JUDGMENT : This is an application preferred by the Special Tahsildar, Adi Dravidar Welfare Department, Cheranmahadevi praying for an order to condone the delay of 1,539 days in filing the second appeal challenging the judgment and decree dated 24.03.2003 in C.M.A.No.1 of 2001 on the file of Subordinate Judge, Ambasamudram. 2. In the affidavit filed in support of the application, it is the case of the petitioner that the Government of Tamil Nadu, invoking the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Land Acquisition Scheme for the Harijan Welfare (Tamil Nadu Act 31 of 1978), acquired the property of the respondents having an extent of 25. 5 hectares in S.Nos.2 and 3 situated in Therku Kadayam Village, Ambasamudram Taluk, Tirunelveli District as per proceedings published in Government Gazette No.61 dated 112. 1997. After necessary enquiry, the Land Acquisition Officer granted compensation at the rate of Rs.25,260/- per acre and the said Award was challenged by the respondents before the Subordinate Judge, Ambasamudram in C.M.A.No.1 of 2001, wherein they claimed a sum of Rs.40,000/- per cent by way of compensation for the acquired property. The Sub Court, Ambasamudram enhanced the Award by granting a sum of Rs.1,74,977/- per acre as per order dated 24.03.2003 in C.M.A.No.1 of 2001. Challenging the said order dated 24.03.2003, the petitioner has preferred the second appeal on various grounds. 3. It is the further case of the petitioner in the affidavit filed in support of the application that there is a delay of 1,539 days in filing the second appeal and the same has happened on account of Tsunami, assembly election, panchayat election and also on account of frequent transfer of Tahsildar and concerned staff in the office of the petitioner. It is further stated that the judgment was delivered on 24.03.2003, but the copy application was made only on 04.06.2007 and ultimately, the certified copy of the order and decreetal order were delivered on 13.06.2007 and immediately, the petitioner has taken steps to file the appeal and in that process, the delay has occasioned and as such, the delay is neither willful nor wanton, but on account of the reasons beyond the control of the petitioner. Accordingly, the petitioner has prayed for condoning the delay. 4. This Court, as per order dated 012. Accordingly, the petitioner has prayed for condoning the delay. 4. This Court, as per order dated 012. 2007, issued notice to the respondents and accordingly, the respondents have entered appearance and on behalf of all the respondents, the first respondent has filed counter opposing the prayer. 5. In the counter affidavit of the first respondent, it is stated that there is no explanation for the delay so as to get the delay condoned. It is further stated in the counter that the respondents have filed an application in E.P.No.27 of 2006 before the trial Court for execution of the order and after enquiry, the Court was pleased to pass an order of attachment of the movable properties of the petitioner and it was only after the said attachment, the petitioner has rushed to this Court for the purpose of filing appeal. After filing the appeal, the petitioner represented before the Executing Court that they would make payment and accordingly, the execution petition was not prosecuted further. However, the fact remains that the petitioner has not deposited the Award amount till date. 6. When the matter came up for hearing on 14.03.2008, the counsel for the respondents submitted that there is no bona fides in the application preferred by the petitioner and their intention is only to drag on the proceeding without making payment to the land owners whose lands were acquired way back in the year 1997. Therefore, to show the bona fides on the part of the petitioner, this Court directed the petitioner to deposit the entire Award amount with interest and cost upto date within a period of two weeks and adjourned the matter to be posted on 27.03.2008. However, the petitioner failed to comply with the order of this Court, inasmuch as the amount has not been deposited till to-day and the said fact is confirmed by the learned Government Advocate appearing for the petitioner. 7. I have heard Thiru. M.Rajarajan, learned Government Advocate appearing for the petitioner and Mr.C. Suresh Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the respondents. 8. The only point which arises for consideration is as to whether the petitioner has made out a case for condoning the delay of 1,539 days in preferring the second appeal. 9. 7. I have heard Thiru. M.Rajarajan, learned Government Advocate appearing for the petitioner and Mr.C. Suresh Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the respondents. 8. The only point which arises for consideration is as to whether the petitioner has made out a case for condoning the delay of 1,539 days in preferring the second appeal. 9. It is seen from the affidavit filed in support of the application that the judgment was pronounced on 24.03.2003, but the copy application was made only on 04.06.2007 after a period of 4 years and 3 months and there is no explanation with regard to such abnormal delay in filing the application for certified copy of the order of the Reference Court. The only ground pleaded for the purpose of con-donation is Tsunami, assembly election, panchayat election and the frequent transfer of Tashildar and concerned staff in the office of the petitioner. The reasons as found mentioned in the affidavit are not sufficient to condone the delay. But in the matter of litigation to which the Government is a party, merely because each days delay has not been explained, it cannot be taken as a reason to reject the prayer for condonation. In case the application is rejected in limine, without testing the order impugned in the second appeal, the ultimate sufferer is the public interest and as such, no hard and fast rule could be adopted in matters, wherein one of the parties to the lis is the Government. 10. The Honourable Supreme Court in G. Ramegowda v. Spl.Land Acquisition Officer reported in 1988(2) SCC 142 = 1989-1-L.W. 580 considered the necessity to show certain amount of latitude in cases where the Government approaches the Court with considerable delay and held thus: "15. In litigation to which Government is a party there is yet another aspect which, perhaps, cannot be ignored. If appeals brought by Government are lost for such defaults, no per-son is individually affected; but what, in the ultimate analysis, suffers is public interest. The decisions of Government are collective and institutional decisions and do not share the characteristics of decisions of private individuals. 16. The law of limitation is, no doubt, the same for a private citizen as for Governmental authorities. Government, like any other litigant must take responsibility for the acts or omissions of its officers. The decisions of Government are collective and institutional decisions and do not share the characteristics of decisions of private individuals. 16. The law of limitation is, no doubt, the same for a private citizen as for Governmental authorities. Government, like any other litigant must take responsibility for the acts or omissions of its officers. But a somewhat different complexion is imparted to the matter where Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross-purposes with it. 17. Therefore, in assessing what, in a particular case, constitutes `sufficient cause for purposes of Section 5, it might, perhaps, be somewhat unrealistic to exclude from the considerations that go into the judicial verdict, these factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Government. Governmental decisions are proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by a considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process of their making. A certain amount of latitude is, therefore, not impermissible. It is rightly said that those who bear responsibility of Government must have `a little play at the joints. Due recognition of these limitations on Governmental functioning - of course, within reasonable limits - is necessary if the judicial approach is not to be rendered unrealistic. It would perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to put Government and private parties on the same footing in all respects in such matters. Implicit in the very nature of Governmental functioning is procedural delay incidental to the decision making process. In the opinion of the High Court, the conduct of the law officers of the Government placed the Government in a predicament and that it was one of those cases where the mala fides of the officers should not be imputed to Government. It relied upon and trusted its law officers. Lindley, M.R., in the In re National Bank of Wales Ltd. observed, though in a different context: Business cannot be carried on upon principles of distrust. Men in responsible positions must be trusted by those above them, as well as by those below them, until there is reason to distrust them. In the opinion of the High Court, it took quite some time for the Government to realise that the law officers failed that trust. 18. Men in responsible positions must be trusted by those above them, as well as by those below them, until there is reason to distrust them. In the opinion of the High Court, it took quite some time for the Government to realise that the law officers failed that trust. 18. While a private person can take instant decision a "bureaucratic or democratic organ" it is said by a learned Judge "hesitates and de-bates, consults and considers, speaks through paper, moves horizontally and vertically till at last it gravitates towards a conclusion, - unmindful of time and impersonally". Now at the end, should we interfere with the discretion exercised by the High Court? Shri Datar criticised that the delay on the part of the Government even after January 20, 1971 for over a year cannot be said to be either bona fide or compelled by reasons beyond its control. This criticism is not without substance. Government could and ought to have moved with greater diligence and dispatch consistent with the urgency of the situation. The conduct of Government was perilously close to such inaction as might, perhaps, have justified rejection of its prayer for condonation. But as is implicit in the reasoning of the High Court, the unarticulated thought, perhaps was that in the interest of keeping the stream of justice pure and clean the awards under appeal should not be permitted to assume finality without an examination of their merits." 11. The Apex Court considered the question of delay on the part of the Government and the lethargic attitude of its officers in Spl. Tehsildar, L.A.Kerala v. K.V.Ayisumma reported in AIR 1996 SC 2750 and held thus: "2. It is now settled law that when the delay was occasioned at the behest of the Government, it would be very difficult to explain the day to day delay. The transaction of the business of the Government being done leisurely by officers who had no or evince no personal interest at different levels. No one takes personal responsibility in processing the matters expeditiously. As a fact at several stages, they take their own time to reach a decision. Even in spite of pointing at the delay, they do not take expeditious action for ultimate decision in filing the appeal. This case is one of such instances. No one takes personal responsibility in processing the matters expeditiously. As a fact at several stages, they take their own time to reach a decision. Even in spite of pointing at the delay, they do not take expeditious action for ultimate decision in filing the appeal. This case is one of such instances. It is true that Section 5 of the Limitation Act envisages explanation of the delay to the satisfaction of the Court and in matters of Limitation Act made no distinction between the State and the citizen. Nonetheless adoption of strict standard of proof leads to grave miscarriage of public justice. It would result in public mischief by skilful management of delay in the process of filing the appeal. The approach of the Court would be pragmatic but not pedantic. Under those circumstances, the Subordinate Judge had rightly adopted correct approach and had condoned the delay without insisting upon explaining every days delay in filing the review application in the light of the law laid down by this Court. The High Court was not right in setting aside the order. Delay was rightly condoned". 12. In State of Nagaland v. Lipok AO reported in 2005(3) SCC 752 , the Apex Court again considered the delay on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology and observed thus:- "13. Experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file-pushing, and passing on the buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. The State which represents collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The courts, therefore, have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression of sufficient cause. Merit is preferred to scuttle a decision on merits in turning down the case on technicalities of delay in presenting the appeal. Delay as accordingly condoned, the order was set aside and the matter was remitted to the High Court for disposal of merits after affording opportunity of hearing to the parties. Merit is preferred to scuttle a decision on merits in turning down the case on technicalities of delay in presenting the appeal. Delay as accordingly condoned, the order was set aside and the matter was remitted to the High Court for disposal of merits after affording opportunity of hearing to the parties. In Prabha v. Ram Parkash Kalra this Court had held that the court should not adopt an injustice-oriented approach in rejecting the application for condo-nation of delay. The appeal was allowed, the delay was condoned and the matter was remitted for expeditious disposal in accordance with law." 13. Though the delay has not been explained in so many words in the present application, I am of the view that the enhancement as made by the trial Court from Rs.25,260/- to Rs.1,74,977/- per acre needs to be examined in the second appeal and in case the appeal is rejected by dismissing the application to con-done the delay, the order of the Reference Court would be given finality without examining the same on merits. 14. In N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy reported in 1998(7) SCC 123 = 1999-1-L.W. 739, the Apex Court observed that the opposite party would be the loser, in case of condonation of delay and he should be compensated for his loss and observed thus: "13. It must be remembered that in every case of delay, there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy, the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the de-lay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time, then the court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. While condoning the delay, the court should not forget the opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a loser and he too would have incurred quite large litigation expenses. It would be a salutary guideline that when courts condone the delay due to laches on the part of the applicant, the court shall compensate the opposite party for his loss." 15. It must be borne in mind that he is a loser and he too would have incurred quite large litigation expenses. It would be a salutary guideline that when courts condone the delay due to laches on the part of the applicant, the court shall compensate the opposite party for his loss." 15. Therefore, in the interest of justice and to enable the petitioner to prosecute the appeal, I am inclined to condone the delay of 1,539 days in filing the second appeal subject to the following conditions: (i) The petitioner shall deposit the entire Award amount along with upto date interest and cost before the Sub Court, Ambasamudram on the credit of C.M.A.No.1 of 2001 within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order; and (ii) The petitioner shall also pay a total sum of Rs.10,000/-(Rupees ten thousand only) as cost to the respondents and such amount shall be paid within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. 16. It is made clear that failure to comply with any of the conditions enumerated above would result in dismissing the application automatically without any further reference to this Court. 17. In the result, the application is allowed, is subject to the above conditions.