JUDGMENT D.G.R. Patnaik, J. 1. This writ application has been filed on behalf of the S.E. Railway through Senior Divisional Operation Manager, Chakradharpur for quashing the order dated 31.5.2006 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal in O.A. No. 24 of 2004 (Annexure-13). 2. Respondent/applicant P.S. Sen-gupta was employed as Dy. CHC under the S.E. Railway with Headquarter at Chakradharpur. On 26.4.1998, after obtaining a special duty pass from his superior in office, he proceeded to Rourekela. At Rourekela, he was arrested by the police on some charges. Consequently, he could not attend his duty thereafter. On the charge firstly, that he absented himself from duty on 26.4.1998 unauthorizedly without giving any information and thereby violated certain specific provisions of conduct rules and secondly, that he left the Headquarters on 26.4.1998 without taking permission from the concerned authorities and thirdly, that he failed to do his assigned duty on 26.4.1998, a departmental inquiry was conducted against him. The first inquiring officer exonerated him from the charges. Not being satisfied, the disciplinary authority appointed another inquiry officer who on conducting the inquiry, held the respondent guilty of all the three charges. Pursuant to the finding of guilt, the disciplinary authority vide its order dated 18/12.11.2002 imposed punishment that the respondent be reverted from his present pay of Rs. 6500-10500/- to his initial pay scale of Rs. 2550-3200/- for a period of three years with cumulative effect. Against the order of disciplinary authority, the respondent filed an appeal before the appellate authority. The appellate authority reconsidered the matter and vide its order dated 16.12.2003, affirmed the finding of guilt arrived at by the inquiring officer in respect of the second and third charge and upheld the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority. The appellate authority further directed that absence of the respondent/applicant on and from 20.11.2002 till date of receipt of the letter be treated as dies non. Against the aforesaid order dated 16.12.2003 of the appellate authority, the respondent preferred O.A. No. 24 of 2004 before the Central Administrative Tribunal. The Tribunal vide its order (impugned) dated 31.5.2006, quashed and set aside the penalty imposed by the disciplinary authority as also the order of the appellate authority as passed against the respondent/applicant, while granting consequential benefits to the respondent/applicant. The Tribunal directed the disciplinary authority to pass appropriate order on the issue of dies non after issuing show-cause to the respondent. The Tribunal directed the disciplinary authority to pass appropriate order on the issue of dies non after issuing show-cause to the respondent. While considering the propriety of the order passed by the appellate authority in the light of the finding of the disciplinary authority, the Tribunal had found that the findings of the disciplinary authority was totally perverse and beyond the scope of the charges and was not based on the evidences relevant to the charges. The observation recorded by the Tribunal is as under: 13. We also notice that the appellate authority has recorded a finding that the applicant had gone to Rourkela for illegal purposes. That illegal purpose has been described as conducting interview for appointment in the railway when the applicant had no authority to do so. We note that this was not the subject-matter of the charge-sheet. We further note that a copy of the charge-sheet submitted in criminal case showing involvement of the applicant is also not referred to in this order. Written statement also does not justify the action of the appellate authority by bringing these documents on records. 14. We also note that the Senior DOM's order issued on 24.7.1998, and the applicant is charged with violation of this order on 26.4.1998. This shows non-application of mind. The Tribunal has further observed which reads as under: 16. In view of the above discussion, we are of the view that the findings of the disciplinary authority is not sustained by the evidence on record and the order imposing penalty deserves to be set aside on this count. We also note that the appellate authority had also decided that the period from 20.11.2002 till the date of receipt of the order of the appellate authority will be period as dies non. Neither the order nor the written statement shows as to whether any notice has been served on the applicant before passing this order. It is settled principle of law that notice has to be served before declaring a particular period as dies non. Hence this part of the order of the appellate authority is also bad in law. 3. Neither the order nor the written statement shows as to whether any notice has been served on the applicant before passing this order. It is settled principle of law that notice has to be served before declaring a particular period as dies non. Hence this part of the order of the appellate authority is also bad in law. 3. The petitioner has assailed the impugned order of the Tribunal primarily on the ground that the Tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction by entering into appreciation of evidence recorded at the disciplinary proceeding all over again, although the finding of the inquiring officer were confirmed by the appellate authority. Taking support from the judgment of the Supreme Court in B.C. Chaturvedi's case reported in 1995 (6) SCC 750, Shri Mahesh Tiwary, learned Counsel representing the petitioner, submits that the Tribunal could not have looked into the evidence, nor could it have found fault with the finding recorded by the inquiring officer which was confirmed by the appellate authority on the facts and evidences on record. Referring to the opening sentence of the impugned order, learned Counsel adds further that the Tribunal has wrongly conceived that the OA No. 25 of 2003 filed before it was in respect of the order passed by the disciplinary authority dated 8.11.2002 and has therefore apparently not recorded any finding in respect of the order dated 16.12.2003 passed by the appellate authority. , 4. Mrs. M.M. Pal, learned Counsel representing the respondent/Railway servant, controverts the grounds advanced by the petitioner as being totally misconceived. Placing reliance on the very same judgment of the Supreme Court in B.C. Chaturvedi's case (supra), learned Counsel explains that the Tribunal's jurisdiction is wide enough and it can look into the evidences on record where prima facie it appears that the finding of the inquiring officer are perverse and not in consonance with the evidence on record. Learned Counsel explains further that in OA No. 24 of 2004, the respondent/applicant had challenged the order dated 16.12.2003 as passed by the appellate authority with the specific prayer that the impugned order dated 16.12.2003 of the appellate authority upholding the order of punishment dated 8/12.11.2002 imposed by the disciplinary authority, be quashed and set aside. The Tribunal vide its impugned order dated 31.5.2006 considered all relevant aspects including the order dated 16.12.2003 passed by the appellate authority and had recorded its finding accordingly. 5. The Tribunal vide its impugned order dated 31.5.2006 considered all relevant aspects including the order dated 16.12.2003 passed by the appellate authority and had recorded its finding accordingly. 5. The short question which is called for adjudication is, whether the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction by reappraising the evidence and setting aside the findings of the inquiring officer as also that of the appellate authority on facts of the case? 6. It is now well-settled that the Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to re-appreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. In the case of B.C. Chaturvedi (supra), the Supreme Court has explained that "the power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the law". 7. Explaining the scope of the powers of the Tribunal in judicial review, the Supreme Court has observed that "when an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has co-extensive power to re-appreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to re-appreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence". 8. However in the same judgment, the Supreme Court has proceeded further to explain that "the Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence". 9. The inference is that though, the disciplinary authority is the sole Judge of the facts and the appellate authority has co-extensive power to re-appreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment, but the findings must be based on some evidence which is relevant and bearing a nexus with the charge relating to the purported misconduct by the public servant. 9. The inference is that though, the disciplinary authority is the sole Judge of the facts and the appellate authority has co-extensive power to re-appreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment, but the findings must be based on some evidence which is relevant and bearing a nexus with the charge relating to the purported misconduct by the public servant. Where the evidence relied upon by the disciplinary authority is neither relevant, nor establishing nexus between the employee and the charged officer, it will be deemed that there is no evidence in law. 10. As noted above, in the instant case, the Tribunal has found that although, the applicant was exonerated from the first charge namely, the charge relating to absenting from his duty without prior permission on 26.4.1998, the disciplinary authority as also the appellate authority have relied upon the evidence which were neither relevant nor bearing any nexus with the other two charges pertaining to the alleged misconduct of the charged officer, and has found that the findings arrived at by the Disciplinary Authority and the appellate authority were totally perverse and not based upon any relevant evidence. The Tribunal did certainly have jurisdiction to assess the propriety of the finding arrived at both by disciplinary authority as also by the appellate authority and for such purposes, to look into the evidences on record. 11. We do not find any infirmity in the Impugned order of the Tribunal. There being no merit in this application, it is accordingly dismissed. M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J. 12. I agree. Application dismissed.