JUDGMENT SANJIB BANERJEE, J. : – A head constable of the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) is in appeal from his failed writ petition challenging the punishment meted out to him in disciplinary proceedings. 2. Though somewhat unnecessary in the context of the matters that ought to be weighed in judicial review, it may be useful to see how the charges on four counts came to be levelled against the appellant. According to the enquiry report that has been relied upon by the disciplinary authority in ultimately subjecting the appellant to compulsory retirement from service, the appellant is said to have outraged the modesty of the wife of another constable in the force at the rented residence of such other constable at a time when the appellant was required to report for a regimental function. The enquiry officer also held that the appellant had remained absent for a period beginning a day after the alleged incident; found him guilty of insubordination; and, of staying away from a regimental function without proper excuse. 3. By a memorandum of April 15/16, 2005 the appellant was informed that an enquiry was proposed to be conducted in relation to the conduct of the appellant under Rule 36 of the CISF Rules, 2001. The articles of charge and the statements of imputation of misconduct in support of the articles were furnished along with the memorandum. The four charges brought against the appellant read as follows: “ARTICLE – I On 30-03-05 at about 1600 hrs No. 822310853 HC(GD) G D Paul of CISF Unit NSCBI Airport Kolkata went to the residence (rented accommodation at A-40, Indira Nagar, Kolkata – 81) of No. 944521768 Constable S R Biswas who was on ‘B’ shift duty (from 1300 hrs to 2100 hrs) and outraged the modesty of Smt Anjana Biswas, wife of the said Constable, who was alone at her residence. The act committed by No. 82230853 HC/GD G.D. Paul is gross misconduct. Hence, the charge. “ARTICLE – II No. 822310853 HC(GD) G D Paul of CISF Unit NSCBI Airport Kolkata was detailed for Quarter Guard duty from 0600 hrs of 31.03.05 to 0600 hrs of 01.04.05. He did not report for duty and remained absent without information to the competent authority. It is an act of indiscipline. Hence, the charge. Hence, the charge. “ARTICLE – II No. 822310853 HC(GD) G D Paul of CISF Unit NSCBI Airport Kolkata was detailed for Quarter Guard duty from 0600 hrs of 31.03.05 to 0600 hrs of 01.04.05. He did not report for duty and remained absent without information to the competent authority. It is an act of indiscipline. Hence, the charge. “ARTICLE – III On 31.03.05 at about 1410 hrs No. 822310853 HC (GD) G D Paul of CISF Unit NSCBI Airport Kolkata had reported at Unit Control room to inform that he was on sick rest. He was directed by the control room In Charge SI/Exe Dabashish Roy to report to Shri N.D. Sharma DC, ‘HQ’ Coy who was present in the SHA/DTB of NSCBI Airport Kolkata. He however did not follow the order and replied that he would not meet anybody. Disobedience of orders issued lawfully by senior is an act of indiscipline. Hence, the charge. “ARTICLE – IV On 30-03-05 at about 1600 hrs was scheduled for Sainik Sammelan of Commandant NSCBI Airport Kolkata, at CISF Sarat Camp, NSCBIA Kolkata No. 822310853 HC (GD) G D Paul who had performed ‘A’ Shift Duty (0500 hrs to 1300 hrs) on the same day was required to attend Sainik Sammelan but he did not attend the same without any cogent reason. Remaining absent from regimental functions is an act of indiscipline. Hence, the Charge.” 4. There is no grievance that the appellant was not afforded an opportunity to present his case or defend himself before the enquiry. The enquiry officer proceeded to conclude that the appellant was guilty as charged on all four counts. The appellant was allowed a further representation which he submitted on November 8, 2005 to the disciplinary authority and such authority made an order on December 1, 2005. The disciplinary authority invoked Rule 32 read with Rule 34(iii) of the CISF Rules, 2001 to award the appellant the punishment of compulsory retirement from service with immediate effect. The suspension of the appellant with effect from April 5, 2005 was also confirmed and it was provided that for the period that the appellant remained suspended he would not be entitled to any more than the subsistence allowance that he had already drawn. 5. The appellant carried the order of December 1, 2005 by way of a departmental appeal. The appellate authority found no merit in the appellant’s case. 5. The appellant carried the order of December 1, 2005 by way of a departmental appeal. The appellate authority found no merit in the appellant’s case. It may be noticed here that neither the disciplinary authority nor the appellate authority summarily rejected the contentions raised by the appellant which they could have done inasmuch as they would have then been merely affirming the reasons given at the previous stages. But both the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority delved into the grounds asserted and gave their independent reasons for concurring with the findings against the appellant. The appellant challenged the departmental decision in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India primarily on the ground that the first charge did not fall within the purview of the department’s authority; that the second and fourth charges were connected to the first charge and, in such sense, not independent charges; and, that the third and fourth charges were mala fide. In addition, the writ petition alluded to the writ petitioner having been victimised in his being found guilty without any material in support of the charges and generally alleged mala fides on the part of the employer. 6. It appears from the judgment and order under appeal that it was the first charge on which the writ petitioner stressed, a line that has been carried in the appeal. The thrust of the submission as recorded in the impugned judgment was that the making of the first charge, and the consequential adjudication thereon, was beyond the authority of the department. Several authorities were cited before the learned Single Judge that have also been placed in course of the hearing of the appeal, including a judgment reported at 2003 (3) CHN 82 (Badal Pal v. Union of India & ors.). In the Badal Pal decision, rendered by a learned Single Judge, it has been held that when a criminal offence was alleged to have been committed by a member of the force outside the scope of his duty, so long as the alleged delinquent had not faced trial before the criminal court leading to conviction the supervisory officer could not initiate any action in terms of Section 8 of the Central Inland Security Force Act, 1968 (the CISF Act). 7. 7. In the judgment under appeal, Section 15 of the CISF Act was referred to and the learned Single Judge was of the opinion that since such provision had not been brought to the notice of the court in the Badal Pal case, the judgment rendered in the Badal Pal case would not have any application in the case of the appellant. The learned Single Judge also observed that in exercise of the authority under Article 226 of the Constitution the writ court cannot upset findings of fact which had been painstakingly gathered in course of validly constituted departmental proceedings. The writ petition thus stood dismissed. 8. The appellant again labours to demonstrate that a charge of the kind that is reflected in Article I of the charge-sheet could not have been taken up for adjudication in departmental proceedings. Counsel for the appellant submits that the for the purpose of departmental proceedings in respect of such matters, the act complained of should have been committed in course of duty by the member of the force. The appellant asserts that acts beyond the scope of duty, particularly criminal acts, cannot fall within the ambit of departmental proceedings of such nature. The appellant cites the Badal Pal judgment and the judgments of the Supreme Court in the A.L. Kalra v. Project and Equipment Corporation [ (1984) 3 SCC 316 ] and the M/s. Glaxo Laboratories (I) Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Meerut & ors. [ (1984) 1 SCC 1 ] to articulate that the making of the first charge and everything that followed it was completely misconceived. 9. The charge that came up for consideration in the Badal Pal matter was that the head constable had entered uninvited into the quarters of another member of the force and had forcibly taken the other member’s wife to his own quarters and attempted to molest her. The employee was found guilty, was dismissed from service and his departmental appeal failed. The alleged victim in that case did not lodge any complaint before the police authorities and no criminal case in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure was initiated against the alleged delinquent. The court appears to have raised a preliminary point as to whether under such circumstances the disciplinary proceedings could have been started on such charge and the alleged delinquent dismissed. The court appears to have raised a preliminary point as to whether under such circumstances the disciplinary proceedings could have been started on such charge and the alleged delinquent dismissed. The court noticed Sections 8, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 18 of the Act and Rules 34 and 37 of the rules under the said Act. The substance of the charge against the employee was construed to be a criminal charge covered by Sections 362 and 366 of the Indian Penal Code. The celebrated judgment of Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel ( AIR 1985 SC 1416 ) was referred to for the ruling that the last paragraph of Rule 37 of the said Rules must be read as directory and not mandatory (such provision requires only a notice to be given to an employee upon such employee convicted to rigorous imprisonment on a criminal charge, before his dismissal from service). On such consideration, the judgment concluded as follows: “16. Therefore, so long the petitioner has not faced trial before the criminal Court leading to conviction, the supervisory officer could not even consider whether any action should be taken against the petitioner in terms of section 8 of the Act. “17. I am, therefore, of the view that once a cognizable offence is alleged to have been committed by a member of the force against the wife of another member of the force in the official quarter, the respondents by virtue of the power conferred under sections 11 and 12 of the Act can at the most arrest and search such employee but thereafter he is required to be handed over to the police for trial and if the employee is convicted in the long run, such fact can afford a ground of dismissal on the ground that he becomes unfit for the discharge of his duty.” 10. In the Glaxo Laboratories matter the provisions of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 fell for consideration in a case where the alleged delinquent workman supporting a strike was said to have manhandled a set of workmen while the other workmen were commuting from the city to the factory of the employer. A charge-sheet was served on the striking workman who approached the labour court under the provisions of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 claiming that the alleged acts of misconduct would not be covered by the Standing Orders. A charge-sheet was served on the striking workman who approached the labour court under the provisions of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 claiming that the alleged acts of misconduct would not be covered by the Standing Orders. The labour court held in favour of the workman. The employer moved the Allahabad High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and a Division Bench held that the construction put by the labour court on the relevant clauses of the Standing Orders was reasonable. The order of dismissal of the writ petition was made the subject matter of the proceedings before the Supreme Court. Paragraph 13 of the report is apposite in the context: “13. After reading clause 10, Mr Shanti Bhushan contended that the expression ‘committed within the premises of the establishment or in the vicinity thereof can qualify only the expression ‘any act subversive of discipline and efficiency and any act involving moral turpitude’ but not the earlier portion of the clause. Numerous acts of misconduct have been collected in clause 10 such as drunkenness, fighting, indecent or disorderly behaviour, use of abusive language, wrongfully interfering with the work of other employees etc. Says Mr. Shanti Bhushan that these acts of misconduct are per se misconduct that each one of them cannot have any corelation to the time or place where it is committed and each one of it is an act of misconduct irrespective of the time and place where it is committed. Expanding the submission, it was urged that drunkenness is such a socially reprehensible action that if it is committed within the premises of the establishment or in the vicinity thereof or anywhere else at any point of time it would none the less be an act of misconduct comprehended in clause 10 and punishable under Standing Order 23. If this construction were even to be accepted the employer will have more power than the almighty State because State chooses to punish drunkenness in public place. But on the construction canvassed for if a man consumes liquor in his own house with the doors closed and gets drunk, the employer can still fire him. If a man uses abusive language towards his close relation in his own house with closed door, the employer would be entitled to fire him, and this approach overlooks the purpose of prescribing conditions of service by a statute. If a man uses abusive language towards his close relation in his own house with closed door, the employer would be entitled to fire him, and this approach overlooks the purpose of prescribing conditions of service by a statute. To enable an employer to peacefully carry on his industrial activity, the Act confers powers on him to prescribe conditions of service including enumerating acts of misconduct when committed within the premises of the establishment. The employer has hardly any extraterritorial jurisdiction. He is not the custodian of general law and order situation nor the Guru or mentor of his workmen for their well regulated cultural advancement. If the power to regulate the behaviour of the workmen outside the duty hours and at any place wherever they may be was conferred upon the employer, contract of service may be reduced to contract of slavery. The employer is entitled to prescribe conditions of service more or less specifying the acts of misconduct to be enforced within the premises where the workmen gather together for rendering service. The employer has both power and jurisdiction to regulate the behaviour of workmen within the premises of the establishment, or for peacefully carrying the industrial activity in the vicinity of the establishment. When the broad purpose for conferring power on the employer to prescribe acts of misconduct that may be committed by his workmen is kept in view, it is not difficult to ascertain whether the expression “committed within the premises of the establishment or in the vicinity thereof” would qualify each and every act of misconduct collocated in clause 10 or the last two only, namely, “any act subversive of discipline and efficiency and any act involving moral turpitude”. To buttress this conclusion, one illustration would suffice. Drunkenness even from the point of view of prohibitionist can at best be said to be an act involving moral turpitude. If the misconduct alleging drunkenness as an act involving moral turpitude is charged, it would have to be shown that it was committed within the premises of the establishment or vicinity thereof but if the misconduct charged would be drunkenness the limitation of its being committed within the premises of the establishment can be disregarded. This makes no sense. If the misconduct alleging drunkenness as an act involving moral turpitude is charged, it would have to be shown that it was committed within the premises of the establishment or vicinity thereof but if the misconduct charged would be drunkenness the limitation of its being committed within the premises of the establishment can be disregarded. This makes no sense. And it may be remembered that the power to prescribe conditions of service is not unilateral but the workmen have right to object and to be heard and a statutory authority namely, Certifying Officer has to certify the same. Therefore, keeping in view the larger objective sought to be achieved by prescribing conditions of employment in certified standing orders, the only construction one can put on clause 10 is that the various acts of misconduct therein set out would be misconduct for the purpose of Standing Order 22 punishable under Standing Order 23, if committed within the premises of the establishment or in the vicinity thereof.” 11. In A.L. Kalra the employer applied for and obtained an advance for purchasing a plot of land for which he executed the requisite agreement. He later applied for and obtained another advance for purchase of a motorcycle. The two loans were governed by separate rules. The house building advance rules required the employer to submit documents evidencing the purchase of land within two months of drawal, failing which he was liable to refund at once the entire amount together with interest. The relevant house building advance rules also obliged the employee to utilise the advance for the purpose for which it was sanctioned and produce the sale deed for verification, failing which the entirety of the advance had to be refunded with interest. The conveyance advance rules obligated the employee to purchase the motorcycle within a month or refund the advance. Kalra failed to refund the house building advance and used the conveyance advance in part beyond the period permitted by the relevant rules. 12. A disciplinary inquiry was held in respect of charges on either account framed against him. The inquiry report went against the employee and the employee was removed from service by the disciplinary authority. The appellate authority confirmed the penalty of removal. The employee filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution before the Delhi High Court which was dismissed in limine as being not maintainable. The inquiry report went against the employee and the employee was removed from service by the disciplinary authority. The appellate authority confirmed the penalty of removal. The employee filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution before the Delhi High Court which was dismissed in limine as being not maintainable. The resultant special leave petition fructified into an appeal culminating in the judgment. Two of the clauses of the applicable rules in that case provided that every employee should at all times maintain absolute integrity and do nothing which was unbecoming of a public servant. A subsequent rule prescribed the various acts of misconduct for which action could be taken against and employee. The employer argued that the general rule could be dovetailed into the subsequent rule specifying acts of misconduct to sustain the penalty handed down to the employee. The Supreme Court frowned upon such argument at paragraph 22 of the report: “22. Rule 4 bears the heading “General”. Rule 5 bears the heading “Misconduct”. The draftsmen of the 1975 Rules made a clear distinction about what would constitute misconduct. A general expectation of a certain decent behaviour in respect of employees keeping in view Corporation culture may be a moral or ethical expectation. Failure to keep to such high standard of moral, ethical or decorous behaviour befitting an officer of the company by itself cannot constitute misconduct unless the specific conduct falls in any of the enumerated misconduct in Rule 5. Any attempt to telescope Rule 4 into Rule 5 must be looked upon with apprehension because Rule 4 is vague and of a general nature and what is unbecoming of a public servant may vary with individuals and expose employees to vagaries of subjective evaluation. What in a given context would constitute conduct unbecoming of a public servant to be treated as misconduct would expose a grey area not amenable to objective evaluation. Where misconduct when proved entails penal consequences, it is obligatory on the employer to specify and if necessary define it with precision and accuracy so that any ex post facto interpretation of some incident may not be camouflaged as misconduct. Where misconduct when proved entails penal consequences, it is obligatory on the employer to specify and if necessary define it with precision and accuracy so that any ex post facto interpretation of some incident may not be camouflaged as misconduct. It is not necessary to dilate on this point in view of a recent decision of this Court in Glaxo Laboratories (I) Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Meerut where this Court held that “everything which is required to be prescribed has to be prescribed with precision and no argument can be entertained that something not prescribed can yet be taken into account as varying what is prescribed. In short, it cannot be left to the vagaries of management to say ex post facto that some acts of omission or commission nowhere found to be enumerated in the relevant Standing Order is nonetheless a misconduct not strictly falling within the enumerated misconduct in the relevant Standing Order but yet a misconduct for the purpose of imposing a penalty”. Rule 4 styled as “General” specifies a norm of behaviour but does not specify that its violation will constitute misconduct. In Rule 5, it is nowhere stated that anything violative of Rule 4 would be per se a misconduct in any of the sub-clauses of Rule 5 which specifies misconduct. It would therefore appear that even if the facts alleged in two heads of charges are accepted as wholly proved, yet that would not constitute misconduct as prescribed in Rule 5 and no penalty can be imposed for such conduct. It may as well be mentioned that Rule 25 which prescribes penalties specifically provides that any of the penalties therein mentioned can be imposed on an employee for misconduct committed by him. Rule 4 does not specify a misconduct.” 13. The appellant also refers to a judgment rendered by a Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Ratan Lal Ex-Constable v. The State of Haryana & ors. (1983 (2) SLR 159) where a constable in the Haryana police was dismissed following disciplinary proceedings after he was found to be under the influence of alcohol at about 1 o’clock in the morning. At the relevant time the constable was not on duty. (1983 (2) SLR 159) where a constable in the Haryana police was dismissed following disciplinary proceedings after he was found to be under the influence of alcohol at about 1 o’clock in the morning. At the relevant time the constable was not on duty. An argument was put forward that a police officer is supposed to be on 24 hours’ duty and even if he was not performing his usual work as sentry he was presumed to be on duty. It was held, however, that, “3. … If that be so, then all members of the Police Force, high or low, have to be taken on duty during the course of their entire service right from the day of their enrolment and if consumption of alcohol has again to be taken as a misconduct then probably most of them can any time be held guilty of the same. … The learned Additional Advocate-General is not in a position to bring to my notice any precedent or (principle) on the basis of which it can be said that mere consumption of liquor by an employee, particularly when he is not on duty, amounts to misconduct or misbehaviour. …” 14. On a query by court as to whether the principle that departmental proceedings may be pursued despite an employee being acquitted in the connected criminal case would not permit disciplinary proceedings to be launched notwithstanding a criminal complaint in relation to the related criminal act not being filed, counsel for the appellant submits that the principle is subject to salutary safeguards recognised by courts. The judgments reported at (1999) 3 SCC 679 (Captain M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd.) and (1981) 2 SCC 714 (Corporation of Nagpur City v. Ramchandra) are placed. 15. In the first of the two cases, Capt. Anthony was a security officer with a government undertaking against whom disciplinary as well as criminal proceedings were initiated on the allegation that in course of a police raid a mining sponge gold ball weighing 4.5 gram and 1276 gram of gold-bearing sand were recovered from his house. In the criminal case he was acquitted with a finding that the prosecution had failed to establish its case. By the time the order of acquittal came to be pronounced, the employee had been dismissed from service following the disciplinary proceedings. In the criminal case he was acquitted with a finding that the prosecution had failed to establish its case. By the time the order of acquittal came to be pronounced, the employee had been dismissed from service following the disciplinary proceedings. Upon his acquittal, the employee sought reinstatement which was turned down and the departmental appeal also failed. A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution was allowed with the finding that the departmental proceedings and the criminal case being based on the same set of facts, the departmental proceedings should have been stayed till the result of the criminal case; and, since the employee was acquitted in the criminal case, the employer could not legally refuse reinstatement and consequent back wages. The intra-court appeal by the employer succeeded and the appellate order of the High Court was carried to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court noticed a consensus of judicial opinion, both in the High Courts and in the Supreme Court, on the fundamental principle that both criminal and departmental proceedings could proceed simultaneously with little exception. After referring to a number of previous Supreme Court judgments it was concluded that there could be no absolute bar in both sets of proceedings continuing simultaneously though separately, but if the two sets of proceedings were based on identical facts and the charge against the delinquent was of grave nature which involved complicated questions it would be desirable to stay the departmental proceedings till the conclusion of the criminal case. The Supreme Court upheld the order passed by the Single Judge in the writ petition on the following reasoning: “35. Since the facts and the evidence in both the proceedings, namely, the departmental proceedings and the criminal case were the same without there being any iota of difference, the distinction, which is usually drawn as between the departmental proceedings and the criminal case on the basis of approach and burden of proof, would not be applicable to the instant case.” 16. In the Ramchandra case it was held that where the accused is acquitted honourably and completely exonerated of the charges it would not be expedient to continue a departmental enquiry on the very same charges or grounds of offence. The Supreme Court, however, cautioned that merely because the accused was acquitted, the authority to continue the departmental enquiry was not taken away nor its direction in any way fettered. 17. The Supreme Court, however, cautioned that merely because the accused was acquitted, the authority to continue the departmental enquiry was not taken away nor its direction in any way fettered. 17. Though the appellant is vehement in his attack on the very authority of the department to embark on any inquiry or adjudication in respect of the first charge, the challenge to the decision-making process in respect of the three other charges has been somewhat muted; as if upon the first charge failing the rest would follow. There is a suggestion that the fourth charge was incidental to the first charge and an assertion that a distinction needs to be drawn between absence from duty and absence from a regimental function. As to the second charge, it is submitted that the service rules permitted absence on medical grounds to be based on a medical certificate being obtained in the prescribed manner and there is nothing on record to show how the charge was found to hold good in the absence of the medical certificate being proved to be bogus. The appellant seeks to show that the third charge was really a part of the second charge and the disobedience of an order to meet an officer of the force when the appellant had gone to inform the force of his being sick should not have been viewed as an act of indiscipline. 18. On behalf of the Union it is emphasised that the CISF is a disciplined force which calls for exemplary behaviour and the fact that the employee was found to have been guilty of indecorous conduct warranted a grave punishment. Counsel for the respondents asserts that a graver punishment of dismissal or removal from service could have been handed down but a lesser punishment was inflicted. The respondents say that the argument that the department could not proceed against the appellant in the absence of a criminal complaint for outraging the modesty of a woman is a red herring. According to counsel, departmental and criminal proceedings operate in independent fields with different sets of rules as to evidence and entirely distinct consequences. The respondents say that even the legal fiction under Section 15 of the Act was not required to be invoked as the head constable was required to be present at the regimental function and it was an extension of his duty. 19. The respondents say that even the legal fiction under Section 15 of the Act was not required to be invoked as the head constable was required to be present at the regimental function and it was an extension of his duty. 19. The respondents rely on a judgment reported at (1992) 4 SCC 54 (State of Punjab & ors. v. Ram Singh Ex-constable) where the constable was governed by the Punjab Police Manual and the relevant rule whereof consisted of two parts – the first referable to gravest acts of misconduct entailing dismissal; and the second connoting the cumulative effect of continued misconduct implying incorrigibility and complete unfitness for police service. The constable was drunk on duty, roamed about at the bus stand wearing his service revolver and had to be brought with great difficulty to the police station before being taken for medical examination where he engaged in a quarrel with the doctor on duty and abused him. After following the departmental procedure an order of dismissal ensued which stood the test in the departmental appeals. The constable brought a suit which was decreed and affirmed in appeal. The civil courts found that the order of dismissal was vitiated by not affording the constable reasonable opportunity to present his defence. The resultant appeal by a special leave was allowed by the Supreme Court on the following essential grounds found at paragraph 6 of the report: “6. Thus it could be seen that the word ‘misconduct’ though not capable of precise definition, on reflection receives its connotation from the context, the delinquency in its performance and its effect on the discipline and the nature of the duty. It may involve moral turpitude, it must be improper or wrong behaviour; unlawful behaviour, wilful in character; forbidden act, a transgression of established and definite rule of action or code of conduct but not mere error of judgment, carelessness or negligence in performance of the duty; the act complained of bears forbidden quality or character. Its ambit has to be construed with reference to the subject matter and the context wherein the term occurs, regard being had to the scope of the statute and the public purpose it seeks to serve. The police service is a disciplined service and it requires to maintain strict discipline. Its ambit has to be construed with reference to the subject matter and the context wherein the term occurs, regard being had to the scope of the statute and the public purpose it seeks to serve. The police service is a disciplined service and it requires to maintain strict discipline. Laxity in this behalf erodes discipline in the service causing serious effect in the maintenance of law and order.” 20. A judgment reported at (1997) 2 SCC 699 (Depot Manager, Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation v. Mohd. Yousuf Miya) is next cited by the respondents to emphasise that the purpose of departmental enquiry and prosecution are altogether different. The respondents rely on paragraph 8 of the report: “8. We are in respectful agreement with the above view. The purpose of departmental enquiry and of prosecution are two different and distinct aspects. The criminal prosecution is launched for an offence for violation of a duty, the offender owes to the society or for breach of which law has provided that the offender shall make satisfaction to the public. So crime is an act of commission in violation of law or of omission of public duty. The departmental enquiry is to maintain discipline in the service and efficiency of public service. It would, therefore, be expedient that the disciplinary proceedings are conducted and completed as expeditiously as possible. It is not, therefore, desirable to lay down any guidelines as inflexible rules in which the departmental proceedings may or may not be stayed pending trial in criminal case against the delinquent officer. Each case requires to be considered in the backdrop of its own facts and circumstances. There would be no bar to proceed simultaneously with departmental enquiry and trial of a criminal case unless the charge in the criminal trial is of grave nature involving complicated questions of fact and law. Offence generally implies infringement of public (sic duty), as distinguished from mere private rights punishable under criminal law. When trial for criminal offence is conducted it should be in accordance with proof of the offence as per the evidence defined under the provisions of the Evidence Act. Converse is the case of departmental enquiry. The enquiry in a departmental proceedings relates to conduct or breach of duty of the delinquent officer to punish him for his misconduct defined under the relevant statutory rules or law. Converse is the case of departmental enquiry. The enquiry in a departmental proceedings relates to conduct or breach of duty of the delinquent officer to punish him for his misconduct defined under the relevant statutory rules or law. That the strict standard of proof or applicability of the Evidence Act stands excluded is a settled legal position. The enquiry in the departmental proceedings relates to the conduct of the delinquent officer and proof in that behalf is not as high as in an offence in criminal charge. It is seen that invariably the departmental enquiry has to be conducted expeditiously so as to effectuate efficiency in public administration and the criminal trial will take its own course. The nature of evidence in criminal trial is entirely different from the departmental proceedings. In the former, prosecution is to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt on the touchstone of human conduct. The standard of proof in the departmental proceedings is not the same as of the criminal trial. The evidence also is different from the standard point of the Evidence Act. The evidence required in the departmental enquiry is not regulated by the Evidence Act. Under these circumstances, what is required to be seen is whether the departmental enquiry would seriously prejudice the delinquent in his defence at the trial in a criminal case. It is always a question of fact to be considered in each case depending on its own facts and circumstances. In this case, we have seen that the charge is failure to anticipate the accident and prevention thereof. It has nothing to do with the culpability of the offence under Sections 304-A and 338, IPC. Under these circumstances, the High Court was not right in staying the proceedings.” 21. The Union has reserved its best ammunition for a parting shot by referring to the judgment reported at AIR 1969 SC 1020 (State of Uttar Pradesh & ors. v. Harish Chandra Singh). The employee in that case was charged on three counts: on a complaint of voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous weapons or means registered at the police station, the sub-inspector failed to investigate the case in accordance with law and failed to comply with the orders of a superior officer; he failed to record and register a case despite a written report of burglary being made over to him; and, the sub-inspector deferred investigation in another burglary case. The Superintendent of Police gave a report but the Inspector General ordered a fresh enquiry. The Superintendent gave a fresh report, finding the sub-inspector guilty of the charges framed against him. At the foot of the report, the Superintendent observed that the sub-inspector had been once placed under suspension and thereafter dismissed before being reinstated on being reduced to the lowest scale of a sub-inspector; that he was suspended again after two years but reinstated and again suspended and proceeded against resulting in a reduced scale of pay upon subsequent reinstatement; there was a misconduct entry for non-registration of a complaint of dacoity; and, he had also earned some minor rewards. According to the Superintendent the service record of the sub-inspector was not encouraging and no leniency could be shown to him as he had disobeyed lawful orders of superior officers and had failed to comply with the mandatory provisions of law and the police regulations. The findings of the Superintendent were forwarded to the sub-inspector and he was called upon to send his written representation thereto. He was given a personal hearing at the second stage. The disciplinary authority ordered that he be removed from service with immediate effect. The departmental appeal also stood rejected and the sub-inspector brought a suit that was dismissed. In appeal the High Court set aside the judgment and decree. 22. The Supreme Court recorded the argument on behalf of the sub-inspector that he should have been tried under Section 29 of the Police Act before he was charged under Section 7 thereof. Section 7 permits the state government to dismiss, suspend or reduce in rank any police-officer if such officer is found to be “remiss or negligent in the discharge of his duty, or unfit for the same.” Section 29 provides for penalties for neglect of duty and makes a police officer liable, on conviction before a magistrate, to penalty or imprisonment. The argument put forth on behalf of the sub-inspector that he should have been tried under Section 29 before he was charged under Section 7 of the Police Act was repelled on the following lines: “14. We are unable to appreciate why it is necessary that a police officer should be prosecuted under Section 29 before departmental proceedings can be taken under Section 7 of the Police Act. We are unable to appreciate why it is necessary that a police officer should be prosecuted under Section 29 before departmental proceedings can be taken under Section 7 of the Police Act. It may be that a police officer is also liable to be prosecuted under Section 29, but it is not necessary that in every case which falls within Section 7, the police officer should first be prosecuted under Section 29 before he can be proceeded against under Section 7. Section 7 deals with disciplinary proceedings, while Section 29 makes certain breaches criminal offences. Section 29 does not in any way limit the operation of Section 7.” 23. The material words of Section 8 of the CISF Act bear a close resemblance to the substance of Section 7 of the Police Act. Section 29 of the Police Act is a penal provision akin to the provisions contained in the Indian Penal Code. The substance of the issue at hand is as to whether on a parity of reasoning by following the Harish Chandra judgment, it should be held that it is completely irrelevant that the departmental proceedings in the instant case continued despite no criminal complaint having been lodged or criminal prosecution having been resorted to. 24. Certain provisions of the CISF Act that are relevant in the context need first to be seen: “8. Dismissal, removal, etc., of members of the Force. – Subject to the provisions of article 311 of the Constitution and to such rules as the Central Government may make under this Act, any supervisory officer may – (i) dismiss, remove, order for compulsory retirement of, or reduce in rank, any enrolled member of the Force whom he thinks remiss or negligent in the discharge of his duty, or unfit for the same; or (ii) award any one or more of the following punishments to any enrolled member of the Force who discharges his duty in a careless or negligent manner, to who by any act of his own renders himself unfit for the discharge thereof, namely:– (a) fine to any amount not exceeding seven days’ pay or reduction in pay scale; (b) drill, extra guard, fatigue or other duty; (c) removal from any office of distinction or deprivation of any special emolument; (d) withholding of increment of pay with or without cumulative effect; (e) withholding of promotion; (f) censure.” “15. Officers and members of the Force to be considered always on duty and liable to be employed anywhere in India. – (1) Every member of the Force shall, for the purpose of this act, be considered to be always on duty, and shall, at any time, be liable to be employed at any place within India. (2) Save as provided in section 14, no member of the force shall engage himself in any employment or office other than his duties under this Act.” “18. Penalties for neglect of duty, etc. – (1) Without prejudice to the provisions contained in section 8, every member of the Force who shall be guilty of any violation of duty or wilful breach or neglect of any rule or regulation or lawful order made by a supervisory officer, or who shall withdraw from the duties of his office without permission, or who, being absent on leave, fails, without reasonable cause, to report himself for duty on the expiration of the leave, or who engages himself without authority in any employment other than his duty as a member of the Force, or who shall be guilty of cowardice, may be taken into Force custody and shall, on conviction, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, an offence punishable under this section shall be cognizable and non-bailable. (2A) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the Central Government may invest the Commandant with the powers of a Magistrate of any class for the purpose of inquiring into or trying any offence committed by an enrolled member of the Force and punishable under this Act, or any offence committed by an enrolled member of the Force against the person or property of another member of the Force: Provided that–– the offence may, if the prescribed authority within the limits of whose jurisdiction the offence has been committed so requires, be inquired into or tried by an ordinary criminal court having jurisdiction in the matter. (i) when the offender is on leave or absent from duty; or (ii) when the offence is not connected with the offender’s duties as an enrolled number of the Force; or (iii) when it is a petty offence even if connected with the offender’s duties as an enrolled member of the Force, or (iv) when, for reasons to be recorded in writing, it is not practicable for the Commandant invested with the powers of a Magistrate to inquire into or try an offence, (3) Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to prevent any member of the Force from being prosecuted under any other law for any offence made punishable by that law, or for being liable under any such law to any other or higher penalty or punishment than is provided for such offence by this section: Provided that no person shall be punished twice for the same offence.” 25. The question squarely raised is whether Badal Pal is good law in that it did not take into account the Harish Chandra dictum. For, if Badal Pal is considered to lay down the correct position at law, the facts in the present case bearing verisimilitude with the facts obtaining in that case would prompt a similar result, at least as far as the first charge is concerned. The ratio in the Badal Pal judgment is that the CISF would not have the authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings in respect of a criminal charge committed outside the scope of duty till such time that a conviction resulted in the criminal proceedings. It must be appreciated here that the first charge, even if taken at face value and against the appellant, reveals the following features: that he absented himself from duty or a function akin to duty; that he travelled to the rented accommodation of a fellow employee; and, that he attempted to outrage the modesty of such fellow employee’s wife. 26. The rented accommodation was not within the CISF precincts. The primary charge, therefore, was his absence without excuse which is also the substance of the fourth charge. As to whether a member of a force committing a crime beyond the geographical limits of the area under the jurisdiction of the force in course of his absence from duty without excuse can be proceeded against departmentally, is the moot point. The primary charge, therefore, was his absence without excuse which is also the substance of the fourth charge. As to whether a member of a force committing a crime beyond the geographical limits of the area under the jurisdiction of the force in course of his absence from duty without excuse can be proceeded against departmentally, is the moot point. What is important to the force is the unexplained absence of the employee from duty. It seems that it would be irrelevant to the force as to whether during such unexplained absence the member of the force committed a petty theft or any grave offence or even murder, unless there is a conviction upon a criminal trial that would make the conduct relevant for the purpose of the discipline of the force. To hold otherwise would be absurd and empower the employer in such a case with draconian powers to control the movement and conduct of an employee as an extra-judicial authority not recognised by law. It would be different if the offence were committed in course of the duty or, possibly, even when a criminal offence is committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the force or the immediate vicinity of the field of duty. But to suggest that the force would have all pervasive control over the body and soul of its members when they are off duty and not within the territorial authority of the force, would be the recognition of an utterly undesirable bondage. 27. The head constable here was charged on the first count of having committed a dastardly act and grievously would he have had to pay for it, but only upon a conviction by due process of law. The expression, “unfit for the same” after the disjunctive “or” in the relevant clause of Section 8 of the CISF Act implies unfit for duty otherwise than in course of duty but cannot be given the enlarged scope of authorising the department to launch disciplinary proceedings against a member of the force for a perceived criminal act committed beyond the scope of his duty and outside the territorial control of the force. The situations envisaged under Section 11 of the CISF Act would not apply in the present case and such provision is, in any event, only limited to arrest without warrant. The situations envisaged under Section 11 of the CISF Act would not apply in the present case and such provision is, in any event, only limited to arrest without warrant. Section 13 of the CISF Act mandates that the member of the force arrested under the Act would be needed to be taken to the nearest police station together with a report of the circumstances occasioning the arrest. Section 18 of the Act is concerned with neglect of duty and sub-section (1) thereof does not encompass within its fold a matter of the nature reflected in the first charge here. In the Harish Chandra case the charge against the sub-inspector was that he was negligent in his duty in failing to register complaints or process or pursue the same. The dictum in that judgment would not cover an offence committed beyond the scope of duty and outside the area of the force. It is the Badal Pal principle that is applicable in respect of the first charge in the instant case and, with respect, the Badal Pal ruling is the apt reading of the scope of authority of the force in such a case. 28. The legal fiction found in Section 15(1) of the CISF Act, if construed literally, may imply that the Code of Criminal Procedure may not apply to members of the force and the mechanism for trial reflected elsewhere in the Act would govern them. But there are express provisions, as for instance in Sections 13 and 18, in the CISF Act that would preclude such a construction of Section 15(1). The Punjab and Haryana High Court judgment is but an instance of the absurdity that would result on a simplistic and literal construction of such provision. The appellant is right in his assertion that the first charge could never have been brought against him departmentally and all that followed the making of the first charge is a nullity. 29. And yet, these may have been wasted pages for the appellant, as the result will bring him little joy. The appellant is right in his assertion that the first charge could never have been brought against him departmentally and all that followed the making of the first charge is a nullity. 29. And yet, these may have been wasted pages for the appellant, as the result will bring him little joy. Even if the first charge and all that followed it is set at naught, there is no challenge of such magnitude or seriousness in respect of the three other charges – those of the appellant remaining absent without information, willfully disobeying a lawful order of a superior officer and remaining absent when expressly required to attend a regimental function – of indiscipline. The appellant was a member of a disciplined force and was detailed for duty from which he absented himself without excuse. It was a serious lapse and such indiscipline ought not to be treated lightly. Since the order of the disciplinary authority was not one of dismissal or removal from service but one of compulsory retirement with all benefits, it cannot be said that such punishment would not be commensurate with the acts of indiscipline for which the head constable has been found guilty as charged under the three remaining counts. 30. The net effect is that the order of the disciplinary authority need not be interfered with and the appeal would fail, with the only solace for the writ petitioner being the finding that the first charge could not have been brought against him in the disciplinary proceedings. The appeal is disposed of accordingly. The application does not survive. There will be no order as to costs. 31. Urgent certified photostat copies of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied to the parties upon compliance with all requisite formalities.