Judgment : The respondents filed O.S.No.89 of 2002 in the Court of Junior Civil Judge, Badvel, against the petitioner, for the relief of perpetual injunction, in respect of the suit schedule property. The petitioner, on the other hand, presented a counter-claim, for that very relief. The trial Court dismissed the suit and decreed the counter-claim. The respondents filed A.S.No.5 of 2008 in the Court of Additional Senior Civil Judge-cum-Fast Track Court, Rajampet at Badvel. After some time, they filed I.A.No.37 of 2008, under Order XXIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), with a prayer to permit them to withdraw the appeal, without prejudice to the right to file a fresh suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession, in respect of the suit schedule property. The petitioner opposed the application, stating that the valuable rights have accrued to him, on account of the decree passed in his counter-claim and the same cannot be defeated by according permission to the respondents, enabling them to file a fresh suit. Through an elaborate order, dated 15.07.2008, the lower Appellate Court allowed the I.A. The same is challenged in this C.R.P. Sri L.J.Veera Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that the order passed by the trial Court granting permission to the respondents to file a fresh suit, is opposed to law and there was absolutely no factual basis for it. He contends that none of the conditions mentioned in sub-rule (3) of Rule 1 of Order XXIII CPC, are present in this case, and that the impugned order cannot be sustained in law. He further submits that the permission accorded to the respondents by the lower appellate Court would violate the mandate under Order II Rule 2 CPC, which insists that the whole claim of a plaintiff, based the same cause of action, must be included in a suit. The respondents failed in their effort to obtain a decree of perpetual injunction, against the petitioner. On the other hand, they suffered a decree of similar nature vis-à-vis the petitioner, in the form of a counter-claim. They preferred an appeal against the decree passed by the trial Court. Instead of proceeding with the appeal, they have chosen to withdraw it, with liberty to file a fresh suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession. On the other hand, they suffered a decree of similar nature vis-à-vis the petitioner, in the form of a counter-claim. They preferred an appeal against the decree passed by the trial Court. Instead of proceeding with the appeal, they have chosen to withdraw it, with liberty to file a fresh suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession. Though learned counsel for the petitioner, initially, raised an objection stating that there is no provision in the C.P.C., which enables the respondents to withdraw the appeal. He did not proceed beyond a point, obviously on realizing that the procedure that applies to original proceedings would govern the appeals also, unless separate provisions are made, on any aspect. A plaintiff in a suit has full liberty to withdraw the suit, at any stage. The only restriction placed upon him is that, if a suit is withdrawn, he cannot present a fresh suit on the same cause of action and obviously, for the same relief, unless he reserves to himself the right to do so and the Court accords such permission. Rule 1 of Order XXIII CPC, which governs the withdrawal of a suit, reads as under: 1. "Withdrawal of suit or abandonment of pat of claim:- (1) At any time after, the institution of a suit, the plaintiff may as against all or any of the defendant abandon his suit or abandon part of his claim: Provided that where the plaintiff is a minor or other person to whom the provisions contained in rules 1 to 14 of Order XXXII extend, neither the suit nor any part of the claim shall be abandoned without the leave of the Court. (2) an application for leave under the proviso to sub-rule (1) shall be accompanied by an affidavit of the next friend and also, if the minor or such other person is represented by a pleader, by a certificate of the pleader to the effect that the abandonment proposed is, in his opinion, for the benefit of the minor or such other person. (3) Whether the Court is satisfied,- (a) that a suit must fail by reason of some formal defect, or (b) that there are sufficient grounds for allowing the plaintiff to institute a fresh suit for the subject-matter of a suit or part of a claim, it may, on such terms as it thinks fit, grant the plaintiff permission to withdraw from such suit or such part of the claim with liberty to institute a fresh suit in respect of the subject-matter of such suit or such part of the claim. (4) Where the plaintiff- (a) abandons any suit or part of claim under sub-rule (1) or (b) withdraws from a suit or part of a claim without the permission referred to in sub-rule (3), he shall be liable for such costs as the Court may award and shall be precluded from instituting any fresh suit in respect of such subject-matter or such part of the claim. (5) Nothing in this rule shall be deemed to authorize the Court to permit one of several plaintiffs to abandon a suit or part of a claim under sub-rule (1), or to withdraw, under sub-rule (3), any suit or part of a claim, without the consent of the other plaintiffs." A perusal of sub-rule (3) discloses that the permission to institute a fresh suit is needed, only when the plaintiff intends to file it "in respect of the subject-matter" of such suit, or part of the claim. The expression "subject-matter" employed in sub-rule (3) is prone to be understood as the property, which is shown in the suit schedule. However, a close scrutiny reveals that the expression refers to the nature of relief than the item of property. For instance, the plaintiff in a suit is in enjoyment of an item of immovable property, on the strength of usufruct mortgage. Anticipating or complaining interference by the defendant, he may file suit for perpetual injunction. If for any reason, he does not want to proceed with the suit, he can withdraw it and his right to seek foreclosure of the mortgage is totally independent of, and unconnected with the suit for perpetual injunction. In both the suits, "the subject-matter", in the ordinary parlance, is the mortgaged property. If for any reason, he does not want to proceed with the suit, he can withdraw it and his right to seek foreclosure of the mortgage is totally independent of, and unconnected with the suit for perpetual injunction. In both the suits, "the subject-matter", in the ordinary parlance, is the mortgaged property. If the expression "subjectmatter", occurring in sub-rule (3), is construed as the item of property, than the nature of relief claimed, withdrawal of suit for mortgage would bar the suit for foreclosure also. That is never the purport of CPC, nor the scheme under relevant provisions. The inescapable conclusion is that what is barred under Rule 1 of Order XXIII CPC is, the filing of a suit for the same relief, on the same cause of action. It is not uncommon that whenever a plaintiff in a suit for perpetual injunctions finds it difficult to prove his possession, he would withdraw the same, without prejudice to his right to file a suit for recovery of possession, if necessary by seeking declaration of title. Suits for declaration of title and recovery of possession can be filed, even after dismissal of the suit for injunction. Since the nature of relief and cause of action in the two categories of suits are totally different, there is no necessity to seek leave under Rule 1 of Order XXIII CPC in such cases. The prayer made by the respondents for granting them leave to file a fresh suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession was, in fact, unnecessary and superfluous. Without such leave also, they could have filed it. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court in Somaraju Chinnammi v. Sumanthu Sivaji Ganesh 2008 (6) ALT 215 . That was a case where the plaintiff in a suit for perpetual injunction wanted to withdraw the suit with liberty to file a fresh suit on the same cause of action. This Court found that the ingredients contained in sub-rule (3) of Rule 1 of Order XXIII CPC were totally absent, in the permission accorded by the trial Court. Such is not the case here. The objection raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner based upon Order II Rule 2 CPC, is equally untenable. The said provision reads as under: 2. Such is not the case here. The objection raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner based upon Order II Rule 2 CPC, is equally untenable. The said provision reads as under: 2. "Suit to include the whole claim:- (1) every suit shall include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the cause of action; but a plaintiff may relinquish any portion of his claim in order to bring the suit within the jurisdiction of any Court. (2) Relinquishment of part of claim.- (3) Omission to sue for one of several reliefs.- Where a plaintiff omits to sue in respect of, or intentionally relinquishes, any portion of his claim, he shall not afterwards sue in respect of the portion so omitted or relinquished. A person entitled to more than one relief in respect of the same cause of action may sue for all or any of such reliefs; but if he omits, except with the leave of the Court, to sue for all such reliefs, he shall not afterwards sue for any relief so omitted." What this provision mandates is that, a plaintiff shall include whole of the claim in respect of the cause of action. In another words, it prohibits splitting of reliefs, which are based on the same cause of action. For instance, if it became necessary for an individual to seek declaration of title in respect of an item of property, and for recovery of possession on the same set of facts, he cannot split the relief and file separate suits for such reliefs. The examples can be multiplied. The claim mentioned in Rule 2 takes in its fold, the reliefs that are connected with each other. However, it is difficult to group in the reliefs, which are in a way contradictory to one another. The relief of perpetual injunction presupposes the plaintiff in a suit being in possession of the property and his facing threats from the defendant. In a suit for recovery of possession, on the other hand, the very basis is that the plaintiff was dispossessed by the defendant and he prays for a decree of recovery of possession. The suit for these reliefs cannot belong to the same category, much less the reliefs of that nature would form part of the same claim. Consequently, the question of splitting them does not arise. The suit for these reliefs cannot belong to the same category, much less the reliefs of that nature would form part of the same claim. Consequently, the question of splitting them does not arise. As a matter of fact, they are mutually exclusive. Viewed from any angle, the contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner cannot be accepted and the order under revision does not warrant interference. The Civil Revision Petition is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.