JUDGMENT Hon’ble Amitava Lala, J.—This writ petition has been made praying inter alia as follows : “(1) issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the order impugned dated 17.9.2005 passed by Hon’ble Chancellor, Veer Bahadur Singh Purvanchal University, Jaunpur (Annexure 1 to the writ petition). (2) issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus restraining the respondents authority not to interfere in the working of the petitioner as Vice Chancellor, Veer Bahadur Singh Purvanchal University, Jaunpur till his tenure i.e. 26.5.2007 and permit the petitioner to work as Vice Chancellor, Veer Bahadur Singh Purvanchal University, Jaunpur. (3) issue a writ order or direction in the nature of mandamus restraining the respondent authorities from any proceeding of Search Committee for appointment of new Vice Chancellor, Veer Bahadur Singh Purvanchal University, Jaunpur. (4) issue any suitable writ, order or direction which this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case. (5) to award the cost of this petition of the petitioner. (6) issue writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari calling for the record of appointment order dated 28.11.2005 issued by the Chancellor in regard to appointment of proposed respondent No. 5 and quashing the impugned order dated 28.11.2005.” 2. At the inception Mr. R.N. Singh, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent Nos. 2 and 5, raised an objection by saying that by the passage of time the writ petition has become infructuous, therefore, the same is liable to be dismissed. According to Mr. Singh, term of the Vice-Chancellor has already expired, therefore, there is no scope to replace the petitioner as Vice-Chancellor of Veer Bahadur Singh Purvanchal University, Jaunpur (hereinafter in short called as ‘University’) even if he succeeds. We have gone through the interim order passed earlier on 11th November, 2005, whereby the Division Bench after giving direction to the parties for exchange of affidavits was pleased to direct that the appointment of the Vice-Chancellor in the meantime, if any, shall be abide by the result of the writ petition. We have called upon Mr. R. Venkataramani, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, to give reply to the said objection at first. Mr. We have called upon Mr. R. Venkataramani, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, to give reply to the said objection at first. Mr. Venkataramani, in turn, contended that he is not inclined to obtain such order from this Court but since the order impugned passed by the Chancellor on 17th September, 2005 seems to be stigmatic in nature for his position and career, therefore, though no order could be passed to replace the writ petitioner in the University as Vice-Chancellor yet the writ petition cannot be said to be totally infructuous. 3. Thus, according to us, hearing will be confined only with regard to Prayer No. 1 and not other prayers, which are related to the continuance or replacement of the writ petitioner in the post of Vice-Chancellor of the University. 4. Mr. Venkataramani contended before this Court that only fault on the part of the writ petitioner is that he has started Distance Education Programme of the University as a Vice-Chancellor. But the Vice-Chancellor cannot be held responsible for such action. It is a collective decision taken by him as Chairman of the Executive Council to enure the benefits of the students. If it seems to be irregular or contrary to law, the programme cannot be approved. But for such action, a Vice-Chancellor cannot be put on the dock and the disciplinary action resulting to removal from the service with various stigmatic remarks cannot be made by the Chancellor. The post of the Vice-Chancellor is very high in the office of a University. Therefore, a Chancellor, before passing any extreme order, should consider all these aspects. In other words, a Vice-Chancellor can be removed from the office only when he is individually involved in any charge contemplated under Section 12 (12) of the Uttar Pradesh State Universities Act, 1973 (hereinafter in short called as the ‘Act’) and to come to a definite conclusion a regular enquiry is needed. Section 12 (12) of the Act is a charging section. Distance Education is a policy of a University to render education. The University is empowered to make ordinance in this regard in accordance with the aforesaid Act. Therefore, if any contravention is there, it cannot be treated as an individual act of the Vice-Chancellor for his punishment. Section 12 (12) of the Act is a charging section. Distance Education is a policy of a University to render education. The University is empowered to make ordinance in this regard in accordance with the aforesaid Act. Therefore, if any contravention is there, it cannot be treated as an individual act of the Vice-Chancellor for his punishment. The decision of the Vice-Chancellor, being Chairman of the Executive Council, may not be regular but that cannot be treated to be an illegality in the eye of law, for which the petitioner as a Vice-Chancellor can be removed from the service. There is a difference between illegality and irregularity. The University has to take a pragmatic view for the benefit and welfare of the students which under no circumstances can be said to be an illegality to attract the provisions of Section 12 (12) of the Act. Indira Gandhi National Open University is opened for the Distance Education Programme by way of correspondence. Such policy has become successful, but when the Universities have started their distance education course, the same are being criticized. Action on the part of the University about distance education course cannot be said to be forbidden by law or fraud or alike. It cannot be done on a day but it takes several years in its implementation. There is no basic difference between correspondence course and distance course. 5. Mr. R.N. Singh, learned Senior Counsel, and Mr. D.K. Arora, learned Additional Advocate General, jointly and severally contended before this Court that, in effect, there are two charges against the Vice-Chancellor; one is financial irregularity regarding collection of fund of Rs. 42 lacs, and other is conducting distance education course without prior approval of the State and/or the Chancellor. Correspondence course and distance education course are not same or similar. Correspondence course is directly conducted by the University, whereas distance education course is conducted by the University through middleman. About 89 distance education centres were opened by this University not only in the States and in the Country but also in a neighbouring country i.e. Nepal. Vice-Chancellor has no power to make ordinance. Ordinance can only be made by the State Government. Whatever argument has been made by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner about the distance education is the personal opinion of the petitioner, there might be different opinion also. Vice-Chancellor has no power to make ordinance. Ordinance can only be made by the State Government. Whatever argument has been made by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner about the distance education is the personal opinion of the petitioner, there might be different opinion also. Therefore, when different views are possible, writ jurisdiction of the Court cannot be invoked. There is no scope of judicial review. The writ petition is liable to be dismissed also on such ground. 6. In reply, Mr. Venkataramani contended that under the direction of a learned Single Judge, a general enquiry has been initiated, which under no circumstances can be contemplated as a regular enquiry under Section 12 (12) of the Act. General enquiry means, an enquiry to form an opinion by the authority i.e. the Chancellor to conduct a regular enquiry. Wrongful understanding cannot be the ground of removal. So far as the charge of misappropriation of Rs. 42 lacs is concerned, a Vice-Chancellor under no circumstances can be held to be involved in such misappropriation. It has to be dealt with by the Accounts Department. However, learned Single Judge of this Court in its judgment and order dated 27th June, 2005 passed in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 45363 of 2005 (Ashwani Kumar Shukla and others v. Hon’ble Kuladhapati, Narendra Dev University of Agriculture and Technology, Raj Bhavan, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh and others) observed that in view of such situation a collective decision has been taken in respect of all the Universities on a general overall view. The individual cases of each university, therefore, required further examination as to whether the Universities had framed any proper rule in accordance with the Act to enable them to run the distance education programmes. After having realized the problem, the Chancellor’s office issued a notice on 6th June, 2005. In such circumstances, learned Single Judge of this Court held as follows : “34. In view of the aforesaid observations and keeping in view the seriousness of the nature of the present litigation, it is hereby required that his Excellency the Chancellor will proceed with the matter as per the letter dated 6.6.2005 and take a decision in the matter as expeditiously as possible preferably within a period of 6 weeks from today. In view of the aforesaid observations and keeping in view the seriousness of the nature of the present litigation, it is hereby required that his Excellency the Chancellor will proceed with the matter as per the letter dated 6.6.2005 and take a decision in the matter as expeditiously as possible preferably within a period of 6 weeks from today. The Vice Chancellors of the respective Universities are directed to cooperate with the Chancellor and submit whatever material is required for consideration by the Chancellor as soon as possible without any further delay. 35. The directions issued by the Chancellor in the impugned order shall attain finality only after fresh orders are passed as directed herein above and no penal action shall be taken against the students of the study centers/coordinators who are the petitioners before this Court till then. His Excellency- the Chancellor shall proceed to decide the matter and it is expected that the decision shall be taken by a speaking and reasoned order in respect of individual Universities in the light of the observations made herein above. The orders impugned shall be subject to the orders passed by His Excellency-the Chancellor hereinafter.” 7. From the Act we find that certain provisions are relevant for the purpose. Relevant parts of Section 7 of the Act are as follows : “7. Powers and duties of the University.— ....................................... ........................................ (4) .......................................... (c) have pursued a course of study by correspondence whether residing within the area of the University or not, and have been registered by the University, subject to such conditions as may be laid down in the Statutes and Ordinances as external candidates; or ........................................ ........................................ (7) to grant such diplomas to, and to provide such lectures and instructions for persons, not being students of the University, as the University may determine; (8) to co-operate or collaborate with other Universities and authorities in such manner and for such purposes as the University may determine;" 8. Sub-sections (6), (7) and (8) of Section 8 speak as follows : ........................................ ........................................ “8. Visitation.— ........................................ (6) If the University authorities do not within a reasonable time, take action to the satisfaction of the State Government, the Government may, after considering any explanation which the University authorities may furnish, issue such directions as it may think fit, and the University authorities shall be bound to comply with such directions. ........................................ “8. Visitation.— ........................................ (6) If the University authorities do not within a reasonable time, take action to the satisfaction of the State Government, the Government may, after considering any explanation which the University authorities may furnish, issue such directions as it may think fit, and the University authorities shall be bound to comply with such directions. (7) The State Government shall send to the Chancellor a copy of every report of an inspection or inquiry caused to be made under sub-section (1) and of every communication received from the Vice-Chancellor under sub-section (5) and of every direction issued under sub-section (6) and also of every report or information received in respect of compliance or non-compliance with such direction. (8) Without prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (6) if the Chancellor on consideration of any document or material referred to in sub-section (7) of this section including any report of an inquiry held before the commencement of this Act, is of opinion that the Executive Council has failed to carry out its functions or has abused its powers, he may, after giving it an opportunity of submitting a written explanation, order that in supersession, of the said Executive Council, an ad hoc Executive Council, consisting of the Vice-Chancellor and such other persons not exceeding ten in number as the Chancellor may appoint in that behalf including any member of the superseded Executive Council, shall for such period not exceeding two years as the Chancellor may from time to time specify, and subject to the provisions of sub-section (11), exercise and perform all the powers and functions of the Executive Council under this Act. ........................................ 9. Section 12 (12) of the Act says that : ........................................ ........................................ “12. The Vice-Chancellor.— ........................................ ........................................ (12) If in the opinion of the Chancellor, the Vice-Chancellor wilfully omits or refuses to carry out the provisions of this Act or abuses the powers vested in him, or if it otherwise appears to the Chancellor that the continuance of the Vice-Chancellor in office is detrimental to the interest of the University, the Chancellor may, after making such inquiry as he deems proper, by order, remove the Vice-Chancellor. ........................................ ........................................ 10. Section 13 (1) (b) of the Act prescribes as under : “13. Powers and duties of the Vice-Chancellor.—(1) The Vice-Chancellor shall be the principal executive and academic officer of the University and shall— ........................................ ........................................ ........................................ 10. Section 13 (1) (b) of the Act prescribes as under : “13. Powers and duties of the Vice-Chancellor.—(1) The Vice-Chancellor shall be the principal executive and academic officer of the University and shall— ........................................ (b) give effect to the decisions of the authorities of the University; ........................................ ........................................ 11. Section 15 of the Act says as follows : “15. The Finance Officer.—(1) There shall be a Finance Officer for the University, who shall be appointed by the State Government by a notification published in the official Gazette, and his remuneration and allowances shall be paid by the University. (2) The Finance Officer shall be responsible for presenting the budget (annual estimates) and the statement of accounts to the Executive Council and also for drawing and disbursing funds on behalf of the University. (3) He shall have the right to speak in and otherwise to take part in the proceedings of the Executive Council but shall not be entitled to vote. (4) The Finance Officer shall have the duty— (a) to ensure that no expenditure, not authorised in the budget, is incurred by the University (otherwise than by way of investment); (b) to disallow any proposed expenditure which may contravene the provisions of this Act or the terms of any Statutes or Ordinances; (c) to ensure that no other financial irregularity is committed and to take steps to set right any irregularities pointed out during audit; (d) to ensure that the property and investments of the University are duly preserved and managed. (5) The Finance Officer shall have access to and may require the production of such records and documents of the University and the furnishing of such information pertaining to its affairs as in his opinion may be necessary for the discharge of his duties. (6) All contracts shall be entered into and signed by the Finance Officer on behalf of the University. (7) Other powers and functions of the Finance Officer shall be such as may be prescribed.” 12. Relevant part of Section 26 of the Act is as follows : “26. The Finance Committee.—The Finance Committee shall consist of— (a) the Vice-Chancellor; ........................................ (e) the Finance Officer who shall also be the Secretary of the Committee. ........................................ (2) The Finance Committee shall advise the Executive Council on matters relating to the administration of property and funds of the University. The Finance Committee.—The Finance Committee shall consist of— (a) the Vice-Chancellor; ........................................ (e) the Finance Officer who shall also be the Secretary of the Committee. ........................................ (2) The Finance Committee shall advise the Executive Council on matters relating to the administration of property and funds of the University. It shall, having regard to the income and resources of the University, fix limits for the total recurring and non-recurring expenditure for the ensuing financial year and may, for any special reasons, revise during the financial year the limits of expenditure so fixed and the limits so fixed shall be binding on the Executive Council. ........................................ ........................................" 13. Relevant portion of Section 50 of the Act is as under : “50. Statutes how made.—(1) The First Statutes of the University shall be made by the State Government by notification in the Gazette and in the case of any existing University, for so long as the First Statutes are not so made, the Statutes as in force immediately before the commencement of this Act, in so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, shall, subject to such adaptations and modifications whether by way of repeal, amendment or addition as may be necessary or expedient, as the State Government may, by notification in the Gazette provide, continue in force, and any such adaptation or modification shall not be called in question. ........................................" (1-B) Until the First Statutes of the Purvanchal University are made under this section, the Statutes of the University of Gorakhpur, as in force immediately before the establishment of the said University shall apply to it subject to such adaptations and modifications as the State Government may, by notification, provide. ........................................ ........................................" 14. Relevant portion of Section 51 of the Act speaks as below : “51. Ordinances.—(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act and the Statutes the Ordinances may provide for any matter which by this Act or the Statutes is to be or may be provided for by the Ordinances. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of sub-section (1), the Ordinance shall provide for the following matters, namely— ........................................ (h) all matters relating to correspondence courses and private candidates; ........................................ ........................................" 15. Section 52 of the Act speaks as under : “52. Ordinance how made.— ........................................ ........................................ (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of sub-section (1), the Ordinance shall provide for the following matters, namely— ........................................ (h) all matters relating to correspondence courses and private candidates; ........................................ ........................................" 15. Section 52 of the Act speaks as under : “52. Ordinance how made.— ........................................ ........................................ (4) The Executive Council shall not have power to amend any draft proposed by the Academic Council under sub-section (3) but may reject it or return to the Academic Council for reconsideration either in whole or in part together with any amendments which the Executive Council may suggest. (5) All Ordinances made by the Executive Council shall have effect from such date as it may direct and shall be submitted as soon as may be to the Chancellor. (6) The Chancellor may, at any time signify to the Executive Council his disallowance of such Ordinances other than those referred to in clause (c) of the proviso to sub-section (3) and from the date of receipt by the Executive Council of intimation of such disallowance, such Ordinances shall become void. (7) The Chancellor may direct that the operation of any Ordinance other than those referred to in clause (c) of the proviso to sub-section (3) shall be suspended until he has an opportunity of exercising his power of disallowance. An order of suspension under this sub-section shall cease to have affect on the expiration of one month from the date of such order.” 16. If conjoint reading of the aforesaid sections is made, following import will come out. As per Section 7 (4)(c) of the Act, the University can pursue correspondence course subject to laying down statutes and ordinances as external candidates. It also grants diploma, provides lectures and instructions for persons, not being the students of the University and co-operate and collaborate with other universities and authorities for the purpose of necessity. As per Section 8 (8) of the Act, on consideration of any document or material including report of any inquiry if the Chancellor forms an opinion that the Executive Council inclusive of Vice-Chancellor failed to carry out any function or abused the powers, he may, after giving opportunity of written explanation, in supersession of such Executive Council inclusive of Vice Chancellor, appoint an ad hoc Executive Council of such nature for the period fixed therein. Section 12 (12) of the Act deals with the power of the Chancellor to remove the Vice-Chancellor on three conditions; (a) when Vice-Chancellor wilfully omits or refuses to carry out the provisions of the Act; (b) when Vice-Chancellor abuses the powers vested in him; and (c) if it otherwise appears to the Chancellor that the continuance of the Vice-Chancellor in the office is detrimental to the interest of the University. As per Section 13 (1)(b) of the Act, Vice-Chancellor will give effect to the decisions of the authorities of the University. As per Section 15 of the Act, Finance Officer to be a person appointed by the State who will deal with financial responsibilities. However, as per Section 26 of the Act, a Finance Committee shall consist of some persons inclusive of the Vice-Chancellor. Section 50 of the Act prescribes that First Statute of the University shall be made by the State Government, but the Purvanchal University will be governed by the Statutes of the Gorakhpur University unless the same is formed. Section 51 of the Act is making a provision for Ordinances necessary for doing the needful. Clause (h) of sub-section (2) of Section 51 says that the University may conduct the correspondence courses. Section 52 of the Act has made a provision as to how the Ordinances will be made. The Ordinances will be made by the Executive Council of the University, but the Chancellor may, at any time, disallow any Ordinance made by the Executive Council. 17. In Allahabad College of Engineering and Management and others v. His Excellency, The Chancellor, M.J.P. Rohilkhand University, Bareilly and others, 2005 (4) ESC 2298 (All), a Division Bench of this Court recorded the submission of the State in the similar situation that when illegally large number of study centres all over country have been established by many Universities, it became imperative for the Chancellor to pass an order under Section 68 of the Act. It was held therein that First Ordinances of every University have to be initially framed by the State Government. The Executive Council of the University can only make a new or additional Ordinances or may amend or repeal the Ordinances framed by the State Government. It was held therein that First Ordinances of every University have to be initially framed by the State Government. The Executive Council of the University can only make a new or additional Ordinances or may amend or repeal the Ordinances framed by the State Government. In view of Section 52 (3) of the Act, the Executive Council could not have made the Ordinances unless a draft of the same had been approved by the State Government as admittedly the Ordinances did effect the income and expenditure of the University. To contradict the relevant portion of such citation, Mr. Venkataramani said that if the Statute is not framed in respect of the concerned University, whether it will be powerless or not. According to us, it is an independent issue regarding policy which cannot be adjudicated against a disciplinary action. However, the Division Bench ultimately held that it is open for the Chancellor to examine the matter and pass appropriate order for refund. In any event, exceptional power of the Chancellor has been by and large approved by the Division Bench. 18. In Kurmanchal Institute of Degree and Diploma and others v. Chancellor, M.J.P., Rohilkhand University and others, 2007 (3) ESC 480 (SC), the Supreme Court held that each University in the country which is recognized under the University Grants Commission Act must have their own territorial jurisdiction save and except for the Central Universities or specified in the Legislative or Parliamentary Act. Such territorial jurisdiction of the University must be maintained as otherwise a chaos would be created. If distance education of such a nature is to be encouraged, the only course would be to suitably amend the provisions of the Act. 19. However, a Division Bench of this Court considered the cause of removal of the Vice-Chancellor in the similarly placed circumstances in two occasions. In Dr. Ram Pal Singh v. State of U.P. and others, 2006 (4) ADJ 119 (AII)(DB), it was held on the basis of the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1968 SC 292 , Dr. Bhool Chand v. Kurukshetra University, that the post of the Vice-Chancellor is of very great importance. A person of the antecedents is unfit to continue. In such case no allegation of mala fide or biasness of the inquiry officer or the Chancellor was available. Bhool Chand v. Kurukshetra University, that the post of the Vice-Chancellor is of very great importance. A person of the antecedents is unfit to continue. In such case no allegation of mala fide or biasness of the inquiry officer or the Chancellor was available. It was held by the Court that wide latitude has to be given to the disciplinary authority in such matters and it is neither desirable nor permissible for the Court to re-appreciate the evidence. In support of the point of evidence, Mr. R.N. Singh cited a judgment reported in AIR 1971 SC 1537 , Zora Singh v. J.M. Tandon and others, which says that in the writ petition for certiorari the superior Court does not sit in appeal and exercises only supervisory jurisdiction and, therefore, does not enter into the question of sufficiency of evidence. However, in Prof. Ramesh Chandra v. State of U.P. and others, 2007 (6) ADJ 112 (DB), it was held that order of removal was based on stale charges. The disciplinary authority proceeded in hot haste. The relevant portion of such judgment is as follows : “72. Observation by the Chancellor that the petitioner did not lead any evidence in support of denial of the charge of giving employment to his close relatives is self-contradictory and supports the case of the petitioner, as he had not been given a chance to lead evidence on the issue. It could be possible for him only if a regular inquiry was conducted. At the most the inquiry conducted under Section 8 (1) could be used as a preliminary inquiry. Admittedly, petitioner was not asked to participate in the said inquiry. Petitioner’s preliminary objections that provisions of Section 8 (1) to 8(7) were not complied with while conducting the inquiry, had been brushed aside by the Chancellor being merely technical. Such a course was not permissible for the Chancellor. The Inquiry Officer recorded a categorical finding that error in evaluation of the answer sheets in CPMT 2000 was not deliberate at all. It was not permissible for the Disciplinary Authority to hold it to be wilful omission or refusal to carry out the provision of the Act. 73. The allegations/charges on which the petitioner stood removed related to his first term and, thus, his removal is based on stale charges. More so, only 13 days were left to complete the second term. It was not permissible for the Disciplinary Authority to hold it to be wilful omission or refusal to carry out the provision of the Act. 73. The allegations/charges on which the petitioner stood removed related to his first term and, thus, his removal is based on stale charges. More so, only 13 days were left to complete the second term. The Disciplinary Authority proceeded in hot haste. The manner in which the enquiry was required to be conducted in the facts and circumstances involved herein, had not been conducted. The conclusions arrived at by the Chancellor had been controversial, which could be recorded only after holding a full-fledged enquiry giving him the charge-sheet and appointing an Inquiry Officer treating the enquiry report submitted by the Inquiry Officer appointed under Section 8 (1) of the Act as a preliminary enquiry report. 74. Undoubtedly, no specific procedure is prescribed nor any particular kind of inquiry has been prescribed under Section 12 (12) of the Act for removal of the Vice-Chancellor. However, in view of the law referred to hereinabove, the nature of enquiry would depend upon the facts involved in a particular case. No straight-jacket formula can be applied. In the present case, the order impugned is stigmatic and is likely to cause serious prejudice and may have civil consequences for the future of the petitioner, thus, full-fledged enquiry was required. There is nothing on record, particularly when there is no finding by the Inquiry Officer appointed under Section 8 (1) of the Act, that petitioner had wilfully omitted or refused to carry out the provisions of the Act or abused his powers or his continuance was detrimental to the interest of the University, we fail to understand as to how the learned Chancellor could reach such a conclusion. The enquiry stood vitiated as charge-sheet was not issued, witnesses were not examined and even the Inquiry Officer/Presenting Officer was not appointed as was warranted in the facts and circumstances of the case. We are of the considered opinion that in the facts and circumstances of the case, principles of natural justice, to the extent it required to be observed had not been complied with.” 20. Mr. Venkataramani wanted to fit his case on the basis of second judgment. We are of the considered opinion that in the facts and circumstances of the case, principles of natural justice, to the extent it required to be observed had not been complied with.” 20. Mr. Venkataramani wanted to fit his case on the basis of second judgment. By citing a three Judges’ Bench judgment of the Supreme Court reported in 1982 (2) SCC 7 , V.T. Khanzode and others v. Reserve Bank of India and another, he wanted to say that the University cannot be said to be powerless. Where a specific power is conferred without prejudice to the generality of a power already conferred, the specific power is only illustrative and cannot restrict the width of the general power. In Akumah v. Hackney London Borough Council, 2005 (2) All E.R. 148, the House of Lords held that as because regulation and control is inherent in the Act but the concept of management should be widely construed. In other words, facilitating about implementation of the Act can be managed by the local authority. Again by citing 1987 (3) SCC 82 , Khargram Panchayat Samiti and another v. State of West Bengal and others, he contended that the rules or the absence of it do not detract from the substantive power conferred by a statute. The conferment of statutory powers on local authorities must be construed as impliedly authorising everything which could fairly and reasonably be regarded as incidental or consequential to the power itself. By showing relevant part of a book known as Dynamic Statutory Interpretation by William N. Eskridge, Jr., First Indian Reprint 2000, he wanted to say that pragmatism argues that there is no "foundationalist” (single overriding) approach to legal issues. Instead, the problem solver should consider the matter from different angles, applying practical experience and factual context before arriving at a solution. By further showing relevant portion of Tenth Edition, 2006 (Extensively Revised & Enlarged) of Principles of Statutory Interpretation (Also Containing General Clauses Act, 1897 with Notes, by Guru Prasanna Singh, he wanted to draw our attention to the observations of Lord Bridge, from where we find that when a change in social conditions produces a novel situation, which was not in contemplation at the time when a statute is first enacted, there can be no a priori assumption that the enactment does not apply to the new circumstances. If the language of the enactment is wide enough to extend to those circumstances, there is no reason why it should not apply. From the First Indian Reprint 2007 of Purposive Interpretation in law by Aharon Barak he said that Judges interpret a constitution according to its purpose—the objectives, values and principles that the constitutional text is designed to actualize. Thus, by citing all the aforesaid judgments and relevant interpretations in the text books he wanted to submit that the University is not powerless. A pragmatic stand has to be taken by the Government in the situation and applying the law accordingly. The stand taken by the Vice-Chancellor is within the fore-corners of law but may not be in strict sense as it is prescribed. 21. By citing the judgment reported in AIR (31) 1944 Lahore 240, I.M. Lall v. Secretary of State, he said that a defect in procedure of rules made by the Government will not substantially help a person even if the enquiry be not in strict conformity with rule, but if the cumulative effect of the various defects is hampering the defence and thus the person concerned had no opportunity, the enquiry is liable to be declared as bad. Therefore, it is to be seen whether the incumbent was removed from the service after affording reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him or not. Even the Court is not powerless to pass any such order, if necessary, by moulding the same as per the ratio of the judgment reported in (1966) Supp. S.C.R. 270, Veruareddi Ramaraghava Reddy and others v. Konduru Seshu Reddy and two others. The question, which has been raised by him, cannot be said to be an academic question as per the ratio of the judgment reported in (1968) 2 All E.R. 252, Gibson v. Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers. In (1982) 3 All E.R. 141, Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v. Evans, it was held that judicial review can be made in case of wrongful dismissal of a person particularly when rules of natural justice have been violated. As against the query of the Court regarding the point raised by Mr. Singh that the judgments of the different Division Benches have been merged with the order of the Supreme Court, Mr. As against the query of the Court regarding the point raised by Mr. Singh that the judgments of the different Division Benches have been merged with the order of the Supreme Court, Mr. Venkataramani stated that doctrine of merger cannot be applicable in this case in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in 2000 (6) SCC 359 , Kunhayammed and others v. State of Kerala and another. The proceedings cannot be held to be infructuous because the doctrine of merger is neither a doctrine of constitutional law nor a doctrine statutorily recognized. It is a common law doctrine founded on the principles of propriety in the hierarchy of justice delivery system. Scope of judicial review before this Court is yet open and the Court even in the writ petition can grant a declaratory relief in such situation. 22. Let us make an overall assessment of the case. It is true to say that the Chancellor has proceeded on the basis of the direction of the learned Single Judge In re : Ashwani Kumar Shukla and others (supra) to make an enquiry to form his opinion. The case of the petitioner is that by virtue of such opinion a preliminary cause can be substantiated for making a regular enquiry. The Chancellor, only on the basis of the direction of the learned Single Judge in respect of overall enquiry, cannot initiate an individual enquiry in respect of the case in hand. There are two parts of the allegations. First part is opening of distance education centers and the second part is financial irregularity on account of collection of fees, etc. for such distance education. According to the writ petitioner, running of the distance education centers is not an individual decision of the Vice-Chancellor but a collective decision of the Executive Council headed by the Vice-Chancellor as Chairman. Secondly, financial irregularity, if any, by way of collection of fees etc. is in the hands of the accounts department headed by the Accounts Officer. In such case also the Vice-Chancellor is only involved as head of the institution. He has no direct role. In neither of the cases the Vice-Chancellor can be held to be personally liable for his removal from the service under Section 12 (12) of the Act. Action of the Chancellor can be, at best, an action under Section 8 (8) of the Act. He has no direct role. In neither of the cases the Vice-Chancellor can be held to be personally liable for his removal from the service under Section 12 (12) of the Act. Action of the Chancellor can be, at best, an action under Section 8 (8) of the Act. However, according to us, we have to see at first, even for the sake of repetition, when a Chancellor uses the power under Section 12 (12) of the Act. He can do so on the following grounds : (a) The Vice-Chancellor wilfully commits or refuses to carry out the provisions of the Act; (b) abuses the powers vested in him; and (c) if it otherwise appears to the Chancellor that the continuance of the Vice-Chancellor in the office is detrimental to the interest of the University. 23. Therefore, according to us, the power of the Chancellor is wide enough to take a decision, provided either of the aforesaid acts necessitates him to intervene. Good-bad indifferent, the case in hand cannot be said to be outside the four-corners of either of the situations necessary for invoking the provisions of Section 12 (12) of the Act. Therefore, the Chancellor had acted within the jurisdiction in such a situation irrespective of the order of the learned Single Judge In re : Ashwani Kumar Shukla and others (supra). Hence, the next point available before us is whether at the time of conducting enquiry for the purpose of forming an opinion to pass an order against the Vice-Chancellor the principle of audi alteram partem and natural justice was fulfilled in its true sense or not. It is to be remembered, at first, that an enquiry by a Chancellor against a Vice-Chancellor for his removal in a situation allegedly detrimental to the interest of University cannot be equated with an ordinary situation between master and servant. In a case of ordinary master-servant relationship, normally one is to be seen as “have” when other is “have nots”. They are not in equal bargaining position. Therefore, rigidity of any technicality in the present case seems to be hypertechnical but not substantive. Had it been the case that on the basis of the order of the learned Single Judge the Chancellor has proceeded with a general enquiry to form an opinion and thereafter directed to conduct the regular enquiry, no different situation could have arrived irrespective of result. Had it been the case that on the basis of the order of the learned Single Judge the Chancellor has proceeded with a general enquiry to form an opinion and thereafter directed to conduct the regular enquiry, no different situation could have arrived irrespective of result. Therefore, action on the part of the Chancellor cannot be seemed to be biased at all. The interest of the Chancellor is related to an institutional safeguard when the Vice-Chancellor cannot avoid its responsibility even being a part of such decision, which is collective in nature on both the account of charges, either for operating distance education centers or for collection of fees through a private body for alleged sum of Rs. 4,41,48,937/-. Therefore, let us consider the decision making process of the Chancellor in forming opinion hereunder : (a) The Chancellor himself clarified the preliminary issue about applicability of Section 12 (12) of the Act at first by taking a view that the Chancellor cannot be debarred from taking any action against the Vice-Chancellor. (b) Thereafter the Vice-Chancellor had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Chancellor on merit. (c) The Chancellor by its letter dated 18th August, 2005 forwarded the enquiry report describing the charges revealed against the Vice-Chancellor and enough opportunity was given to the Vice-Chancellor for making his submission. (d) The Chancellor had relied upon all the records, report of the enquiry conducted by the enquiry officer as per the order of the Chancellor and the reply given by the Vice-Chancellor, and after going through the deliberations regarding the charge of irregularity drawn an inference. (e) The Chancellor held that : (i) Vice-Chancellor has not submitted any satisfactory reply in respect of establishment of nearly 700 study centers in an irregular manner; (ii) Vice-Chancellor himself has stated in his reply that establishment of these education centers outside the purview of the University was totally irregular and illegal and having in the knowledge of the Vice-Chancellor, he is at fault; (iii) ground of taking decision by the Executive and Academic Councils cannot disassociate or escape the Vice-Chancellor from his legal responsibility in creating havoc situation about the future of the students; and (iv) explanation of the Vice-Chancellor about similarity of the correspondence course to be conducted by the University itself and running the distance education centers by the University through middleman was not accepted. (f) Regarding financial irregularity the Chancellor held as follows : (i) Appointment of private agent NIMACT for collection of fees was surfaced; (ii) earning of the University for a sum of Rs. 4,41,48,937/- by means of distance education programme and handing over a sum of Rs. 33,44,087.50 to NIMACT and a further sum of Rs. 1,24,12,855.65 for other purpose, was held irregular; (iii) irregular payment of crores of rupees by the University to the external agency and not having any financial discipline of the University, neither can be said that the Vice-Chancellor discharged his basic legal duties nor his guilt and/or involvement can be said to be manifested and/or can make himself disassociate; (iv) the enquiry officer clarified even after the direction dated 16th April, 2005 regarding imposition of ban by the Chancellor on conducting any programme of distance education out of the money received in the same, but about Rs. 42 lacs have been withdrawn and paid to NIMACT resource development center; and (v) he was held as absolute guilty for the charge. Vice-Chancellor was not solely held responsible under the order impugned but also others. However, the Chancellor ultimately came to the conclusion that the Vice-Chancellor had grossly misused the power of the University and made it as business center, therefore, continuance of the Vice-Chancellor on the post is against the interest of the University. 24. Hence, we find that not only the Chancellor considered the preliminary point about his power under Section 12 (12) of the Act but also followed the principles of natural justice and audi alteram partem in toto and ultimately came to a conclusion on the basis of the enquiry report, reply to the charges and due deliberation on merit. Thus, under no circumstances the action on the part of the Chancellor can be held to be illegal as alleged or at all. Thereafter the Vice-Chancellor was removed on the basis of such order, thereby the order was acted upon. The Vice-Chancellor was not able to obtain any interim order in his favour from the writ Court. The Vice-Chancellor has been replaced, therefore, he cannot go back to his original position nor the writ petitioner is inclined to do so. Therefore, the writ petition appears to be infructuous in nature. The action resulted hereunder cannot be reverted back. There is no scope of status quo ante. In totality, the writ petition cannot be allowed. The Vice-Chancellor has been replaced, therefore, he cannot go back to his original position nor the writ petitioner is inclined to do so. Therefore, the writ petition appears to be infructuous in nature. The action resulted hereunder cannot be reverted back. There is no scope of status quo ante. In totality, the writ petition cannot be allowed. 25. Thus, the writ petition is dismissed, however, without imposing any cost. 26. In any event, it is open for the writ petitioner to approach the Chancellor for removing and/or expunging stigmatic remarks made against him under the order impugned. Hon’ble Shishir Kumar, J.—I agree. ————