JUDGMENT H.N. Sarma, J. 1. This second appeal is filed by the Defendants/Appellants challenging the appellate judgment and decree dated 22.8.98 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) No. 2, Hailakandi, in T.A. No. 19/ 98 whereby dismissing the appeal, the decree passed by the learned trial Court in TS No. 82/92, decreeing the suit of the Plaintiff for khas possession was affirmed. 2. I have heard Mr. B.R. Dey, learned senior counsel for the Appellant and Mr. M. Nath, learned Counsel for the Respondents. 3. The facts that emerge from the pleadings of the parties necessary for disposal of this appeal are that one Bhupendra Chakravorty took settlement of the suit land from late Jitendra Chandra Nath, the brother of the Plaintiff-Respondents. Subsequently on amicable partition, the schedule land fell in the share of the Plaintiff. Late Bhupendra Chakravorty without the knowledge of the Plaintiff-Respondents illegally transferred the suit land to one late Prabhat Chandra Chanda, the predecessor of the principal Defendants. The Plaintiff-Respondents having required the suit land for their personal use and occupation orally asked the Appellant-Defendants to vacate the same, but they not having complied with such demand of the Plaintiff-Respondents, registered notice to that effect was also served upon the Defendant No. 3 asking to vacate the suit land. However, the same not having complied with, the Plaintiffs-Respondents filed the Title Suit No. 82/92. 4. The principal Defendant contested the suit by filing written statements denying the allegations of the Plaintiffs-Respondents. Apart from taking usual legal plea, the Defendants, on facts pleaded that after the death of their father Prabhat Chandra Chanda, they are in occupation of the suit land and for such use and occupation, they offered rent to the Plaintiffs, but they refused to accept. Further case of the Appellant-Defendants is that they purchased the suit land with the consent of late Prabhat Chandra Nath, the brother of the Plaintiffs who was also a witness to the registered sale deed. Accordingly, they are not liable to be evicted from the suit land and the Plaintiffs are not entitled to get any relief in the suit. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed by the learned trial Court: 1. Is the suit maintainable in its present form? 2. Is there any cause of action for the suit? 3. Is the suit properly valued and stamped? 4. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed by the learned trial Court: 1. Is the suit maintainable in its present form? 2. Is there any cause of action for the suit? 3. Is the suit properly valued and stamped? 4. Whether any valid notice for the suit was served in the Defendants? 5. Whether the sit is bad under estoppel, waiver and acquiescence? 6. Whether the predecessor of the Defendants constructed any permanent structure on the suit land within five years of the settlement? 7. To what relief, if arty, the Plaintiff is entitled? Additional Issues: 6 (a) What was the actual area of land in respect of which the registered lease deed was executed between Bhupendra Kumar Chakravorty and late Jitendra Chandra Nath? 6 (b) What was the actual dates from which the settlement between parties started? 5. Both the parties examined three witnesses each in support of their respective case and also exhibited some documents, the learned trial Court at the end of the trial decreed the suit in favour of the Plaintiffs. The said decree was carried into appeal in the Court of the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) No. 2, Hailakandi being Title Appeal No. 19/98. The said appeal having been dismissed on 15.6.99, the present second appeal is filed by the Defendants. 6. Although the appeal was admitted to be heard vide order dated 17.9.99, no specific substantial question of law was framed, but it was referred that the appeal would be heard on the substantial question of as enumerated in the memo of appeal. On reading of the grounds incorporated in the memo of appeal and as agreed to by the learned Counsels, the following substantial question found to have emerged in this appeal. Whether the learned Court below erred in law in passing the impugned judgment and decree without considering the right of the Appellant to get compensation on account of alleged improvement made by him over the suit land in terms of Section 6 of the Assam Non-Agricultural Urban Areas Tenancy Act, 1955. 7. Mr. Whether the learned Court below erred in law in passing the impugned judgment and decree without considering the right of the Appellant to get compensation on account of alleged improvement made by him over the suit land in terms of Section 6 of the Assam Non-Agricultural Urban Areas Tenancy Act, 1955. 7. Mr. Dey, learned senior counsel for the Appellant, has strenuously submitted that in the instant case, the notice of the proceeding as required under Section 11 of the Assam Non-Agricultural Urban Areas Tenancy Act, 1955 was not served to all the Defendants and, as such, the suit is invalid in law for non-service of notice upon all the Defendants and this point they also be considered as a substantial question of law. 8. Mr. Nath, learned Counsel for the Respondents, however, referring paragraphs-17 and 18 of the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Hero Vinoth (Minor) v. Seshammal reported in (2006) 5 SCC 545 , submits that no grounds to that effect having been incorporated in the memo of appeal, the prayer made by the Appellant cannot be accepted and rightly such a substantial question of law has not been framed. 9. I have considered the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties and I have also perused the materials available on record: 10. Submission made by the learned Counsel for the Appellant regarding impermissibility to pass a decree for ejectment under the Assam Non-Agricultural Urban Areas Tenancy Act, 1955, without paying compensation for the improvement made by the tenant, is based on recognition of such right of a tenant under Section 6 of the said Act, which regulates such rights. Under Section 6 of the Act, in a suit for ejectment against a tenant, if any question arises whether the tenant has effected any improvement on the land of the tenancy or whether such improvement is reasonable improvement or whether any compensation may be paid for such an improvement and if so, how much, the question is required to be decided by the Court having regard to the circumstances of each case. 11. The written statement the Defendants disclose that they have not raised any such plea regarding compensation for any improvement made. In fact, there is no pleading at all regarding the improvement and claim of any right to get compensation before evicting them from the suit land. 11. The written statement the Defendants disclose that they have not raised any such plea regarding compensation for any improvement made. In fact, there is no pleading at all regarding the improvement and claim of any right to get compensation before evicting them from the suit land. A Court is required to investigate such facts for determining compensation, if such question arises out of the pleadings of the Defendants. The pleadings of the Defendant are absolutely silent in this regard and rightly no such issue was framed in this regard by the learned trial Court. Accordingly, on this count this substantial question fails. 12. Mr. Dey has strenuously urged that the under Section 11 of the Act a prior notice before institution of a suit for ejectment is a mandatory requirement and such notice is to be served upon all the Defendants. But in the instant case, the Plaintiffs have effected service of such notice only upon the Defendant No. 3 and, as such, the suit is bad atleast so far it relates to the other Defendants. 13. A careful reading of Section 11 disclose that compliance of the provisions contained therein relating to service of notice is a condition precedent for filing an ejectment suit and is a mandatory one. Without service of such prior notice, no suit for ejectment except of recovery of arrear rents is to be instituted until after the expiration of one month from the date of the receipt by the tenant of such a notice in writing by the landlord requiring the tenant to surrender possession of the land in favour of the landlord. Admittedly, in this case, the notice was served upon the Defendant No. 3 only. Now the question that falls for consideration as to whether such service of notice upon the Defendant No. 3 conforms to the requirement of Section 11. Pleadings of the parties as well as other materials including the deposition of the witnesses disclose that the suit land was originally taken on lease by the predecessor in interest of the principal Defendants late Prabhat Chandra Chanda. Pleadings of the parties as well as other materials including the deposition of the witnesses disclose that the suit land was originally taken on lease by the predecessor in interest of the principal Defendants late Prabhat Chandra Chanda. It also transpires from the records that after the death of the father of the principal Defendants, the Defendants are living in the suit land in a common mess and incidence of tenancy is also the same as was enjoyed by the original tenant, which is a single tenancy and devolves upon the Defendants from their father and the rent payable after the expiry of the original tenant also remains as same. In fact, after the expiry of late Prabhat Chandra Chanda, the tenancy right over the suit land devolves upon the heirs, the present Appellants. In fact, the tenancy is a joint tenancy and they are tenants in common. In such a situation, the Defendant No. 3 accepted the notice on behalf of all and, therefore, upon the service of notice upon the Defendant No. 3 there have been sufficient compliance of Section 11 of the Act. In this connection, I am fortified with the decision of the Apex Court rendered in the case of H.C. Pandey v. G.C. Paul reported in AIR 1989 SC 1470 . The Apex Court in paragraph-4 of the judgment held as follows: It is now well settled that on the death of the original tenant, subject to any provision to the contrary either negativing or limiting the succession, the tenancy rights devolve on the heirs of the deceased tenant. The incidence of the tenancy are the same as those enjoyed by the original tenant. It is a single tenancy which devolves on the heirs. There is no division of the premises or of the rent payable therefor. That is the position as between the landlord and the heirs of the deceased tenant. In other words, the heirs succeed to the tenancy as joint tenants. In the present case it appears that the Respondent acted on behalf of the tenants, that he paid rent on behalf of all and he accepted notice also on behalf of all. In the circumstances, the notice was served on the Respondent was sufficient. In other words, the heirs succeed to the tenancy as joint tenants. In the present case it appears that the Respondent acted on behalf of the tenants, that he paid rent on behalf of all and he accepted notice also on behalf of all. In the circumstances, the notice was served on the Respondent was sufficient. It seems to us that the view taken in Ramesh Chand Bose, AIR 1977 All 38 (supra) is erroneous where lays down that the heirs of the deceased tenant succeed as tenants in common. In our opinion, the notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act served by the Appellant on the Respondent is a valid notice and therefore the suit must succeed. In view of the aforesaid factual and legal position, the grievance relating to non-service of notice upon the other Defendants as raised by Mr. Dey cannot be accepted to reverse the impugned decree. 14. For the foregoing reasons as discussed above, this appeal is devoid of merit and dismissed accordingly. 15. No costs. Appeal dismissed