Honble VYAS, J.–In this writ petition, petitioner is challenging the validity of impugned order dated 21/7/1993 (Annex.1), whereby, petitioner was dismissed from service for misconduct alleged to be committed by him to remain absent from duty without sanctioned leave so also petitioner is further challenging the order passed by Appellate Authority dated 25/8/1993 (Annex.3) and order Annex.4 dated 10/4/1995 passed by the Reviewing Authority. (2). According to facts of the case, petitioner was substantively appointed on the post of constable in the month of August, 1979. He was charge sheeted vide charge sheet dated 8/4/1993 in which two charges were levelled against him. which read as follows: ^^¼1½ ;g fd fnukad 8-11-92 le; 7 ih,e ij estj goynkj vkj-ih-,Q- ckalokMk }kjk ykbZu ds gkftj eqyktekuksa dk jksydksy eqrkfcd gktjh jftLVj ds fy;k x;k rks vki jksy dksy esa gkftj ugha gksuk ik;k tkus ij jks- vke jiV la[;k 433 ij vkidks xSj gkftjh vafdr dh xbZ] vki fn0 12-1-93 dks bl dk;kZy; ls vken dk vknsk izkIr dj iqu% iq-yk- ckalokMk ij jks-vke jiV la[;k 625 le; 8 ih,e ntZ djokbZA ¼2½ ;g fd vkidks M;wVh iq-yk- ckalokMk ls chekj eqyfte dh fuxjkuh esa egkRek xka/kh vLirky ckalokMk ij yxkbZ xbZ Fkh] fnukad 14-1-93 dks Jh esgcqc [kka dkfu-ua- 475 us vLirky ls VsyhQksu iq-yk- ckalokMk esa crk;k fd Jh rsu flag dkfu ua- 321 M~;wVh ij ugha gS ftl ij vkjvkbZ iq- ykbZu ckalokMk }kjk jks vke jiV la[;k 720 le; 5.30 ih,e ij vkdh xSj gk- vafdr dh xbZ] vki fnukad 11-2-93 dks bl dk;kZy; ls vken dk vknsk izkIr dj vkjih,Q ls ih,e ij vken ntZ djokbZA** (3). In reply to above charge sheet, petitioner denied the charges levelled against him and submitted that his wife was seriously ill in village and there is no hospital nearby village and his children are minor upon above reason a request was made to R.I. under whom he was working but his prayer for leave was rejected, therefore, due to serious illness of wife he was not in position to attend the duty. This reply was not considered and after conducting inquiry against the petitioner under Rule 16 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1968 the services of petitioner were terminated vide order dated 23.7.1993. While inflicting such penalty the respondents have sanctioned 71 days earned leave and 23 days half pay leave to the petitioner. This reply was not considered and after conducting inquiry against the petitioner under Rule 16 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1968 the services of petitioner were terminated vide order dated 23.7.1993. While inflicting such penalty the respondents have sanctioned 71 days earned leave and 23 days half pay leave to the petitioner. (4). According to the petitioner, on one hand his reply was not properly considered for the purpose of termination but on other hand by passing the order of sanctioning privileged leave for 71 days and 23 days half pay leave while accepting reasons for absence stated in reply to the charge sheet, respondents themselves have regularized the services of petitioner, therefore, it is not a case of committing any misconduct, more so it is a case in which the explanation of petitioner with regard to his absence was accepted by the respondents themselves, therefore, leave for the period of alleged absence was sanctioned to the petitioner. (5). The order of punishment was further challenged by the petitioner before the Appellate Authority but his appeal rejected and review application was also rejected by the Reviewing Authority. (6). Learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently argued that although the ground of jurisdiction is not taken in writ petition but while citing the judgment of Jaipur Bench reported in 2007 WLC 484 (Ram Karan vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors.), it is argued that order of punishment has been passed by Superintendent of Police, whereas, as per the judgment of this Court Superintendent of Police is not the disciplinary authority for the post of enumerated in subordinate services and petitioner is working on the post of Constable, therefore, order has been passed by the authority having no jurisdiction. (7). Without prejudice to above argument, it is contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that the order impugned is totally non-speaking order so also the inquiry which is conducted for alleged misconduct is also erroneous because no evidence whatsoever has been taken by the inquiry officer and only on the basis of presumption and allegation levelled by the department, he has been penalized by the Superintendent of Police. Further, it is argued that from the perusal of punishment order it is abundantly clear that no reason whatsoever has been assigned nor any evidence has been discussed for the purpose of arriving at the finding of guilt against the petitioner. (8). Learned counsel further argued that once the period of absence is regularized by the respondents it has resulted in acceptance of the explanation submitted by the petitioner, therefore, petitioner was to be exonerated but on the one hand period of absence was regularized and by way of sanctioning P.L. For 71 days and HPL for 23 days and on the other hand for the allegation of absence from duty for the same period he has been penalized with penalty of termination which is totally erroneous, illegal and unconstitutional. (9). Learned counsel for the petitioner further argued that all these points were not considered by the appellate authority as well as Reviewing Authority, so also admittedly in this case copy of inquiry report was not supplied to the petitioner which is mandatory, therefore, order of punishment deserves to be set aside. (10). Per contra learned Government Counsel Shri B.L.Tiwari vehemently argued that in this case there is no question of taking any evidence against the petitioner because he himself made a confession before the inquiry officer that he remained absent from duty due to illness of his wife. With regard to judgment cited by learned counsel for the petitioner for the proposition that order has been passed by incompetent authority it is contended that material document was not placed before the learned Single Judge. More specifically learned Government Counsel has invited the attention of this Court towards order dated 21/23.12.1985 which is said to be issued by the Director General cum I.G.,Police, Rajasthan, Jaipur in exercise of power conferred under Rule 15(1) of the Rajasthan Civil Services (C.C.& A) Rules, 1958 in which specifically with the approval of the Government the powers were given to the Superintendent of Police for taking disciplinary action against officers working under his subordination. Admittedly petitioner was working on the post of constable, therefore, according to this order Superintendent of Police was competent to take disciplinary action against him, therefore, the judgment cited by learned counsel for the petitioner is not applicable in the present case. (11). Admittedly petitioner was working on the post of constable, therefore, according to this order Superintendent of Police was competent to take disciplinary action against him, therefore, the judgment cited by learned counsel for the petitioner is not applicable in the present case. (11). Learned Government Counsel further argued that in this case there is no question of discussing any evidence by the disciplinary authority because admittedly petitioner himself admitted before the inquiry officer that he remained absent from duty for the alleged period for which he was charge sheeted, although he gave his explanation that his wife was seriously ill, therefore, he remained absent, therefore, it was not necessary for the disciplinary authority to discuss any evidence and there is no illegality committed by the disciplinary authority. (12). Learned Government Counsel further argued that the ground of non-supply of inquiry report is also baseless because no prejudice is caused to the petitioner by non-supplying the inquiry report as petitioner himself admitted the guilt. In these circumstances, all the ground taken by the petitioner have no force and the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. (13). I have considered the rival submissions and entire record of the case. It is true that no inquiry report was supplied to the petitioner prior to passing the order of termination against the petitioner by the Superintendent of Police but at the same time there is force in the argument of learned Government Counsel that no prejudice was caused due to non-supply of inquiry report, in my opinion, contention of the respondents in this regard has no force because in inquiry no evidence was recorded, no documents were exhibited and illegal finding for absence of the petitioner was recorded, therefore, respondents have committed the mandatory requirement of providing inquiry report prior to passing order of punishment. (14). With regard to jurisdiction of Superintendent of Police, it is clear from the judgment rendered by Coordinate Bench of this Court referred to above that the order dated 21/23.12.1985 was not brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge. However, learned Government Counsel submitted that appeal against the order passed in Ram Karans case (supra) is pending before the Division bench. However, learned Government Counsel submitted that appeal against the order passed in Ram Karans case (supra) is pending before the Division bench. Therefore, in my opinion, it is not proper to take any different view which is taken by the Coordinate Bench but the fact remains that as per order dated 21/23.12.1985 Superintendent of Police was having competence to pass an order of termination. Therefore, in my opinion, no finding is required on this point at this stage. (15). However, in my opinion, once the respondents themselves have regularized the period for which petitioner remained absent from duty by sanctioning 71 days PL and 23 days HPL, it is obvious that respondents have accepted the explanation submitted by petitioner, but respondents on the one hand accepted the explanation of the petitioner for the alleged absence and on the other hand passed the order of punishment, the operative part of the impugned order dated 23/7/1993 is as follows: ^^eqk v/kksgLrk{kjdrkZ }kjk foHkkxh; i=koyh ,oa lacaf/kr vfHkys[kksa o tkap vf/kdkjh ds tkap izfrosnu dk xgurk ls v/;;u ,oa euu fd;k rks nks"kh deZpkjh ij yxk;s x;s fnukad 8-12-92 le; 7 ih,e ls 12-1-93 dks le; 8 ih,e rd 65 ;ksx fn- 14-1-93 le; 5.20 ih,e ls 11-2-93 rd 29 fnu dqy 2 ckj esa ckjh ls 94 ;kse LosPNk ls xSj gkftj gksus ds vkjksi izekf.kr gSA vr% Jh rsuflag dkfu ;ua- 321 dks jkT; lsok ls i`Fkd fd;k tkrk gS] 94 ;kse xSj gkftj vof/k dks 71 ;ksx mikftZr vodkk ¼ih,y½ o 23 ;ksx v)Z osru vodkk ¼,pih,y½ esa lqekj dh tkrh gSA** (16). In view of the above action of the disciplinary authority for sanctioning leave of absence period and regularizing the service, no order of termination can be passed in view of judgment rendered by Honble Apex Court in case of State of Punjab vs. Bakshish Singh reported in 1999 (2) SRJ 264, whereby, the Apex Court upheld the judgment passed by trial court dated 12/5/1993 in which the trial court decreed the suit filed by constable of Punjab Police and set aside the order of termination on the ground that disciplinary authority itself regularized the period of absence and treated the period of employees absence from duty as the "period of leave without pay". The Apex Court while upholding finding of trial court set aside the judgment of High Court by which High Court of Punjab and Haryana quashed the judgment and decree of the trial court. Para No.11 and 12 are as follows: "11. Applying the above principles to the instant case, it will be noticed that the trial court recorded a categorical finding of fact that a proper opportunity of hearing was not afforded to the respondent in the departmental proceedings and that his allegation that his signatures on certain papers during those proceedings were obtained under duress, was not controverted as the State of Punjab had lead no evidence in defence. The trial court also recorded a finding that unauthorized absence from duty having been regularized by treating the period of absence as leave without pay, the charge of misconduct did not survive. It was with this finding that the suit was decreed. The lower appellate court confirmed the finding that since the prod of unauthorized absence from duty was regularized, the charge did not survive but it did not say a word about the finding relating to the opportunity of hearing in the departmental proceedings. Since those findings were not specifically set aside about the lower appellate court was silent about them, the same shall be treated to have been affirmed. In the face of these findings, it was not open to the lower appellate court to remand the case to the punishing authority for passing a fresh order of punishment. The High court, before which the second appeal was filed by the State of Punjab, did not advert itself to this inconsistency as it dismissed the appeal summarily, which indirectly reflects that it allowed an inconsistent judgment to pass through its scrutiny. 12. It is in these circumstances that we, in exercise of our power of doing complete justice between the parties, finally decide this appeal and the whole case by providing as under: (a) The appeal is allowed. (b) The judgment dated 15/1/1996 passed by the lower appellate court insofar as it purports to remand the case to the punishing authority as also the judgment of the High Court dated 21.8.1996 are set aside. (c) The judgment and decree passed by the trial court is upheld." (17). (b) The judgment dated 15/1/1996 passed by the lower appellate court insofar as it purports to remand the case to the punishing authority as also the judgment of the High Court dated 21.8.1996 are set aside. (c) The judgment and decree passed by the trial court is upheld." (17). Similar view was taken by the Division Bench of this Court in the judgment reported in 1989 (1) RLR page 757 = (1989 (1) RLW 387) (Datar Singh vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors). Relevant para 5 is as follows: "5. No respondent has filed reply to the writ petition. Admittedly, it is mentioned in the charge sheet itself that E.O.L. (Extra-ordinary leave) has been granted in respect of each absence much prior to the issuance of the charge sheet. It has also been specifically stated so in the writ petition. As already mentioned above, reply to the writ petition has not been filed by any respondent. During arguments, this fact was not disputed. The granting of leave of whatever nature it may be, tantamounts to considering the absence as justified or at any rate the condonation and regularization of the absence. After such regularization and condition, no disciplinary action lies. It was open to the Superintendent of Police, Banswara (Respondent NO.2) to have refused to grant leave to the petitioner. When once leave has been granted, it cannot be said that the petitioner had absented himself from duty and thereby made himself liable for punishment. The very purpose of granting leave was to regularize the petitioners absence. Thereafter, it was not open to him to initiate any disciplinary action against the petitioner for his absence from duty." (18). In this view of the matter, in this case the order of termination of service of petitioner is totally unwarranted because absence period has already been regularized by the competent authority and purpose of regularizing any period of absence is to grant service benefits to employee. Therefore, order of punishment passed by the respondents cannot be sustained. (19). Accordingly this writ petition is allowed. The order of termination dated 21/7/1993 is hereby quashed and set aside. The Consequential orders passed by Appellate Authority and Reviewing Authority are also quashed with all consequential benefits. No costs.