no affidavit of the commissioner has been filed nor any contemporaneous proof has been made available to show that the FIR was registered pursuant to the direction of the Commissioner of Police cannot be accepted and is contrary to the record. On a consideration of the affidavits filed by the respondents and other documents produced, it has to be inferred that the FIR was registered pursuant to the directions of the Commissioner of Police. In the circumstances, registration of FIR cannot be the ground for initiating contempt proceedings against the police officials. During the pendency of the present proceedings the matter pertaining to issue of notice to the commissioner had also come up, however, it was not accepted. 29. In the circumstances, registration of FIR cannot be the ground for initiating contempt proceedings against the police officials. During the pendency of the present proceedings the matter pertaining to issue of notice to the commissioner had also come up, however, it was not accepted. 29. The learned Senior counsel, Mr.Sood has also laid great emphasis on the dismissal of the application of Sh.Navin Soni seeking withdrawal of summoning order passed against them in the complaint filed against them under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act by order dated 9th March, 1999 and has contended that the averments made by said Sh.Navin Soni and others in their complaint which led to the registration of the FIR No.270/2000 pursuant to which petitioner was arrested, were similar to the averments made in the application and since the application seeking withdrawal of summoning order was dismissed, it had been established that the allegations made by Sh.Navin Soni and others against the petitioners were untrue and consequently the petitioner should not have been arrested. As stated earlier, perusal of order dated 9th March, 1999 categorically shows that while dismissing the application of Sh.Navin Soni and others it was categorically held by the learned Magistrate that at the time of taking cognizance, Court is only required to satisfy whether prima facie case is made out and that the Court is not supposed to go into the entire merits of the case meticulously and to consider the defence likely to be put up by the accused. Consequently, by order dated 9th March, 1999 it was not held and decided that the pleas and contentions raised by Sh.Navin Soni and others were palpably or apparently false. Consequently there was nothing before the respondents from which it could be inferred that the pleas and contentions raised by the complainant, Navin Soni and others were false and could not be relied on and did not require investigation. 30. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied on the report of the Inspector CBT/Crime Branch dated 16th November, 2001 holding that FIR No.270/2000 under Sections 379/420/468/471 IPC which was lodged on the complaint of Mr.Navin Soni against the petitioner at P.S.Kirti Nagar, is false and as no offence was found against petitioner to charge sheet him in this case. Perusal of the said report also shows that it was requested that the petitioner, Mr.R.P.Malik who was arrested on 29th June, 2000 and released on bail, be discharged as no case is made out against him and that the case may be cancelled and proceedings under Section 182 of the IPC be initiated against Sh.Navin Soni. However, this report does not infer and conclude that the police officials had initiated investigation against the petitioner on account of collusion with the complainant in FIR No.270 of 2000 or that investigation and arrest of the petitioner was outcome of mala fide or malice on the part of the respondents. In any case the petitioner was arrested on 29th June, 2000 and that on the basis of subsequent report dated 16th November, 2001, it is difficult to infer in the present facts and circumstances that there was intentional or deliberate malafide or lack of good faith or collusion on the part of the respondents in arresting the petitioner on 29th June, 2000 or on that date it was conclusively established that the pleas raised by Navin Soni were palpably false requiring no further investigation or custodial investigation. The petitioner was produced after arrest before the competent Magistrate in compliance with law on 30th June, 2000. However, bail was not granted and the petitioner was rather remanded as the prosecution had claimed that they still had to recover some documents from the possession of the accused which were stamp used in agreement to sell dated 14th January 1998 which was alleged to be forged; counterfoil of pay slip dated 11th March, 1998 in respect of cheque No.722832 and the Income Tax record, return filed by him for the relevant period as the whole transaction on 14th January, 1998 was on the basis of Rupees 15 lakhs allegedly given in cash by the petitioner to Sh.Navin Soni which is a large amount. On considering the pleas of the petitioner and the pleas raised by the prosecution the bail was denied. It will not be appropriate in the circumstances to invoke contempt jurisdiction against the police officials for seeking remand of the petitioner for the recovery of the said documents. If the police officials were not entitled for remand and bail ought to have been granted to the petitioner, the order dated 30th June, 2001 could be challenged by the petitioner which admittedly was not done. If the police officials were not entitled for remand and bail ought to have been granted to the petitioner, the order dated 30th June, 2001 could be challenged by the petitioner which admittedly was not done. 31. The complaint regarding loss of signed cheques was made in 1996 whereas the alleged transaction between the petitioner and Shri Navin Soni on the basis of Rupees 15 lakh given in cash took place in January, 1998. The transaction involved a substantial amount in cash. The respondents examined the W/Ct who had received the complaint in 1996 as well as the petitioner and the complainant. Some documents were seized and other documents could not be obtained because they were not on the record of the pending proceedings initiated at the instance of petitioner. The plea and contentions of the complainant were not rejected while dismissing his application seeking withdrawal of summons issued against them. In the circumstances the decision to further continue the investigation and to take the petitioner in custody, prima facie does not show lack of good faith or mala fide on the part of the respondents. The determination about existence of mala fide involves two questions, namely (i) whether there is a personal bias or an oblique motive, and (ii) whether the administrative action is contrary to the objects, requirements and conditions of a valid exercise of administrative power. There is no specific allegation of personal bias of the respondents against the petitioner. Mere assertion or a vague or bald statement is not sufficient. It must be demonstrated either by admitted or proved facts and circumstances obtainable in a given case. The administrative action is said to be done in good faith, if it is in fact done honestly, whether it is done negligently or not. An act done honestly is deemed to have been done in good faith. An administrative authority must, therefore, act in a bona fide manner and should never act for an improper motive or ulterior purpose or contrary to the requirements of the statute, or the basis of the circumstances contemplated by law, or improperly exercise discretion to achieve some ulterior purpose. The mala fide has been imputed against the respondents because the petitioner was arrested. The facts as they were before the respondents in June, 2000, however, do not show any action contrary to statute or any order of the Court. The mala fide has been imputed against the respondents because the petitioner was arrested. The facts as they were before the respondents in June, 2000, however, do not show any action contrary to statute or any order of the Court. The petitioner after his arrest was produced before a Magistrate who denied him bail and rather first granted remand for one day and thereafter granted judicial custody for a further period. Though subsequently it has been inferred by the authorities that no charge is made out which order is also assailed by the complainant, however, from these facts it is apparent that in June, 2000 no mala fide or malice can be inferred against the respondents. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also emphasized that the record pertaining to the withdrawal of large sums of money by the petitioner and other documents were not considered properly or were not considered. But this in itself will not show any malice. In law malice is not established from the omission to consider some documents said to be relevant to the accused. In State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 222, the Apex Court had dealt with the concept of mala fide and malice and had held as under: 50. Mala fides means want of good faith, personal bias, grudge, oblique or improper motive or ulterior purpose. The administrative action must be said to be done in good faith, if it is in fact done honestly, whether it is done negligently or not. An act done honestly is deemed to have been done in good faith. An administrative authority must, therefore, act in a bona fide manner and should never act for an improper motive or ulterior purposes or contrary to the requirements of the statute, or the basis of the circumstances contemplated by law, or improperly exercised discretion to achieve some ulterior purpose. The determination of a plea of mala fide involves two questions, namely (i) whether there is a personal bias or an oblique motive, and (ii) whether the administrative action is contrary to the objects, requirements and conditions of a valid exercise of administrative power. 51. The action taken must, therefore, be proved to have been made mala fide for such considerations. Mere assertion or a vague or bald statement is not sufficient. 51. The action taken must, therefore, be proved to have been made mala fide for such considerations. Mere assertion or a vague or bald statement is not sufficient. It must be demonstrated either by admitted or proved facts and circumstances obtainable in a given case. If it is established that the action has been taken mala fide for any such considerations or by fraud on power or colourable exercise of power, it cannot be allowed to stand. 52. Public administration cannot be carried on in a spirit of judicial detachment. There is a very wide range of discretionary administrative acts not importing an implied duty to act judicially though the act must be done in good faith to which legal protection will be accorded. But the administrative act de hors judicial flavour does not entail compliance with the rule against interest and likelihood of bias. It is implicit that a complainant when he lodges a report to the Station House Officer accusing a person of commission of an offence, often may be a person aggrieved, but rarely a pro bono publico. Therefore, inherent animosity is licit and by itself is not tended to cloud the veracity of the accusation suspected to have been committed, provided it is based on factual foundation. 59. Malice in law could be inferred from doing of wrongful act intentionally without any just cause or excuse or without there being reasonable relation to the purpose of the exercise of statutory power. Malice in law is not established from the omission to consider some documents said to be relevant to the accused. Equally reporting the commission of a crime to the Station House Officer, cannot be held to be a colourable exercise of power with bad faith or fraud on power. It may be honest and bona fide exercise of power. There are no grounds made out or shown to us that the first information report was not lodged in good faith. 32. In absence of any such facts which will categorically show malice and/or mala fide on the part of the respondents, penal consequences of Contempt proceedings cannot be initiated against them simply because there had been an alleged error of judgment in the action taken by them. In the present facts and circumstances, the alleged error also cannot be termed as willful on account of improper or corrupt motives. In the present facts and circumstances, the alleged error also cannot be termed as willful on account of improper or corrupt motives. At the best it can be said that the respondents acted without proper care or caution in arresting the petitioner to carry out the investigation further but such an action cannot be termed to be actuated by any corrupt or dishonest motives nor has any such allegations been even prima facie established by the petitioner against the respondents. 33. Regarding not initiating any Criminal Contempt proceedings against Sh.Navin Soni, Smt.Asha Soni and Sh. Badri Prasad @ Badri Prakash Soni, as most of the allegations in the contempt petition are against them, the learned counsel for the petitioner during the course of argument contended that they can be impleaded as party at this stage in the interest of justice. At this belated stage, as the contempt petition dated 2nd August, 2000 was filed in August, 2000 and the alleged contempt had allegedly been committed in June, 2000 when the petitioner was arrested, it will not be appropriate to initiate any action for criminal Contempt on the allegations made by the petitioner against Sh.Navin Soni, Smt.Asha Soni and Sh.Badri Prasad @ Badri Prakash Soni against whom other proceedings are also pending, even if their acts tantamount to committing contempt of Court. It will also be not appropriate to restart the entire proceedings again. Section 20 of the The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 contemplates that no Court shall initiate any proceedings for Contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. Though Article 215 of the Constitution of India empowers every High Court to punish the contempt of Court subordinate to it, but the Contempt of Courts act lays down how that power is to be exercised. Article 215 of the Constitution of India and other relevant provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 has to be read together. It is apparent from consideration of these relevant provisions that the High Court should not take cognizance normally if the period of one year has already elapsed. Article 215 of the Constitution of India and other relevant provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 has to be read together. It is apparent from consideration of these relevant provisions that the High Court should not take cognizance normally if the period of one year has already elapsed. The learned counsel for the petitioner was also unable to disclose any such facts which would have entitled the petitioner for condonation of delay and to initiate the contempt proceedings at this belated stage against the said persons in case they have committed contempt of Court as contemplated under the relevant provisions of the Act. No grounds for condonation of delay is also made out in the present facts and circumstances. In any case section 5 of the Limitation Act does not deal with the condonation of the period of limitation prescribed in The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Therefore the delay in initiating proceedings under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 cannot be condoned under the provisions of the Limitation Act. 34. The respondents have also alleged that on the remand being granted on 30th June, 2001, the advocates of the petitioner misbehaved with the complainant who had reached there. It is also alleged that though the petitioner was normal prior to consideration of his bail application, after his bail application was declined, on a complaint being made by him, he was taken to the emergency ward of DDU Hospital for his medical examination, where he was admitted. It is also alleged that the police remand could not be utilized because of it. It is also pleaded that on 29th June, 2000 when the petitioner was brought to the police station his son-in-law who claimed to be a Government counsel and other advocates Sh.R.P.Luthra and Sh.Anil Kumar Sharma and a MLA Sh.Ram Babu Sharma and sons of the petitioner, Inder Malik and Manoj Malik were present. They had allegedly told that the petitioner is owner of 100 crores and he has his own prestige and that they will see how the petitioner is arrested (put in hawalat) and in case he would be arrested, allegation of violation of Supreme Court guidelines shall be made against the police officials. They had allegedly told that the petitioner is owner of 100 crores and he has his own prestige and that they will see how the petitioner is arrested (put in hawalat) and in case he would be arrested, allegation of violation of Supreme Court guidelines shall be made against the police officials. It is also contended by the respondents that the petitioner was provided telephone facility and he was allowed to make telephone calls to his house and known people were present and only after following the guideline, the petitioner was arrested. The respondents have also contended that on 30th June, 2000 a number of political leaders and advocates had threatened the police officials on telephone not to oppose the case in the Court and not to oppose the bail of the petitioner, otherwise complaints shall be filed against them. For these allegations the respondents have relied on the entries made in daily diary being DD No.27A dated 29th June, 2000; DD no. 19-B dated 30.6.2000; DD no. 25 A dated 30th June, 2000 and DD No.23A dated 1st July, 2000. Reliance cannot be placed on the alleged daily diary entries, as they can be self serving. Lack of mala fide and malice cannot be inferred on the basis of these entries in daily diary. The petitioner was not arrested for the alleged threats allegedly given to the police officials or on account of the conduct of the friends and relatives of the petitioner. The plea of the respondents is that the petitioner was arrested in order to carry out the investigation and because it was inferred that the custodial interrogation was required. Contents and observations made by the police authorities in the daily diaries cannot assume the character of substantive or corroborative evidence, though a Court is within its competence to read them as an aid to satisfy its conscience in appreciating legal evidence available on record. The Supreme Court in Mahabir Singh Vs State of Haryana, (2001) 7 SCC 148 at page 157 had considered the evidentiary value of daily diaries and had held as under: 14. A reading of the said sub-sections makes the position clear that the discretion given to the court to use such diaries is only for aiding the court to decide on a point. A reading of the said sub-sections makes the position clear that the discretion given to the court to use such diaries is only for aiding the court to decide on a point. It is made abundantly clear in sub-section (2) itself that the court is forbidden from using the entries of such diaries as evidence. What cannot be used as evidence against the accused cannot be used in any other manner against him. If the court uses the entries in a case diary for contradicting a police officer it should be done only in the manner provided in Section 145 of the Evidence Act i.e. by giving the author of the statement an opportunity to explain the contradiction, after his attention is called to that part of the statement which is intended to be so used for contradiction. In other words, the power conferred on the court for perusal of the diary under Section 172 of the Code is not intended for explaining a contradiction which the defence has winched to the fore through the channel permitted by law. The interdict contained in Section 162 of the Code, debars the court from using the power under Section 172 of the Code for the purpose of explaining the contradiction. In the circumstances no such inferences as has been alleged by the respondents can be drawn in their favor and against the petitioner on the basis of the entries made in the daily diaries. 35. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also referred to the guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Dalip K.Basu (supra). Considering the guidelines laid down by the Apex Court and the plea raised by the petitioner, it is apparent that none of those guidelines have been violated nor it can be inferred that there is any deliberate or intentional violation of any of the guidelines. No mala fide or malice or lack of good faith is discernable in the present facts and circumstances. The petitioner was arrested on 29th June, 2000 and he sought bail on 30th June, 2000, however, even the judicial authorities declined the bail on the same facts and circumstances which order was not challenged by the petitioner. Later on, pursuant to some alleged compromise between the petitioner and Sh.Navin Soni on 3rd July, 2000, the petitioner was released. The petitioner was arrested on 29th June, 2000 and he sought bail on 30th June, 2000, however, even the judicial authorities declined the bail on the same facts and circumstances which order was not challenged by the petitioner. Later on, pursuant to some alleged compromise between the petitioner and Sh.Navin Soni on 3rd July, 2000, the petitioner was released. In the circumstances, it will not be difficult to infer that there is no deliberate and intentional violation of any rules or statute or guidelines by the respondents so as to entail the consequence of committing criminal contempt. Consequently registering of FIR and investigation thereof and arrest of petitioner in the present facts and circumstances will not taint the action of the respondents as a deliberate interference with due course of justice or pressurizing or coercing the petitioner not to continue with his complaint under Section 138 of the Criminal Procedure Code or another FIR filed by the petitioner being FIR No.220/2000. Merely because a complaint by the accused/petitioner was also pending does not entitle him not to be arrested. In the totality of facts and circumstances, there is no violation of the guidelines enumerated by the Apex Court in the case of Dalip K.Basu (supra). 36. If a police officer, with an intention to avoid the effect of the courts order acts in a manner that undermines the dignity and authority of the Court, he, without doubt, commits contempt of the court because such a police officer not only undermine the authority of the Court but also brings it into disrepute by lowering its authority in the eyes of general public. In the present case there was no such order which has been violated by the respondents. Dismissal of the application of accused for the withdrawal of the summons issued to them in the case filed by the petitioner had not adjudicated their pleas on the basis of which an FIR was also registered against the petitioner. The FIR was registered on the directions of the higher Police authorities and had to be investigated which was done by the respondent. No mala fide or malice or lack of good faith can be inferred on the part of the respondents in the present facts and circumstances. The FIR was registered on the directions of the higher Police authorities and had to be investigated which was done by the respondent. No mala fide or malice or lack of good faith can be inferred on the part of the respondents in the present facts and circumstances. No court has to impose a sentence under the Act for the contempt of Court unless it is satisfied that the contempt is of such a nature that it substantially interferes, or tends substantially to interfere with the due course of justice. It also cannot be doubted that every abuse of the process of Court may not necessarily amount to contempt of Court. It is only that abuse of the process of Court which is calculated to hamper the due course of judicial proceeding or the orderly administration of justice which is contempt of Court. None of these factors are available in the present facts and circumstances to take action against the respondents/police officials for committing contempt of Court. 37. Therefore, in the present facts and circumstances for the foregoing reasons there are no grounds to take action against the respondents for committing criminal contempt of Court. The petition, is therefore, without any merit and it is dismissed. Notices issued to respondents are discharged. Parties are also left to bear their own costs.