Judgment :- Heard Mr. N. Quadir Hoseyn, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner and Ms. Pushya Sitaraman, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents. 2. The above writ petitions have been filed challenging the proceedings issued by the first respondent, under Section 133(6) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and to forbear the respondents from demanding information or details from the petitioner in pursuance of the notices issued, under Section 133(6) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. 3. It is submitted that the notices had been issued to the petitioner under Section 133(6) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, to furnish the required information available in respect of persons who have cash transactions of over Rs.1 lakh or, who have offered security for available loan/O.D. of over Rs.50 lakhs. 4. It is further stated that the power to call for information has been conferred upon the authorities, under Section 133(6) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Sub Section (6) of Section 133 of The Income Tax Act, 1961, as it stood originally, had provided for calling for information, which would be useful or relevant to any proceeding under the Act. It has been held by the Courts of law that unless a proceeding is pending, the powers under Section 133(6) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, cannot be exercised. In such circumstances, an amendment was made by the Finance Act, 1995, with effect from 01.07.1995, inserting the word "inquiry" before the word "proceeding" in Section 133(6) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The effect of the amendment is that the powers conferred under Section 133(6) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, can be exercised to obtain information, if it would be useful or relevant for any enquiry or proceeding under the Income Tax Act, 1961. The provision had been explained by Circular No.717, dated 14.08.1995, issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes, containing Explanatory Notes on the provisions relating to the Finance Act, 1995, which are applicable to Direct Taxes. Thus, it is clear that the authorised inquiry can only be "case specific" or "area specific". 5. The writ petitions have been filed stating that the proceedings under challenge and the notices issued, pursuant to the said proceedings are violative of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. Thus, it is clear that the authorised inquiry can only be "case specific" or "area specific". 5. The writ petitions have been filed stating that the proceedings under challenge and the notices issued, pursuant to the said proceedings are violative of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. The impugned notices propose to commence a detailed enquiry, without reference to any proceeding or enquiry pending before any authority, and they have been issued in contravention of Section 133(6) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Since the failure to furnish the information called for under Section 133(6) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, entails levy of penalty, under Section 272(A)(2)(c) of the Act, the notices carry penal consequences. The second proviso to Section 133(6) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, provides that the power in respect of an inquiry, in a case where no proceeding is pending, shall not be exercised by any income tax authority below the rank of Director or Commissioner without the prior approval of the Director or, as the case may be, the Commissioner. 6. Apart from challenging the validity of the impugned proceedings, the main contention of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner is that the impugned notices, issued in pursuance to such proceedings, ought to have stated that prior approval had been obtained from the Director or the Commissioner or from such other higher authority, as provided under the second proviso to Section 133(6) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. In the absence of such an information, the impugned notices cannot be held to be valid. 7. At this stage of hearing of the writ petitions, it was brought to the notice of this Court the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in Karnataka Bank Ltd Vs. Secretary, Government of India and others, reported in (255 ITR 508), wherein, it has been held that "it is clear from the mere reading of the said provision that it is not necessary that any inquiry should have commenced with the issuance of notice or otherwise before Section 133(6) could have been invoked. It is with the view to collect information that power is given under Section 133(6) to issue notice, inter alia, requiring a banking company to furnish information in respect of such points or matters as may be useful or relevant. It is with the view to collect information that power is given under Section 133(6) to issue notice, inter alia, requiring a banking company to furnish information in respect of such points or matters as may be useful or relevant. The second proviso makes it clear that such information can be sought for even when no proceeding under the Act is pending, the only safeguard being that before this power can be invoked the approval of the Director or the Commissioner, as the case may be, has to be obtained. In the instant case, the notice dated July 7, 2000, indicates that it was at the instance of the Director of Income-tax (investigation) that the information was sought for." 8. It was also pointed out that a new provision has been introduced as Section 285 BA, in the Income Tax Act, 1961, with effect from 01.04.2005, creating an obligation to furnish annual information return. 9. It was submitted by the learned counsel Ms. Pushya Sitaraman, appearing on behalf of the respondents, that in view of the decision of the Supreme Court, reported in Karnataka Bank Ltd Vs. Secretary, Government of India and others (255 ITR 508), and in view of the insertion of Section 285 BA in the Income Tax, Act, 1961, the issues raised in the writ petitions have lost their relevance and any further discussion relating to the said issues would be a mere academic exercise. 10. In view of the submissions made by the learned counsels appearing for the parties concerned, this Court is of the view that no further orders are required to be passed in the above writ petitions. Hence, these writ petitions stand dismissed. No costs.