Judgment : 1. Civil Suit 404 of 2006 was filed by Subramanyan and Company against Chitra Construction Private Limited and G. Govindarajan seeking permanent injunction and Civil Suit 391 of 2006 was filed by Chitra Construction Private Limited as against S.Subramanyan and Company and its six Partners seeking permanent injunction. On the basis of a compromise memo filed by both the parties, the suit filed by Chitra Construction Private Limited was dismissed as withdrawn and the suit in C.S. No. 404 of 2006 was decreed in terms of the compromise memo. 2. Application No. 5002 of 2007 in C.S. No. 404 of 2006 is filed seeking to set aside the compromise decree passed in C.S. No. 404 of 2006 on 23.2.2007 as null and void and Application No. 5003 of 2007 in C.S. No. 391 of 2006 is filed seeking to set aside the compromise memo and restore the suit in C.S. No. 391 of 2006 by recalling the order dated 23.2.2007 passed therein. Similar averments are found in both the applications. Necessary material facts, in brief, necessary for the disposal of these applications found therein are as follows: (i) The applicant is a Private Limited Company carrying on business in investment and construction and property development. The first respondent is a partnership firm consisting of six partners. The. first respondent represented to the applicant that they are the owners of an extent of 2.53 acres of vacant land comprised in T.S. Nos. 1 and 3 situated at Poonamallee High Road, Chennai. They also informed the applicant that T.S. Nos. 1 and 3 were in one block. (ii) After discussion and negotiation, the applicant entered into an oral agreement with S. Subramanyan & Company on 20.12.2005 for purchase of the aforesaid property from the respondent for a consideration of Rs. 25.3 crore and paid a, sum of Rs. 1,05,00,000/- in cash to Mr. S. Ramamurthy who received the said amount on behalf of other partners. (iii) The applicants, thereafter, engaged the service of professional like Architects and Engineers for expert opinion. The applicants have spent a sum of Rs. 20,00,000/-in that regard. Planning permission also was sought from Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority by the said S. Ramamurthy representing the respondent-partnership firm. In the said application, the applicant Company was referred as the Developer. Mr. (iii) The applicants, thereafter, engaged the service of professional like Architects and Engineers for expert opinion. The applicants have spent a sum of Rs. 20,00,000/-in that regard. Planning permission also was sought from Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority by the said S. Ramamurthy representing the respondent-partnership firm. In the said application, the applicant Company was referred as the Developer. Mr. Ramamurthy also applied to the Airports Authority of India for NOC for construction of a multi-storied building. The applicants were all along under the impression that the entire extent of the properties of 2.53 acres were comprised only in T.S. Nos. 1 and 3 and they never knew that a survey number fell in between. (iv) Subsequently, an agreement of sale was executed oh 2.2.2006 by and between the applicant company and the respondent partnership firm. The sale consideration was fixed at Rs. 25,30,000/-. A sum of Rs. 24 lakhs was paid to the said Ramamurthy over and above the sum of Rs. l,05,00,000/- which was paid earlier by cash. As per the terms of the agreement, two months time was fixed for the completion of the sale transaction. The applicant company would arrange financial assistance by way of loan from their bankers for the completion of the sale transaction and the amounts would be directly paid by the bank to the owners. Obviously, genuine documents and title deeds were required for the purpose of mobilising loan by the applicant. (v) The applicant company came to know that the land in T.S. Nos. 1 and 3 were not contiguous and compact block but the land comprised in T.S. No. 2/2 was sandwiched between the two extents of lands comprised in T.S. Nos. 1 and 3. The respondents completely suppressed this vital information and misled the applicants to enter into an oral agreement and subsequently a written agreement of sale dated 2.2.2006. Patta copies of T.S. Nos. 1 and 3 alone were handed over to the applicants- After much persuasion, a copy of the alleged patta for T.S. No. 2/2 was given by the respondents. It was a forged patta. (vi) On 9.4.2006, the respondents replaced the said patta with another patta. A sum of Rs. 20,00,000/- was also handed over to the respondents by the applicants at the time of handing over the patta towards the expenses incurred for getting the same. It was a forged patta. (vi) On 9.4.2006, the respondents replaced the said patta with another patta. A sum of Rs. 20,00,000/- was also handed over to the respondents by the applicants at the time of handing over the patta towards the expenses incurred for getting the same. The applicant company was made to believe that the respondents were holding valid pattas for the entire extent of 2.53 acres of land comprised in T.S. No. 1, T.S. No. 2/2 and T.S. No. 3. The applicant company and the respondent partnership firm have been in joint possession of the property. (vii) The applicant company received a letter dated 13.5.2006 from the second respondent S. Ramamurthy stating that the agreement stood terminated on 2.4.2006. The applicant, thereafter, filed the suit in C.S. No. 391 of 2006 before this Court seeking the relief of permanent injunction restraining the respondent partnership firm and their men from interfering with the joint and peaceful possession of the property. The respondent partnership firm, suppressing all these details, filed a suit in C.S. No. 404 of 2006 before this Court seeking permanent injunction restraining the applicant company and their men from interfering with their peaceful possession. (viii) The respondents coerced and caused . undue influence and induced the applicant company to settle all disputes. The applicant company could ill afford to wait for the adjudication of the dispute in the Courts having parted with several crores of rupees. The applicant offered for such a course of settlement on the bona fide belief and impression that the respondents would be fair and just and that they were having patta for the entire extent of 2.53 acres which comprised of one block without any breakage on ground. The first respondent prepared the terms of compromise. The applicants did not suspect the phraseology and terminology of the terms of compromise. The applicant was hurried up to sign the memo of compromise. The respondents were aware that the patta was forged. The other Director was also not allowed to be consulted nor was her consent obtained in the memo of compromise. (ix) It was stated therein that the patta in respect of T.S. No. 2/2 was secured by the applicant company on behalf of the respondent partnership firm and that the applicant company reassured the respondents that the patta was a valid patta. (ix) It was stated therein that the patta in respect of T.S. No. 2/2 was secured by the applicant company on behalf of the respondent partnership firm and that the applicant company reassured the respondents that the patta was a valid patta. The fact remains that both the pattas handed over by the respondents in respect of T.S. No. 2/2 were procured by the respondents. The applicants neither applied for them nor obtained them. The applicant company was in no way involved in any transaction with the respondents on the date of issuance of those pattas viz., 30.12.2003 and 19.12.2005. (x) In the memo of compromise, the second appeal proceedings before this Court alone was referred to. The respondents made no mention about their appeal pending before the revenue authorities for patta pertaining to T.S. No. 2/2. The applicant company agreed for some marginal increase in consideration under the bona fide belief and impression that the property was in one block. There was no necessity for the applicant company to suspect the bona fides of the patta for T.S. No. 2/2 produced by the respondents. (xi) To their utter shock and surprise, the applicants were informed by the State Bank of India by their letter dated 3.4.2007 that the survey numbers in the sale deed and TSLR differed. The applicant company came to understand that the patta dated.19.12.2005 was also not genuine. In fact, the patta in, respect of T.S. No. 2/2 obtained, by the respondent was a forged and fabricated one and that their claim for issuance of a patta was still pending before the revenue authorities. Those facts were wilfully suppressed by the respondents obviously with a view to cheat the applicants. The applicant company lodged a criminal complaint with reference to the aforesaid facts and circumstances. (xii) In the anticipatory bail application filed by the partners of the respondent firm, they admitted that an appeal before the Land Commissioner was pending. The patta that could not have been obtained by the applicant was deliberately referred in clause 4 of the memo of compromise as if pattas were obtained by the applicant company. (xiii) The memo of compromise and the memo of withdrawal are void and do not reflect any lawful settlement arrived at between the parties. The same is vitiated by fraud, undue influence, duress and coercion. (xiii) The memo of compromise and the memo of withdrawal are void and do not reflect any lawful settlement arrived at between the parties. The same is vitiated by fraud, undue influence, duress and coercion. There is no access to the land bearing T.S. No. 3. Hence, the price escalation is exorbitant, unjust and unreasonable. The applicant company was misled to believe that the respondent firm was holding clear title for the entire extent of the property. To achieve their illegal desire, they have gone to the extent of forging revenue records. Suppressing all these facts, the respondent firm has forced the applicant to enter into a compromise. Therefore, the applicant seeks for setting aside the compromise decree dated 23.2.2007 passed in C.S. No. 404 of 2006 as null and void and to set aside the compromise memo filed in C.S. No. 391 of 2006 and restore the suit in C.S. No. 391 of 2006 by recalling the order passed therein on 23.2.2007. 3. The sum and substance of the version of the respondents found in their counter affidavit is as follows: (i) The present applications have been filed abusing the process of law. It is unfair, unethical and vexatious. It is false to state that G. Govindarajan was coerced or pressurized to enter into the memo of compromise dated23.2.2007. It is not true to say that the respondents prepared the terms of compromise. It is vexatious and malicious to state that the applicants did not read the phraseology of the compromise. It is false to state that the applicants were forced to withdraw their allegations in the plaint and to accept the respondents dictates. It is perjury and sheer Contempt of Court to state that the compromise memo was shown to the applicants only in the Court premises and the applicants were hurried up to sign the memo of compromise. It is a sheer mockery of the entire judicial system and of this great institution to state that the applicants signature was obtained at the last minute in a hurry. (ii) The suits in C.S. No. 391and 404 of 2006 were pending right from May 2006. The compromise proposal was discussed in the presence of the learned senior counsel for the applicants. The learned senior counsel for the applicants informed the respondents that the applicants had accepted the revised consideration of Rs. 40 crores. (ii) The suits in C.S. No. 391and 404 of 2006 were pending right from May 2006. The compromise proposal was discussed in the presence of the learned senior counsel for the applicants. The learned senior counsel for the applicants informed the respondents that the applicants had accepted the revised consideration of Rs. 40 crores. There were several rounds of litigations, negotiations and exchanges of draft compromise memo between the counsel for the respondents and the learned senior counsel, for the applicants. The applicants were fully aware of the negotiations. The final draft of the compromise memo reflected the negotiated and agreed position of the business. (iii) The applicants had made a false allegation that the respondents obtained a forged patta for T.S. No. 2/2. It has also been falsely alleged that the applicants paid a large amount of cash. The patta was obtained only by the applicants along with family members and his minion one Swami Ramakrishnan. As the applicants obtained patta, they should dispel any confusion over its genuineness. On 23.2.2007, the applicants were present along‘ with their counsel. The respondents also were present along with their counsel. The Honourable Judge, having affirmed the terms of compromise from both the parties, recorded the memo of compromise after the same was signed by both the counsel. (iv) On 15.4.2007, the applicants filed Application No. 3011 of 2007 seeking extension of time under the compromise decree. The extension was sought for the purpose of rectification of some typographical error in the patta. There was no whisper about any forgery or any other serious allegation. The application seeking extension of time was dismissed after giving adequate opportunity to the applicants to make good the balance. No appeal was preferred thereagainst. Having filed such an application and suffered dismissal, it is not open to the applicants to turn around and challenge the compromise decree. The applicants are estopped from doing so. The present applications seeking to set aside the compromise decree and the compromise memo are not at all maintainable. Therefore, the respondents pray for dismissal of these two applications. 4. Mr. AR.L. Sundaresan, learned senior counsel appearing for the applicants would submit that: the applicants came into picture only on 2.2.2006. Therefore, the patta dated 30.12.2003 and 19.12.2005 had been obtained only by the respondents. The pendency of patta proceedings before the revenue authorities were completely suppressed. Therefore, the respondents pray for dismissal of these two applications. 4. Mr. AR.L. Sundaresan, learned senior counsel appearing for the applicants would submit that: the applicants came into picture only on 2.2.2006. Therefore, the patta dated 30.12.2003 and 19.12.2005 had been obtained only by the respondents. The pendency of patta proceedings before the revenue authorities were completely suppressed. The condition No. 4 which speaks about the obtention of pattas by the applicants have been surreptitiously introduced in the memo of compromise. At the time when the extension was sought for by the applicants, the applicants did not suspect the bona fides of the memo of compromise entered into between the parties. The applicants have established that forged pattas have been introduced by the respondents to clinch the compromise between the parties. Therefore, the compromise itself is not a lawful one. The applications to set aside the compromise decree and the compromise memo are sustainable. There is no need to prefer an appeal as against the compromise decree, it is further submitted. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents would vehemently submit that the applicants have come out with these applications misusing the process of the Court inasmuch as the compromise formula was chalked put in the presence of both the parties and their respective counsel. When there had been deliberation upon the compromise formula before ever the memo of compromise was finalised, the question of misleading the applicants, does not arise. The compromise memo would loudly speak about the pattas obtained by the applicants and their satisfaction about the title to the entire property proposed to be sold by the respondents. Both the parties and their respective counsel were present before the learned Judge who enquired them and thereafter having been satisfied with their understanding of the compromise formula projected before the Court, he was pleased to record the memo of compromise and pass a compromise decree. There was no room for coercion or threat in the above facts and circumstances of the case. The applicants sought for extension of time to comply with the terms of compromise decree. There was no whisper about the alleged forgery of the pattas by the respondents. On rejection of their plea for extension of time to comply with the conditions of the compromise decree the applicants have come out with these applications. The applicants sought for extension of time to comply with the terms of compromise decree. There was no whisper about the alleged forgery of the pattas by the respondents. On rejection of their plea for extension of time to comply with the conditions of the compromise decree the applicants have come out with these applications. A very strange plea has been set up by the applicants that the Managing Director was not authorised to clinch the compromise even in the absence of any Board resolution which will govern only the indoor management of a Company. The Managing Director empowered to sue and to contest the suit has power to clinch the compromise. The applicants cannot be permitted to approbate and reprobate the compromise decree- passed by the Court/ he would submit. 6. A Bench of Rajasthan High Court in Gopal Lal v. Babu Lal AIR 2004 Raj. 264 has held as follows: “Thus a suit challenging the compromise decree is barred under Order 23Rule 3A read with explanation to Order 23Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The law however provides two modes to challenge the compromise decree by a party to the compromise. The first remedy is under proviso to Rule 3 of Order 23 of the Code of Civil Procedure. According to the proviso, a party can question the compromise before the Court which has recorded the .same and has passed the decree in accordance :therewith. The second remedy lies in filing an appeal under Section 96(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure against the compromise decree.” 7. The Supreme Court in Banwarilal v. Chando Devi AIR 1993 SC 1139 : (1993) 1 SCC 581 has held: “ 13. Where the amending act introduced a ….. proviso along with an explanation to Rule 3 of Order 23 saying that where it is alleged by one party and denied by other that an adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at, “the Court shall decide the question”, the Court before which a petition of compromise is filed and which has recorded such compromise, has to decide the question whether an adjustment or satisfaction had been arrived at on basis of any lawful agreement. To make the enquiry in respect of validity of the agreement or the. To make the enquiry in respect of validity of the agreement or the. compromise more comprehensive, the explanation to the proviso says that an agreement or compromise “which is void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act …” shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of the said Rule. In view of the proviso read with the explanation, a Court which had entertained the petition of compromise has to examine whether the compromise was void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act. Even Rule 1 (m) of Order 43 has been deleted under which an appeal was maintainable against an order recording a compromise. As such a party challenging a compromise can file a petition under provisoto Rule 3 of Order 23, or an appeal under Section 96(1) of the code, in which he can now question the validity of the compromise in view of Rule 1A of Order 43 of the Code.” 8. The aforesaid ratios laid down by the Supreme Court as well as the Bench of the Rajasthan High Court would make it clear that a party challenging a compromise decree can either prefer an appeal under Section 96(1) of the Code on the ground that a compromise was not lawful or was secured by playing fraud, or file a petition under proviso to Rule 3 of Order 23. Therefore, the applications filed under Order 23Rule 3 are maintainable in the eye of law. 9. The Supreme Court in Jet Ply Wood ( P) Ltd. v. Madhukar Nowlakha Ltd. v. Madhukar Nowlakha Ltd. v. Madhukar Nowlakha AIR 2006 SC 1260 : (2006) 3 SCC 699 : (2006) 2 MLJ 433 has held that if a suit has been withdrawn on account of a mistake occasioned by misrepresentation/subterfuge by the defence, an order permitting the withdrawal of the suit can very well be recalled by the Court. It has been observed therein that the Court which has permitted withdrawal of the suit would not be powerless to set aside the order of withdrawal in exercise of its inherent power under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 10. After all, a consent decree falls within the definition of “conveyance” or “instrument”. Therefore, consent decree can be set aside on any of the grounds on which the agreement itself can be set aside. 10. After all, a consent decree falls within the definition of “conveyance” or “instrument”. Therefore, consent decree can be set aside on any of the grounds on which the agreement itself can be set aside. (See: Ruby Sales And Services ( P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra (1994) 1 SCC 531 . Therefore, if the applicants establish that the suits were terminated on the basis of a compromise which smacked of total misrepresentations misleading them to fall into the trap of settlement, this Court has got power to restore the suits to original positions. 11. It has been observed by the High Court of Patna in Mt. Balas Devi v. Bansidhar Sahu AIR 1951 Pat. 459 as follows: “The Court is always in favour of construing a compromise in a manner which tends to shorten litigation and the Court will always resist any attempt on the part of any of the parties to construe the decree in such a way as to multiply litigation. On a proper construction of the entire terms of the compromise between the parties in this case, in my opinion, it should be held that the parties contemplated that recourse to a fresh suit each time a default is made in the payment of maintenance or in the payment of arrears of maintenance was not necessary. Rather the parties must be deemed to have intended that they were putting an end to the litigation between them. Hence in my opinion, for the reason given above, the contentions raised on behalf of the appellant are sound.” Of course, the Court shall not encourage multiplication of litigation. Once a compromise decree is passed, the Court should not encourage filing of a fresh suit each time there is a default in the orders of a compromise decree. But, the Court is legally empowered to revive the suits if compromise decrees are passed on the basis of a settlement founded on fraud or misrepresentation. 12. Once a compromise decree is passed, the Court should not encourage filing of a fresh suit each time there is a default in the orders of a compromise decree. But, the Court is legally empowered to revive the suits if compromise decrees are passed on the basis of a settlement founded on fraud or misrepresentation. 12. The High Court of Delhi in Anand Deep Singh v. Ranjit Kaur and Others Anand Deep Singh v. Ranjit Kaur and Others Anand Deep Singh v. Ranjit Kaur and Others 2000 (54) DRJ 284 has held that a compromise decree creates an estoppel by judgment and has binding force like res judicata, of course, unless it is vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation or other like grounds which renders the agreement or compromise void or voidable under the Contract Act inasmuch as the compromise decree is passed only on proving to the satisfaction of the Court that the suit has been adjusted wholly or in part and that the adjustment is by way of a lawful agreement or compromise and the agreement or compromise has been signed by the parties. If the applicants could establish that there was misrepresentation or fraud played upon them by the respondents, they are entitled to seek for setting aside the compromise decree. 13. It is very feebly contended by the learned senior counsel for the applicants that there was no resolution passed by the Board of Directors authorising the Managing Director of Chitra Construction Private Limited to clinch the compromise. The High Court of Calcutta in Sri Kishan Rathi v. Mondal Brothers and Co. (P) Limited and Another Sri Kishan Rathi v. Mondal Brothers and Co. (P) Limited and Another Sri Kishan Rathi v. Mondal Brothers and Co. (P) Limited and Another AIR 1967 Cal. 175 has held as follows: “The minute books and the book of resolution of the Board of Directors are books of the company and are not open to strangers and outsiders. This was also within the special knowledge of the defendant company. If the defendant company was trying to prove that its Manager and Director had no authority to borrow money then it was for the company to prove from its own books of minutes and resolutions that no authority was given to Naresh Chandra Mondal, its Manager.and Director.” 14. The High Court of Allahabad in Lakshmi Rattan Cotton Mills Co. If the defendant company was trying to prove that its Manager and Director had no authority to borrow money then it was for the company to prove from its own books of minutes and resolutions that no authority was given to Naresh Chandra Mondal, its Manager.and Director.” 14. The High Court of Allahabad in Lakshmi Rattan Cotton Mills Co. Ltd. v. J. K. Jute Mills Co. Ltd. AIR 1957 All 311 has held as follows: “If the transaction in question could be authorised by the passing of a resolution/such an act is a mere formality. A bona fide creditor, in the absence of any suspicious circumstances, is entitled to presume its existence. A transaction entered into by the borrowing company under such circumstances cannot be defeated merely on the ground that no such resolution was in fact passed. The passing of such a resolution is a mere matter of indoor‘ or internal management and its absence, under such circumstances, cannot be used to defeat the just claim of a bona fide creditor. A creditor being an outsider or a third party and an innocent stranger is entitled to proceed on the assumption of its existence.” 15. I am in full agreement with the aforesaid ratios laid down by the Calcutta High Court and the Allahabad High Court that the resolution of the Board can only govern the indoor management of a Company. The outsider can very well presume that the internal management of the Company has been regular and is being carried on in accordance with law and Memorandum and Articles of Association. Lack of any Board resolution will not deprive the outsider who clinches a deal bona fide with the Managing Director of a Company. Therefore, the plea of the applicants that the other Director was not consulted and that there was no Board resolution to clinch the compromise deal with the respondent and that therefore, the compromise decree itself is liable to be set aside is found not sustainable. 16. Let me now deal with the merit of the applications seeking to set aside the compromise decree and the compromise memo. 16. Let me now deal with the merit of the applications seeking to set aside the compromise decree and the compromise memo. It is relevant to incorporate para 4 of the memo of compromise filed by both the parties which reads as follows: “( 4) The defendants hereby declare that they have scrutinised all the documents and records in respect of the suit property and are fully satisfied with: a. the manner in which the plaintiff has derived the title to the suit property. b. the sole ownership and rights of the plaintiff over the suit property. c. the marketable title of the plaintiff over the suit property with no encumbrances of any kind and the authenticity of all the documents in connection with the suit property.” In respect of the ownership relating to the portion of land in T.S. No. 2/2, Block No. 37, formerly R.S. No. 167/3, the defendants acknowledge the existence of the High Court decree dated 16.6.1998 made in S.A. 1264 of 1984, confirming the plaintiffs ownership. The defendant confirms that he had secured a patta (Extract of the Town Survey Land Register) for this portion of the land .at his cost/ on the plaintiffs behalf, and further reassures the plaintiff that it is a good and valid patta.” 17. Two aspects found in para 4 of the memo of compromise will have to be carefully scrutinised by this Court. The applicants have declared that they, having scrutinized all the documents, were satisfied with the authenticity of those documents in connection with the suit property, Then the applicants also have confirmed in the said para that they have secured patta for T.S. No. 2/2 Block No. 37 at their cost, of course, on behalf of the respondents and that they also reassured that the respondents have good and valid patta. 18. The materials available on record will have to be scanned by this Court to find whether such a paragraph has been introduced in the memo of compromise completely misleading the applicants herein and whether the contents in the said paragraph reflect the true state of affairs. 19. In the present applications, the applicants have unambiguously stated that there was in fact an oral agreement with the respondents entered into on 20.12.2005 for the purchase of the subject property for a consideration of Rs. 25,30,00,000/-. 19. In the present applications, the applicants have unambiguously stated that there was in fact an oral agreement with the respondents entered into on 20.12.2005 for the purchase of the subject property for a consideration of Rs. 25,30,00,000/-. Of course, the agreement of sale in writing was entered into between the parties on 2.2.2006. But, the fact remains that the applicants started transaction with the respondents as on 20.12.2005. The applicants would not have applied for the patta for T.S. No. 2/2 prior to 20.12.2005. On a perusal of the pattas dated 30.12.2003 and 19.12.2005, it is found that those pattas have already been obtained prior to the date the applicants plunged headlong in the sale transaction with the respondents. 20. Yet another important aspect will have to be taken note of by this Court. On a careful perusal of those two pattas, it is found that they were issued not to the applicants, but to the respondents S. Subramanyan and Company. Further, there is no reference in those pattas that the applicants sought patta from the revenue authorities. If the pattas have been sought for by the applicants, there would have been some reference as to the role of the applicants in the issuance of the aforesaid pattas; To top it all, it is found that on 26.11.2002, the respondents did apply for the patta for the entire property measuring 253 acres in old Survey No. 167/1A, 163 and 168. The applications submitted to the Tahsildar, Egmore-Nungambakkam, Chennai before the issuance of the patta dated 19.12.2005 completely rules out the possibility of the applicants approaching the Tahsildar seeking patta for the subject property. The applicants would not have dreamt of applying for patta in the year 2003 when admittedly, the sale transaction proposal commenced only during December 2005. 21. The proceedings of the Collector of Chennai dated 7.12.2004 would go to establish that the respondents S. Subramanyan and Company sought for issuance of patta for the subject property, but, the.Collector of Chennai, having received a report from the; Tahsildar, Egmore-Nungambakkam, Chennai to the effect that the said property in T.S. No. 2 was classified as Government Poramboke, rejected the plea for patta for the aforesaid property. 22. 22. It is found that the respondents have preferred an appeal before the Special Commissioner and Commissioner of Land Administration Chepauk, Chennai, aggrieved by the aforesaid order passed by the Collector in the patta proceedings. In the anticipatory bail application filed by the respondents, they have categorically admitted that such proceedings are pending before the Special Commissioner and Commissioner of Land Administration, Chepauk, Chennai. 23. Clause 16 of the terms of agreement of sale discloses that the applicants have a proposal to obtain loan from Indian Overseas Bank for completing the sale transaction of the schedule mentioned property and arrange for direct payment from their bankers to the respondents. 24. When the documents circulated to the applicants were submitted to State Bank of India, their lawyers have made an observation that Survey Numbers in the sale deed and the TSLR differ. Therefore, the applicants were directed to furnish a certificate, from the revenue/Survey Authorities confirming the present survey numbers and the corresponding old survey numbers with reference to the subject property. Thereafter, it appears that the applicants have lodged a complaint on 7.5.2007 alleging forgery of documents by the respondents. It appears that the investigating official approached the Tahsildar, Egmore Nungambakkam Taluk who, vide his letter A4 17469 of 2007 dated 15.5.2007, has specifically stated that patta in C.A.1210 of 2003 dated 30.12.2003 and patta in C.A.1422 of 2005-06 dated 19.12.2005 were not issued by the Revenue Department. It has also been very assertively stated therein that T.S. No. 2 in old Survey No. 167/3 has been classified as Government Channel Poramboke in the permanent land register. 25. The above facts and circumstances would clinchingly show that the applicants never applied for patta for the property in T.S. No. 2/2 inasmuch as they had come into picture in the sale transaction only on 20.12.2005. The respondents, in fact applied for patta before the Collector of Chennai, but such a plea has been completely rejected by the Collector of Chennai. The respondents took up the matter in appeal before the Special Commissioner and Commissioner of Land Administration, Chepauk, Chennai as against the adverse order passed by the Collector of Chennai and the same is admittedly pending disposal till today. It is found that it was only the respondent who applied for pattas dated on 30.12.2003 and 19.12.2005. The respondents took up the matter in appeal before the Special Commissioner and Commissioner of Land Administration, Chepauk, Chennai as against the adverse order passed by the Collector of Chennai and the same is admittedly pending disposal till today. It is found that it was only the respondent who applied for pattas dated on 30.12.2003 and 19.12.2005. Both the pattas have been found to be forged documents by the Tahsildar, Egmore-Nungambakkam Taluk who is the competent authority to issue, patta. In fact, the said land has been classified as Government Channel Poramboke in the permanent land register. 26. In the above facts and circumstances of; the case, the Court has to approach the tenor of para 4 of the memo of compromise filed in C.S. No. 404 of 2006. As rightly pointed out by the learned senior counsel appearing for the applicants, such a clause has been introduced throwing the entire burden of the respondents on the shoulder of the applicants as for the issuance of patta and the title to the subject property stating mischievously therein against the factual, scenario that the applicants herein on behalf of the respondents applied for patta and got themselves satisfied with the good and valid patta. The averment therein goes further to say that the authenticity of all the documents in connection with the suit property were thoroughly verified by the applicants and they were satisfied therewith. This averment also cannot be true. 27. It is found that there has been a total misrepresentation made by the respondents to the applicants with respect to their title over the disputed property in T.S. No. 2/2. It has been stated in the memo of compromise as though the applicants applied for pattas and obtained the same on behalf of the respondents against true facts. Now, it has been shown before the Court that the said pattas, as per the proceedings of the Tahsildar, Egmore-Nungambakkam Taluk, were forged pattas. The applicants have been made to believe that the respondents have got patta for the disputed property in T.S. No. 2/2 to fortify their title over the same. 28. It is found that T.S. No. 2/2 is running in between two properties in T.S. Nos. 1 and 3. The applicants are found to be developers of the properties. The applicants have been made to believe that the respondents have got patta for the disputed property in T.S. No. 2/2 to fortify their title over the same. 28. It is found that T.S. No. 2/2 is running in between two properties in T.S. Nos. 1 and 3. The applicants are found to be developers of the properties. They have been made to believe that no stranger has any right over a stretch of land lying in between the properties in T.S. Nos. 1 and 3. The applicants have been completely misled to believe the version of the respondents. Para 4 of the memo of compromise has been drafted to thrust upon the entire responsibility as to the verification of the title of the respondents and the issuance of patta on the shoulders of the applicants. 29. Both the parties and their respective learned counsel would have been involved in the process of striking a compromise. The Court, of course, has also ascertained from the respective parties and their counsel and thereafter recorded the memo of compromise clinched by the parties. But, when it is found that there has been a misrepresentation and the compromise memo was reduced into writing against the facts, the laborious process involving both the parties which culminated in passing of the compromise decree and the withdrawal of the other suit will not deprive the applicants of their right to challenge, the memo of compromise and the compromise decree. When, forged documents had played a vital role in convincing the applicants to give their consent for such a compromise formula, then the Court will have to rush to the assistance of the applicants who seek to set aside the compromise decree and recall the order passed in the other suit. 30. The Supreme Court in R. N. Gosain v. Yashpal Dhir AIR 1993 SC 352 : (1992) 4 SCC 683 has held as follows: “Law does not permit a person to both approbate and reprobate. 30. The Supreme Court in R. N. Gosain v. Yashpal Dhir AIR 1993 SC 352 : (1992) 4 SCC 683 has held as follows: “Law does not permit a person to both approbate and reprobate. This principle is based on the doctrine, of election which postulates that no party can accept and reject the same instrument and that “a person cannot say at one time that a transaction is valid and thereby obtain some advantage, to which he could only be entitled on the footing that it is valid, and then turn round and say it is void for the purpose of securing some other advantage.” 31. It has been observed in Bakshi Ram v. Brij Lal AIR 1995 SC 395 : (1994) Supp-3 SCC 198 as follows: “What was not disputed was that the rights of the parties flowed from the compromise decree. It was not a declaratory decree as ordinarily understood. The rights acknowledged and declared were not only of the appellants but even of brothers of Brij Lal who were not donees, and, as such, rank outsider. In any case the compromise decree having become final it was binding between the parties. Brij Lal could not wriggle out of its binding effect. In equity a person drawing benefit from a transaction is not permitted to escape from the disadvantage if any flowing from it. The respondent having prevented the appellants from getting a declaration that the entire gift deed was invalid in lieu of which they gave up, because of the compromise, their claim for the property in dispute cannot be permitted to turn round now and take the stand “Heads I win, tails you lose.” Law has to promote justice. The Courts of equity and justice cannot uphold such an unfair stand. The respondent cannot be permitted to reprobate to his advantage.” 32. These two decisions would. not apply to the facts of this case inasmuch as the applicants having not suspected the bona fides of the respondents, in clinching, the compromise deal, accepted the compromise decree and sought for sometime if or compliance of the terms of the compromise decree. This Court was also pleased, to dismiss the said application. But, the act of fabrication and forgery of the pattas have come to light only after the said petition seeking extension of time to comply with the terms of the compromise decree was dismissed. This Court was also pleased, to dismiss the said application. But, the act of fabrication and forgery of the pattas have come to light only after the said petition seeking extension of time to comply with the terms of the compromise decree was dismissed. Further, it is found that the applicants have not enjoyed the benefits of the compromise deal beforeever seeking to set side the compromise decree and the memo of compromise. Therefore, those two ratios do not have any relevance to the case on hand. As the applicants have established that there had been total misrepresentation armed with fabricated and forged pattas in clinching the compromise deal which culminated in passing of the compromise decree in C.S. No. 404 of 2006 and the withdrawal of the suit in C.S. No. 391 of 2006, they are entitled to the reliefs sought for in these applications. 33. In the result, the compromise decree dated 36 23.2.2007 passed in C.S. No. 404 of 2006 is set aside as null and void and the suit in C.S. No. 404 of 2006 is restored to file. Consequently, Application No. 5002 of 2007 stands allowed. The compromise memo filed in C.S. No. 391 of 2006 is set aside and the said suit is so restored to file recalling the order dated 23.22007 passed therein by this, Court. Consequently, Application No. 5003 of 2007 is also allowed.