Judgment: Both these matters are interconnected with each other and were directed to be heard together as parties in both the matters are common. Accordingly, I have heard Sri V.V.L.N. Sarma, learned counsel for the appellant in the second appeal and for the petitioner in revision petition as well as Sri V.L.N.G.K. Murthy, learned counsel for the respondent in both the matters. 2. The appellant in the second appeal and the 1st petitioner in revision petition is being referred to hereunder as ‘appellant’ for the sake of convenience. 3. The brief facts are as follows: a) The appellant claims to be the owner of suit schedule house property which is a tiled house bearing M.No.44-12-48, situated at Paradesammapeta, Jagannadhapuram, Kakinada. She alleged that her husband died in 1961 and that she was blessed with four children; three daughters and one son. The said son appears as petitioner No.2 in C.R.P.No.6411 of 2004. The appellant alleges that she is an illiterate and not worldly wise and after the death of her husband, the management of all her affairs is being looked after by her brother, respondent herein in both the matters. b) It is alleged that her brother owns a small house on the northern side of the plaint schedule property and the plaint schedule house was purchased by her husband on 18-01-1954 with her sthreedhana. She further alleged that she has borrowed monies for the purpose of management of their family and one such creditor one Singanamalli Suryanarayana, resorted to filing O.S.No.673 of 1973, on the basis of a mortgage, and after obtaining a decree brought this plaint schedule house for sale in E.P.No.65 of 1977. It is alleged that the respondent, brother of the appellant, engaged an advocate on behalf of the appellant and also obtained her signatures on many papers. To satisfy the said decree, the appellant alleges to have raised Rs.4000/- by selling her gold bangles and gave the same to the respondent for discharging the said debt. c) It is further alleged that the appellant used to accompany the respondent to go to the Civil Court for the purpose of said litigation initiated by Singanamalli Suryanarayana and at that time she signed on several papers. c) It is further alleged that the appellant used to accompany the respondent to go to the Civil Court for the purpose of said litigation initiated by Singanamalli Suryanarayana and at that time she signed on several papers. She alleged that the office of the Registrar is also situated in the same Court compound and she later came to know that she was made to sign sale deed relating to suit house as if she has sold the suit house to the respondent herein under sale deed, dated 12-05-1978. d) She alleges that she came to know the aforesaid fraud played by the respondent when she received a notice from the respondent, under Ex.A-1, dated 12-04-1985, alleging that the appellant is a tenant in possession on a rent of Rs.40/- per month and that she has committed willful default and asking her to vacate the premises. The appellant claims that she gave a reply, dated 24-04-1985, stating that the respondent, in a fraudulent manner got sale deed registered. Later, she obtained Ex.A-2, registration extract of the said disputed sale deed and she filed the present suit on 04-07-1985 as an indigent person. She has accordingly filed a suit seeking a declaration that the registered sale deed, Ex.A-2, is void and non-existent and no binding on her and for permanent injunction restraining the respondent from interfering with the appellant’s possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule house. 4. The respondent herein filed the written statement denying the plaint allegations alleging that the appellant herself borrowed money and was managing her affairs independently. It is also asserted that she herself engaged an advocate and defended herself in the said legal action taken by the creditor and only for the purpose of settling the said creditor, when she required the amount, she requested the respondent, as a brother, to purchase the plaint –A schedule house. The respondent claims that in the said situation, he agreed to purchase the said schedule house and paid the decreetal amount to the creditor and obtained full satisfaction receipt and thereafter, the appellant along with her son (petitioner No.2 in C.R.P.) executed a registered sale deed in his favour on 12-05-1978. The respondent, further, invested money for repairs of the house and the respondent has allowed her to continue in the same house on a nominal rent of Rs.40/- per month. The respondent, further, invested money for repairs of the house and the respondent has allowed her to continue in the same house on a nominal rent of Rs.40/- per month. The said rents were paid very irregularly by her and ultimately, she committed default from January 1984 compelling the respondent to issue a notice dated 02-04-1985, which was not served on her and he once again issued another notice, dated 12-04-1985, Ex.A-1 and after noticing her evasive reply, Ex.A-3, dated 25-04-1985, he filed R.C.C.No.30 of 1985 before the learned Rent Controller-cum-District Munsif, Kakainda, for eviction of the appellant and her son. The respondent, therefore, denied that there is any fraud committed by him as alleged and further alleged that the present suit is filed as a counter blast to the R.C.C.No.30 of 1985 fled by him. 5. On the basis of the pleadings, the trial Court framed as many as 9 issues as follows: 1. Whether the sale deed dated 12-05-1978 is vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation and is not supported by consideration? 2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for declaration that the sale deed dated 12-05-1978 is in favour of defendant is void? 3. Whether there is no landlord and tenant relationship between the defendant and the plaintiff? 4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the permanent injunction prayed for? 5. Whether the management of court affairs in O.S.No.673 of 1973 in E.P.No.65 of 1977 by the defendant for the plaintiff and her son are true and correct? 6. Whether the management of plaintiff affairs by the defendant is true? 7. Whether the suit is barred by limitation? 8. Whether the plaintiff is estopped from filing the suit? 9. To what relief? 6. In the trial Court, the appellant examined herself as P.W.1 as well as P.Ws.2 and 3 and marked Exs.A-1 to A-3, whereas respondent herein examined himself as D.W.1 and three other witnesses D.Ws.2 to 4 and marked Ex.B-1 to B-5. 7. On an elaborate discussion on oral and documentary evidence, the trial Court answered issue No.1 against the appellant by holding that she has failed to establish any fraud in execution of Ex.A-2, sale deed, and consequently further answered that the appellant is not entitled for declaration as sought for. 7. On an elaborate discussion on oral and documentary evidence, the trial Court answered issue No.1 against the appellant by holding that she has failed to establish any fraud in execution of Ex.A-2, sale deed, and consequently further answered that the appellant is not entitled for declaration as sought for. On further issues, it was also found against the appellant by holding that there is relationship of landlord and tenant between the respondent and the appellant and most importantly, it was found that the suit was barred by limitation apart from other findings. The appellant thereupon filed appeal before the lower appellate Court. On the basis of various contentions raised by both sides, the lower appellate Court also framed the following points for consideration: 1. Whether the sale deed dated 12-08-1978 is vitiated by fraud and misrepresentation and is not supported by consideration? 2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to cancellation of the sale deed as prayed for? 3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to permanent injunction? 4. Whether the suit is barred by limitation? 5. Whether there are any grounds to interfere with the judgment of the trial Court? 6. To what relief? 8. The lower appellant Court has re-appreciated the evidence on record with reference to the findings of the trial Court and held against the appellant that she has failed to establish the fraud as alleged by her in execution of the said sale deed, Ex.A-2, dated 12-05-1978 and consequently held that she is not entitled for declaration as sought for and that the suit filed by the appellant is barred by limitation under Article 59 of the Limitation Act. 9. In this second appeal, the following substantial questions of law were formulated and are required to be answered. 1. Whether the appreciation of the material on record by the Courts below is perverse? 2. Whether Ex.B-2 is brought into existence by the defendant by playing fraud, undue influence and misrepresentation on the plaintiff without any consideration? 3. Whether the suit in question, is within the period of limitation? 10. I have heard the learned counsel for the appellant in detail, who has made forceful submissions with reference to the relationship between the parties, and the circumstances under which the sale deed in question came to be executed. 3. Whether the suit in question, is within the period of limitation? 10. I have heard the learned counsel for the appellant in detail, who has made forceful submissions with reference to the relationship between the parties, and the circumstances under which the sale deed in question came to be executed. The indebtedness and illiteracy of the appellant apart from respondent taking advantage of being in dominant position over the appellant and practicing undue influence and misrepresentation on the appellant was also urged. He has further submitted that the respondent has taken full advantage of the illiteracy as well as the heavy dependency of the appellant on the respondent, and by playing undue influence, fraud and misrepresentation, has secured a sale deed from her in his name. He strongly relies upon the circumstance that the office of the Registrar is situated within the same compound in which the Court is situated and contends that while the appellant was being taken by the respondent for settling the litigation initiated by Singnamalli Suryanarayana, on the pretext of settling litigation, her signatures on the disputed registered sale deed were also taken and the said document was registered. The learned counsel, therefore, contends that the appellant being in dark about execution and registration of the sale deed till the receipt of legal notice, Ex.A-1, dated 12-04-1985, within three months thereafter, she filed the present suit on 04-07-1985 and it cannot be said that the case of the appellant is not probable and that the suit is well within time. He has, therefore, urged that the concurrent findings of both the Courts on the crucial issue deserve to be set aside by upholding the claim of the appellant. 11. Learned counsel for the respondent has equally forcefully submitted that the concurrent findings of the fact reached by the Courts below, on the crucial questions, are not open for interference in the second appeal. He further submits that both the Courts below have meticulously and minutely examined the oral and documentary evidence and have appreciated the same in the light of legal position as were cited before the Courts below and have reached the correct conclusions which naturally flow from the said evidence. He further submits that both the Courts below have meticulously and minutely examined the oral and documentary evidence and have appreciated the same in the light of legal position as were cited before the Courts below and have reached the correct conclusions which naturally flow from the said evidence. The learned counsel, therefore, would contend that the conclusions reached by both the Courts below are clearly based on evidence and cannot be said to be perverse and consequently interference by this Court under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) is not warranted on the facts and circumstances of the case. 12. So far as the question of fraud is concerned, the learned counsel would contend that mere suspicion is not enough unless the appellant is able to plead and prove the fraud. To the extent of contentions, based on mis-representation and undue influence, he submits that neither of the said two aspects were pleaded and in the absence of thereof, the same cannot be considered, even apart from merits. The learned counsel also submits that the suit is clearly barred by limitation as the appellant herself has admitted in her evidence that she came to know of the disputed sale, two or three months after the execution and as such the suit is filed after more than seven years thereafter is clearly beyond the limitation prescribed. 13. I have considered the aforesaid submissions in the light of the findings of the Courts below. 14. Before I proceed further with reference to the merits of the matter, it is necessary to notice the decision reported in Union Of India V. M/S. Chaturbhai M. Patel & CO., AIR 1976 S.C. 712 where the Supreme Court has quoted the legal position. Para-7 of its judgment would be apt to extract hereunder: “7. The High Court has carefully considered the various circumstances relied upon by the appellant and has held that they are not at all conclusive to prove the case of fraud. It is well settled that fraud like any other charge of a criminal offence whether made in civil or criminal proceedings, must be established beyond reasonabe doubt: per Lord Atkin in A. L. N. Narayanan Chettyar v. Official Assignee, High Court Rangoon, AIR 1941 PC 93. It is well settled that fraud like any other charge of a criminal offence whether made in civil or criminal proceedings, must be established beyond reasonabe doubt: per Lord Atkin in A. L. N. Narayanan Chettyar v. Official Assignee, High Court Rangoon, AIR 1941 PC 93. However suspicious may be the circumstances, however strange the coincidences, and however grave the doubts, suspicion alone can never take the place of proof. In our normal life we are sometimes faced with unexplainable phenomenon and strange coincidences, for, as it is said, truth is stranger than fiction. In these circumstances, therefore, going through the judgment of the High Court we are satisfied that the appellant has not been able to make out a case of fraud as found by the High Court. As such the High Court was fully justified in negativing the plea of fraud and in decreeing the suit of the plaintiff.” 15. Similarly to the extent of plea of undue influence as well as mis-representation, the following passage also would be apt to extract from other decision of the Supreme Court in Afsar Shaikh and Another V. Soleman Bibi AIR 1976 S.C. 163 . “15. While it is true that 'undue influence', 'fraud', 'misrepresentation' are cognate vices and may, in part, overlap in some cases, they are in law distinct categories, and are in view of Order 6, Rule 4, read with Order 6, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, required to be separately pleaded with specificity, particularity and precision. A general allegation in the plaint, that the plaintiff was a simple old man of ninety who had reposed great confidence in the defendant, was much too insufficient to amount to an averment of undue influence of which the High Court could take notice, particularly when no issue was claimed and no contention was raised on that point at any stage in the trial court, or, in the first round, even before the first appellate court.” 16. The learned counsel for the respondent has cited the decision of the Supreme Court in A.C. Ananthaswamy And Others V. Boraiah (Dead) By LRS. (2004) 8 S.C.C. 588 , and the following passage there from is relied upon: “……..Fraud is to be pleaded and proved. The learned counsel for the respondent has cited the decision of the Supreme Court in A.C. Ananthaswamy And Others V. Boraiah (Dead) By LRS. (2004) 8 S.C.C. 588 , and the following passage there from is relied upon: “……..Fraud is to be pleaded and proved. To prove fraud, it must be proved that representation made was false to the knowledge of the party making such representation or that the party could have no reasonable belief that it was true. The level of proof required in such cases is extremely higher. An ambiguous statement cannot per se make the representor guilty of fraud. To prove a case of fraud, it must be proved that the representation made was false to the knowledge of the party making such representation. (See Pollock & Mulla; Indian Contrct & Specific Relief Acts (2001), 12th Edn. P.489.)” 17. In the light of the above legal position, if we examine the evidence on record and findings of both the Courts, the following features are noticeable: a) Ex.A-2, sale deed was executed not only by the appellant but by her son, who is petitioner No.2, in C.R.P. He was undisputedly major on the date of execution of sale deed and he was examined as P.W.2. The execution of the document by both the vendors i.e. appellant and her son, is not in dispute. During his cross-examination, he stated that P.W.1 i.e. his mother, appellant herein, is regularly drawing her pension from sub-treasury office. While respondent herein is his 4th maternal uncle, D.W.2 is his 3rd maternal uncle. He was in the final year of polytechnic in 1978. He admits of having signed sale deed himself and his mother putting thumb impression mark at the Registrar’s office. In his entire evidence, he has never stated of any fraud, mis-representation or undue influence on the part of D.W.1 i.e. respondent herein. b) Further D.W.2 is the another maternal uncle of P.W.2, elder to the respondent herein. He has stated in his evidence that appellant herself was looking after her affairs after death of her husband and he states that the respondent never looked after her affairs except for purchasing the said house to discharge the debt which the appellant had incurred. He deposed that he himself along with appellant and her son went to the said creditor’s house and paid the amount and obtained full satisfaction receipt. He deposed that he himself along with appellant and her son went to the said creditor’s house and paid the amount and obtained full satisfaction receipt. He confirmed the said full satisfaction receipt, Ex.B-1, having been attested by him. He further confirms that subsequently respondent obtained Ex.A-2, sale deed (Ex.A-2 is the registration extract of the sale deed whereas Ex.B-2 is the original sale deed). c) In his cross-examination, he has stated that the appellant herself gave the papers relating to the suit property after Ex.B-1, full satisfaction receipt, was recorded and the said papers were obtained from the Court. In his re-examination, he has stated that the appellant sold Ac.1.50 cents of her husband’s land after his death and purchased Ac.2.00 cents. The same was subsequently sold by the appellant and the said transaction was long prior to the present disputed sale transaction. d) Further, D.W.3 is another witness, who is the scribe of Ex.B-2, original sale deed, who confirms that the contents of the document were read over to the parties and the appellant and her son signed and affixed a thumb marks and afterwards, it was registered. The suggestion given to him is that the appellant did not know anything about the said original sale deed, Ex.B-2. Further, the attestor of Ex.B-2 was examined as D.W.4 who also confirms the execution of the document in his presence. 18. In the light of the above evidence, certain admissions of appellant as P.W.1 are very material in answering questions. She states in her evidence as follows: “………………I came to know about the sale deed two or three months after the defendant got obtained the sale deed.” The aforesaid oral evidence clearly shows that the appellant herself was aware of the sale deed two or three months thereafter. The said knowledge, therefore, is some time in 1978. This, however, cannot explain as to why the present suit was not filed within three years thereafter. Even otherwise her son, who was finishing his polytechnic course in 1978, is also one of the vendors under the said sale deed. Even assuming that the appellant was unaware of the sale, her son, vendor No.2, was a co-executant and was definitely aware of sale but he has not questioned the sale in question, as he has not joined along with the appellant in the present suit. Even assuming that the appellant was unaware of the sale, her son, vendor No.2, was a co-executant and was definitely aware of sale but he has not questioned the sale in question, as he has not joined along with the appellant in the present suit. Even otherwise under Section 3 of the Registration Act, the very registration of the sale deed amounts to notice. Thus to accept the case of the appellant that she was not aware of the sale in question and came to know only when she received Ex.A-1, legal notice, from the respondent, is improbable and the evidence on record does not support the aforesaid contention. The findings of both the Courts below on the aspect of limitation, held against the appellant, therefore, are not vitiated by any error. The substantial question of law No.3, framed as above, is, therefore, answered against the appellant. 19. With respect to the substantial question of law No.2, as above, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court (2 supra), the contentions, based on undue influence and mis-representation, have to be excluded from consideration, as there is neither any pleading nor any evidence. In fact, it is not even stated in the plaint that the respondent herein was in a dominating position with respect to appellant nor it is stated that he influenced the appellant and her son to execute the sale deed by using his dominant position. In the absence of very basic averment to that effect in the plaint, the only question which needs to be considered is whether the appellant has established fraud as alleged? 20. In the decisions of the Supreme Court, first and third cited above, it was held that all particulars relating to the fraud must be pleaded and proved. Mere suspicion is not enough to reach a finding of fraud. The proof of such fraud must be beyond all reasonable doubt. The case of the appellant, even if examined from the point of view of her illiteracy, her old age, the fact that she had already lost her husband, her son was very young at that time and there was nobody to look after her affairs, would not be relevant in answering her contention that her brother, the respondent, has committed fraud on her in taking the said sale deed. The charge of fraud is a serious one which requires elaborating pleadings and evidence, which both the Courts below found to be lacking in the present case. The said concurrent findings reached by the Courts below, therefore, cannot be said to be perverse nor it can be said that there is any error in appreciation of the said evidence. While exercising jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC, therefore, the said finding arrived at by both the Courts below on the material on record, in the absence of any infirmity, the same cannot be interfered with in the Second Appeal. The said substantial question of law, therefore, is answered against the appellant. 21. Further as stated above, since the appreciation of evidence by both the Courts below is not shown to be perverse on any ground, the first substantial question of law also deserves to be answered against the appellant. 22. The learned counsel for the appellant has cited a several cases as listed below: With regard to Thamma Peda Thatayya V. Bhagwandas Atmasingh, 1969 (1) ALT 334 it was a case, where a specific plea was there that the document was not read over and explained to the executant as the language, in which it is written, was unknown to him and being unaware of the terms and recitals, he signed and executed the document. In our case, no such averment is found and as such the said decision has no application. In Achuthan Pillai V. Marikar (Motors) Ltd., Trivandrum And Others, AIR 1983 KERALA 81, it was a case, where a blank stamp paper was alleged to have been fabricated into a document, which is also not the case here. The decision in Chaitan Charan Parida V. Maheswar Parida And Another, Air 1991 Orissa 125 relates to a case of gift deed executed by a pardanashin lady, who was an illiterate, which also does not apply to the present case. In MST. Sethani V. Bhana, AIR 1993 S.C. 956 a case dealing with undue influence which is not pleaded in the present case. In Rankanidhi Sahu V. Nandakishore Sahu, AIR 1990 ORISSA 64 where a Pardanashin illiterate lady executed a document, which does not apply to the present case. In Brundaban Misra V. Iswar Swain and Others, AIR 1983 ORISSA 172 it is also a case of execution by an illiterate woman. In Rankanidhi Sahu V. Nandakishore Sahu, AIR 1990 ORISSA 64 where a Pardanashin illiterate lady executed a document, which does not apply to the present case. In Brundaban Misra V. Iswar Swain and Others, AIR 1983 ORISSA 172 it is also a case of execution by an illiterate woman. In the present case, as already discussed, the document is executed by the appellant as well as her son, who was educated and as such the said case has no application. The decision in Lourembam Heramot Singh V. Laisram Angahal Lsingh And Others AIR 1979 GAUHATI 68 is relied upon for proposition that mere registration is not proof of execution. But in the present case, the execution and registration both are admitted by the appellant. The case in MST. Kharbuja Kuer V. Jangbahadur Rai and Others AIR 1963 S.C. 1203 is also relating to a document executed by Pardanashin lady, which, for the reasons stated above, has no application to the present case. In Somnath Misra V. Narahari Das And Others, AIR 1977 NOC 304 (ORI) the case is relating to an illiterate person executing the document and the contents being not read over and explained to the said person. On the facts of our case, there is no such pleading and as such the said decision cannot assist the appellant. In Dr. Kumari Shantha Arogyadoss (Deceased By L.Rs.) and Others V. Smt. G.C. Kamala and Others, 2000 AIHC 227 it was a case regarding what is meant by execution, when applied to a document, which has also no application as execution and registration are admitted by the appellant. To the same effect, the decision of this Court in Ahalya Bai V. Gangapur Shankariaah and Others 1996 (4) ALD 1088 and Ramjan Khan and Others V. Baba Raghunath Dass and Others, AIR 1992 M.P. 22 is for the proposition that when document contains thumb impression of illiterate person, it is the burden of beneficiary to prove the due execution, which has no application as appellant and her son both have admitted execution and registered the document. The decision in Madan Gopal Kanodia V. Mamraj Maniram and Others, AIR 1976 S.C. 461 , is relied upon to show that misreading of evidence is a substantial question of law. On facts of the present case, no error of appreciation is found on the part of both the Courts below. SMT. The decision in Madan Gopal Kanodia V. Mamraj Maniram and Others, AIR 1976 S.C. 461 , is relied upon to show that misreading of evidence is a substantial question of law. On facts of the present case, no error of appreciation is found on the part of both the Courts below. SMT. Annapurna Barik Dei and Another V. Smt. Inda Bewa and Others AIR 1995 ORISSA 273, is also a case of Pardanshin lady executing a deed which has no application to the facts of the present case. 23. In the result, therefore, the second appeal is liable to be dismissed. C.R.P.No.6411 of 2004: 24. In this revision, the concurrent findings of both the Courts below are that the petitioners have defaulted in payment of rents and that the respondent requires schedule premises for his bona fide occupation. The respondent in the second appeal, who is the eviction petitioner, is examined as P.W.1 and D.W.2 in the second appeal, is examined as P.W.2 in R.C.C.No.30 of 1985. Almost same set of documents, which are subject matter of second appeal, are also filed in these proceedings. 25. The most crucial question which was urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners was that there is no evidence supporting on finding as to the relationship between the parties as landlord and tenant. The learned counsel has criticized the findings of the learned Rent Controller, which are primarily based upon the sale deed, executed by the petitioners herein in favour of the respondent herein, on 12-05-1978 marked as Ex.A-5. The said sale having been upheld in the second appeal, the ownership of the respondent herein cannot be disputed. 26. The learned Rent Controller has once again examined the selfsame contentions regarding the fraud pleaded by the petitioners and discussed the evidence surrounding the sale deed (marked Ex.A-5 in the C.R.P.). The learned Rent Controller, therefore, has proceeded to determine if there is truth in the case pleaded by the petitioners and proceeded to find that in fact, the petitioners have sold the suit property to the respondent and as such the petitioners are tenants of the respondent and liable to pay the rent and consequently, passed the eviction order. The learned Rent Controller, therefore, has proceeded to determine if there is truth in the case pleaded by the petitioners and proceeded to find that in fact, the petitioners have sold the suit property to the respondent and as such the petitioners are tenants of the respondent and liable to pay the rent and consequently, passed the eviction order. The lower appellate Court also has considered the same only in paragraph-8 of its judgment and has merely reiterated and expressed agreement with the findings of the learned Rent Controller without independently discussing the issues arising in the past rent control case. 27. The entire discussion of the Rent Controller is however with reference to the said sale and having upheld the sale, the eviction was ordered. The lower appellate Court also has committed the same error and in fact, in paragraph-8 of the lower appellate Court’s judgment, only reiteration of the findings of the learned Rent Controller are found. 28. I, therefore, find that there is no independent appreciation of any evidence by both the Courts below with regard to the questions which arise in the present eviction case. Most of the conclusions of the lower appellate Court in para-8 are only on the ground that Rent Controller has clearly discussed the entire evidence and has reached conclusions. The appreciation by the lower appellate Court, therefore, is not satisfactory and is not in accordance with requirement, and is not inconfirmity with Order 41 Rule 31 CPC. For that reason, therefore, I deem it appropriate, in the interest of justice, to remit the appeal R.C.A.No.24 of 1996 to the Rent Control Appellate Authority-cum-Principal Senior Civil Judge, Kakinada, for reconsideration afresh. 29. In the result, S.A.No.992 of 2007 is dismissed. C.R.P.No.6411 of 2004 is allowed and the R.C.A.No.24 of 1996 is remitted for reconsideration. There shall be no order as to costs.