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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2008 DIGILAW 1044 (MP)

ANNU alias ANOOP KUMAR v. STATE OF M. P.

2008-08-20

A.K.SAXENA

body2008
Judgment A.K.Saxena, J. ( 1. ) The appellant Annu alias Anoop Kumar has preferred this appeal under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 against the judgment dated 1.6.94 passed by Ist Additional Sessions Judge, Katni in Sessions Trial No.549/93 whereby, the appellant/accused has been convicted under Section 376(1) of I.P.C. and sentenced to 10 years rigorous imprisonment. ( 2. ) The prosecution story in short is that the prosecutrix, aged about 13 years, was residing with her mother PW-9 Noor Jahan. On 4.2.93, the mother of the prosecutrix went to sell the bangles. Thereafter, at about 8.00 a.m., the prosecutrix went behind the Amirganj school to answer the call of nature. When she was ready to come back, the appellant/accused Annu @ Anoop Kumar caught hold of her from behind. The prosecutrix tried to raise an alarm, but the appellant tied up the mouth of the prosecutrix with the help of handkerchief. He also threatened her and thereafter, he ravished the prosecutrix. After committing the offence of rape, the appellant fled away from there. ( 3. ) The prosecutrix felt insulted because of the act done by the appellant and came back to her house. She poured kerosene and ablazed herself. Thereafter, PW-1 Alam Khan, his wife PW-16 Samina Bee and other persons reached at the house of the prosecutrix as soon as they heard the cry of the prosecutrix. They extinguished the fire. Thereafter, the prosecutrix told the facts of the incident to them. PW-1 Alam Khan informed PW-2 Wali Mohommad about the incident, who went in search of mother of the prosecutrix. He informed Noor Jahan about the incident. The mother of the prosecutrix reached at her house and thereafter, the prosecutrix was sent to hospital in an auto-rickshaw. ( 4. ) PW-19 Dr. (Ku.) Shahsi Saravgi examined the prosecutrix and she informed the police vide memorandum Ex.P/23 with a request that the dying declaration may be recorded. This information was noted down in rojnamcha-sahna and its copy is Ex.P/22-A. ( 5. ) PW-17 P.D. Mishra left the police station to reach the hospital as soon as he received the information Ex.P/14-A from police station Katni on telephone. After reaching the hospital, this Investigating Officer recorded the dehati-nalishi Ex.P/15. PW-5 Ku. Nahida Khatoon, Naib Tahsildar and Executive Magistrate recorded the dying declaration Ex.P/2 of the prosecutrix. PW-15 K.S. Shekhawat also investigated the matter. After reaching the hospital, this Investigating Officer recorded the dehati-nalishi Ex.P/15. PW-5 Ku. Nahida Khatoon, Naib Tahsildar and Executive Magistrate recorded the dying declaration Ex.P/2 of the prosecutrix. PW-15 K.S. Shekhawat also investigated the matter. After the death of the prosecutrix, he prepared the panchnama after service of notice on the witnesses. PW-6 Dr. T.N. Khare conducted the post-mortem. PW-15 K.S. Shekhawat prepared the site plan Ex.P/1-A on 5.2.93 and on the same day, various articles were seized from the place of incident and seizure memo Ex.P/12 was prepared. PW-14 Sukhdev Prasad also prepared the map Ex.P/3 of the place of incident. The appellant/accused was arrested by him on 15.2.93 and he prepared the arrest memo Ex.P/13. The memorandum Ex.P/14 of the appellant was recorded. The appellant was sent for medical examination and PW-11 Dr. Naresh Saravgi examined him. After completion of investigation, the charge-sheet was filed. ( 6. ) The trial Court framed the charges under Sections 376(1) and 306 of I.P.C, but it was found that the offence punishable under Section 306 of I.P.C. was not proved beyond reasonable doubt and the appellant/accused was acquitted of this charge, but he was convicted under Section 376(1) of I.P.C. ( 7. ) The appellant has preferred this appeal on the grounds that on the date of incident, the appellant was less than 18 years of age and his case could have been tried by the Juvenile Court. There is no believable evidence in favour of the prosecution story. There were not external injuries on the person of the prosecutrix. It was not possible for the prosecutrix to speak anything before the witnesses, as she sustained 70% to 80% burn injuries and, therefore, the statements of witnesses are not believable. No specific act of the appellant was disclosed by the prosecutrix about the rape, therefore, no offence was made out under Section 376 of I.P.C. against the appellant. There are lot of contradictions in the statements of witnesses. The FIR Ex.P/15 is not believable evidence. The dying declaration is also not believable piece of evidence. Therefore, the judgment of the trial Court is against the evidence and law. ( 8. ) The learned counsel for the appellant vehemently argued on these points that the appellant was less than 18 years of age and, therefore, his case could have been tried by the Juvenile Court. The dying declaration is also not believable piece of evidence. Therefore, the judgment of the trial Court is against the evidence and law. ( 8. ) The learned counsel for the appellant vehemently argued on these points that the appellant was less than 18 years of age and, therefore, his case could have been tried by the Juvenile Court. In the dying declaration, nothing has been disclosed about the feet of rape, therefore, the offence under Section 376(1) of I.P.C. Could not be proved. The statements of witnesses cannot be believed in view of contradictions came in their statements and dehati-nalishi. The dying declaration recorded by the police officer is not believable and for this, he placed his reliance on the case of Rajesh @ Raja v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1997(1) M.P.L.J. 136 . ( 9. ) Firstly, I shall consider this argument that the appellant was less than 18 years of age on the date of incident, therefore, the trial Court has committed an error as the trial Court had no jurisdiction to try the case of the appellant. The charge-sheet was filed against the appellant/accused showing his age 19 years. His apparent from the order sheets of the committal Court as well as the trial Court that the appellant failed to raise any objection about his age and the competency of the trial Court of holding the trial. He never claimed before the committal Court and the trial Court that he was a juvenile offender. No evidence was produced during the trial about the age by the appellant. At the time of considering the question of sentence by Court, the learned counsel for the accused argued for the first time that the appellant was aged about 17 years on the date of incident, therefore, the sentence of lesser period may be awarded. At that time also, it was not argued on behalf of the accused that the accused was a juvenile offender on the date of incident, therefore, the trial Court cannot pass any sentence against him. It appears that only to get lesser sentence, the learned counsel of the accused argued before the trial Court that the accused was 17 years old on the date of incident. It appears that only to get lesser sentence, the learned counsel of the accused argued before the trial Court that the accused was 17 years old on the date of incident. But the bare argument advanced by learned counsel of the appellant in this appeal, is not sufficient to come to this conclusion that the appellant/accused was juvenile offender on the date of the incident and because of that, he could have been tried by the Juvenile Court and not by the Sessions Court. According to Section 2(h) of the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986, in case of a boy, if he has not attained the age of sixteen years, he shall be a juvenile but in the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, it has been provided under Section 2(k) that where a person has not completed the age of eighteen years, he will be called as juvenile. In the instant case, the date of offence is 4.2.93. During this period, the Act of 1986 was applicable. It means while raising the point of age of the appellant, the provisions of this Act of 1986 were ignored. ( 10. ) The objection that the appellant was a juvenile offender on the date of incident, is raised in the appeal for the first time, but it cannot be considered at the appellate stage. If a document has been filed to show the age of the appellant for the first time in the appellate Court, it has got no importance because the appellant failed to prove any document in the trial Court. Apart from that, only filing of a document in appellate Court, is not sufficient to prove the document. The appellant cannot be allowed to raise a new plea in defence at the appellate stage. In such circumstances, the school transfer certificate, filed in this appeal by the appellant, cannot be taken into consideration. The crux of this point is that when the appellant failed to raise any objection about his age before the committal Court or the trial Court, the fact of age cannot be considered at the appellate stage because the objection in respect of age, is raised for the first time in the appellate Court. The crux of this point is that when the appellant failed to raise any objection about his age before the committal Court or the trial Court, the fact of age cannot be considered at the appellate stage because the objection in respect of age, is raised for the first time in the appellate Court. In these circumstances, this argument is not tenable that the appellant was a juvenile offender on the date of incident and the Juvenile Court was competent to try the case, therefore, the trial was illegally held by the Sessions Court. Since, the appellant was 19 years old on the date of incident, therefore, he was not a juvenile offender and the trial was rightly held in the Sessions Court. ( 11. ) Now the other points, involved in this case, may be considered. PW-17 P.D. Mishra deposed that on 4.2.93, after receiving the information that the prosecutrix has been admitted in the hospital, he left the police station and the fact of his leaving the police station, was disclosed in rojnamcha-sahna Ex.P/14-A. In this rojnamcha-sahna, it was disclosed that Constable No. 1352 Brij Mohan of police station, Katni informed the police station, Tikuri on telephone that the prosecutrix was burnt while preparing the food and she has been admitted in Government Hospital, Katni. It is not clear in this case as to from where Brij Mohan received the above information and on what basis he sent the information to police station, Tikuri. No witness has been cross-examined by the defence counsel on this point. There is no other evidence to show that the prosecutrix received burn injuries when she was preparing the food. It is apparent from further investigation including the site plan Ex.P/1 -A and Ex.P/13 that the incident had taken place far from the residence of the prosecutrix. In these circumstances, on the basis of sahna report Ex.P/14-A, it cannot be believed that the prosecutrix sustained burn injuries when she was preparing the food. This fact is totally against the prosecution story and it appears that somebody, who was interested in the appellant, might have informed Brij Mohan and he sent the information to police station, Tikuri, accordingly. In these circumstances, on the basis of rojnamcha-sahna Ex.P/14-A, the prosecution story cannot be disbelieved at all. ( 12. This fact is totally against the prosecution story and it appears that somebody, who was interested in the appellant, might have informed Brij Mohan and he sent the information to police station, Tikuri, accordingly. In these circumstances, on the basis of rojnamcha-sahna Ex.P/14-A, the prosecution story cannot be disbelieved at all. ( 12. ) Before coming to the statements of witnesses, I am of the opinion that the dying declaration Ex.P/2, the statement of PW-5 Ku. Nahida Khatoon and the statement of PW-19 Dr.(Ku.) Shashi Saravgi may be considered. PW-5 Ku. Nahida Khatoon was Executive Magistrate and on 4.2.93, she recorded the dying declaration Ex.P/2 of the prosecutrix and she repeated different facts of the dying declaration in her statement, which were disclosed by the deceased during recording of the dying declaration. This witness was cross-examined by the defence counsel within two lines only and in the cross-examination, this witness has further deposed that whatever the prosecutrix had disclosed, she noted down those facts in the dying declaration. Therefore, considering the whole statement of this witness, 1 found that the dying declaration Ex.P/2 is believable piece of evidence. ( 13. ) PW-19 Dr.(Ku.) Shahsi Saravgi deposed that on 4.2.93, she examined the prosecutrix and found superficial burn injuries on different parts of her body. She has also stated that she requested the In-charge, Police Station, Katni vide memo Ex.P/23 to record the dying declaration. She has further stated that PW-5 Ku. Nahida Khatoon came to hospital for recording the dying declaration of the prosecutrix and she certified on Ex.P/2 that the prosecutrix is fully conscious to give her statement and after completion of recording of dying declaration, she put a note that the prosecutrix was fully conscious during recording of statement in her presence. She has also stated that she remained present during recording of dying declaration. In cross-examination, this witness has disclosed that after sustaining the burn injuries, it is not necessary that the patient will go in coma, because there was no injury on the brain and even after sustaining 75% bum injuries, the patient may remain conscious. ( 14. ) Considering the statements of these two witnesses, it becomes clear that the dying declaration Ex.P/2 was properly recorded by the Executive Magistrate in presence of the doctor and, therefore, the dying declaration Ex.P/2 must be believed in this case. ( 15. ( 14. ) Considering the statements of these two witnesses, it becomes clear that the dying declaration Ex.P/2 was properly recorded by the Executive Magistrate in presence of the doctor and, therefore, the dying declaration Ex.P/2 must be believed in this case. ( 15. ) The learned counsel for the appellant placed his reliance on the case of Rajesh (supra) wherein, it has been laid down that the dying declaration should not be recorded in presence of any Investigating Officer because the Investigating Officer may prompt the injured to give a particular statement. But it could not be established in this case that the dying declaration Ex.P/2 was recorded in presence of the Investigating Officer. The dehati-nalishi Ex.P/15 was lodged on 4.2.93 at 16.20 hours whereas, the dying declaration Ex.P/2 was recorded at 4.00 p.m. on the same day. It is nowhere stated by PW-5 Ku. Nahida Khatoon that the police officer was also present at the time of recording of dying declaration and not a single question was put to this witness or to PW-19 Dr.(Ku.) Shashi Saravgi about the presence of Investigating Officer in their cross-examination. Therefore, the principle laid down in above case law is not applicable in respect of the dying declaration Ex.P/2. ( 16. ) PW-17 P.D. Mishra deposed that he reached at the Government Hospital, Katni where the prosecutrix lodged the dehati-nalishi Ex.P/15 and thereafter, he registered the crime vide report Ex.P/17. It is apparent that after recording of dehati nalishi Ex.P/15, the prosecutrix expired and, therefore, this dehati-nalishi becomes the dying declaration in this case. ( 17. ) The dehati-nalishi Ex.P/14 was recorded as a first information report and not as a dying declaration. Since, it was the first information report of this case and obviously, it should have been recorded by the police officer. Apart from that, there is no law that the dying declaration cannot be recorded by the police officer. If a person is dying and nobody is available to the police officer then certainly, the police officer is capable of recording of the dying declaration of that person. Though, the parameters for consideration of dying declaration, recorded by the police officer, may be more strict, but certainly, the dying declaration cannot be discarded merely because it was recorded by the police officer. Though, the parameters for consideration of dying declaration, recorded by the police officer, may be more strict, but certainly, the dying declaration cannot be discarded merely because it was recorded by the police officer. In the instant case, the position is much better because the dying declaration was recorded by an Executive Magistrate and thereafter, the dehati-nalishi Ex.P/15 was recorded by police officer, which became another dying declaration in this case. This piece of evidence is also believable in this case. ( 18. ) Before coming to the point as to what was stated by the prosecutrix in her dying declaration about the incident, this Court will consider the statements of witnesses. PW-1 Alam Khan deposed that after reaching at his house, he heard the noise then, he went to the house of the prosecutrix along with his wife and he saw that the prosecutrix was burning and then he extinguished the fire. Thereafter, he asked about the incident and then the prosecutrix told that Annu @ Anoop Kumar ravished her and because of that, she ablazed herself. PW-16 Samina Bee has also corroborated the several facts. On a perusal of statements of both these witnesses, I found that there is no material contradiction and it is apparent from the statements of these witnesses that the prosecutrix disclosed them that the accused ravished her and because of that, she ablazed herself. ( 19. ) PW-2 Wali Mohammad deposed that he went in search of mother of the prosecturix and met Noor Jahan. He informed her and then they came to the house. PW-9 Noor Jahan also corroborated this fact. This witness has stated that her daughter told that Anooplal ne meri izzat le liya hai, isliye maine aag laga liya hai. It means, according to her daughter, Anooplal committed rape with her and because of that, she ablazed herself. ( 20. ) PW-2 Wali Mohammad has stated that the prosecutrix told on the way to hospital that Annu closed her mouth and ravished her. This witness was cross-examined at length and what he failed to disclose in examination-in-chief, was disclosed in his cross-examination that the prosecutrix told that she went behind the school to answer the call of nature and Annu @ Anooplal caught hold of her. This witness was cross-examined at length and what he failed to disclose in examination-in-chief, was disclosed in his cross-examination that the prosecutrix told that she went behind the school to answer the call of nature and Annu @ Anooplal caught hold of her. Though, the above fact has been disclosed by the witness only when the statement, recorded under Section 161 of Cr.P.C, was read over, but even though the above fact came in the statement of this witness and it is quite believable part of evidence in this case. Thereafter, this witness has further repeated in cross-examination that according to prosecutrix, Annu ravished her. The statement of this witness as well as the statement of PW-9 Noor Jahan are believable. ( 21. ) PW-3 Nafiza, PW-4 Zaheer and PW-10 Shahida Beguam failed to corroborate a part of prosecution story and they have been declared hostile, but it is apparent from the statements of these witnesses that an incident had taken place and the prosecutrix sustained burn injuries. If these witnesses failed to corroborate this fact that the prosecutrix disclosed the facts against the appellant, it does not mean that the statements of other witnesses should be disbelieved. As earlier discussed, the dying declaration Ex.P/2 and the dehati-nalishi Ex.P/15, are believable documents, therefore, the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant caught hold of the prosecutrix and ravished her and because of this, the prosecutrix poured the kerosene and ablazed herself. In these circumstances, the statements of above mentioned three witnesses who have been declared hostile, cannot be believed and on the basis of their statements, the prosecution story does not become doubtful. ( 22. ) It has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that in the dying declaration Ex.P/2, the prosecutrix disclosed that Mere Sath Usne Galat Kam Kiya but it does not mean that the appellant raped the prosecutrix, therefore, no offence under Section 376(1) of I.P.C. was proved beyond reasonable doubt. Though, the learned counsel for the appellant did not cite any case law in support of his contention, but I considered the principles laid down in the cases of Mahesh Kumar Bherulal Chawada v. State of M.P., 1995 Cri.L.J. 2021 (MP), Wahid Khan v. State of M.P., 1998(1) JLJ 290 and Narayan v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2003 Cri.L.J., 268 (MP). In the case of Mahesh Kumar (supra), the Court found as follows:- 31. Further more, it is important to note that Ex.P/3 and the said alleged statement of Sunita made to Kusumkant does not indicate that the accused had committed sexual intercourse with her when the prosecution has to prove a charge for commission of offence punishable under Section 376, I.P.C. Prosecution is bound to prove all ingredients, of the said crime and the section. It cannot be done by using words Galat Kam Bura Kam. It is to be noted that insulting a person by words, gestures or indecent behaviour is also Galat Kam or Bura Kam such terms did not make the prosecution to prove offence which is punishable under Section 376, I.P.C ( 23. ) In the case of Narayan (supra), it was held that if the words MERE SATH ULTA KAM KIYA, have not been explained by the prosecutrix or prosecution by adducing reasonable evidence to understand that in the local parlance of that area, ULTA KAM means sexual intercourse then in absence of evidence, the words ULTA KAM would not amount to sexual intercourse. But, in the case of Wahid Khan (supra), it was held that where the prosecutrix states that after removing her clothes, BURA KAM KIYA, it means nothing than committing the sexual intercourse. This Court referred the case of Wahid Khan in the case of Narayan (supra) and came to this conclusion that it was not disclosed by the prosecutrix that the clothes were removed and thereafter, BURA KAM KIYA, therefore, it means the expression BURA KAM KIYA, would not amount to committing rape. ( 24. ) First of all, this Court is of the opinion that where a case of rape has been filed in the Court with the allegations that the accused committed rape and for the fact of sexual intercourse, certain expressions were used such as Galat Kam Kiya, Bura Kam Kiya or Ulta Kam Kiya, then prima facie, these expressions would amount to sexual intercourse. It is not necessary at all in each and every case that the prosecutrix must express categorically all the details of rape or in other words, we cannot expect of a lady that she shall disclose all the acts of the accused, when he ravished her. In the Courts, obscenity must be avoided. It is not necessary at all in each and every case that the prosecutrix must express categorically all the details of rape or in other words, we cannot expect of a lady that she shall disclose all the acts of the accused, when he ravished her. In the Courts, obscenity must be avoided. Normally, the ladles are shy of disclosing the facts of rape in specific terms in presence of the accused, Advocates, Judge and the deposition writer. It is very easy for a lady to disclose the words spoken to her, gestures or indecent behaviour shown to her by tile accused, but certainly, it is not expected of a lady that she shall disclose facts of sexual intercourse in detail. Therefore, if a lady says in the Court that the accused had committed Galat Kam or Bura Kam or Ulta Kam, or any other such type of expression is disclosed by her and if there is any direct or indirect evidence in the statement of the prosecutrix or she discloses any other circumstance in support of her above expressions, this certainly amounts to committing rape. It is not necessary at all for that lady to disclose a particular circumstance or any other vulgar details. Even if a particular fact or circumstance has not been disclosed by the prosecutrix in support of a phrase, it does not mean that in absence of a particular circumstance, the offence of rape shall not be proved. It has been held in the case of Wahid Khan (supra), that - "......in different parts of the country, a particular act is described in many ways and different expressions are used for the purpose of same act. In my opinion, evidence of a witness has to be understood from the language of the people of that area. It is not expected of a witness to use in deposition the words mentioned in codified law. A Judge is under an obligation to understand what a witness desires to convey." ( 25. In my opinion, evidence of a witness has to be understood from the language of the people of that area. It is not expected of a witness to use in deposition the words mentioned in codified law. A Judge is under an obligation to understand what a witness desires to convey." ( 25. ) In a case of rape, if the prosecutrix discloses the words - Mere Sath Galat Kam Kiya or Ulta Kam Kiya or Bura Kam Kiya, and she also discloses any or different circumstances in corroboration of the story such as the accused caught hold of her or removed the clothes or entered in the house or dragged her towards a particular place and so on and so forth and then she uses any expression to describe the fact of sexual intercourse, then certainly, it would mean that the prosecutrix wants to disclose the fact of rape committed by the accused. We cannot restrict ourselves to a particular situation. The facts, situations and expressions differ from case to case and the Courts have to find out the exact meaning of the expression from the evidence adduced in that particular case. ( 26. ) In the present case, the prosecutrix disclosed in the dying declaration Ex.P/2 that when she went to answer the call of nature, Annu caught hold of her from behind and swathe her mouth and then, as per her expression, Mere Sath Usne Galat Kam Kiya. If the phrase Mere Sath Usne Galat Kam Kiya, coupled with above facts, is considered, then it becomes clear that the prosecutrix wanted to say that the accused ravished her. ( 27. ) The dehati-nalishi Ex.P/15 is also very important piece of evidence in this case in which the prosecutrix had disclosed that the accused Annu @ Anoop caught hold of her, threw her, opened the untwisted thread of her Salwar and then committed sexual intercourse. These facts are very important in this case. ( 28. ) The witnesses have also stated that the fact of rape committed by the accused, was also disclosed to them by the prosecutrix. In these circumstances, what the prosecutrix has stated in the dying declaration Ex.P/2 about the rape, finds support from other evidence in this case. These facts are very important in this case. ( 28. ) The witnesses have also stated that the fact of rape committed by the accused, was also disclosed to them by the prosecutrix. In these circumstances, what the prosecutrix has stated in the dying declaration Ex.P/2 about the rape, finds support from other evidence in this case. This Court is still of the opinion that in absence of evidence of dehati-nalishi or the statements of witnesses about the information given by the deceased, the appellant could have been convicted for the offence of rape on the basis of dying declaration Ex.P/2 only because, there are supportive facts to the phrase Mere Sath Galat Kam Kiya, and this phrase was sufficient to prove that the appellant raped the prosecutrix. ( 29. ) In view of the above discussion, since the other statements are of formal nature, therefore, it is not necessary to consider here because, those statements are in respect of seizure of slide, duty certificate of constable, seizure of various articles from the place of incident, etc. PW-6 Dr. T.N. Khare conducted the post-mortem of the deceased and found that the deceased died because of shock as a result of extensive burn. This witness has given the post-mortem report Ex.P/4 and no definite opinion could be given by him regarding rape due to burn injuries. PW-19 Dr.(Ku.) Shashi Saravgi also did not disclose anything about the fact of rape. But, this medical evidence is not sufficient to disbelieve the prosecution story because, if the doctor was not able to give any opinion about the commission of rape because of burn injuries or for any other cause, it does not mean that no rape was committed with the girl. In view of the dying declarations and other evidence, this fact was proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant committed rape on the prosecutrix, therefore, if the medical evidence does not support the fact of rape, the prosecution story does not become doubtful. ( 30. ) The trial Court has not committed any error in believing the prosecution story and coming to this conclusion that the offence punishable under Section 376(1) of I.P.C. was proved beyond reasonable doubt. ( 30. ) The trial Court has not committed any error in believing the prosecution story and coming to this conclusion that the offence punishable under Section 376(1) of I.P.C. was proved beyond reasonable doubt. Since, it appears that no appeal lias been preferred by the State against the acquittal of the appellant under Section 306 of I.P.C, therefore, it would not be proper for this Court to consider this aspect of the case. But, considering all the facts and evidence, this Court is of the opinion that the offence under Section 376 (1) of I.P.C. was proved beyond reasonable doubt against the appellant/accused. ( 31. ) The appellant was 19 years old at the time of incident. He committed rape with a girl aged about 13 years and because of this incident, the prosecutrix became disgusted and committed suicide. In these circumstances, the offence of the appellant becomes more heinous. The appellant has been sentenced to ten years rigorous imprisonment and there is no adequate or special reason for reducing the jail sentence. Considering the nature of crime and result of this offence that the prosecutrix committed suicide, this Court is of the opinion that the jail sentence of ten years rigorous imprisonment was proper. ( 32. ) In view of above discussion, this Court finds that there is no merit in this appeal. Hence, it is dismissed. The bail bonds of the appellant are cancelled. The appellant Annu @ Anoop Kumar shall surrender before the Court below immediately to serve the remaining part of sentence failing which, the Court below is directed to issue non-bailable warrant against the appellant. The appellant shall be entitled to set off under Section 428 of Cr.P.C. The property shall be disposed of in accordance with the orders of the trial Court. Appeal dismissed.