Judgment S.K. SETH, J. ( 1. ) This is tenants appeal from an eviction decree suffered by him concurrently under Section 12(l)(a) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act for short). ( 2. ) Facts relevant for the disposal of this appeal in short are as under. ( 3. ) A shop in Jaora was let out to appellant on payment of monthly rent of Rs.351. Appellant committed defaults in payment of rent. A demand-cum-notice calling upon him to pay arrears of rent from 1.12.1999 to 30.6.2003 was served, but he failed to pay or tender demanded arrears of rent. Hence, respondent/landlord filed suit seeking eviction of the appellant from suit shop on the ground of non- payment of arrears of rent as also on the ground of bonafide need. Suit was contested by the appellant. On the basis of pleadings, trial court framed issues and allowed parties to adduce evidence. ( 4. ) It may be mentioned here that there was no dispute with regard to the rate of monthly rent being Rs. 351. On discussion of evidence on record, the trial Court, while rejecting the claim for eviction on the ground of bonafide need, found that despite service of demand notice, appellant neither tendered/paid to respondent arrears of rent nor took advantage of first limb of Section 13(1) of the Act. With the result suit was decreed under Section 12(l) (a) of the Act. These findings of the trial Court were upheld by the lower appellate Court in the appeal filed by the appellant. Hence this second appeal which is confined only to eviction decree passed under Section 12(l)(a) of the Act. ( 5. ) Shri Chaphakar, learned senior counsel raised two-fold submissions. His first contention was that in absence of precise pleading regarding non payment of arrears of rent despite service of demand notice, provisions of Section 12(l)(a) would not be attracted to pass or sustain an eviction decree on that ground. His second submission was that Courts below failed to see that in absence of specific issue with regard to ground of eviction covered under Section 12(l)(a), no decree on that ground could be passed against the appellant. ( 6. ) After going the material available on records, we are not impressed by the submissions of Shri Chaphekar. His second submission was that Courts below failed to see that in absence of specific issue with regard to ground of eviction covered under Section 12(l)(a), no decree on that ground could be passed against the appellant. ( 6. ) After going the material available on records, we are not impressed by the submissions of Shri Chaphekar. From a bare reading of the plaint, relief of eviction was sought on two counts, viz., bonafide need and non-payment of arrears of rent. It is clear from plaint averments that appellant failed to pay or tender arrears of rent despite service of demand notice. Thus parties were alive to the controversy and accordingly conducted their case. Present is not a case where appellant was taken by surprise for want of pleading and issues. It is no doubt true that the object of pleading is to bring the parties to a trial by focusing their attention on the matter in dispute. If the parties led evidence fully knowing the case projected by each of them, one party can not make much capital out of loose wordings used in the pleading. In interpreting the pleadings, Court should avoid adopting pedantic approach to defeat the justice on hair splitting technicalities. In such a case, it is the duty of the court to gather the true spirit behind a pleading by reading it as a whole and not as a word of art or literature. If the strict rule of pleadings of English law is enforced in muffasil courts, then it is very likely that hardly any case could pass the hurdle and reach the stage of a decision on merit. In the case on hand, sufficient pleadings were there to make appellant understand what was the plaintiffs case even if, trial Court failed to frame necessary issues. But that is not the case here. Trial Court had framed issues regarding non-payment of arrears of rent from 1.12.1999 to 30.6.2003 and based upon evidence recorded finding that appellant after service of demand notice neither complied with Section 12(1)(a) nor with Section 13(1) of the Act so as to avoid eviction under section 12(l)(a) of the Act by virtue of Section 12(3) of the Act. It is an additional protection given to tenant to ward off eviction on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent. It is an additional protection given to tenant to ward off eviction on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent. When a tenant commits a default in payment of arrears of rent within stipulated time, the impediment to file a suit for eviction on that ground is removed. A further protection is afforded to a tenant under Section 12(3), if he deposits or pays to landlord the entire arrears of rent within one month of service to writ of summons and continues to pay or deposit month by month a sum equivalent to rent by 15th of each succeeding month as along as eviction suit is pending. In the case in hand, appellant missed all opportunities at his peril, therefore, Courts below rightly passed an eviction decree against him. So far as deposit of arrears made on 17.2.2007 before passing of eviction decree by the trial Court is concerned, suffice it to say that the appellant took a calculated risk during the pendency of the suit and deposited part of arrears when the trial was coming to a close and sought condonation. Trial Court found that application was not bonafide and rejected the application for condonation of delay by assigning valid and cogent reasons and refused to extend the protection available under Section 12(3) read with Section 13(1) of the Act. ( 7. ) Thus, we find no merit in this appeal as it does not give rise to any question of law much less substantial question of law for admitting this appeal for final hearing. Accordingly appeal fails and is hereby dismissed summarily without any orders as to costs of this appeal. Direction regarding costs given by Courts below shall remain unaffected. ( 8. ) At this stage, learned counsel for appellant prayed that, appellant be allowed three months time to vacate and handover possession of the suit accommodation to respondent. Shri Sunil Jain, learned counsel, on caveat for respondent readily agreed to the prayer. In view of this, it is directed that appellant shall furnish an undertaking within two weeks from the date of this Order before the trial Court that he will handover vacant possession of the suit accommodation to respondent on or before 90 days from the date of this Order and shall also continue to pay a sum equivalent to monthly rent on or before fifteenth of each succeeding month without fail. In case of default in furnishing the undertaking or payment of sum equivalent to monthly rent on the due date, then notwithstanding this order, respondent would be free to execute the decree in accordance with law and obtain possession of suit accommodation. ( 9. ) Order accordingly. Order accordingly.