JUDGMENT:- (1). The petitioner, who was an employee of Nabadwip Municipality, had approached this Court by filing a writ petition (being W.P. No. 19440 (W) of 2004) with a prayer for release of his retiral dues and other benefits. He had retired from his service on 31st January, 1999. Before approaching this Court, he had written a letter to the Chairman of the Municipality on 13th September 2004, summarizing his entitlement under the following heads :- (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) Arrear Pension : Gratuity : Provident Fund : House Rent : Arrear Salary : Rs. 2,80,350/-Rs. 1,20,780/-Rs. 1,22,125/-Rs. 0,15,225/-Rs. 1,15,230/- (2). The pension payment order ("PPO" in short) was issued by the Directorate of Pension, Provident Fund and Group Insurance of the Government of West Bengal in respect of the petitioner on 28th May, 2004. The PPO reflected that the petitioner had become entitled to pension with effect from 1st February, 1999. His claim for gratuity was also corroborated in the PPO. It appears that the petitioner has been receiving pension from the year 2004 and has received roughly half the sum stipulated in the PPO as Gratuity. The petitioners prayer in the Writ Petition were:- "a) issue a writ/order/direction in the nature of Mandamus Commanding the respondents concerned and each one of them, specially, the respondent Nos. 1 to 5 herein, to forthwith release and make payment of all the arrears of retiral and other benefits due to your petitioner as prayed for in terms of Annexure P-5 herein less the amount already received in terms of Annexure p-6 herein towards retiring gratuity, to which the petitioner is admittedly entitled in accordance with law together with the statutory rate of interest accrued thereon till the date of such actual payment is made ; b) issues a writ/order/direction in the nature of Mandamus Commanding the respondents concerned and each one of them specially the respondent Nos. 1 to 5 herein, to act and proceed strictly in accordance with law in the matter of payment of admitted amount of arrears of retiral and other benefits of the petitioner as prayed for in terms of Annexure P-5 herein ; c) issue a writ/order/direction in the nature of Certiorari Commanding the respondents concerned and each one of them to forthwith transmit or cause to be transmitted the entire records in original in connection with the case of your petitioner before this Honble Court and on such production being made to render conscionable justice by directing the said concerned respondents and each one of them specially the respondent Nos. 1 to 5 herein to forthwith release and make payment of all his arrear dues viz, arrear Pension (about 63 months), arrear Gratuity, arrear Provident Fund, arrear house rent allowances and arrear salary due to the petitioner due to revision of pay scales, as prayed for in terms of Annexure -5 herein, less the amount already paid in terms of Annexure P-6 herein to which the petitioner is admittedly entitled in accordance with law together with the statutory rate of interest accrued thereon till date of such actual payment is made ;d) issue Rule NISI in terms of prayers (a) to (c) above ; e) made the Rule absolute should the respondents fail to make sufficient answer or return. f) issue an interim order directing the respondents concerned and each one of them, specially the respondent Nos. 1 to 5 herein, their men, agents, subordinates and employees to forthwith make an ad-hoc payment of a reasonable amount to your petitioner towards his postal retiral benefits as stated in Annexure P-5 herein, to be adjusted against final payment of such arrears of post retiral benefits, to which your petitioner is admittedly entitled in accordance with law, pending disposal of this application ; g) issue and ad-interim order in terms of prayer (f) above ; h) award cost and costs incidental to this application; i) pass such other order or further order or orders and/or directions as to Your Lordships may deem fit and proper; And your petitioner, as in duty bound, shall ever pray." (3). Annexure "P5" to the Writ petition specified in prayer (a) of the writ petition is the letter to which I have referred to in the earlier part of this judgment. Annexure "P5" to the Writ petition specified in prayer (a) of the writ petition is the letter to which I have referred to in the earlier part of this judgment. Annexure "P6" comprises of a communication of the Chairman of the Municipality informing the writ petitioner that a bill for Rs. 60,390/-(rupees sixty thousand and three ninety only) was ready for payment on account of 50% retiring gratuity. The petitioner was advised to take payment of this sum within seven days from the date of receipt of that letter. (4). The writ petition was allowed by this Court on 22nd July, 2008 by directing the Municipal Authorities to pay to the petitioner the entire sum of money reflected in the PPO, deducting therefrom the sum of money already having been disbursed in his favour. Such payment was directed to be made within a period of eight weeks from the date of communication of the order. (5). The present application is in the nature of a petition for review of the judgment of this Court. The petitioner prays in this petition for a direction for release of certain further sum of money to which he is entitled to, and for which appropriate prayer was made in the writ petition, but the same was not addressed to in the judgment of this Court. The specific prayer of the petitioner is for direction upon the Municipal Authorities for payment of arrear salary and provident fund as well as interest on delayed release of his dues under various heads. The case of the petitioner is that in course of his service his salary ought to have been revised on account of various directives of the State Government but during his tenure such salary had not been enhanced. His further case is that he is entitled to interest on delayed payment of his legitimate dues. (6). Mr. Bidyut Kiran Mukhopadhyay, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner submitted that specific prayer was made for reliefs under these two heads in the writ petition and argument was also advanced for such reliefs but the claim of the petitioner was not reflected in the judgment delivered by this Court. (7). Mr. Majumdar, the learned Advocate appearing for the Municipal Authorities, however, raised the question of maintainability of this petition. (7). Mr. Majumdar, the learned Advocate appearing for the Municipal Authorities, however, raised the question of maintainability of this petition. His submission is that the judgment delivered by this Court in the writ petition has already been appealed against, and in the event the petitioner was aggrieved by the order in any way, he was entitled to file a cross appeal or prefer an independent appeal for his grievances which are being articulated in this petition. His case is that there is no scope for reviewing the judgment already delivered by this Court. His further submission is that the petitioner would not be entitled to interest as no claim for such interest was made by issuing notice making demand for the same and the service rule also does not stipulate payment of interest. He has also contested the claim of the petitioner to receive arrear salary or Provident Fund. (8). It is not in dispute that prayer was made for reliefs under these two heads and submission was also advanced to establish the petitioners entitlement for such dues. In the judgment delivered by this Court, however, such submissions were not recorded and no order was passed as regards petitioners claim under these two heads. The course of action which a litigant ought to take in a situation like this has been prescribed by this Court almost a century back, in the case of Sarat Chandra v. Bibhabati Debi (AIR 1921 Cal 584) :- "It is plain that in cases of this character where a litigant feels aggrieved by the statement in a judgment that an admission has been made, the most convenient and satisfactory course to follow, wherever practicable, is to apply to the Judge without delay and ask for rectification or review of the judgment". (9). In the event grievance of a litigant is that his submission has not been recorded or considered by the Court, then also in my opinion the same course is to be adopted. This Court makes no claim of infallibility, and would not hesitate to correct its own omissions or errors when the same is brought to the notice of this Court. (10). Before considering the petitioners substantive claims, I propose to deal first with the question of maintainability of the present petition. Admittedly the respondent Municipality has preferred an appeal against the judgment passed by this Court. (10). Before considering the petitioners substantive claims, I propose to deal first with the question of maintainability of the present petition. Admittedly the respondent Municipality has preferred an appeal against the judgment passed by this Court. In the event the petitioner prefers a cross appeal or directly prefers an appeal from the judgment passed by this Court, the petitioner would have been entitled to the reliefs which he is seeking in the present application. But in my opinion, since the main grievance of the petitioner is that certain points argued before me was not considered, in my opinion, it is well within the right of the petitioner to maintain the present petition for correcting the omission in the judgment delivered by this Court. In fact this would be the proper course for the petitioner. (11). In the case of ShankarK. Mandal v. State of Bihar and Ors. reported in (2003)9 SCC 519 , the Honble Supreme Court was considering an appeal in which the appellant had made out a case that in two stages in the High Court, before the Honble Single Judge and the Appellate Bench, certain submissions of the appellant was wrongly recorded. It was held by the Honble Supreme Court :-"10. It is not open for the appellants to take such stand before this Court, as they are bound by the observations of the High Court. If there was any wrong recording of the stands, the course to be adopted is well known. 11. If really there was no concession, or a different stand was taken, the only course open to the appellant was to move the High Court in line with what has been said in State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak. In a recent decision Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd., the view in the said case was reiterated by observing that statements of fact as to what transpired at the hearing, recorded in the judgment of the Court, are conclusive of the facts so stated and no one can contradict such statements by affidavit or other evidence. If a party thinks that the happenings in Court have been wrongly recorded in a judgment, it is incumbent upon the party, while the matter is still fresh in the minds of the Judges, to call the attention of the very Judges who have made the record. If a party thinks that the happenings in Court have been wrongly recorded in a judgment, it is incumbent upon the party, while the matter is still fresh in the minds of the Judges, to call the attention of the very Judges who have made the record. That is the only way to have the record corrected. If no such step is taken, the matter must necessarily end there. It is not open to the appellant to contend before this Court to the contrary. (12). Thus, if a party to a litigation makes out a grievance that proceedings in a Court has been wrongly recorded in a judgment, the only way to correct the record is to approach the Court which passed the order. In the factual context of the present case also in my opinion such a course is required to be followed. In the present case, the main grievance of the petitioner is that certain submissions made by his Counsel has not been recorded or considered in the judgment. In the event the petitioner was to prefer an appeal, the ratio of the decision of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of S. K. Mandal (supra) would have become applicable, and in such a situation, the petitioner would have had to urge this issue before this Court only. Moreover, I have been informed by the learned Advocates appearing for both the parties that though the petitioner has preferred an appeal and an application for stay of operation of the judgment has been filed, the tatter has not yet been moved and no hearing of the appeal proceeding has as yet taken place. Thus, if I entertain the present petition at this stage, there would be no disruption of the appeal proceeding at this stage, and if any order is passed modifying my earlier judgment, the appellant could always amend the Grounds of Appeal if they are so advised. (13). On the question of jurisdiction, in my opinion this Court has the jurisdiction to address the issue raised by the petitioner in exercise of inherent power this Court is vested with. The subsistence of such inherent power of the Writ Court has been recognised by a Constitution Bench of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Shib Deo Singh and Anr. v. State of Punjab and Ors. reported in 1963 SC 1909. The subsistence of such inherent power of the Writ Court has been recognised by a Constitution Bench of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Shib Deo Singh and Anr. v. State of Punjab and Ors. reported in 1963 SC 1909. In this decision, the Honble Supreme Court held:-"It is sufficient to say that there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude the High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every Court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or the correct grave and palpable errors committed by it..............." (14). The power or jurisdiction to exercise which I have been invited to, and which I am inclined to exercise is akin to the power of the civil Court under Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure but the Writ Court would not be strictly circumscribed by the parameter prescribed in the said provision of the Code while exercising the jurisdiction to review, though board principles laid down therein ought to be followed. In any event, considering submissions made on behalf of the petitioner in my opinion the grounds on which the present petition is anchored would constitute "other sufficient reason", on the basis of which jurisdiction to review an order or judgment could be exercised. (15). In the given facts, I am satisfied that the present petition is maintainable and the petitioner has made out a case for examination of his claims for arrear salary and provident fund and interest on delayed payment. (16). Now I shall address the question of validity of the claim of the petitioner and test as to whether he would be entitled to:-(a) payment on account of arrear salary and provident fund, (b) interest for delay in payment in respect of the reliefs he asked for in the writ petition. The learned Advocate for the respondents had argued that since the petitioner had not given any notice of interest as such he would not be entitled to such relief. Resisting the petitioners claim for arrear salary and provident fund, he has advanced the same arguments he advanced in course of hearing of the writ petition. The learned Advocate for the respondents had argued that since the petitioner had not given any notice of interest as such he would not be entitled to such relief. Resisting the petitioners claim for arrear salary and provident fund, he has advanced the same arguments he advanced in course of hearing of the writ petition. His submission was that the State Government could not mandate the salary structure of the Municipality, and unless the State Government compensated the burden placed on the Municipality, it was not possible for the Municipality to pay such salary and grant other benefits from its own resources. I have rejected this argument in my judgment delivered on 22nd July, 2008, and do not think there is any question of reopening this issue in the present proceeding. (17). On the question of interest, petitioners claim is based on delayed payment of interest. The Constitutional Writ Court is not fettered by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure or the Interest Act while adjudicating the claim for interest in respect of dues arising out of employer and employee relationship. Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court has wide power to grant reliefs in the event legal rights of a citizen are breached. Such power, in my opinion, includes power to grant interest when a finding is made that the petitioner was deprived of his legitimate dues for a long period of time by an authority which comes within the definition of "State" under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. (18). Interest is essentially earning capacity of money. In the event someone is deprived of certain amount of money due to him on the Count of rendering service to the Municipality for a long period of time, he remains deprived of the benefit of the sum of money during this period. The Municipality during this period gets to enjoy the earning power of such sum of money, to which they are not entitled to. The claim of the petitioner for interest in reality is for compensation for being deprived of his right to enjoy his legitimate dues. In this case, I found no valid reason for non-payment of his legitimate dues. The Municipality during this period gets to enjoy the earning power of such sum of money, to which they are not entitled to. The claim of the petitioner for interest in reality is for compensation for being deprived of his right to enjoy his legitimate dues. In this case, I found no valid reason for non-payment of his legitimate dues. On equitable grounds, in my opinion the petitioner would be entitled to interest at the rate of 9% per annum to be computed from lapse of three months from the date of his retirement on all outstanding dues, to be computed till the date such sum is received by the petitioner. (19). As regards his claim for arrear provident fund and salary, I have not found sufficient material on the basis of which the actual dues can be established or determined. The normal course for the petitioner in a similar situation would have been to file a suit. But having regard to the fact that the petitioner has been fighting this litigation for more than four years, in the interest of justice I decline to relegate him to a 6uit which again would have engaged both the petitioner and the Municipality in a protracted litigation. Accordingly, I direct the Municipal Authorities themselves to examine the petitioners claim for arrear salary and provident fund after taking into consideration the petitioners entitlement, in terms of the judgment delivered in the main writ petition. In fact, Mr. Mukhopadhyay himself has submitted that this course of action may be adopted and I find such submission fair and reasonable. (20). Under these circumstances, the judgment delivered by this Court in W.P. No. 19440(W) of 2004 on 22nd July, 2008 is modified and I direct the Municipality to pay to the petitioner, in addition to what has been directed to be paid in my judgment delivered on 22nd July, 2008 interest at the rate of 9% per annum upon calculating the dues, for the period between the date upon lapse of three months from the date of his retirement uptil the date the actual sum is disbursed to the petitioner. The Municipality is also directed to examine the claim of the petitioner for arrear salary and provident fund, within a period of eight weeks from the date of communication of the order upon giving the petitioner an opportunity of being heard. The Municipality is also directed to examine the claim of the petitioner for arrear salary and provident fund, within a period of eight weeks from the date of communication of the order upon giving the petitioner an opportunity of being heard. The Chairman of the Municipality shall depute a senior and responsible officer of the Municipality for this exercise. The instant application stands allowed in the above term. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.