JUDGMENT This petition is filed challenging the order dated 29-11-1996 passed by the learned J.M.F.C. Jamner in RC.C. No.95 of 1994 by which the respondent Nos.1 and 2 were discharged on the ground that the complaint which was filed under Sections 379, 427, 447 r.w. 34 of I.P.C. and in the said complaint the trial was not yet commenced and a period of two years was completed. 2. It is the case of the petitioner that the land Gat No.299/1 situated at village Shendurni, Tq. Jamner, District Jalgaon is owned and possessed by the petitioner. It is the further case of the petitioner that on 28-21993 one Dagadu Madhav Gopal resident of Jangipura, Tq. Jamner told the petitioner that the respondent No.1 cut down the tree of tamarind and he saw the incident and there was one person alongwith the respondent No.1. The petitioner submitted that on the very day i.e. on 28-2-1993 the petitioner moved an application to the Chairman of Crop protection society Limited Shendumi against the respondent Nos. 1 and 2. The respondent Nos.1 and 2 are residents of the same village and they were the friends of the petitioner. They in furtherance of their common intention unlawfully entered in the petitioner's land and cut down the tree of tamarind and unauthorizedly taken away the said tree material and they caused the damages to the petitioner. It is further stated that on 223-1993 the petitioner sent registered post notice to the respondents calling upon them to pay compensation for the offence committed by them. However, the said notice was returned back to the petitioner with a remark that the addressee not inclined to accept. The petitioner lodged a complaint on 30-3-1993 to the Shendurni out post against the respondents. The police authorities did not take cognizance and therefore, on 29-4-1993 the petitioner made representation to the Superintendent of Police, Jalgaon for necessary action. In spite of that nothing has been done by the said authority, and therefore, the petitioner filed a complaint before the learned J.M.F.C. Jamner for the offence punishable under Sections 379, 427 and 447 r.w. S.34 of I.P.C.. 3. On the complaint filed by the petitioner, the learned J.M.F.C. called report from the police. The police authorities investigated the matter and submitted report to the learned J.M.F.C. on 29-9-1994. 3. On the complaint filed by the petitioner, the learned J.M.F.C. called report from the police. The police authorities investigated the matter and submitted report to the learned J.M.F.C. on 29-9-1994. The learned J.M.F.C. perused the report filed by the police authorities and after verification of the report issued process under Sections 379, 427 and 447 r.w.34 of I.P.C. as against the respondents by his order dated 29-11-1994. 4. In pursuance to the summons issued by the learned J.M.F.C. the respondent Nos.1 and 2 appeared in the court on 6-5-1995 and sought for bail. They were released on bail on P. R. bond of Rs.2000/- with surety of like amount by the court below. 5. After the appearance of the respondents, the matter was posted for framing of charges. Since the respondents being absent on 28-11-1996 the petitioner moved an application in the court below for issuing of warrant against the respondent Nos.1 and 2. The said application came to be granted on 28-111996 by the court and the case came to be posted on the next date. The court below on 29-111996 after hearing the advocates for the respective parties closed the entire proceeding. 6. It is the case of the petitioner that in view of the directions given by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Writ Petition No. 1128 of 1986 "common cause" the lower court discharged the respondents. 7. Being aggrieved by the order dated 29-11-1996 below Exh.l in R.C.C. No.95 of 1994 passed by the learned J.M.F.C. Jamner, the petitioner filed this petition. It is the contention of the petitioner that the order passed by the learned J.M.F.C. is contrary to the directions given by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and therefore, the order passed by the learned J.M.F.C. is liable to be quashed as the Magistrate has wrongly discharged the respondent Nos.1 and 2. 8. I have heard the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the present case is covered under the direction given by the Supreme Court in the case of 'Common Cause' A registered society Vs. Union of India (1996(2) Mh.L.J. SC 1). He further submitted that though this case is covered under direction 2(f), the said judgment is overruled by the larger Bench of the Supreme Court consisting of seven Hon'ble Judges in the case of P. R. Rao Vs. Union of India (1996(2) Mh.L.J. SC 1). He further submitted that though this case is covered under direction 2(f), the said judgment is overruled by the larger Bench of the Supreme Court consisting of seven Hon'ble Judges in the case of P. R. Rao Vs. State of Karnataka ( 2002(3) Mh.L.J. 145 ). According to the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner since the judgment delivered in the common cause case in 1996 has been over ruled by the Apex Court, the order passed by the learned J.M.F.C. deserves to be quashed and set aside. 9. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent Nos.1 and 2 conceded that the judgment in common cause case delivered by the Apex Court in the year 1996 has been over ruled subsequently, by the larger Bench of the Supreme Court. However, he submitted that in para 34 of the said judgment, it is clarified that the decision given in the said case shall not be ground for reopening a case or proceedings by setting aside any such acquittal or discharge as is based on the authority of 'Common Cause' and 'Raj Deo Sharma' cases and which has already achieved finality and reopen the trial against the accused therein. 10. I have carefully perused the judgment of the Supreme Court in the 'Common Cause' reported in 1996(2) Mh.L.J. 1 . The case of the respondent is covered under 2(f) of the directions given by the Apex Court, which reads as under : "2(f) Where the cases pending in criminal courts under Indian Penal Code or any other law for the time being in force are punishable with imprisonment upto three years, which or without fine, and if such pendency is for more than two years and if in such cases trial have still not commenced, the criminal court shall discharge or acquit the accused, as the case may be, and close such cases." It is true that the larger Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of P. Ramchandra Rao Vs. State of Karnataka (supra) has made it clear prescribing time limit or periods of limitation for criminal trial and acquitting accused on ground of delay by two-three Judge Benches of Supreme Court in the cases namely, Common Cause I, 1996(2) Mh.L.J. (SC) 1 : (1996)4 SCC 3; Common Cause II, 1997(1) Mh.L.J. (SC) 112 : (1996)6 SCC 775 ;, Raj Deo Sharma I, (1998)7 SCC 507 ; Raj Deo Sharma II, (1999)7 SCC 604 : [1999 ALL MR (Cri) 1554 (S.C.)] is uncalled for and impermissible, firstly, because it tantamounts to impermissible judicial legislation and secondly, because such bar of limitation fly in the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench decision of the Supreme Court in A.R. Antulay case reported in (1992)1 SCC 225 and therefore, run counter to the doctrine of precedents and their binding efficacy. 11. Though the judgment in common cause has been over ruled by the larger Bench of the Apex Court in P. Ramchandra Rao case (supra), however, in para 34 of the said judgment, it is clarified that the said decision shall not be a ground for reopening a case or proceeding by setting aside any such acquittal or discharge as is based on the authority of 'Common Cause' and 'Raj Deo Sharma' cases and which has already achieved finality and reopen the trial against the accused therein. 12. In the instant case the learned J.M.F.C. Jamner has passed an order on 29-111996 discharging the respondent Nos.1 and 2 relying on the common cause. The said order has attained the finality. In view of the observations in para 34 of the larger Bench of the Apex Court in the case of P. Ramchandra Rao case (supra), this case does not warrant any interference. The writ petition is dismissed. The Rule is discharged. Petition allowed.