1. Madhu Sharma had died an unnatural death on October 10, 1996 within seven/eight months of her marriage with respondent Bal Krishan. Suspecting foul play, her father had lodged a complaint in Police Station, Akhnoor. After conducting proceedings under Section 174 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a case under Section 306/498-A RPC came to be registered against the respondents, who were challaned and subsequently tried by learned 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Jammu, whereafter the case was transferred for disposal to learned Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track) Jammu. 2. The prosecution had examined PWs Chajju Ram, Bimla Devi, Sukhdev Raj, Yash Paul, Rajinder Sharma, Dr. Gafoor Ahmed, Dr. R. K. Gupta and S. K, Razdan, as its witnesses whereas the respondents had examined DWs Bhim Sen, Yash Paul, Ganesh Dass, Thakar Dass and Balak Ram as their defence witnesses. 3. The trial Court came to the conclusion that the prosecution had failed to prove that the respondents had treated the deceased with cruelty and in that view of the matter presumption under Section 114-C (wrongly mentioned as 113-A in the judgment) of the Evidence Act, was not attracted in the case. It accordingly acquitted the respondents. 4. Learned counsel for the State Mr. Salathia submitted that the trial Court had erred in holding that the provisions of Section 114-C of the Evidence Act were not attracted in the case because once the commission of suicide was established, a presumption would arise that the same had been abetted by the husband or any other relative of the husband. 5. I have considered the submission of learned State counsel and do not find any substance in it because perusal of Section 114-C of the Evidence Act indicates that the presumption under the Section would arise against the husband or any of his relatives only if it had been proved that the husband had subjected his wife to cruelty as defined in Section 498-A of the State Ranbir Penal Code Samvat, 1989. 6. 6. Perusal of the definition of `cruelty as it so appears in Section 498-A of the State Ranbir Penal Code, demonstrates that mere harassment of a woman may not amount to cruelty in terms of Section 498-A of RPC unless such harassment; was with a view to coercing her or any other person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or was on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demands. 7. No such case as contemplated by the definition of Section 498-A of RPC has been proved by the prosecution in this case. 8. None of the prosecution witnesses had spoken about respondents having ever treated the deceased with cruelty. The only evidence which had been led by the prosecution was regarding respondents demand of Rupees 40/50 thousand and that too just a few days before her death. Barring a mild mention in the statements of the prosecution witnesses that the deceased would complain of some taunts by her in-laws, there is absolutely no evidence on records on the basis whereof it may be said that the respondents had maltreated or harassed the deceased because of her parents not meeting the demand of Rupees 40/50 thousand alleged to have been made by her in-laws. 9. A judgment of acquittal is not required to be interfered with if two views are possible. Presumption of innocence of an accused becomes stronger with his acquittal by the court of first instance. Strong and overwhelming evidence is thus required before a judgment of acquittal may be interfered with. 10. Appellate Court is thus required to interfere with the order of acquittal only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so and the judgment of acquittal was found to be unreasonable and not based on relevant and convincing material. 11. The view taken by learned Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track) Jammu in acquitting the respondents, is certainly a view which could be taken in the case in view of the nature of the evidence which the prosecution had led in the case. 12. The view taken by learned trial Court that presumption under Section 114-C of the Evidence Act was not attracted in the case does not suffer from any error of law. 13. 12. The view taken by learned trial Court that presumption under Section 114-C of the Evidence Act was not attracted in the case does not suffer from any error of law. 13. For all what has been said above, I do not find any merit in learned State counsels submission that the trial Court had erred in drawing presumption and acquitting the respondents. Judgment of acquittal passed by the trial Court, therefore, does not need any interference. The acquittal appeal, therefore, lacks merit. It is, accordingly, dismissed.