JUDGMENT : Dr. B.S.Chauhan, C.J. - The case has a chequered history as litigation is going on for last forty five years as to who should have the mining lease for excavation of minerals in Kalaparbat area of Keonjhar district. The State Government vide letter dated 20.7.1965 threw open an area measuring 438.50 acres in said Kalaparbat area for re-grant under Rule 59(1) of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960. (hereinafter called 'the Rules). Pursuant to the said notification dated 20.7.1965, the Petitioner Dr. Sarojini Pradhan, (the predecessor interest of the Respondent No. 10) and six others submitted their applications. Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (hereinafter called 'the Act) provided the period for deciding the applications. None of the said applications was disposed of within the statutory prescribed period. Therefore, against such inaction of the Government, Petitioner and Dr. Sarojini Pradhan filed revisions before the Central Government. The Central Government disposed of the said revisions vide Order Dated 7.4.1967 directing the State Government to consider the applications for mining lease. In spite of the said direction, the applications were not considered. Thus, the Petitioner again approached the Central Government. The said application was rejected vide Order Dated 13.10.1967. Being aggrieved, Petitioner filed OJC Nos. 855 of 1969 before this Court for issuance of direction to the State Government to grant mining lease in its favour. Dr. Sarojini Pradhan opposed the said application after seeking impleadment as Respondent in the case. This Court vide Order Dated 21.6.1971 disposed of the petition directing the State Government to decide the said applications. The State Government made recommendation dated 3.9.1971 for grant of lease in favour of Dr. Sarojini Pradhan and sought for approval of the Central Government u/s 5(1) of the Act. The Central Government vide Order Dated 18.2.1972 did not accord approval to the recommendation made by the State Government. The State Government again vide its letter dated 25.4.1972 informed the Central Government about its inclination to make the grant of lease in favour of Dr. Sarojini Pradhan. However, the Central Government vide letter dated 29.12.1972 asked the State Government to reject her application and as a consequence the State Government rejected her application vide Order Dated 8.6.1973. The Petitioner as well as Dr. Sarojini Pradhan and other applicants filed revision applications before the Central Government. The Central Government vide Order Dated 2.5.1978 rejected the revision filed by Dr. The Petitioner as well as Dr. Sarojini Pradhan and other applicants filed revision applications before the Central Government. The Central Government vide Order Dated 2.5.1978 rejected the revision filed by Dr. Sarojini Pradhan but allowed the revision of the Petitioner with a direction to the State Government to pass a fresh order on merit. Being aggrieved Dr. Sarojini Pradhan filed OJC Nos. 829 of 1978 before this Court challenging the Order Dated 2.5.1978. This Court vide judgment and Order Dated 4.9.1987 allowed the said Writ Petition and directed the Central Government to reconsider the question of approval of grant of lease after giving opportunity of hearing to the parties concerned by a speaking and reasoned order. At this juncture, the original applicant Dr. Sarojini Pradhan died on 10.9.1987 and her legal heirs were allowed to be substituted in her place though at the relevant time there was no provision for substitution of legal representatives of the deceased applicant. The Central Government vide Order Dated 11.5.1990 approved the recommendation in favour of the legal heirs of Dr. Sarojini Pradhan. Being aggrieved, the said order was challenged by the Petitioner by filing OJC Nos. 4316 of 1990 before this Court. This Court vide judgment and Order Dated 13.12.1996 quashed the order of approval in favour of Dr. Sarojini Pradhan and directed the Central Government to reconsider the matter and pass a fresh speaking order. In the meanwhile, the Central Government asked the State Government to send a fresh proposal for grant of mining lease over the said area of 171.226 hectares as in respect of 46.22 hectares licence had been granted in favour of some other person. The Central Government gave opportunity of hearing to the Petitioner as well as to the legal heirs of Dr. Sarojini Pradhan and representative of the State Government and ultimately approved the grant of mining lease in favour of legal heirs of Dr. Sarojini Pradhan vide Order Dated 8.4.1999. Being aggrieved of the said order, Petitioner filed OJC Nos. 11537 of 1999 before this Court. This Court vide judgment and Order Dated 2.7.2001 allowed the Writ Petition and quashed the Order Dated 8.4.1999 and directed the Central Government to decide the matter afresh after hearing the Petitioner and legal heirs of Dr. Sarojini Pradhan. Being aggrieved of the said order, Petitioner filed OJC Nos. 11537 of 1999 before this Court. This Court vide judgment and Order Dated 2.7.2001 allowed the Writ Petition and quashed the Order Dated 8.4.1999 and directed the Central Government to decide the matter afresh after hearing the Petitioner and legal heirs of Dr. Sarojini Pradhan. Being aggrieved, Petitioner filed SLP before the Hon'ble Supreme Court challenging the judgment and order of this Court dated 2.7.2001 so far as right of hearing had been conferred upon the legal heirs of the deceased Dr. Sarojini Pradhan. The said SLP was dismissed by the Apex Court vide Order Dated 24.8.2001. The State Government recommended for grant of lease in favour of Opposite Party Nos. 10 and sent the matter to the Central Government for approval. A copy of the same was served upon the Petitioner. The matter was heard by the Central Government on 28.8.2001 and 13.9.2001 and the order was passed on 26.9.2001 rejecting the claim of the Petitioner and granting approval in favour of the legal heirs of Dr. Sarojini Pradhan. Petitioner filed this Writ Petition challenging the said order. 2. So far as issue as to whether the legal heirs of Dr. Saojini Pradhan could be heard, OJC Nos. 3662 of 2002 was decided against the Petitioner by this Court vide judgment and Order Dated 31.8.2007. The matter is pending consideration before the Apex Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court vide Order Dated 22.7.2008 directed this Court to decide the present Writ Petition expeditiously, so that all the issues can be adjudicated upon finally. 3. Dr. Devi Pal, Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Petitioner submitted that the impugned order suffers from non? observance of principles of natural justice and approval had been granted without giving an opportunity of hearing to the Petitioner though it adversely affects the civil rights of the Petitioner. The main thrust of argument of Dr. Pal is that the matter had been heard by Mr. S.P. Gupta, Joint Secretary on 28.8.2001 and 13.9.2001 but has been decided by Dr. R.K. Khetri, Deputy Secretary to Government of India, Ministry of Coal and Mines vide Order Dated 26.7.2001 and had been communicated by Sri O.P. Khetri, Under Secretary to Government of India. In case the matter had been heard by Mr. S.P. Gupta, it ought to have been decided by him alone and not by anyone else. R.K. Khetri, Deputy Secretary to Government of India, Ministry of Coal and Mines vide Order Dated 26.7.2001 and had been communicated by Sri O.P. Khetri, Under Secretary to Government of India. In case the matter had been heard by Mr. S.P. Gupta, it ought to have been decided by him alone and not by anyone else. The decision has been taken by Dr. R.K. Khetri on the basis of detailed notes prepared by Mr. S.P. Gupta and it does not meet the requirement of observance of principles of natural justice. The approval granted in favour of legal heirs of Dr. Sarojini Pradhan carries serious civil consequences and adversely affects the Petitioner. The order has been passed taking into consideration various extraneous material and in ignorance of relevant material. The State Government made the recommendation in favour of Respondent No. 10 after taking into account five years performance of the parties. The Central Government took into consideration certain other material relating to further period of two years, which was not permissible. More so, the Income Tax documents i.e. clearance certificate had been taken into consideration for the subsequent period. Therefore, the order stood vitiated. 4. Per contra, Mr. J. Das, Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the legal heirs of Dr. Sarojini Pradhan has admitted that Mr. S.P. Gupta, Joint Secretary did not pass the order, though he heard the parties. The case has been decided by the Central Government. Dr. R.K. Khetri, Deputy Secretary made further notes on the basis of the notes prepared by Mr. S.P. Gupta and the Hon'ble Minister concerned accorded the approval. Such a course is permissible and therefore it is not a case where the principles of natural justice have not been given strict adherence. The documents supplied by the Indian Bureau of Mines (hereinafter called the 'IBM') for two subsequent years related to both the parties. The said documents had been made available to both the parties. Petitioner did not raise any objection whatsoever in this regard. Same remained the position in respect of Income Tax Clearance Certificates etc. Thus it cannot take any objection on this petition. Petition lacks merit and is liable to be rejected. 5. Mr. J.K. Misra, Learned Assistant Solicitor General submitted that the Central Government had considered the case strictly in accordance with law as well as ensuring compliance of the directions of this Court. Thus it cannot take any objection on this petition. Petition lacks merit and is liable to be rejected. 5. Mr. J.K. Misra, Learned Assistant Solicitor General submitted that the Central Government had considered the case strictly in accordance with law as well as ensuring compliance of the directions of this Court. Rules of Business permit that case can be examined by an Officer on the basis of notes prepared by another Officer. In the instant case as the Hon'ble Minister concerned, has accorded the approval, the issues raised by the Petitioner are untenable. While deciding the earlier case i.e. O.J.C. Nos. 11537 of 1999, this Court vide Order Dated 2.7.2001 restricted the case only to the extent that copy of the recommendation made by the State Government in favour of the Respondent No. 10 should have been made available to the Petitioner. The case cannot be reopened on all fronts. Petition lacks merit and not worth consideration. 6. Mr. P. Panda and Mr. Khuntia, Learned Counsel for the State have adopted the submissions made by Mr. J.K. Mishra, Learned Asst. Solicitor General. 7. We have considered the rival submissions made by Learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record. 8. The scope of judicial review in such matter is limited to the process of decision making and not against the decision itself as it lies to correct the errors of law Or fundamental procedural requirements which may lead to manifest injustice. The Court can interfere with the impugned order in exceptional circumstances. In exercise of such a power, the High Court cannot trench on the jurisdiction of the statutory authority to re-appreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own conclusion. Judicial review is not all appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. When the conclusion of the authority is based on evidence, the Court is devoid of power to re appreciate the evidence. Interference is permissible provided the Court comes to the conclusion that the finding of fact recorded by the authority is not based on facts or authority fails to take into consideration the relevant facts. (Vide Rae Bareli Kshetriya Gramin Bank Vs. Bhola Nath Singh and other, ; General Court Martial and Others Vs. Col. Aniltej Singh Dhaliwal, ; N.R. Nair and Others Vs. Union of India and Others, and S.J.S. Business Enterprises (P) Ltd. Vs. (Vide Rae Bareli Kshetriya Gramin Bank Vs. Bhola Nath Singh and other, ; General Court Martial and Others Vs. Col. Aniltej Singh Dhaliwal, ; N.R. Nair and Others Vs. Union of India and Others, and S.J.S. Business Enterprises (P) Ltd. Vs. State of Bihar and Others, ). 9. It is equally well settled that where a quasi-judicial authority record findings based 011 no legal evidence and the findings are either his ipse dixit or based on conjectures and surmises, the order suffers from the infirmity of non-application of mind and stands vitiated, and such a finding can be held to be perverse and hence unsustainable (vide Rajinder Kumar Kindra Vs. Delhi Administration through Secretary (Labour) and Others, ). 10. In Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay and Others Vs. Mahindra and Mahindra Limited and Others the Apex Court held as under: By now, the parameters of the Court's power of judicial review and the grounds on which the Court can interfere with the same are well settled and it would be redundant to recapitulate the whole catena of decisions of this Court commencing from The Barium Chemicals Ltd. and Another Vs. The Company Law Board and Others. Undisputedly, it is a settled position that if the action or decision is perverse or is such that no reasonable body of persons, properly informed, could come to, or has been arrived at by the authority misdirecting itself by adopting a wrong approach, of has been influenced by irrelevant or extraneous matters the Court would be justified in interfering with the same.It must act in good faith, must have regard to all relevant considerations, must not be swayed by irrelevant considerations, must not seek to promote purposes alien to the letter or to the spirit of the legislation that gives it power to act, and must not act arbitrarily or capriciously. 11. In Smt. Shalini Soni and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others the Supreme Court held: It is an unwritten rule of the law, constitutional and administrative, that whenever a decision making function is entrusted to the subjective satisfaction of a statutory functionary, there is an implicit obligation to apply his mind to pertinent and proximate matters only, eschewing the irrelevant and the remote. 12. Union of India (UOI) and Others the Supreme Court held: It is an unwritten rule of the law, constitutional and administrative, that whenever a decision making function is entrusted to the subjective satisfaction of a statutory functionary, there is an implicit obligation to apply his mind to pertinent and proximate matters only, eschewing the irrelevant and the remote. 12. The ground for interference may be where the Court comes to the conclusion that exercise of power is manifestly arbitrary unreasonably or there is manifest error in the exercise of such power or in isolation of the statutory provision or error of law apparent on the face of the record. ( Vide State of U.P. and Others Vs. Renusagar Power Co. and Others, ); Karnataka State Industrial Investment and Development Corporation Ltd. Vs. Cavalet India Ltd. and Others, ; Maharashtra State Seeds Corpn. Ltd Vs. Haridas and Another, ; and Mathura Prasad Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, . 13. In Commissioner of Income Tax (Central), Calcutta Vs. Daulat Ram Rawatmull the Supreme Court held as under: There should, in our opinion, be direct nexus between the conclusion of fact arrived at by the authority concerned and the primary facts upon which that conclusion is based. The use of extraneous and irrelevant material in arriving at that conclusion would vitiate the conclusion of fact because it is difficult to predicate as to what extent the extraneous and irrelevant material has influenced the authority in arriving at the conclusion of fact. 14. In H. B. Gandhi v. Gopi Nath and Sons, the Supreme Court held that "if a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the findings so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then the findings are rendered infirm in law." 15. In Tata Cellular Vs. Union of India the Apex Court examined the scope of judicial review and held that where the Court comes to the conclusion that the selection or rejection is arbitrary, it must interfere. However, the Court cannot function as a superboard, or with the zeal of a pedantic schoolmaster substituting its judgment for that of the administrator. The duty of the Court in such matter is confined to the question of legality. However, the Court cannot function as a superboard, or with the zeal of a pedantic schoolmaster substituting its judgment for that of the administrator. The duty of the Court in such matter is confined to the question of legality. Therefore, the Courts concern should be whether a decision making authority 1. exceeded its power. 2. committed an error of law; 3. committed a breach of the rules of natural justice, 4. reached a decision which no reasonable person would have reached or 5. abused its powers. 16. The Court further held that the grounds on which an administrative action is subject to control by judicial review can be classified as under: (i) Illegality:. This means the decision-maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision-making power and must give effect to it. (ii) Irrationality, namely, Wednesbury unreasonableness. It applies to a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at. The decision is such that no authority properly directing itself on the relevant law and acting reasonably could have reached it. (iii) Procedural impropriety. 17. In view of the above, the legal position emerges is that judicial review is permissible only in exceptional circumstances where the authority has acted unreasonably or in arbitrary manner which resulted in manifest injustice or the order suffers from non-observance of the principle of natural justice or statutory provisions have not been given effect to or the order is perverse and or is not based on facts or where the order has been passed taking into consideration some extraneous material or not taking into consideration the relevant material on record or there is error of law apparent on the face of the order. 18. It cannot be doubted that the principles of natural justice cannot be put into a strait-jacket formula and that its application will depend upon the fact situation of a case. It cannot be applied in a vacuum without reference to the relevant facts involved therein. Vide K.L. Tripathi Vs. State Bank of India and Others, ; N.K. Prasada Vs. Government of India and Others, ; State of Punjab Vs. Jagir Singh, ; Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation and Another Vs. S.G. Kotturappa and Another, ; and Viveka Nand Sethi Vs. It cannot be applied in a vacuum without reference to the relevant facts involved therein. Vide K.L. Tripathi Vs. State Bank of India and Others, ; N.K. Prasada Vs. Government of India and Others, ; State of Punjab Vs. Jagir Singh, ; Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation and Another Vs. S.G. Kotturappa and Another, ; and Viveka Nand Sethi Vs. Chairman, J and K Bank Ltd. and Others, . 19. In The Chairman, Board of Mining Examination and Chief Inspector of Mines and Another Vs. Ramjee the Court observed that natural justice is not an unruly horse, no lurking landmine, nor a judicial cure-all. If fairness is shown by the decision maker to the man proceeded against, the form, features and the fundamentals of such essential processual propriety being conditioned by the facts and circumstances of each situation, no breach of natural justice can be complained of. Unnatural expansion of natural justice, without reference of the administrative realities and other factors of a given case, can be exasperating. The Courts cannot look at law in the abstract or natural justice as a mere artifact. Nor can they fit into a rigid mould the concept of reasonable opportunity. If the totality of circumstances satisfied the Court that the party visited with adverse order has not suffered from denial of reasonable opportunity, the Court will decline to be punctilious or fanatical as if the rules of natural justice were sacred scriptures. 20. In Union of India and Another Vs. Tulsiram Patel and Others, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: Though the two rules of natural justice, namely, nemo judex in causa sua and audi alteram partern, have now a definite meaning and connotation in law and their content and implications are well understood and firmly established, they are nonetheless not statutory rules. Each of these rules yields to and changes with the exigencies of different situations. They do not apply in the same manner to situations which are not alike. These rules are not cast in a rigid mould nor can they be put in a legal straitjacket. They are not immutable but flexible. 21. It is equally well settled that the principles of natural justice must not be stretched too far and in this connection reference may be made to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Sohan Lal Gupta (Dead) thr. L.Rs. and Others Vs. They are not immutable but flexible. 21. It is equally well settled that the principles of natural justice must not be stretched too far and in this connection reference may be made to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Sohan Lal Gupta (Dead) thr. L.Rs. and Others Vs. Smt. Asha Devi Gupta and Others, ; Canara Bank and Others Vs. Shri Debasis Das and Others, ; and Mardia Chemicals Ltd. Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others Etc. Etc., . 22. In Hira Nath Mishra and Others Vs. The Principal, Rajendra Medical College, Ranchi and Another, ; and State of Haryana and Another Vs. Rattan Singh the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that it is not always necessary to hear a person as right of hearing does not mean to give personal hearing and its scope may differ in different circumstances. 23. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad, Vs. Karunakar, etc. etc., made reference to its earlier decisions and observed: ... the rules of natural justice operate in areas not covered by any law. They do not supplant the law of the land but supplement it. They are not embodied rules and their aim is to secure justice or to prevent miscarriage of justice...the concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the law under which the inquiry is held and the constitution of the tribunal or the body of persons appointed for that purpose. Whenever a complaint is made before a Court that some principle of natural justice has been contravened, the Court has to decide whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of that case. The rule that inquiry must be held in good faith and without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably is now included among the principles of natural justice." (Emphasis added). 24. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in The Bihar School Examination Board Vs. Subhas Chandra Sinha and Others, ; Biswa Ranjan Sahoo and others Vs. Sushanta Kumar Dinda and Others, ; Chairman, J and K State Board of Education Vs. Feyaz Ahmed Malik and Others, ; and Union of India and Others Vs. 24. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in The Bihar School Examination Board Vs. Subhas Chandra Sinha and Others, ; Biswa Ranjan Sahoo and others Vs. Sushanta Kumar Dinda and Others, ; Chairman, J and K State Board of Education Vs. Feyaz Ahmed Malik and Others, ; and Union of India and Others Vs. O. Chakradhar while considering the case of cancellation of the entire examinations because of use of mass copy or malpractice in selection held that principles of natural justice in such a matter have no application as in such a case nothing would become fruitful by issuance of notice. Fabrication would obviously either be not known or no one would come forward to bear the brunt. The illegality and irregularity are so intermixed with the whole process of the selection that it becomes impossible to sort out right from the wrong or vice versa. 25. In Syndicate Bank and Others Vs. Venkatesh Gururao Kurati the Apex Court held as under:? To sustain the allegation of violation of principles of natural justice, one must establish that prejudice has been caused to him for non-observance of principles of natural justice. 26. In matter involving civil consequences i.e. where a person raised the grievance of having adverse affect of an order by non-observance of principle of natural justice is liable to be quashed, for the reason that strict adherence to the principles of natural justice provides minimum protection of the life of an individual against the arbitral procedure that may be adopted by judicial/quasi judicial or administrative authority while making an order affecting those rights and unless a statutory provision either specifically or by necessary implication excludes the application of the principles of natural justice, requirement of giving reasonable opportunity of being heard before an order is made is generally read into the provisions of a statute. (Vide Canara Bank Vs. V.K. Awasthy, ; Swadeshi Cotton Mills Vs. Union of India (UOI), ; Mohinder Singh Gill and Another Vs. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and Others, ; and State of Orissa Vs. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei and Others, .) 27. Therefore, in view of the above, it is evident that if an order adversely affects a party or has civil consequence, it should be given an opportunity of being heard. However, it does not necessarily mean an oral or personal hearing. 28. Dr. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei and Others, .) 27. Therefore, in view of the above, it is evident that if an order adversely affects a party or has civil consequence, it should be given an opportunity of being heard. However, it does not necessarily mean an oral or personal hearing. 28. Dr. Devi Pal, Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Petitioner has vehemently submitted that it is not permissible in law that the matter is heard by one person and decided by another one. If such a course is adopted, the order stands vitiated for non-observance of principles of natural justice. He has placed heavy reliance upon the judgment of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Gullapalli Nageswara Rao and Others Vs. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation and Another wherein the Court held: The second objection is that while the Act and the Rilles framed thereunder impose a duty on the State Government to give a personal hearing, the procedure prescribed by the Rules imposes a duty on the Secretary to hear and the Chief Minister to decide. This divided responsibility is destructive of the concept of judicial hearing. Such a procedure defeats the object of personal hearing. Personal hearing enables the authority concerned to watch the demeanour of the witnesses and clear up his doubts during the course of the arguments, and the party appearing to persuade the authority by reasoned argument to accept his point of view. If one person hears and another decides, then personal hearing becomes an empty formality. We therefore hold that the said procedure followed in this case also offends another basic principle of judicial procedure." (Emphasis added) 29. This judgment is based on interpretation and implementation of the Statutory Rules as the Court observed that the Rules applicable therein provided that it was purely a "judicial hearing" 30. The Full Bench of Patna High Court in Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Bihar-I, Patna Vs. Jagdish Prasad Choudhary, Sahebganj has applied the ratio of the said judgment observing that oral hearing by one officer cannot be in addition to his successor in deciding the case for the reason that law requires a real genuine and effective hearing. In case of a hearing, a person may persuade the authority to his point of view by removing his doubts and by answering his question while in written representation, he cannot avail such benefit. In case of a hearing, a person may persuade the authority to his point of view by removing his doubts and by answering his question while in written representation, he cannot avail such benefit. The Court further held that requirement of oral hearing must be insisted upon as a matter of public policy namely, to prevent not only a perverse decision but also to secure a decision which is not vitiated because of ignorance or carelessness due to absence of oral hearing. In taking a clear decision, it becomes necessary to give an oral hearing to the party affected by the decision in question and as such, a requirement of oral hearing is implicit with the concept of fairness in quasi-judicial and even administrative functioning. Proceedings of assessment under the Wealth Tax Act are admittedly quasi-judicial in nature. Thus procedure prescribed therein is to be strictly observed. 31. In Sahara India (Firm), Lucknow Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Central-I and Another the Supreme Court considered the provisions of Section 142 (2A) of the Income Tax Act which provides that at any stage of proceedings, the Assessing Officer having regard to the nature and complexity of the accounts of the Assessee and in the interest of Revenue, is of the opinion that it is necessary to do so, he may, with the previous approval of the Commissioner, direct the Assessee to get the accounts audited by an accountant, nominated by the Chief Commissioner or Commissioner in this behalf and to furnish a report of such audit in this behalf; The Supreme Court after considering the issue involved therein, came to the conclusion that issuance of show-cause notice prior to passing an order was a mandatory requirement and in case the order is passed without observing the said principles, the order stands vitiated. Undoubtedly assessment under the Income Tax is judicial function. Thus such a requirement was held to be mandatory. 32. In Union of India and Anr. v. E.K. Andrew, 1999 (95) Comp Cases 537, the Division Bench of Kerala High Court while examining the case of removal of the Chairman, Bank of Kochin Ltd. considered this issue at length and held the rule that the person who heard the case should pass the orders is an indispensable requirement in the observance of principles of natural justice. This rule has a salient purpose. This rule has a salient purpose. The authority who passes the order, must apply its mind after hearing the aggrieved party. During the course of hearing the authority must be able to formulate the conclusions after noticing the demeanour of the parties. The Court further placed reliance upon the Judgments in Shir Amir Singh Vs. Government of India and Others, ; Bhattathiripad v. Tahsildar, (1994) 1 KLT 790 wherein it has been held that order should be passed by a person who hears it and opportunity should be given to grip with the issues arising for consideration otherwise the order can be held to be in violation of the principles of natural justice and is liable to be quashed on this sole ground. 33. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Bachhittar Singh Vs. The State of Punjab, considered the character of a disciplinary proceedings against a Government servant and held that it is judicial order. The Court observed as under: ...The first is coming to a conclusion on the evidence as to whether the charges alleged against the Government servant are established or not and the second is reached only if it is found that they are so established. The stage deals with the action to be taken against the Government servant concerned. The High Court accepts that the first stage is a judicial proceeding and indeed it must be so because charges have to be framed, notice has to be given and the person concerned has to be given an opportunity of being heard. Even so far as the second stage is concerned, Article 311 (2) of the Constitution requires a notice to be given to the person concerned as also an opportunity of being heard. Therefore, this stage of the proceeding is no less judicial than the earlier one. Consequently any action decided to be taken against a Government servant found guilty of misconduct is a judicial order and as such it cannot be varied at the will of the authority who is empowered to impose the punishment.....' (emphasis added) 34. Another Constitution Bench in Union of India (UOI) Vs. Consequently any action decided to be taken against a Government servant found guilty of misconduct is a judicial order and as such it cannot be varied at the will of the authority who is empowered to impose the punishment.....' (emphasis added) 34. Another Constitution Bench in Union of India (UOI) Vs. H.C. Goel, has taken a similar view in respect of the disciplinary proceeding observing as under: ...It is true that the order of dismissal which may be passed against a Government servant found guilty of misconduct, can be described as an administrative order; nevertheless, the proceedings held against such a public servant under the statutory rules to determine whether he is guilty of the charges framed against him are in the nature of quasi-judicial proceedings... (emphasis added) 35. While deciding this case, the Apex Court has not taken note of the earlier judgment in Bachhittar Singh (supra). 36. A three Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Anil Kumar Vs. Presiding Officer and Others without taking note of either of these Judgments referred to above, while considering the nature of enquiry came to the following conclusion: ... It is well-settled that a disciplinary enquiry has to be a quasi-judicial enquiry held according to the principles of natural justice and the Enquiry Officer has a duty to act judicially......An enquiry report in a quasi-judicial enquiry must show the reasons for the conclusion. It cannot be an ipse dixit of the Enquiry Officer. It has to be a speaking order in the sense that the conclusion is supported by reasons.......It should all the more be so where the quasi-judicial enquiry may result in deprivation of livelihood or attach a stigma to the character... 37. Similarly in Union of India and others Vs. Mohd. Ramzan Khan the Supreme Court examined the nature of the disciplinary proceeding and held that even if such proceedings are not judicial. There can be no dispute that these are quasi-judicial in nature. There is a charge and a denial followed by an inquiry at which evidence is led and assessment of material before conclusion is reached, these facets do make the matter quasi-judicial and attracts the principles of natural justice. 38. The Supreme Court in General Manager, Eastern Railway and Another Vs. There is a charge and a denial followed by an inquiry at which evidence is led and assessment of material before conclusion is reached, these facets do make the matter quasi-judicial and attracts the principles of natural justice. 38. The Supreme Court in General Manager, Eastern Railway and Another Vs. Jawala Prosad Singh did not approve this theory in case of disciplinary proceedings against an employee observing that evidence is recorded by the enquiry officer appointed by the disciplinary authority but punishment is awarded by the disciplinary authority, who has no opportunity to watch the demeanour of the witnesses. The Authority passes an order on examining the record of the case. The Court observed that in judicial proceedings evidence is recorded by the Magistrates/Judges and cases are decided by their successors in office, if they are not there at the stage of conclusion of the Trial. In such eventuality, demeonour of a witness has no meaning at all. Therefore, the rule that one who hears, must decide does not apply universally. It would depend upon the nature of proceedings and statutory Rules applicable in the case. If the law applicable in a particular case permits non-observance thereof, it does not require to be adhered to at all. 39. While disposing of the earlier Writ Petition being O.J.C. Nos. 11537 of 1999, this Court had interfered only on the ground that the copy of the proposal/recommendation made in favour of the legal heirs of Dr. Sarojini Pradhan had not given to the present Petitioner. Therefore, after setting aside the order of the Central Government, the Court directed the Central Government to reconsider the case. This Court directed the Central Government for: (a) details of the order/recommendation of the State Government to the Central Government be disclosed to the present Petitioner. (b) If any fresh material has been relied upon by the Central Government, it may be disclosed to both the parties. (c) Material placed by either of the party before the State Government and the Central Government be disclosed to the other side. (d) Personal hearing be accorded to both the parties, and (e) The Central Government may pass speaking and reasoned order and communicate the same to both the parties thereafter. 40. The original record, submitted by Shri J.K. Mishra, Learned Asst. (d) Personal hearing be accorded to both the parties, and (e) The Central Government may pass speaking and reasoned order and communicate the same to both the parties thereafter. 40. The original record, submitted by Shri J.K. Mishra, Learned Asst. Solicitor General, clearly makes it out that the Central Government conducted the proceedings in strict adherence to the aforesaid directions of this Court. No reference to any Officer or post or designation had been made. The Order Dated 11.7.2001 provides, while issuing notice to the legal heirs of Dr. Sarojini Pradhan that they shall appear before the Central Government on 18.7.2001. The same reference has been made in the Order Dated 20.07.2001. The Order Dated 14.08.2001 provides that the matter was being heard by the Central Government in pursuance of the order of this Court in O.J.C. Nos. 11537 of 1999 and the notice was issued on 28.8.2001. The matter had been heard by Mr. S.P. Gupta, Joint Secretary for two days i.e. 28.8.2001 and 13.9.2001. Mr. S.P. Gupta, Joint Secretary had given the opportunity to both the parties to place their respective cases and file the documents and in pursuance thereof copies of submissions, written arguments and other particulars submitted by the Petitioner had been made available to the legal heirs of Dr. Sarojini Pradhan and vice? versa. The Order Dated 13.9.2001 duly signed by Mr. S.P. Gupta, Joint Secretary reads as under: ... Thus all the documents available with the. Central Government are also available with both the parties. 41. Earlier order reveals that IBM was asked to furnish certain reports in respect of both the parties and the said reports were made available to the parties concerned. 42. Thus it is evident that after complying all formalities required, the issues were adjudicated. After conclusion of the arguments by the parties, Mr. S.P. Gupta, Joint Secretary who has heard the parties, prepared the notes which runs to seventeen pages (from page 32 to 49, containing 47 paragraphs of the original record). It has been duly signed by the Mr. S.P. Gupta, Joint Secretary on 17.9.2001. In fact this is the report which has been duly approved by the Secretary on 18.9.2001 and by the Hon'ble Minister on 25th September, 2001. While making the endorsement of the approval, the Secretary has written as under: I endorse fully the above note of the Joint Secretary. S.P. Gupta, Joint Secretary on 17.9.2001. In fact this is the report which has been duly approved by the Secretary on 18.9.2001 and by the Hon'ble Minister on 25th September, 2001. While making the endorsement of the approval, the Secretary has written as under: I endorse fully the above note of the Joint Secretary. This is a very old case in which the parties have repeatedly taken recourse to the Courts. As such even now more litigation may follow. Therefore, the decision of the Central Government has to be in terms of a speaking order which is backed by facts and law. 43. The order impugned (Annex.-1) is in fact verbatim to the said report/note prepared by Mr. S.P. Gupta, Joint Secretary. It has been signed by another Officer who had been directed to communicate the decision of approval. 44. Therefore, it is evident that proceedings have been conducted as per the directions of this Court. None of the parties ever raised any objection before the Central Government that the said directions are not being followed. 45. In State (Anti Corruption Branch) Govt. of N.C.T. of Delhi and Another Vs. Dr. R.C. Anand and Another while dealing with a case under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, particularly for grant of sanction for prosecution, the Apex Court had considered the meaning of 'ratification' and held as under: The expression "ratify" means to approve and accept formally. It means to conform, by expressing consent, approval or formal sanction. "Approve" means to have or express a favourable opinion of, to accept as satisfactory. 46. u/s 30 of the Act the Central Government has the power to revise any order made by a State Government. Against that order the remedy, under Rule 54 of the Rules, 1960, was available to the Petitioner. For the reasons best known to the Petitioner such a recourse was not taken. The Courts have consistently held that under the said provisions of the Act and the Rules, the power of revision can also be exercised suo motu and the Revisional authority can examine as to whether the recommendation has been made on proper appreciation of facts and material on record. The Revisional authority acts quasi judicially and has to pass an order after making requirement of all judicial proceedings. 47. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Province of Bombay Vs. The Revisional authority acts quasi judicially and has to pass an order after making requirement of all judicial proceedings. 47. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Province of Bombay Vs. Kusaldas S. Advani and Others, explained the scope as what are the quasi-judicial proceedings observing as under: ...When the law under which the authority is making a decision, itself requires a judicial approach, the decision will be quasi-judicial. Prescribed forms of procedure are not necessary to make an inquiry judicial, provided in coming to the decision the well-recognised principles of approach are required to be followed. 48. The Court further explained that it is not necessary that the authority has to decide a lis between the parties. It is enough if the authority proposes to do the act and the subject is opposing it. The final determination of the authority is yet to be quasi-judicial act provided the authority is required by the statute to act judicially. 49. In State of Himachal Pradesh Vs. Raja Mahendra Pal and Others the Apex Court explained as what may be quasi-judicial acts observing as under: Quasi-judicial acts are such acts which mandate an officer the duty of looking into certain facts not in a way which it specially directs but after a discretion, in its nature judicial. The exercise of power by such tribunal or authority contemplates the adjudication of rival claims of the persons by an act of the mind or judgment upon the proposed course of official action as to an object of the corporate power, for the consequences of which the official will not be liable, although his act was not well judged. A quasijudicial function has been termed to be one which stands midway a judicial and an administrative function. The primary test is as to whether the authority alleged to be a quasi-judicial one, has any express statutory duty to act judicially in arriving at the decision in question. If the reply is in the affirmative, the authority would be deemed to be quasi-judicial, and if the reply is in the negative, it would not be. The dictionary meaning of the word "quasi" is "not exactly". 50. In Indian National Congress (I) Vs. If the reply is in the affirmative, the authority would be deemed to be quasi-judicial, and if the reply is in the negative, it would not be. The dictionary meaning of the word "quasi" is "not exactly". 50. In Indian National Congress (I) Vs. Institute of Social Welfare and Others the Supreme Court examined a case wherein the High Court had issued a direction to the Election Commission of India to examine the grievance of one of the parties for de-registration of another political party. The Court held as under: ...it is true that mere presence of one or two attributes of quasi-judicial authority would not make an administrative act as a quasi-judicial act. In some case, an administrative authority may determine question of fact before arriving at a decision which may affect the right of an Appellant but such a decision would not be a quasi-judicial act. It is a different thing that in some cases, fair play may demand affording of an opportunity to the claimant whose right is going to be affected by the act of the administrative authority, still such an administrative authority would not be a quasi-judicial authority.....it must be borne in mind that another test which distinguishes administrative function from quasi-judicial function is, the authority who acts quasi-judicially is required to act according to the rules, whereas the authority which acts administratively is dictated by the policy and expediency. The aforequoted passage shows that where an authority whose decision is dictated by policy and expediency exercises administratively although it may be exercising functions in some respects as if it were judicial... The Court further held as under: This matter may be examined from another angle. If the directions of the High Court for considering the complaint of the Respondent that some of the Appellant political parties are not functioning in conformity with the provisions of Section 29-A is to be implemented, the result will be that a detailed enquiry has to be conducted where evidence may have to be adduced to substantiate or deny the allegations against the parties. Thus, a lis would arise. Then there would be two contending parties opposed to each other and the Commission has to decide the matter of deregistration of a political party. In such a situation the proceedings before the Commission would partake the character of quasi -judicial proceeding... 51. In Shivji Nathubhai Vs. Thus, a lis would arise. Then there would be two contending parties opposed to each other and the Commission has to decide the matter of deregistration of a political party. In such a situation the proceedings before the Commission would partake the character of quasi -judicial proceeding... 51. In Shivji Nathubhai Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others the Apex Court held that while exercising such power the Central Government is bound to act judicially and the writ of certiorari can be issued for quashing the order of the Central Government. 52. Similar view has been reiterated in Nukala Seeta Ramaiah and Another Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Others, ; Narsinghdas Jankidas Mohta Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh, ; Sree Narayan Company Vs. State of Orissa and Others, ; Ramnik Lal Kothari Vs. Government of India, Ministry of Steel Mines and Metals (Department of Mines and Metals) and Others, ; Dharamchand Jain Vs. State of Orissa and Others, ; and Smt. Dev Kunver Bai Pandya Vs. State of Orissa and Others, . 53. In Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd. Vs. Union of India and Others (UOI) the Supreme Court held hat while exercising a Revisional power the Central Government is bound to act judicially and should not take into consideration any extraneous matters or any irrelevant consideration. 54. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Bharat Raja Vs. The Union of India (UOI) and Others held that exercising of power of revision under Rules 55 of the Rules are quasi judicial and the Central Government acts as a tribunal and not as an administrative authority. 55. It is an attempt to get remedy which could be available to the Petitioner by filing the revision. Therefore, it cannot be permitted to achieve the said goal indirectly (vide Jagir Singh Vs. Ranbir Singh and Another, ; and M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath and Ors. AIR 2000 SC 1997 ). 56. In the instant case, as the Central Government had been acting under the order of this Court, it was required only to observe the directions given by it. It is not permissible for the Petitioner to reopen the whole case as if the Court in exercise of its power of judicial review may decide the case as a civil suit. In the instant case, as the Central Government had been acting under the order of this Court, it was required only to observe the directions given by it. It is not permissible for the Petitioner to reopen the whole case as if the Court in exercise of its power of judicial review may decide the case as a civil suit. Had the Petitioner gone in revision u/s 30 of the Act and Rules 54 and 55 of the Rules, it's case could have been examined by the authority quasi judicially. We are alive of the fact that this Court had asked the Central Government to reconsider the case observing the principle of fair play without any arbitrariness and nothing further. Therefore, it is immaterial for this Court to examine the issue as to whether approval amounts to administrative or quasi-judicial function. While considering the case of approval, the Central Government is not deciding a lis between two parties nor it can direct the State Government to grant the lease in favour of a adversary party. It has a right only to accept or reject the proposal submitted by the State Government. Petitioner has made an attempt to make a mountain out of a mole hill. 57. In the aforesaid premises, the Writ Petition lacks merit and needs no further consideration and is accordingly dismissed. No costs. Final Result : Dismissed