JUDGMENT RAJES KUMAR, J. - By means of the present petitions, the petitioners seek the following reliefs : "(i) issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned Circular No. 137 dated March 29/30, 2007, issued by respondent No. 3 (annexure 1). (ii) issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned notices dated February 22, 2008 and February 29, 2008 for the assessment year 2001-02, issued by respondent Nos. 3 and 4 with respect to all the petitioners (annexure 2). (iii) issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents, particularly respondent Nos. 3, 4 and 5 not to proceed in pursuance of the impugned notices dated February 22, 2008 and February 29, 2008. (iv) issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents, not to initiate any reassessment proceedings for the assessment year 2001-02, against any of the petitioners. (v) issue any other writ, order or direction which this honourable court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case. (vi) an order for costs." The brief facts of the case giving rise to the present petitions are that the dispute relates to the assessment year 2001-02 under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as, "the Central Act"). The petitioners are rice miller and engaged in the business of manufacturing of rice from paddy. Both paddy and rice are declared commodity under section 14 of the Central Act and are the goods of special importance and liable to tax at the point of first purchase under the notification issued under section 3D(i) of the U.P. Trade Tax Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as, "the Act"). The petitioners claimed to have purchased paddy after paying the tax under the Act on their purchases and procured/manufactured rice out of such paddy and such procured rice has been sold inside the State of U.P. and outside the State of U.P. in the course of inter-State sales. The petitioners claimed to have purchased paddy after paying the tax under the Act on their purchases and procured/manufactured rice out of such paddy and such procured rice has been sold inside the State of U.P. and outside the State of U.P. in the course of inter-State sales. Under section 8 of the Central Act, on the inter-State sales of the rice, tax was leviable at the rate of four per cent against form C to the registered dealers and at the rate of eight per cent on the sale of unregistered dealers without form C. The claim of the petitioners is that they were entitled for set-off of the tax paid on paddy with the tax payable on rice on the sales in the course of inter-State sales in view of section 15(c) of the Central Act. The assessing authority passed the assessment order under section 9 of the Central Act accepted the claim of the petitioner and allowed the set-off of the tax paid on paddy with the tax payable on rice under the Central Act. Notices under section 21 of the Act purported to have been issued to withdraw the claim of such set-off on the ground that under section 15(c) of the Central Act, the set-off of the tax paid on paddy with the tax payable on the procured rice under the Central Act is not contemplated. Since the limitation by which the proceedings under section 21(1) of the Act could be initiated had expired, notices for approval to initiate the proceedings beyond the period of limitation under the proviso to section 21(2) of the Act were issued by the Additional Commissioner of Trade Tax. It is informed that the approvals have been granted and in pursuance thereof notices under section 21 of the Act have been issued and the assessment orders have also been passed, but in view of the interim orders passed by this court, the demand notices have not been served. Heard Sri Bharat Ji Agrawal, learned Senior Advocate, Sri N. C. Mishra and Sri Hari Om Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners and Sri J. N. Mathur, Additional Advocate-General assisted by Shri H. P. Srivastava, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel. Heard Sri Bharat Ji Agrawal, learned Senior Advocate, Sri N. C. Mishra and Sri Hari Om Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners and Sri J. N. Mathur, Additional Advocate-General assisted by Shri H. P. Srivastava, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel. Shri Bharat Ji Agrawal, learned counsel for the petitioners, submitted that section 15 of the Central Act contemplates restriction and condition to levy the tax on the goods of special importance. It also provides certain concessions and benefits of set-off to avoid cascading of tax. He submitted that section 15(c) of the Central Act contemplates set-off of the tax paid on paddy with the tax payable on the procured rice from such paddy both under the State law as well as under the Central Act. He submitted that there is nothing under section 15(c) of the Act, which restricted the benefit only under the State law and not under the Central Act. He submitted that in the absence of any word being used in section 15(c) of the Act contemplating benefit of set-off with the tax on the sale in the course of inter-State sales only, the benefit of set-off of tax paid on paddy is available both for intra-State sales as well and inter-State sales of rice. He further submitted that section 15 of the Act has been introduced to reduce the burden of tax on the customer. He further submitted that the impugned circular dated March 29, 2007, which is annexure 1 to the writ petition, is contrary to plain language of section 15(c) of the Central Act and the circular dated March 18, 1998 issued in respect of new unit for the purposes of computation of the exemption limit provides the benefit of the set-off of the tax paid on paddy with the tax payable on rice on the sale in the course of inter-State sales which indicates that the Commissioner was of the view that the set-off of the tax paid on paddy was allowable with the tax payable on rice in the course of inter-State sales under section 15(c) of the Central Act. He submitted that from the plain reading of section 15(c) of the Central Act, it is clear that the benefit of set-off was available both under the State law as well as under the Central Act. He submitted that from the plain reading of section 15(c) of the Central Act, it is clear that the benefit of set-off was available both under the State law as well as under the Central Act. In the earlier part of section 15(c) the word "State law" has been used for paddy but for rice such word has not been used. This shows the intention to provide benefit both under the State law as well as Central Act. He has also referred the object to introduce under section 15(c) of the Central Act by Act No. 103 of 1976, which is published in Chaturvedi Book at pages 1404 to 1409. He submitted that the Division Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Aitha Narasaiah & Co. v. State of Andhra Pradesh reported in [1979] 43 STC 183 is squarely applicable in the present case in which it has been held that the tax payable on the sale of rice under the Central Act be reduced by the tax paid on paddy under the State law. He submitted that in the absence of any decision of the jurisdictional High Court, the decision on the Central Act of other High Courts is binding. He relied upon the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Commissioner of Income-tax v. Chimanlal J. Dalai & Co. reported in [1965] 57 ITR 285 and in the case of Subramanian (K.), Income-tax Officer v. Siemens India Ltd. reported in [1985] 156 ITR 11 (Bom); [1983] 36 CTR 197. He submitted that for more than 30 years, the authorities have understood section 15(c) of the Central Act as the benefit of set-off was admissible under the Central Law and therefore, to maintain the consistency in the law the same understanding should be allowed to continue. In support of his contention, he relied upon the Full Bench decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Jagdamba Industries v. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in [1988] 69 STC 1. He submitted that the Commissioner of Trade Tax in the circular has illegally distinguished the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court merely on the ground that in the Andhra Pradesh State law, there was Explanation, which provided set-off while such Explanation is not available under the U.P. Trade Tax Act. He submitted that the Commissioner of Trade Tax in the circular has illegally distinguished the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court merely on the ground that in the Andhra Pradesh State law, there was Explanation, which provided set-off while such Explanation is not available under the U.P. Trade Tax Act. In this connection, he submitted that the presence of Explanation in the Andhra Pradesh Sales Tax Act, 1957 does not make any difference inasmuch as in the absence of Explanation on the plain reading of section 15(c) of the Central Act, the set-off is available under the Central Act. Reliance is placed on the decision of this court in the case of Pawansut Trading Company v. Commissioner of Trade Tax reported in [2007] 9 VST 509; [2007] UPTC 636. He submitted that no proceeding under section 21 of the Act can be initiated on account of change of opinion. The approval may be granted in the case of change of opinion, but in the absence of any such word being used under section 21(1) of the Act, the assessing authority cannot initiate the proceeding under section 21 of the Act on account of change of opinion as it settled by the decisions of the apex court and various High Courts. He submitted that for the initiation of proceeding under section 21 of the Act, there should be some material on the basis of which belief can be formed that the tax under the Central Act has been wrongly reduced. In the present case, whatever material was available in existence at the time of passing of the assessment orders the same material existed at the time of the initiation of the proceeding under section 21 of the Act. No material has been referred in the notice under section 21 of the Act on the basis of which belief was formed. He submitted that where two views are possible and there is ambiguity, the view in favour of the subject should be adopted. Reliance is placed on the decision of the apex court in the case of Sun Export Corporation, Bombay v. Collector of Customs, Bombay reported in [1998] 111 STC 69; [1997] 6 SCC 564. He submitted that the heading of section is not conclusive to interpret the provision. Reliance is placed on the decision of the apex court in the case of Forage & Co. He submitted that the heading of section is not conclusive to interpret the provision. Reliance is placed on the decision of the apex court in the case of Forage & Co. (of Lushala) v. Municipal Corpn. of Greater Bombay reported in AIR 2000 SC 378 . He further submitted that in the earlier assessment orders, benefit of set-off has been allowed having regard to the provision of section 15(c) of the Central Act and the position as it existed has not changed inasmuch as neither any decision of the apex court on the issue nor any decision of any of the High Courts on this issue has been referred or any other material on the basis of which belief was formed that the set-off of tax under section 15(c) of the Central Act has been wrongly given. Initiation of the proceeding is merely based on the subjective opinion and merely on account of change of opinion. In support of his contention, he relied upon the decisions in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh v. Oruganti Venkateswarlu & Bros. reported in [1967] 20 STC 340 (AP), State of Andhra Pradesh v. Srinivasa Trading Co. reported in [1986] 61 STC 208 (AP), Aitha Narasaiah & Co. v. State of Andhra Pradesh reported in [1979] 43 STC 183 (AP), Satnam Overseas (Export) v. State of Haryana reported in [2003] 130 STC 107 (SC); [2002] UPTC 1211, Seven Hills Par Boiled Rice Mill v. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Hyderabad reported in [2008] 11 VST 184 (AP), Shree Hanuman Rice Mill v. State of Orissa reported in [1988] 70 STC 316 (Orissa), Commissioner of Trade Tax v. Moti Lal Duli Chand Pvt. Ltd., Kanpur reported in [2009] 21 VST 191 (All); [2007] UPTC 245, Ambika Steels Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in [2008] 12 VST 390 (All); [2007] 35 NTN 126 and Binani Industries Limited v. Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes reported in [2007] 6 VST 783 (SC); [2007] 5 JT SC 311. Shri Hari Om Singh, learned counsel for the petitioners, submitted that under article 286(3) of the Constitution of India, the Parliament has power to put restriction in respect of inter-State sales and in exercise of said power, section 15 of the Central Act has been introduced, therefore, section 15(c) of the Central Act provides set-off with the tax payable on the inter-State sales. Sri N. C. Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioners, submitted that in the fiscal statute the literal meaning of the word used in the statute should be given. He submitted that wherever the Legislature wanted to use the words "State law" in section 15 of the Central Act, it has been specifically used. In section 15(c) of the Central Act for the paddy the words "under the State law" are used, but for the procured rice, the words under the State law have not been used which means that the object is to provide set-off of the tax paid on paddy with the tax payable both under the State law as well as under the Central Act. He submitted that the Commissioner can issue circular only in exercise of power under rule 4(2) in consistency with the provisions of the Act and any circular issued contrary to the provisions of the Act is illegal, not binding and liable to be set aside. He submitted that the Commissioner has no power to fix the liability of tax. In support of his contention, he relied upon the Division Bench decision of this court in the case of Mercury Laboratories Pvt. Ltd. v. State of U.P. reported in [2000] 119 STC 271; [2000] UPTC 82. Sri Jaideep Mathur, learned Additional Advocate-General, submitted that only under section 15, the restriction on the levy of tax under the State law has been imposed. None of the clause provides any benefit or concession of tax under the Central law, which is also clear from the opening part of section 15 of the Central Act. He submitted that the plain reading of the section 15(c) of the Act provides for reduction of tax leviable on rice under the State law by the amount of tax levied on paddy under the State law out of which rice was procured. He submitted that the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Aitha Narasaiah & Co. v. State of Andhra Pradesh [1979] 43 STC 183 was based on the Explanation available under the State law and on consideration of section 8(2A) of the Central Act. He submitted that in paragraph 9 of the apex court decision in the case of Satnam Overseas (Export) v. State of Haryana reported in [2003] 130 STC 107 (SC); [2002] UPTC 1211 is a complete answer of the issue. He submitted that in paragraph 9 of the apex court decision in the case of Satnam Overseas (Export) v. State of Haryana reported in [2003] 130 STC 107 (SC); [2002] UPTC 1211 is a complete answer of the issue. On the issue of change of opinion, he submitted that the language of section 15(c) of the Central Act by itself constitutes the material. However, he fairly admitted that no fresh material has been received by the Additional Commissioner or by the assessing authority in any form at the time of issue of notice. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, we have given our anxious consideration to the rival submissions. It is relevant to refer some of the constitutional provisions and the provisions under the Central Act. Entry 54, List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution provides power to the State to make law and reads as follows : "54. Taxes on the sale or purchase of goods other than newspapers, subject to the provisions of entry 92A of List I." Entry 92A, List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution provides power to the Central Government to make law and reads as follows : "92A. Taxes on the sale or purchase of goods other than newspapers, where such sale or purchase takes place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce." Article 286 of the Constitution reads as follows : "286. Restrictions as to imposition of tax on the sale or purchase of goods. - (1) No law of a State shall impose, or authorise the imposition of, a tax on the sale or purchase of goods where such sale or purchase takes place, - (a) outside the State; or (b) in the course of the import of the goods into, or export of the goods out of the territory of India. (2) Parliament may by law formulate principles for determining when a sale or purchase of goods takes place in any of the ways mentioned in clause (1). (2) Parliament may by law formulate principles for determining when a sale or purchase of goods takes place in any of the ways mentioned in clause (1). (3) Any law of a State shall, in so far as it imposes, or authorises the imposition of, - (a) a tax on the sale or purchase of goods declared by Parliament by law to be of special importance in inter-State trade or commerce; or (b) a tax on the sale or purchase of goods, being a tax of the nature referred to in sub-clause (b), sub-clause (c) or sub-clause (d) of clause (29A) of article 366; be subject to such restrictions and conditions in regard to the system of levy, rates and other incidents of the tax as Parliament may by law specify." Report of the Taxation Enquiry Commission Volume 3 reads as follows : "Taxation Enquiry Commission. - The Commission in its report says : 'To give effect to our recommendations regarding the Central Regulation of States sales taxes on goods of special importance in inter-State trade, the Central legislation will have, firstly to specify such goods and secondly, to impose conditions and restrictions subject to which the State Governments can impose their tax on the internal trade in those goods. The main condition will be that no State shall have a system of levy other than a single-point levy on such specified goods. The tax may be either on sales or on purchases, but it will be recoverable only at the last stage of sale or purchase by a registered dealer. This condition is necessary to ensure that the tax burden on goods of importance in inter-State trade is properly regulated and not allowed to remain vague or undetermined as would be the case under any other system of sales tax. The second condition will be to prescribe a maximum rate of tax. As stated earlier, we recommended that this rate should be three pies per rupee. This would amount to nearly 1 1/2 per cent as against one per cent, which we have recommended in respect of all other inter-State sales. There are two important grounds on which we recommend this higher rate. As stated earlier, we recommended that this rate should be three pies per rupee. This would amount to nearly 1 1/2 per cent as against one per cent, which we have recommended in respect of all other inter-State sales. There are two important grounds on which we recommend this higher rate. Firstly, for the goods specified as of special importance in inter-State trade as distinguished from all other goods which figure in inter-State trade, the point of levy of tax would be only one, i.e., the point at which such goods (raw material, etc.) are taxed by the State in which they are produced. As we proceed to mention below, it will be a condition in respect of such goods that no other sales tax shall be levied on them either by the exporting State or the importing State. Secondly, the higher levy we recommend will be at the raw material or analogous stage when the cost of goods will obviously be much lower than at the subsequent stage of conversion of the material into finished goods. A levy of 1 1/2, at the earlier stage would, therefore by no means be unreasonable in comparison with a levy of one per cent on manufactured goods. A tax at this rate will ordinarily be levied either at the point of dispatch of the specified goods to another State or when the raw material, etc., are sold in the producing State itself for manufacture in that State at the point of sale to, or purchase by, the manufacturer. The third condition, as already indicated, will be that the importing State should not levy either a sales tax or a purchase tax on these goods if at the export end they have already been subjected to tax; otherwise these commodities would be taxed more than once and the object of controlling the incidence thereon will be frustrated.'" Power to control State taxation. - Article 283(3), as it appears after the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution, but before the Constitution (Forty-sixth) Amendment Act, 1982, places certain limitations on the taxing power of a State. - Article 283(3), as it appears after the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution, but before the Constitution (Forty-sixth) Amendment Act, 1982, places certain limitations on the taxing power of a State. It says : 'Any law of a State shall, in so far as it imposes, or authorises the imposition of, a tax on the sale or purchase of goods declared by Parliament by law, to be of special importance in inter-State trade or commerce, be subject to such restrictions and conditions in regard to the system of levy, rates and other incidents of the tax as Parliament may by law specify.' It means that the Parliament may declare particular goods to be of special importance in inter-State trade or commerce. The Parliament may place restrictions and conditions on a State law imposing tax on the sale or purchase of such goods. The restrictions and conditions to be prescribed by the Parliament by law should be related to the system of levy, rates and other incidents of the tax. In accordance with this provision, the Parliament has enacted sections 14 and 15 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. Section 15(a) is to the effect that every sales tax law of a State, in so far as it relates to imposition of tax on the sale or purchase of declared goods, would be subject to two limitations, namely, (i) the tax payable under such law in respect of sale or purchase of goods inside the State shall not exceed four per cent of the sale or purchase price thereof, and (ii) such tax shall not be levied at more than one State. If a State law contains provisions contrary to the limitations so laid down, the effect of article 286(3) read with section 15 of the Central Sales Tax Act would be to automatically modify the State law in so far as it relates to declared goods and to bring such law in conformity with the said provisions. Sections 14 and 15 to be read together. - Sections 14 and 15 of the Central Sales Tax Act have to be read together as they constitute a scheme relating to taxation of goods declared to be of special importance in inter-State trade or commerce. Sections 14 and 15 to be read together. - Sections 14 and 15 of the Central Sales Tax Act have to be read together as they constitute a scheme relating to taxation of goods declared to be of special importance in inter-State trade or commerce. While section 14 enumerates the items of declared goods section 15 imposes the restrictions and conditions regarding tax on sale or purchase of such goods within a State. Section 14, in other words, is not a taxing provision but it merely classifies different commodities under the same species under one entry. Merely because different goods or commodities are listed together in the same sub-heading or sub-item in section 14 cannot mean that they are regarded as one and the same item. Whenever the Legislature wanted different goods placed in the same entry to be regarded as a single commodity, it expressly provided for the same, like section 15(c). It was, accordingly, held that the appellants, who had purchased raw hides and skins on payment of purchase tax, were liable to pay sales tax in respect of sale of dressed hides and skins and such levy would not fall foul of section 15 of the Central Sales Tax Act. Also held that the provisions, under the Tamil Nadu Act, imposing a tax of two per cent on raw hides and skins at the point of last purchase and a tax of two per cent at the point of first sale in the State, were valid and not violative of section 15 of the Central Sales Tax Act. Object of section 15. - Section 15 is designed to override and control the State power to tax transactions of sales and purchases of declared goods. The twin purpose which is sought to be effected by placing section 15 on the statute books is (i) to prescribe the maximum rate of sale or purchase tax under a State law, at one precise stage, and (ii) to prevent subjecting the same goods to tax under the State law and the Central law where the goods are, later, sold in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. Object (i) is sought to be fulfilled by enacting clause (a) and object (ii) by enacting clause (b) of section 15. Object (i) is sought to be fulfilled by enacting clause (a) and object (ii) by enacting clause (b) of section 15. The underlying object seems to be have uniformity, at least in respect of declared goods, of the rate and mode of tax levy throughout India. Section 21. Assessment of tax on the turnover not assessed during the year. - (1) If the assessing authority has reason to believe that the whole or any part of the turnover of the dealer, for any assessment year or part thereof, has escaped assessment to tax or has been under-assessed or has been assessed to tax at a rate lower than that at which it is assessable under this Act, or any deductions or exemptions have been wrongly allowed in respect thereof, the assessing authority may, after issuing notice to the dealer and making such inquiry as it may consider necessary assess or reassess the dealer or tax according to law : Provided that the tax shall be charged at the rate at which it would have been charged, had the turnover escaped assessment or full assessment, as the case may be. Explanation I. - Nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to prevent the assessing authority from making an assessment to the best of its judgment. Explanation II. - For the purposes of this section and of section 22, 'assessing authority' means the officer or authority who passed the earlier assessment order, if any and includes the officer or authority having jurisdiction for the time being to assess the dealer. Explanation III. - Notwithstanding the issuance of notice under this sub-section, where an order of assessment or reassessment is in existence from before the issuance of such notice it shall continue to be effective as such, until varied by an order of assessment or reassessment made under this section in pursuance of such notice. Explanation III. - Notwithstanding the issuance of notice under this sub-section, where an order of assessment or reassessment is in existence from before the issuance of such notice it shall continue to be effective as such, until varied by an order of assessment or reassessment made under this section in pursuance of such notice. (2) Except as otherwise provided in this section, no order of assessment or reassessment under any provision of this Act for any assessment year shall be made after the expiration of two years from the end of such year or 31st March, 1988, whichever is later : Provided that if the Commissioner on his own or on the basis of reasons recorded by the assessing authority, is satisfied that it is just and expedient so to do authorises the assessing authority in that behalf, such assessment or reassessment may be made after the expiration of the period aforesaid but not after the expiration of six years from the end of such year or 31st March, 2002, whichever is later, notwithstanding that such assessment or reassessment may involve a change of opinion : Provided further that the assessment or reassessment for the assessment year 1987-88 may be made by 31st March, 1993 : Provided also that if the eligibility certificate granted under section 4A has been amended or cancelled by the Commissioner under sub-section (3) of section 4A, the order of assessment or reassessment may be made within one year from the date of receipt by the assessing authority of the copy of the order amending or cancelling the aforesaid certificate or by March 31, 1995, whichever is later : Provided also that the assessment or reassessment for the assessment year 1989-90 may be made by March 31, 1995. Section 15 of the Central Act. "15. Restrictions and conditions in regard to tax on sale or purchase of declared goods within a State. Section 15 of the Central Act. "15. Restrictions and conditions in regard to tax on sale or purchase of declared goods within a State. - Every sales tax law of a State shall, in so far as it imposes or authorises the imposition of a tax on the sale or purchase of declared goods, be subject to the following restrictions and conditions, namely :- (a) The tax payable under that law in respect of any sale or purchase of such goods inside the State shall not exceed four per cent of the sale or purchase price thereof; (b) Where a tax has been levied under that law in respect of the sale or purchase inside the State of any declared goods and such goods are sold in the course of inter-State trade or commerce, and tax has been paid under this Act in respect of the sale of such goods in the course of inter-State trade or commerce, the tax levied under such law shall be reimbursed to the person making such sale in the course of inter-State trade or commerce in such manner and subject to such conditions as may be provided in any law in force in that State; (c) Where a tax has been levied under that law in respect of the sale or purchase inside the State of any paddy referred to in sub-clause (i) of clause (i) of section 14, the tax leviable on rice procured out of such paddy shall be reduced by the amount of tax levied on such paddy; (ca) Where a tax on sale or purchase of paddy referred to in sub-clause (i) of clause (i) of section 14 is leviable under that law and the rice procured out of such paddy is exported out of India, then, for the purposes of sub-section (3) of section 5, the paddy and rice shall be treated as a single commodity. (d) Each of the pulses referred to in clause (vi-a) of section 14, whether whole or separated, and whether with or without husk, shall be treated as a single commodity for the purposes of levy of tax under that law." Present writ petitions raise the interesting question relating to the interpretation of section 15(c) of the Central Act. (d) Each of the pulses referred to in clause (vi-a) of section 14, whether whole or separated, and whether with or without husk, shall be treated as a single commodity for the purposes of levy of tax under that law." Present writ petitions raise the interesting question relating to the interpretation of section 15(c) of the Central Act. The question is whether under section 15(c) of the Central Act the tax leviable under the Central Act on the sale and inter-State sales of rice procured out of such paddy is liable to be reduced by the amount of tax levied on the paddy under the U.P. Trade Tax Act. Whether Circular No. 137, dated 29th/30th March, 2007 issued by the Commissioner of Trade Tax, U.P., expressing his opinion that such reduction is not permissible, is legally correct. Another question for consideration is whether the initiation of proceedings under section 21 of the Act is merely based on change of opinion and, therefore, bad in law. In view of the provisions of sub-article (3) of article 246 read with entry 54 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, a State is competent to legislate authorising imposition of taxes on the sale or purchase of goods (other than newspaper), subject to the provisions of entry 92A of List I. Under the said entry (92A of List I), the Parliament is competent to legislate authorising imposition of taxes on the sale or purchase of goods (other than newspaper), where such sale or purchase takes place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. In other words, any Act passed by a State Legislature authorising imposition of taxes on sale or purchase of goods will be subject to the legislation made by the Parliament under entry 92A of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. Article 286 of the Constitution of India prescribes the restriction as to the imposition of a tax on sale or purchase of goods enumerated therein. Article 286(1) of the Constitution of India lays down the restriction on a State law as to the imposition or authorising the imposition of a tax on sale or purchase of goods where such sale or purchase takes place (a) outside the State or (b) in the course of import of goods into or export of goods out of the territory of India. Clause (2) thereof empowers the Parliament to formulate principles for determining as to when a sale or purchase of goods takes place in any of the ways aforementioned. The directive embodied in clause (3) is that any law of State shall, insofar as it imposes or authorises the imposition of tax, specified in sub-clauses (a) and (b) thereof, be subject to such restrictions and conditions in regard to the system of levy, rates and other incidence of tax, as the Parliament may by law specify. The said sub-clauses are as follows : (a) a tax on the sale or purchase of goods declared by Parliament by law to be of special importance in inter-State trade or commerce (the declared goods); or (b) a tax on the sale or purchase of goods being a tax of the nature referred to in sub-clause (b), sub-clause (c) or sub-clause (d) of clause (29A) of article 366. In exercise of the power conferred under clause (2) of article 286, the Parliament enacted the Central Sales Tax Act formulating principles for determining when a sale or purchase of goods takes place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce or outside a State or in the course of import or export. Section 5 of the Central Act embodies the principles as to when a sale or purchase of goods is said to take place in the course of import or export. In exercise of power under article 286(3) of the Constitution of India, Parliament enacted section 15 of the Central Sales Tax Act. The provisions of section 15 of the Central Act enumerate the restrictions and conditions in regard to tax on sale or purchase of declared goods within a State, which is defined in clause (c) of section 2 of the Central Act to mean the goods declared under section 14 to be of special importance in inter-State trade or commerce. It may be pointed out here that paddy and rice are enumerated in sub-clauses (i) and (ii) respectively or clause (i) of section 14 and they are, therefore, declared goods. It may be pointed out here that paddy and rice are enumerated in sub-clauses (i) and (ii) respectively or clause (i) of section 14 and they are, therefore, declared goods. Reverting to section 15, clause (a) imposes two restrictions on the tax to be imposed on sale or purchase of declared goods inside the State : (1) an upper ceiling of four per cent on sale or purchase price of such goods and (2) such tax shall not be levied at more than one stage (this second restriction has been deleted by the Finance Act No. 20 of 2002, with effect from 1st April, 2002). Clause (b) provides relief of reimbursement of tax paid under the Central Act in case of double taxation of declared goods; that is, where tax has been levied under the State Act on sale or purchase of such goods and is again levied under the Central Act in respect of sale of such goods in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. The edict of clause (c) makes it clear that a State law which imposes or authorises the imposition of tax on sale or purchase of rice or paddy inside the State has to be treated in the following manner : where a tax has been levied in respect of sale or purchase inside the State on paddy, the tax leviable on rice procured out of such paddy shall be reduced by the amount of tax levied on it (such paddy). Clause (ca) is inserted by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1996 (33 of 1996), with effect from 28 September, 1996. It directs that where a tax on sale or purchase of paddy is leviable under a State law and the rice procured out of such paddy is exported out of India then for purposes of penultimate sale under section 5(3), the paddy and rice shall be treated as a single commodity. In the circumstances mentioned in clause (ca), it brings paddy on par with pulses dealt with in clause (d), the mandate embodied in clause (d) is that pulses enumerated in clause (vi-a) of section 14, whether whole or separated, and whether with or without husk, shall be treated as a single commodity for the purposes of levy of tax under any State law. In State of Punjab v. Punjab Fibres Ltd. reported in [2005] 139 STC 200 (SC); AIR 2004 SCW 6988, dealing with the notification issued under the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, it has been held as follows : "It is settled law that to avail of the benefits of a notification the party must strictly comply with the conditions of the notification. It is also settled law that the notification has to be interpreted in terms of its wording. Where the language is very clear and unambiguous, benefit cannot be granted merely on the ground of sympathy." In I.T.C. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, New Delhi [2004] 7 JT 409 SC, the Supreme Court has said that : "... Words have to be construed strictly according to their ordinary and natural meaning, particularly when the statute is a fiscal one irrespective of the object with which the provision was introduced. Of course if there is ambiguity in the statutory language, reference may be made to the legislative intent to resolve the ambiguity. But if the statutory language is unambiguous then that must be given effect to. The Legislature is deemed to intend and mean what it says. The need for interpretation arises only when the words used in the statutes are, on their own terms, ambivalent and do not manifest the intention of the Legislature. Keshavji Ravji and Co. v. Commissioner of Income-tax [1990] 183 ITR 1 (SC); [1990] 1 JT 253 SC." Exceptions to the above rule of strict interpretation have also been noted therein. They are - (1) The rule of strict construction does not apply to a provision which merely lays down the machinery for the calculation or procedure for the collection of tax. (2) If two constructions are possible and a strict construction would lead to an absurd result then the construction which is in keeping with the object of the statutory provision on in keeping with equity could be accepted. The apex court in the case of Binani Industries Limited v. Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes reported in [2007] 6 VST 783; [2007] 5 JT SC 311, following its earlier decision in the case of Ahmedabad Manufacturing and Calico Printing Co. The apex court in the case of Binani Industries Limited v. Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes reported in [2007] 6 VST 783; [2007] 5 JT SC 311, following its earlier decision in the case of Ahmedabad Manufacturing and Calico Printing Co. Ltd. v. S. G. Mehta, Income-tax Officer reported in [1963] 48 ITR 154 (SC); AIR 1963 SC 1436 and Commercial Tax Officer v. Biswanath Jhunjhunwala reported in [1996] 5 SCC 626 has held that : "... it is the language of the provision that matters and when the meaning is clear, it has to be given full effect. In both these cases, this court held that the proviso which amended the existing provision gave it retrospectivity. When the provision of law is explicit, it has to operate fully and there could not be any limits to its operation. This court in Biswanath Jhunjhunwala case [1996] 5 SCC 626 said that if the language expressly so states or clearly implies, retrospectivity must be given to the provision. ..." In the case of Polestar Electronic (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Additional Commissioner, Sales Tax reported in [1978] 41 STC 409 (SC); [1979] UPTC 129, the apex court observed as follows : "If the language of a statute is clear and explicit, effect must be given to it, for in such a case the words best declare the intention of the law-giver. It would not be right to refuse to place on the language of the statute the plain and natural meaning which it must bear on the ground that it produces a consequence which could not have been intended by the Legislature. It is only from the language of the statute that the intention of the Legislature must be gathered for the Legislature means no more and no less than what it says. It is not permissible to the court to speculate as to what the Legislature must have intended and then to twist or bend the language of the statute to make it accord with the presumed intention of the Legislature. … It must also be remembered that section 5(2)(a)(ii) and the second proviso occur in a taxing statute and it is well-settled rule of interpretation that in construing a taxing statute 'one must have regard to the strict letter of the law and not merely to the spirit of the statute or the substance of the law'. … It must also be remembered that section 5(2)(a)(ii) and the second proviso occur in a taxing statute and it is well-settled rule of interpretation that in construing a taxing statute 'one must have regard to the strict letter of the law and not merely to the spirit of the statute or the substance of the law'. The oft-quoted words of Rowlett, J., in Cape Brandy Syndicate v. Inland Revenue Commissioners [1921] 1 KB 64, lay down the correct rule of interpretation in case of a fiscal statute : 'In a taxing Act one has to look merely at what is clearly said. There is no room for any intendment. There is no equity about a tax. There is no presumption as to a tax. Nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied. One can only look fairly at the language used'. It is a rule firmly established that 'the words of a taxing Act must never be stretched against a tax-payer'. If the Legislature has failed to clarify its meaning by use of appropriate language, the benefit must go to the tax-payer. Even if there is any doubt as to interpretation, it must be resolved in favour of the subject. ..." In the light of the aforesaid discussions let us examine the scope of section 15(c) of the Central Act. As referred hereinabove section 15 of the Central Act enumerates restrictions and conditions in regard to tax on sale or purchase of declared goods within a State. Therefore, clause (c) of section 15 of the Central Act is to be read putting restrictions in regard to tax on sale or purchase of declared goods within a State. It provides for reduction of tax leviable on rice procured out of paddy, on which the tax has been levied under the State law. This reduction is only with regard to the tax on sale of rice within a State as referred hereinabove. The reduction of tax on inter-State sales of rice by the tax levied on paddy is neither stated in clause (c) nor intended and, therefore, cannot be imported. Neither clause (a) nor clause (b) or any other clauses provides any concession in any manner in respect of tax on the sale of declared goods in the course of inter-State sales. The reduction of tax on inter-State sales of rice by the tax levied on paddy is neither stated in clause (c) nor intended and, therefore, cannot be imported. Neither clause (a) nor clause (b) or any other clauses provides any concession in any manner in respect of tax on the sale of declared goods in the course of inter-State sales. Clause (b) of section 15 of the Central Act provides reimbursement of the tax paid under the State law on the declared goods. It does not provide any exemption or any concession or reduction of the tax leviable under the Central Act. Therefore, in our opinion, it is beyond doubt that clause (c) of section 15 of the Central Act provides the reduction of tax leviable on the sale of rice under the U.P. Trade Tax Act with the tax levied on the paddy under the State law out of which such rice was produced. The following sentences of the Report of Taxation Enquiry Commission Vol. II also support our views : "Power to control State taxation. - Article 283(3), as it appears after the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution, but before the Constitution (Forty-sixth) Amendment Act, 1982, places certain limitations on the taxing power of a State. It says : 'Any law of a State shall, in so far as it imposes, or authorises the imposition of, a tax on the sale or purchase of goods declared by Parliament by law to be of special importance in inter-State trade or commerce, be subject to such restrictions and conditions in regard to the system of levy, rates and other incidents of the tax as Parliament may by law specify.' It means that the Parliament may declare particular goods to be of special importance in inter-State trade or commerce. The Parliament may place restrictions and conditions on a State law imposing tax on the sale or purchase of such goods. The restrictions and conditions to be prescribed by the Parliament by law should be related to the system of levy, rates and other incidents of the tax. In accordance with this provision, the Parliament has enacted sections 14 and 15 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. Sections 14 and 15 to be read together. The restrictions and conditions to be prescribed by the Parliament by law should be related to the system of levy, rates and other incidents of the tax. In accordance with this provision, the Parliament has enacted sections 14 and 15 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. Sections 14 and 15 to be read together. - Sections 14 and 15 of the Central Sales Tax Act have to be read together as they constitute a scheme relating to taxation of goods declared to be of special importance in inter-State trade or commerce. While section 14 enumerates the items of declared goods, section 15 imposes the restrictions and conditions regarding tax on sale or purchase of such goods within a State. Object of section 15. - Section 15 is designed to override and control the State power to tax transactions of sales and purchases of declared goods." The above view is in consonance with the decision of the apex court in the case of Satnam Overseas (Export) v. State of Haryana reported in [2003] 130 STC 107; [2002] UPTC 1211. The learned counsel for the petitioners want us to read the judgment of Satnam Overseas (Export) v. State of Haryana reported in [2003] 130 STC 107 (SC); [2002] UPTC 1211, in the manner that clause (c) of section 15 of the Central Act also provides reduction of tax leviable under the Central Act on the sale of rice with the tax levied on paddy under the State law. We are afraid to accept the submission. We do not find anything in the decision of the apex court in the case of Satnam Overseas (Export) v. State of Haryana [2003] 130 STC 107; [2002] UPTC 1211 as submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner. It would be convenient to refer some of the relevant sentences of the decision of the apex court : "The provisions, quoted above, enumerate the restrictions and conditions in regard to tax on sale or purchase of declared goods within a State. ... ... It would be convenient to refer some of the relevant sentences of the decision of the apex court : "The provisions, quoted above, enumerate the restrictions and conditions in regard to tax on sale or purchase of declared goods within a State. ... ... The edict of clause (c) makes it clear that a State law which imposes or authorises imposition of tax on sale or purchase of rice or paddy inside the State has to be treated in the following manner : where a tax has been levied in respect of sale or purchase inside the State on paddy, the tax leviable on rice procured out of such paddy shall be reduced by the amount of tax levied on it (such paddy); for example, assuming that in a State the rate of tax on the sale or purchase price of paddy is one per cent and of rice is four per cent, then the tax leviable on the sale of rice will be reduced by one per cent, consequently, the tax payable on the sale of rice would be only three per cent." From the above example, referred hereinabove, it is clear that four per cent tax on rice as applicable in the State law has been taken. It may be mentioned here that under section 8 of the Central Act the turnover of rice against form "C" is liable to tax at four per cent and without form "C" is liable to tax at eight per cent being a declared commodity. (In the case of either commodities, the general rate applicable is 10 per cent without form "C"). It is also useful to refer the case of Mahendrakumar Iswarlal and Co. v. Commercial Tax Officer reported in AIR 1968 Mad 90 . The Division Bench of the Madras High Court has considered article 286(3) of the Constitution and held "That means the Parliament may declare particular goods to be of special importance in inter-State trade or commerce. The Parliament may place such restrictions and conditions on a State law imposing tax on the sale or purchase of such goods. The restrictions and conditions to be prescribed by the Parliament by law should be related to the system of levy, rates and other incidents of the tax. In accordance with this provision, the Parliament has enacted sections 14 and 15 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. The restrictions and conditions to be prescribed by the Parliament by law should be related to the system of levy, rates and other incidents of the tax. In accordance with this provision, the Parliament has enacted sections 14 and 15 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. ..." Now coming to the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Aitha Narasaiah & Co. v. State of Andhra Pradesh [1979] 43 STC 183, which is very strongly relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners. There was an Explanation III of the Third Schedule in the State law, which says that "For the purpose of items 21 and 22, where a tax has been levied under this Act in respect of the sale or purchase inside the State of any paddy, the tax leviable on rice procured out of such paddy shall be reduced by the amount of tax levied on such paddy". The Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court relied upon its earlier decision in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh v. Oruganti Venkateswarlu & Bros. [1967] 20 STC 340, wherein section 8(2A) of the Central Act has been interpreted and held as follows : "Thus section 8(2A) and section 15(b) and (c) of the Central Act 74 of 1956 read together and juxtaposed with items 21 and 22 of the State Act 6 of 1957, Explanation III in the Third Schedule, in our view, the same conclusion follows to hold tax on rice involved in the inter-State trade procured out of paddy which suffered the State tax has to be reduced. ..." It was further held that "In the result having regard to the provisions in section 8(2A), section 15(c) of the Central Act 74 of 1956, item 22 read with Explanation III in the Third Schedule of the State Act 6 of 1957 paddy' out of which rice is procured involved in inter-State trade, we hold that tax paid on paddy is liable to be (reduced) reimbursed. ..." We have gone through the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. Same is clearly distinguishable. The entire judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court is based on Explanation III of the Schedule under the State law and section 8(2A) of the Central Act. Firstly, the said Explanation is not available under the U.P. Trade Tax Act. ..." We have gone through the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. Same is clearly distinguishable. The entire judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court is based on Explanation III of the Schedule under the State law and section 8(2A) of the Central Act. Firstly, the said Explanation is not available under the U.P. Trade Tax Act. Therefore, section 8(2A) of the Central Act does not apply; secondly, it is doubtful that it lays down the correct law in view of the subsequent decision of the apex court in the case of Pine Chemicals Ltd. v. Assessing Authority reported in [1992] 85 STC 432; [1992] 2 SCC 683. In the case of State of Andhra Pradesh v. Srinivasa Trading Co. reported in [1986] 61 STC 208, the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court on a similar situation has followed its earlier decision in the case of Aitha Narasaiah & Co. v. State of Andhra Pradesh [1979] 43 STC 183 referred hereinabove. The decision of the Orissa High Court in the case of Shree Hanuman Rice Mill v. State of Orissa reported in [1988] 70 STC 316, is also based on section 8(2A) of the Central Sales Tax Act and thus, is not applicable and is clearly distinguishable. In the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Food Corporation of India v. State of Punjab reported in [2006] 148 STC 312, the dispute relates to the set-off of the tax paid on paddy with the tax payable on rice under the State law and not under the Central Sales Tax Act. Thus, this case has no relevance. In this view of the matter, we are of the view that there is no illegality in the impugned circular dated March 29/30, 2007 issued by the Commissioner of Trade Tax, which is in conformity with the plain language of section 15(c) of the Central Act. We have also examined the circular dated March 18, 1998. The said circular was issued in the case of new unit. We have perused the circular. There is nothing in the circular which provides the benefit of the reduction of tax leviable under the Central Act on the inter-State sale of rice by the tax levied on paddy. This circular does not help the petitioners. The said circular was issued in the case of new unit. We have perused the circular. There is nothing in the circular which provides the benefit of the reduction of tax leviable under the Central Act on the inter-State sale of rice by the tax levied on paddy. This circular does not help the petitioners. In view of the above, the various decisions cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners have no relevance and it is not necessary to deal with them. Now coming to the next question whether the initiation of proceeding under section 21 of the Act is valid. It appears that after the circular being issued by the Commissioner of Trade Tax dated March 29/30, 2007 referred hereinabove the Additional Commissioner has issued the notice for granting the approval to initiate the proceeding beyond the period of limitation prescribed under section 21(1) of the Act. Perusal of the language of the circular and the notices under the proviso to section 21(2) of the Act reveal that the contents are the same. Thus, it is clear that the notices have been issued on the basis of the circular. After the approval being granted by the Additional Commissioner under the proviso to section 21(2) of the Act extending the period of limitation to initiate the proceeding, the notices under section 21(1) of the Act have been issued by the respective assessing authority of the petitioners. The contents of the notice are as follows : MATTER IN OTHER LANGUAGE. Perusal of the notice issued under section 21 of the Act reveals that no basis or material has been referred therein on the basis of which the belief was formed. The Additional Advocate-General has very fairly admitted that no fresh material is available on record on the basis of which belief was formed that the exemption/deduction has wrongly been allowed. On these facts it is to be examined whether the initiation of the proceeding is legally justified or not. Section 21(1) of the U.P. Trade Tax Act, which contemplates assessment and reassessment is equivalent to section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Both the sections relate to the assessment of escaped assessment to tax. In both the sections the proceedings can be initiated only if the assessing authority "has a reason to believe" that there is escaped assessment. Section 21(1) of the U.P. Trade Tax Act, which contemplates assessment and reassessment is equivalent to section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Both the sections relate to the assessment of escaped assessment to tax. In both the sections the proceedings can be initiated only if the assessing authority "has a reason to believe" that there is escaped assessment. Under section 21(1) of the Act the words are "has reason to believe" and not "reason to suspect". The belief entertained by the assessing officer must not be arbitrary or irrational. It must be reasonable and based on reasons, which are relevant. It must be in good faith and not in mere pretence, should have a rational connection and relevant bearing on the formation of the belief, and should not be extraneous or irrelevant. The material should be relating to the particular year for which the assessment is sought to be reopened. It is not any and every material, howsoever vague and indefinite or distant, remote and far-fetched, which would warrant the formation of the belief relating to escapement of income. In the case of John Lal (HUF) v. Commissioner of Income-tax, U.P. reported in [1973] 88 ITR 439 (SC), the apex court has held as follows : "The formation of required belief by the Income-tax Officer before proceedings can be validly initiated under section 34(1)(a) is a condition precedent : the fulfilment of this condition is not a mere formality, it is mandatory, and failure to fulfil that condition would vitiate the entire proceedings. Further, the formation of the required belief is not the only requirement : the officer is further required to record his reasons for taking action under section 34(1)(a) and obtain the sanction of the Central Board or the Commissioner, as the case may be." In Joti Prashad v. State of Haryana [1992] 6 JT 94 SC the honourable Supreme Court while dealing with the meaning of expression "reason to believe" in section 26 of the Indian Penal Code held that the reason to believe is not the same as suspicion and a person must have reason to believe if the circumstances are such that a reasonable man would, by probable reasoning, conclude or infer regarding the nature of the thing concerned. In Income-tax Officer v. Lakhmani Mewal Das [1976] 103 ITR 437; [1976] UPTC 809, the honourable Supreme Court held that the reasons for the formation of the belief contemplated by section 147(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, for the reopening of an assessment must have a rational connection or relevant bearing on the formation of the belief. Rational connection postulates that there must be a direct nexus or live link between the material coming to the notice of the Income-tax Officer and the formation of his belief. The honourable Supreme Court further observed that though it is true that the court cannot go into the sufficiency or adequacy of the material and substitute its own opinion for that of the Income-tax Officer on the point as to whether action should be initiated for reopening the assessment yet at the same time we have to bear in mind that it is not any and every material, howsoever, vague and indefinite or distant, remote and far-fetched, which would warrant the formation of the belief relating to escapement of the income of the assessee from assessment. In Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. v. Bhagwan Industries (P.) Ltd. [1973] 31 STC 293 (SC), it was held that reasonable grounds necessarily postulate that they must be germane to the formation of the belief regarding escaped assessment. If the grounds are of an extraneous character, the same would not warrant initiation of proceedings under this section. If however, the grounds are relevant and have a nexus with the formation of belief regarding escaped assessment, the assessing authority would be clothed with jurisdiction to take action under this section. The question whether the assessing officer had reasons to believe is a question of jurisdiction, a vital thing, which can always be investigated by the court under article 226 of the Constitution as held in Daulatram Rawatmal v. Income-tax Officer [1960] 38 ITR 301 (Cal), Jamna Lal Kabra v. Income-tax Officer [1968] 69 ITR 461 (All), Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. v. Income-tax Officer [1961] 41 ITR 191 (SC), C. M. Rajgharia v. Income-tax Officer [1975] 98 ITR 486 (Patna) and Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd. v. Income-tax Officer [1965] 57 ITR 637 (SC). Ltd. v. Income-tax Officer [1961] 41 ITR 191 (SC), C. M. Rajgharia v. Income-tax Officer [1975] 98 ITR 486 (Patna) and Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd. v. Income-tax Officer [1965] 57 ITR 637 (SC). If there is no rational and intelligible nexus between the reasons and the belief, so that, on such reasons, no one properly instructed on facts and law could reasonably entertain the belief, the conclusion would be inescapable that the assessing officer could not have reason to believe. In such a case, the notice issued by him would be liable to be struck down as invalid as held in the case of Ganga Saran & Sons P. Ltd. v. Income-tax Officer [1981] 130 ITR 1 (SC). In the case of Indra Prastha Chemicals Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax reported in [2004] 271 ITR 113; [2005] UPTC 53 this court held as follows : "Thus, it is well-settled that the 'reason to believe' under section 147 must be held in good faith and should have a rational connection and relevant bearing on the formation of the belief and should not be extraneous or irrelevant. Further, this court in proceedings under article 226 of the Constitution of India can scrutinize the reasons recorded by the assessing officer for initiating the proceedings under section 147/148 of the Act. The sufficiency of the material cannot be gone into but relevancy certainly be gone into." It is settled principle of law that in a writ jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution of India, this court cannot look into the sufficiency of the material on the basis of which a belief has been formed and notice under section 21 of the Act has been issued. This court can only examine whether there was any material and whether the material is relevant to form the belief of escaped income. (Income-tax Officer v. Lakhmani Mewal Das [1976] 103 ITR 437 (SC); [1976] UPTC 809 (SC), Indra Prashta Chemicals Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax reported in [2004] 271 ITR 113 (All); 2005 UPTC 53). In the case of Commissioner of Income-tax, Gujarat - II v. Kurban Hussain Ibrahimji Mithiborwala reported in [1971] 82 ITR 821, the apex court has held that it is well-settled that the Income-tax Officer's jurisdiction to reopen an assessment under section 34 of the Income-tax Act, 1922, depends upon the issuance of a valid notice. In the case of Commissioner of Income-tax, Gujarat - II v. Kurban Hussain Ibrahimji Mithiborwala reported in [1971] 82 ITR 821, the apex court has held that it is well-settled that the Income-tax Officer's jurisdiction to reopen an assessment under section 34 of the Income-tax Act, 1922, depends upon the issuance of a valid notice. If the notice issued by him is invalid for any reason the entire proceedings taken by him would become void for want of jurisdiction. In the case of Kalpana Kola Kendra, Kanpur v. Sales Tax Officer, Circle 20, Kanpur reported in [1989] 75 STC 198 (All); [1989] UPTC 597, the Division Bench held as follows : "Section 21 of the Act is based upon the theory that the taxes must be paid by the assessee in correct sum and likewise it must be collected by the statutory machinery. The escapement from assessment whether it results on account of concealment practiced or fraud played by the assessee or as a result of negligence or ignorance of the assessing authority, in our opinion, is of no consequence, provided the action to reopen the assessment is otherwise justified and the assessing officer is not acting arbitrarily or in a capricious manner. The escapement of assessment contemplated under that section may be due to various reasons. The term 'turnover has escaped assessment to tax' which includes under-assessment, may as well be the result of lack of care on the part of the assessing officer or by reason of inadvertence on his part. Section 21 does not prohibit obtaining of information from the investigation of material on the record of the original assessment. The scope of that section is not circumscribed by a rider like the one that exists in section 147(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, namely, the Income-tax Officer has reason to believe that by reason of the omission or failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for the assessment for that year, income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for that year. The escapement envisaged by section 21 of the Act for the purposes of reassessment need not necessarily spring from a source extraneous to the original record. The escapement envisaged by section 21 of the Act for the purposes of reassessment need not necessarily spring from a source extraneous to the original record. However, a second thought or a mere change of opinion, by the assessing authority on the same set of facts and the material on the record would not clothe the assessing authority with a valid jurisdiction. ... We are not impressed by the argument that the instant case is a case of change of opinion. Change of opinion necessarily postulates that the assessing authority had an occasion to consider the material earlier, and on the same set of facts another opinion was sought to be formed. The question of change of opinion cannot arise where there has been no previous proceeding of assessment in respect of a turnover in dispute. As pointed out by the Calcutta High Court in Income-tax Officer v. Mahadeo Lal Tulsyan [1978] 111 ITR 25, a change of opinion by the assessing officer contemplates, formation of two different opinions or to make two different inferences at two stages on the same set of primary facts. The distinction between an inadvertent mistake or omission and change of opinion was pointed out by one of us after reviewing a large number of decided cases, both by this court and by the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. v. Madhu Chemical Works, Bareilly [1988] 71 STC 421 (All); [1988] UPTC 230. It was held that in a case where a particular point has been considered on merits, and a view is taken, it would not be a case of inadvertent mistake or omission, if it is found that the view taken earlier was wrong. It would be a case of change of opinions, but if it is not so, then it would be a case of non-application of mind and an action would be justified under section 21 of the Act." It is settled principle of law that the notice under section 21 of the Act cannot be issued on account of change of opinion on the basis of material available on record. In the case of Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Gopalji, Varanasi reported in [1974] UPTC 277, the Sales Tax Officer got second thought about the applicability or effect of the survey and hence notice under section 21 was issued. In the case of Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Gopalji, Varanasi reported in [1974] UPTC 277, the Sales Tax Officer got second thought about the applicability or effect of the survey and hence notice under section 21 was issued. It was held that this would not constitute reason to believe within the meaning of section 21 of the said Act. Hence notice under section 21 was held invalid. In the case of Palco Lining Company v. Sales Tax Officer reported in [1983] 54 STC 255 (All); [1983] UPTC 1116, the assessment order recorded that the assessing authority has after elaborately considering the evidence taken the view that what was being sold by the petitioner was nothing but collar lining and its turnover of sale was held exempt from the Sales Tax Act. Under a notification the assessing authority, however, issued notice under section 21 of the said Act for reassessing the same matter, hence it was held notice under section 21 to be invalid. In the case of Palco Lining Company v. Sales Tax Officer reported in [1983] 54 STC 255 (All); [1983] UPTC 1116, the court held as follows : "It does not permit reassessment of turnover which, after the due consideration, had been found not exigible to tax merely because the assessing authority subsequently comes to take a different view of the matter." To the similar effect is another decision where we find under section 34 of the Income-tax Act, 1922 which is similar to the provision of section 21 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, after considering the provision of section 34 of the said Act the following observation has been made by the apex court in the case of Commissioner of Income-tax v. Bhanji Lavji [1971] 79 ITR 582, which is quoted as under : "When the primary facts necessary for assessment are fully and truly disclosed to the Income-tax Officer at the stage of the original assessment proceedings, he is not entitled, on a change of opinion, to commence proceedings for reassessment under section 34(1)(a)." To the similar effect is also the decision of Commissioner of Income-tax v. Dinesh Chandra H. Shah reported in [1971] 82 ITR 367 (SC) wherein it is held that : "... It appears that the Income-tax Officer clearly sought to justify the reopening of the assessment under section 34(1)(b) merely on the ground of change of opinion. It appears that the Income-tax Officer clearly sought to justify the reopening of the assessment under section 34(1)(b) merely on the ground of change of opinion. It is well-settled by now, and Mr. Desai quite rightly does not dispute the proposition, that mere change of opinion could not be a valid ground for reopening the assessment under section 34(1)(b) of the Act. We would accordingly uphold the answer returned by the High Court on the short ground that the reassessment for the year in question was sought to be reopened for the reason that the successor of the Income-tax Officer who had made the original assessment had changed his opinion which did not furnish a justifiable reason for taking action under section 34(1)(b)." While considering section 147 of the said Act in the case of the Income-tax Officer v. Nawab Mir Barkat Ali Khan Bahadur reported in [1974] 97 ITR 239; AIR 1975 SC 703 , the same view has been taken. Having second thought on the same material does not warrant initiation of proceedings under section 147 of the Income-tax Act. In the case of Harbans Lal Malhotra v. Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax, Ghaziabad reported in [1997] 107 STC 98; [1994] UPTC 1041, the Division Bench of this court held that the authority cannot issue any notice on account of change of opinion nor in the absence of any material for the year in question. It has been further held that the original assessment order disclosed a detailed scrutiny of all the documents of the petitioner including the agreement in question and the very basis of the assessment was an arriving at the conclusion that the documents on record revealed that the transfer of the goods amounted to stock transfer. The notice under section 21 of the Act has been held as amounting to re-examination of the same matter again and to making fresh enquiry in the same matter, which is not permissible. The notice under section 21 of the Act has been held as amounting to re-examination of the same matter again and to making fresh enquiry in the same matter, which is not permissible. In the case of Ratan Industries (Pvt.) Limited, Agra v. Additional Commissioner of Trade Tax, Agra reported in [2006] 148 STC 111; [2004] 24 NTN 384, the Division Bench of this court in paragraph 22 observed that "It is a well-settled principle of law that the question which has been examined in detail in the original assessment proceeding and thereafter the assessment order has passed, then the said assessment order cannot be reopened under section 21 of the Act on mere change of opinion." In the case of Royal Trading Co. v. Trade Tax Officer reported in [2000] UPTC 642 the Division Bench of this court held that "no assessment proceeding can legally be taken even if an authorisation has been given under section 21(2) of the Act by the Commissioner of Trade Tax, if no cogent material was there to form a reasonable belief as required under section 21(2) of the Act itself." In the case of IL & FS Investment Managers Ltd. v. Income-tax Officer reported in [2008] 298 ITR 32 (Bom); [2007] 209 CTR 1 (Bom), the Bombay High Court held that the proceeding cannot be reopened merely because the assessing authority is of the view that the depreciation has been wrongly allowed merely on a change of opinion. In the case of Anil Kumar Bhandari v. Joint Commissioner of Income-tax reported in [2007] 294 ITR 222 (Cal), the deduction was allowed under section 80HHC and the case was reopened on the ground that the deduction has been wrongly allowed. The Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court held that the initiation of reassessment proceeding by the assessing authority purportedly to reopen the assessment upon the change of opinion on the same facts is not justified. The Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court held that the initiation of reassessment proceeding by the assessing authority purportedly to reopen the assessment upon the change of opinion on the same facts is not justified. In the case of Mercury Laboratories Pvt. Ltd. v. State of U.P. reported in [2000] 119 STC 271 (All); [2000] UPTC 82, the Division Bench of this court held as follows : "After giving anxious consideration to the arguments raised by the learned counsel for the parties we find that the Commissioner, Sales Tax had no authority to either issue directions, instructions, guidelines or message or even suggestions to the assessing authority or the subordinate authority who has to deal with the matter of assessment, impressing upon them in any manner that the 'life-saving drugs' which have been notified and are being sold in the brand name of the respective companies would not be entitled for exemption. We have yet to see an assessing authority which is subordinate to the Commissioner, Sales Tax which has courage to go beyond the wishes of Commissioner, Sales Tax, because that may not only make him liable for adverse remarks or some punitive action but would also make him open for submitting explanation as to why he has caused loss to the State Revenue by granting such exemption when the things were made clear in this regard. Therefore, the contention of the learned State counsel that the aforesaid guidelines were not binding on subordinate authorities and was only a view expressed by the Commissioner, Sales Tax in the magazine does not stand to reason. ... ... The message or guidelines issued by the Commissioner undoubtedly interferes in the judicial discretion and the judicial action of the assessing authority, which cannot be protected under law. The Commissioner, even otherwise was having no occasion to interpret the notification as he was not dealing with any such dispute, either in his appellate capacity or otherwise. ... ... The message or guidelines issued by the Commissioner undoubtedly interferes in the judicial discretion and the judicial action of the assessing authority, which cannot be protected under law. The Commissioner, even otherwise was having no occasion to interpret the notification as he was not dealing with any such dispute, either in his appellate capacity or otherwise. The Commissioner had no authority, otherwise, to guide the subordinate authorities, by his own personal view, in the matter of taxation or exemption, under the notification." In view of the above discussions, we are of the view that though we have upheld the view taken by the Commissioner of Trade Tax in the impugned circular, we express that the Commissioner of Trade Tax had no authority to issue such circular giving his own interpretation in respect of particular provision though no such question in any of the proceeding before him was involved and issuing a direction to the subordinate authority to proceed on the basis of such view amounts to interference with the judicial function of subordinate officers. In this view of the matter, we direct that the Commissioner of Trade Tax should refrain himself in issuing such direction in future, which amounts to interference with the quasi-judicial function of subordinate officers. In any view of the matter, the view expressed in the circular may amount to his own view and does not constitute material on the basis of which a belief could be formed to reopen the case. Further, perusal of the notices (one of the notice being referred hereinabove) issued by the assessing authority reveals that no material has been referred on the basis of which belief was formed to reopen the case under section 21(1) of the Act. In the original assessment order under section 9 of the Central Act, the tax levied on the turnover of rice under the Central Act has been reduced by the tax levied on the paddy out of which such rice was procured. Some of the assessment orders passed under section 9 of the Central Act have been filed along with counter and rejoinder affidavits. The reduction of tax could only be possible under section 15(c) of the Central Act. Some of the assessment orders passed under section 9 of the Central Act have been filed along with counter and rejoinder affidavits. The reduction of tax could only be possible under section 15(c) of the Central Act. Several writ petitions which have been filed at Lucknow Bench and at Allahabad reveal that the assessing authority has understood section 15(c) of the Central Act that reduction of tax under the Central Act on the turnover of rice with the tax levied on paddy was permissible. The notices under section 21 of the Act have been issued without any fresh material and only on account of change of opinion. Initial opinion while passing the original assessment orders under section 9 of the Central Act may be incorrect, but once the view has been taken and the reduction has been allowed on the same existing fact, the proceeding under section 21 of the Act cannot be taken on account of change of opinion. The assessing authority in the notice under section 21 of the Act has neither referred any decision of any High Court or of the apex court interpreting section 15(c) of the Act in the manner in which it has now been considered. Therefore, apart from his own change of view and may be on the basis of instructions of the Commissioner of Trade Tax by the impugned circular, proceedings under section 21 of the Act have been initiated. Thus, on the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the view that at the time of initiation of the proceeding under section 21 of the Act, there was no material on the basis of which a belief could be formed that there was escaped assessment, namely, that the tax levied on the inter-State sales of rice has been wrongly reduced by the tax levied on the paddy out of which such rice was procured except on account of his own change of opinion in this regard. It may be mentioned here that in view of language used in the proviso to section 21(2) of the Act, the approval of extension of time may be granted even in case of change of opinion, but in absence of any such words in section 21(1) of the Act the assessing authority cannot initiate and reopen the proceeding under section 21(1) of the Act on account of change of opinion. Thus, we hold as follows : (i) Section 15(c) of the Central Act provides reduction of tax leviable on the turnover of rice under the U.P. Trade Tax Act with the tax levied on the paddy out of which such rice was procured. It does not provide any reduction of tax under the Central Act by the tax paid on paddy under the State law out of which such rice was procured. (ii) The proceedings under section 21 of the Act have been initiated without any material on the basis of which belief could be formed that there was escaped assessment, namely, that the tax levied on the inter-State sales of rice under the Central Act has been wrongly reduced by the tax levied on paddy under the U.P. Trade Tax Act out of which such rice was procured except on account of change of opinion. The initiation of proceedings under section 21(1) of the Act on account of change of opinion are not permissible and, therefore, the initiation of proceedings under section 21 of the Act in the cases of the petitioners are bad in law. In the result, all the writ petitions are allowed in part. Reassessment proceedings and orders passed under section 21 of the Act are hereby quashed.