JUDGMENT : B.S. Chauhan, C.J. - These appeals have been filed by the Appellant against the Judgment and order of the Learned Single Judge dated 26th April, 1994 dismissing the First Appeal Nos. 145 of 1971 and 9 & 15 of 1972, against the Judgment and decree dated 25th September, 1971 passed by the Subordinate Judge, Berhampur in Title Suit No. 6 of 1969 (Urmila Padhi v. Judhisthiro Padhi and Ors.). 2. The matters relate to the partition of immovable properties of the descendants of one Nirakar Padhi. The pedigree of the descendants is as follows: Nirakar Padhi | -------------------------------------- Srinibas Judhisthiro (D.1) | (died during pendency of the suit). Khalli | (died in 1944) | = Urmila (Plaintiff) | (died on 20.4.69) | | -------------------------------------------- Ramanath Radhakrishna Mahalakshmi Padhi(D.2) Padhi (D.3) (D.1/c) Married to | Jaganriath Padhi Kanchan | Padhi (D.6) Kishore Padhi wife (D.5) 3. As per the genealogy, Judhisthiro Padhi had two sons, namely, Ramanath Padhi (D.2) and Radhakrishna Pad hi (D.3), and one daughter Mahalakshmi (D.1/c), who was married to Jagannath Padhi and has one son, Kishore Padhi (D.5). 4. Srinibas was having only one son Khalli, who got married to Urmila. He died in 1944 at a very young age immediately after the marriage. Urmila Padhi claimed the partition of the properties, which was accepted in 1967 by Judhisthiro Padhi. A partition deed, in this respect, was executed and registered on 27th June, 1968. There was a division of properties by metes and bounds. Smt. Urmila Padhi was given only 6 annas share in stead of 8 annas in the family settlement. Immediately thereafter, Urmila executed a registered deed of settlement in respect of some of the properties in favour of her sister. Smt. Ambalika Padhi (D.4) on 31st October, 1968, and a Will in favour of his brother's son Bhajakrushna Panda on. 24th January, 1969. As the Appellant/ Defendant created certain hindrances and blocked the delivery of paddy to Smt. Urmila Padhi and Ambalika Padhi. Smt. Urmila Padhi filed a suit on 25.12.1968 for confirmation of partition of schedule properties as per the deed of partition dated 22nd June, 1968 and for certain other reliefs. Ramanath Padhi (D.2) was of unsound mind, thus his wife Smt. Kanchan Padhi was impleaded as Defendant (D.6) so that Defendant No. 2 could be represented properly. After filing of the suit, Plaintiff Smt. Urmila Padhi died on 20.4.1969. Ramanath Padhi (D.2) was of unsound mind, thus his wife Smt. Kanchan Padhi was impleaded as Defendant (D.6) so that Defendant No. 2 could be represented properly. After filing of the suit, Plaintiff Smt. Urmila Padhi died on 20.4.1969. Bhajakrishna Panda, Urmila's brother's son in whose favour Will had been executed was substituted as her LR vide Order Dated 28.4.1969. Judhisthiro Padhi also died and as his two sons were Defendants in the suit, his daughter Mahalaxmi (D.1/c) was substituted as his legal representative. The Trial Court transposed Smt. Ambalika Padhi (D.4) as the Plaintiff vide Order Dated 19.8.1971. The contesting Defendants took the plea that Plaintiff Smt. Urmila Padhi being a child widow had never joined the family of her husband, who had died at a very young age and her marriage had never been consummated. She started living with her parents and never came to claim the properties. As she had abandoned her share, even otherwise, under the then existing Hindu law, she had no right to inherit the property of her late husband, partition took place between Judhisthiro and his two sons by metes and bounds prior to 1952 and land was settled under the Orissa Estates Abolition Act in 1951 (hereinafter called the Act, 1951) strictly in accordance with law in their favour. The partition deed dated 27.6.1968 was the document just to have an ostensible title of Smt. Urmila Padhi in the properties. The deed of settlement and Will were got prepared at the behest of the persons who intended to garb the land and other immovable properties and thus none of them was a valid document. Pleas of adoption of Kishore Chandra Padhi (D.5) by the Plaintiff Smt. Urmila Padhi, and transfer of some land by Judhisthiro Padhi (D.1) in favour of Smt. Kanchan Padhi (D.6.). 5. In view of the pleadings taken by the parties, the Trial Court framed as many as 18 issues: (1) Whether the Plaintiff has any right, title or interest in suit properties as per schedule A and if the registered partition deed No. 3604 dated 22.6.1968 is true genuine valid and binding on Defendant No. 1 (2) Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to any share in the property and if the partition deed dated 22.6.1968 is not cancelled by deed dated 8.1.1969 executed by 1st Defendant. (3) Whether the Plaintiffs alleged management or possession of Schedule properties through Defendant No. 4 is true and valid. (4) Whether the settlement deed dated 24.1.1969 executed by Plaintiff in favour of Brajakrishna is true and could convey any title to the said transferee. (5) Whether the suit properties were divided by the Defendants 1 to 3 prior to 1952 and settled under the O.E.A. Act in 1954 as per shares allotted to 1st Defendant. (6) Whether the item No. 8 of suit A schedule is the separate property of Defendant Nos. 1 and 3. (7) Whether the Civil Court has jurisdiction in view of Section 39 of the O.E.A. Act and in view of settlement of the lands in shares in favour of Defendants. (8) Whether Urmila had any right or a status in the family. (9) Whether the alleged partition deed dated 22.6.1968 the settlement deed said to be executed by Urmila, for item No. 5 and 6 of 'D' schedule properties, the adoption deed dated 22.6.1968 purported to be executed by Urmila alleging to have adopted Kishore Chandra Padhi son of Jagannath Padhi and other deeds are true genuine and not the result of raud, undue influence, coercion, pressure exercised on Defendant No. 1 conspiring among Defendant No. 2 Urmila and her parents, brothers etc. and claimants under these deed derive any title. (10) Whether the suit schedule is correct. (11) Whether the alleged adoption of Kishore Chandra Padhi by Urmila is true and genuine. (12) Whether the Will dated 24.1.1969 said to be executed by deceased Urmila in favour of present Plaintiff is genuine and whether execution of any will is true. (13) Whether there was any cause of action for the suit. (14) Whether the suit valuation as made Court-fees paid is correct and proper. (15) Whether the suit is maintainable in the present form and if property constituted. (16) To what relief. (17) Whether the partition dated 2.7.1969 is true valid and binding on the third Defendant. (18) Whether the settlement made by Judhistir in favour of Defendant No. 6 on 10.7.1969 is true and valid. 6. The Trial Court decreed the suit vide Judgment and decree dated 25th September, 1971. (16) To what relief. (17) Whether the partition dated 2.7.1969 is true valid and binding on the third Defendant. (18) Whether the settlement made by Judhistir in favour of Defendant No. 6 on 10.7.1969 is true and valid. 6. The Trial Court decreed the suit vide Judgment and decree dated 25th September, 1971. Being aggrieved against the said Judgment and decree Radhakrushna Padhi (D.3), filed the First Appeal No. 145 of 1971, Smt. Mahalakshmi Padhi (D.1/c) filed First Appeal No. 9 of 1972 and Ramanath Padhi (D.2) filed First Appeal No. 15 of 1972 before this Court. 7. All the aforesaid three appeals were heard together and allowed vide common Judgment and Order Dated 18.6.1993 on the ground that after the death of Plaintiff-Urmila Padhi, the cause of action did not survive and transposition of Smt. Ambalika Padhi (D.4) as Plaintiff No. 1 was not permissible Niranjan Ray Vs. Jogendra Behera and Others. The Hon'ble Apex Court set aside the said Judgment in Smt. Ambalika Padhi and another Vs. Sh. Radhakrishna Padhi and others, and remanded the aforesaid three appeals to this Court for hearing on merit. The Learned Single Judge dismissed all the three appeals vide impugned Judgment and Order Dated 26th June, 1994. Hence these appeals. 8. Dr. Sujata Das, Learned Counsel for the Appellants in all the three appeals has submitted that Courts below erred in disbelieving the partition prior to 1952 among Judhisthiro Padhi and his two sons by metes and bounds which was a valid partition; properties had vested in them as per the Act, 1951 and stood settled in their favour. Plaintiff, Urmila being a child widow, whose marriage had never been consummated, never claimed any share, she had no right/interest or title in the said properties or any part thereof. The partition deed executed and registered on 22nd June, 1968 had been created to show her ostensible ownership; other documents, i.e. deed of settlement and Will were totally feeble and product of fraud at the instance of her relatives, particularly, her sister Ambalika and her brother's son Bhajakrushna Panda. The deed of settlement and Will executed in their favour had no sanctity in law as had been obtained by coercion. Ramanath Padhi (D.2) died when the appeals were pending before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and nobody was substituted at his place, thus the appeal stood abated while pending before the Supreme Court itself. The deed of settlement and Will executed in their favour had no sanctity in law as had been obtained by coercion. Ramanath Padhi (D.2) died when the appeals were pending before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and nobody was substituted at his place, thus the appeal stood abated while pending before the Supreme Court itself. The said appeals could not have been remanded and therefore the Judgment and order of the Learned Single Judge which was under challenge before the Apex Court revived and for that reason the appeals deserve to be allowed. 9. On the contrary, Shri B. Routray and Shri S.S. Rao, Learned Counsel appearing for the contesting Respondents have submitted that as Smt. Kanchan Padhi (D.6), wife of Ramanath Padhi (D.2), had been impleaded as Ramanath (D.2) was of unsound mind and she had filed the written statement and contested the case through out, thus, Ramanath was duly represented even after his death and in such eventuality the question of abatement could not arise. The Trial Court as well as first Appellate Court have categorically held that theory of partition prior to 1952 set up by the Appellant Defendants was a concocted story. There was no such partition at all. Partition deed executed and registered on 27.6.1968; deed of settlement dated 31.10.1968 in favour of Ambalika Padhi and Will dated 24.1.1969 in favour of Bhajakrushna Panda were valid documents. This Court should not interfere with concurrent findings of facts and all the appeals are liable to be dismissed. 10. We have considered the rival submissions made by Learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record. 11. The contention raised by Dr. Sujata Das that as Ramanath Padhi (D.2) died while appeal was pending before the Hon'ble Apex Court and thus, the same stood abated as no substitution was made, has no merit for the reason that he was duly represented, from the initial stage, by his wife Smt. Kanchan Padhi (D.6). Therefore, for non-substitution of his legal representatives, the appeals would not abate. This view stand fortified by the Judgments of the Supreme Court in Surayya Begum (Mst) Vs. Mohd. Usman and Others, ; and Mohd. Hussain (dead) by LRs and Others Vs. Occhavlal and Others wherein the Apex Court has held that where there has been a substantial representation of the rights of the deceased party, question of abatement would not arise. 12. Mohd. Usman and Others, ; and Mohd. Hussain (dead) by LRs and Others Vs. Occhavlal and Others wherein the Apex Court has held that where there has been a substantial representation of the rights of the deceased party, question of abatement would not arise. 12. So far as partition deed is concerned, the Trial Court decided the issue Nos. 5, 6, 7 and 8 together and after considering the evidence of all the parties concerned, came to the conclusion that partition prior to 1952 was merely a fraud played against Plaintiff -Smt. Urmila Padhi. and the fraudulent act had been admitted by Radhakrishna (D.3) in his written statement. Nobody had ever denied right and interest by Smt. Urmila Padhi in the properties of the family. It is the admitted case that she became the widow when there was a joint mess in the family. Therefore, the question of partition in her absence could not arise. More so, Radhakrishna (D.3) had admitted that Smt. Urmila did not come to claim any share otherwise they could have definitely given her share as she was the member of their family. In such a fact-situation, the theory of partition prior to 1952 remained a concocted story. Radhakrishna Padhi, Appellant/(D.3) appeared as D.W.11 and could not tell as in whose presence the partition took place. Nor he could tell as which share had gone to whom. Trial Court held that properties acquired subsequent to 1955 vide registered documents had also been shown to have been partitioned prior to 1952. Therefore, the partition theory had no legs to stand on its own. There was no coherence regarding the time of alleged partition in 1952 among the Defendants and their witnesses. Appellant/D.3 Radhakrishna padhi did not know the date of partition. The difference was not of days or month, it was of years. Therefore, the issue Nos. 5,6,7 & 8 were answered against the Defendants accordingly. 13. The first Appellate Court affirmed the findings of facts on the issues given by the Learned Trial Court observing that where joint family property was settled on some of the members of the family, unless it is specifically claimed that others stood excluded and after adjudication, settlement made on one or some only, it was to be presumed that the settlement was in favour of the joint family. Therefore, the Defendants could not get any benefit out of such settlement under the Act, 1951 to exclude interest of Plaintiff-Urmila Padhi from the said properties. 14. We have given our serious thoughts on the aforesaid issues and Learned Counsel for the parties had taken us through the entire evidence. Reiterating the same findings would amount to unnecessary repetition. We do not find any cogent reason to take a contrary Views. Therefore, we affirm the said findings on the said Issues. 15. So far as the partition dated 22.6.1968 is concerned, it is nobody's case that it was a fictitious/forged document. More so, it has not been submitted/deposed by any person that such a document had not been executed and registered. Plaintiff Smt. Urmila herself filed the executed and registered partition deed along with plaint and pleaded about its execution and registration. 16. Niranjan Padhi, P.W.3 in support of the Plaintiff deposed that in 1967 Urmila became separate in mess and property from Judhisthiro. The deed of partition was executed on 22.6.1968 and was registered on 27.6.1968. He was present when the deed was written and registered. He had signed there as a witness. Ext. 1/c was the original partition deed wherein he had signed as a witness. Trinath Das, samudi of Defendant No. 2 was present there. Mathiri Tripathy was also present there and had signed as a witness. 17. Plain tiffs case was further supported by Dwarikanath Panda, P.W.4 to the full extent and he stated that in 1967 Urmila became separate from Judhisthiro in mess and property. The document of partition was prepared six months after the said partition. 18. Trinath Das, D.W.5, examined on behalf of Defendant Nos. 2 to 6, deposed that land was divided and deed was registered on 22.6.1968 and to the said documents he was a witness. Partition took place between the two branches, namely, Urmila Padhi and Judhisthiro Padhi. 19. Kanchan Padhi (D.6) examined herself as D.W.9 and she had stated that Urmila and Radhakrishna Padhi quarreled and Urmila went away to her father's house. Thereafter, she came and demanded share from Judhisthiro. She demanded eight annas share, but Judhisthiro told that she had no children and that she should take only four annas share. Her brother Dwari Panda and her sister's husband came with her to demand partition. Six annas share was settled to be given to Urmila Padhi. Thereafter, she came and demanded share from Judhisthiro. She demanded eight annas share, but Judhisthiro told that she had no children and that she should take only four annas share. Her brother Dwari Panda and her sister's husband came with her to demand partition. Six annas share was settled to be given to Urmila Padhi. She was given accordingly. She continued to live with them for 10 months. Then a partition deed was executed giving her six annas share. The entire land, including the share of Urmila Padhi had been cultivated together by them. The partition was between Judhisthiro and herself. Thereafter, she left for Sidheswar. 20. Radhakrishna Padhi (D.3), examined himself as D.W.11 and deposed that he did not know if any document was registered on 22nd or 27th or June, 1968. Me did not know about partition between Judhisthiro and Urmila. Nor he know whether his father signed any, partition deed. Thus, there is no evidence to deny execution and Registration of the partition deed by him. 21. One of the attesting witnesses was examined on behalf of the Plaintiff. The scribe was also examined and on the basis of same, the Trial Court as well as the first Appellate Court reached the conclusion correctly that it was a valid partition on the basis of settlement in the family. As Smt. Urmila Padhi was not having any child or any liability she agreed to accept 6 annas shares instead of 8 annas. Ramanath (D.2) had merely alleged that it was a fraud and the document was got executed to show the ostensible title. However, in view of the provisions contained under Order-VI Rule 4 CPC, material facts as how the fraud had been committed are required to be pleaded and proved. No such attempt was made in this case. Mere allegation in this regard is not enough. Thus, we are of the view that the findings of facts recorded by the Court below do not require any interference. 22. In view of the above, if the alleged partition prior to 1952 is disbelieved and the partition on 1968 stands duly proved, 12 Urmila Padhi was fully competent to dispose of her properties by deed of settlement and Will. 22. In view of the above, if the alleged partition prior to 1952 is disbelieved and the partition on 1968 stands duly proved, 12 Urmila Padhi was fully competent to dispose of her properties by deed of settlement and Will. In view of the fact that Urmila Padhi herself pleaded these facts in the plaint and impleaded her sister Smt. Ambalika as Defendant, if any suspicion or fraud is alleged by the Defendant, the onus was on them to prove it. 23. In view of the provisions of Section 63(c) of the Indian Succession Act, the documents should be attested at least by two witnesses. This requirement stood complied with as the deed of settlement as well as the Will was attested by two witnesses. Requirement of provision of Section 67 of the Evidence Act that at least one of the attesting witnesses should be examined had also been complied with. Niranjan Padhi (P.W.-3) has deposed that Plaintiff Urmila was quite able to write and read. It is no one's case that though she was suffering from Cancer, she was so physically weak or she was a women of unsound mind or was not in a mental condition to take a decision. None of the parties in their cross examination had so deposed. Urmila herself filed the suit disclosing the settlement deed and Will of her free will and the present Appellant failed to establish the fact or to prove that she was mentally and physically not fit to take such a decision. The cases do not have any special feature which may warrant interference with the findings of facts recorded by the Courts below. It cannot be held that the deed of settlement and Will are not valid documents and had not been executed by the Plaintiff on her free will. 24. In AIR 1949 272 (Privy Council) it was held that circumstances and evidence in the case any of the grounds put forth were not sufficient to show that the testator was not of sound mind or that the Will was executed under the undue influence of the propounder or any other persons at his behest. 24. In AIR 1949 272 (Privy Council) it was held that circumstances and evidence in the case any of the grounds put forth were not sufficient to show that the testator was not of sound mind or that the Will was executed under the undue influence of the propounder or any other persons at his behest. In the said case a 'Will' had been impeaching by the wife of the testator on the grounds that the testator was not in right mind to execute the Will and the same had been executed under the undue influence of the propounder. In order to fortify her grounds she had alleged that she had never been informed about the Will; no adequate provision has been made by her considering the readiness of her state left by the testator and the entire property had been settled by 'Will', nothing has been considered for adoption etc. The Privy Council rejected all the contention observing that none of the grounds put forth were sufficient to show that testator was not of sound mind or 'Will' had been executed under the undue influence of the propounder. 25. In Gurdial Kaur and others Vs. Kartar Kaur and Others the Apex Court held that if there is a suspicious circumstances about the execution of the Will, it is the duty of the person seeking the declaration about the validity of the Will to dispel such suspicious circumstances. Where the propounder was unable to dispel the suspicious circumstances which surrounded the question of valid execution and attestation of the Will, propounder should not be benefited. Will must be a product of free volition of the executant who had voluntarily executed the same after knowing and understanding the contents of the Will. The Will should not only be executed and attested in the manner required under the provisions of Indian Succession Act alone, aforesaid conditions should also be fulfilled. The mere fact that the Will is a registered document by itself is not sufficient to dispel all suspicions regarding the validity of the Will where suspicion exists. 26. While deciding the said case, Apex Court placed reliance on its earlier Judgment in H. Venkatachala Iyengar Vs. B.N. Thimmajamma and Others, ; and Rani Purnima Devi and Another Vs. Kumar Khagendra Narayan Dev and Another, . 27. In Uma Devi Nambiar and Others Vs. 26. While deciding the said case, Apex Court placed reliance on its earlier Judgment in H. Venkatachala Iyengar Vs. B.N. Thimmajamma and Others, ; and Rani Purnima Devi and Another Vs. Kumar Khagendra Narayan Dev and Another, . 27. In Uma Devi Nambiar and Others Vs. T.C. Sidhan (Dead) the Apex Court considered the circumstances of depriving the natural heirs from inheritance and ground for raising suspicion for the reason that the whole idea behind the execution of the Will is to interfere in the normal line of succession and so natural heirs would be debarred in every case of the Will. 28. In Joseph Antony Lazarus (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. A.J. Francis the Apex Court examined the issue relating to suspicion of the validity of the will. In the said case the Court took consideration of the old age health condition of the testatrix, different signatures on different pages of the Will and one year gap of execution and registration of the Will. The non examination of the scribe of the Will, factors, which create doubt regarding the validity of the Will and held that in such circumstances, may establish the suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution and registration of the Will. Therefore, it becomes necessary in a given case to determine the physical and mental status of the testatrix and testator and has to found out as to whether he was under the undue influence of the propounder. 29. In Adivekka and Others Vs. Hanamavva Kom Venkatesh 'D' by LRs. and Another the Apex Court considered a large number of its earlier Judgments and on the issue and came to the conclusion as under: ...The propounder is also required to prove that the testator has signed the will and that he had put his signature out of his own free will having a sound disposition of mind and understood the nature and effect thereof. If sufficient evidence in this behalf is brought on record, the onus of the propounder may be held to have been discharged....In the case of proof of Will, a signature of a testator alone would not prove the execution thereof, if his mind may appear to be very feeble and debilitated. However, if a defence of fraud, coercion or undue influence is raised, the burden would be on the caveator. 30. However, if a defence of fraud, coercion or undue influence is raised, the burden would be on the caveator. 30. While deciding the said case, the Court placed reliance upon its earlier Judgment in Madhukar D. Shende Vs. Tarabai Aba Shedage, ; and Pentakota Satyanarayana and Others Vs. Pentakota Seetharatnam and Others, . The Court further held as under: We may, however, hasten to add that there exists a distinction where suspicions are well founded and the cases where there are only suspicions alone. Existence of suspicious circumstances alone may not be sufficient. The Court may not start with a suspicion and it should not close its mind to find the truth. A resolute and impenetrable incredulity is not demanded from the Judge even if there exist circumstances of grave suspicion. 31. In Pentakota Satyanarayana and Others Vs. Pentakota Seetharatnam and Others the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered a case, where the testator was alive and had filed the written statement admitting the execution of the document. The Apex Court made the following observations: In the instant case, there was unequivocal admission of the Will in the written statement filed by P. Srirammurthy. In his written statement, he has specifically averred that he had executed the Will and also described the Appellants as his sons and Alia Kantamma as his wife as the admission was found in the pleadings. The case of the Appellants cannot be thrown out. As already noticed, the first, Defendant has specifically pleaded that he had executed a Will in the year 1980 and such admissions cannot be easily brushed aside. However, the testator could not be examined as he was not alive at the time of trial.... The document also contains the signatures of the attesting witnesses and the scribe. Such particulars are required to be endorsed by the Registrar along with his signature and date of document. A presumption by a reference to Section 114 of the Evidence Act shall arise to the effect that particulars contained in the endorsement of registration were regularly and duly performed and are correctly recorded. In our opinion, the burden of proof to prove the Will has been duly and satisfactorily discharged by the Appellants. The onus is discharged by the propounder adducing prima facie evidence proving the competence of the testator and execution of the Will in the manner contemplated by law. In our opinion, the burden of proof to prove the Will has been duly and satisfactorily discharged by the Appellants. The onus is discharged by the propounder adducing prima facie evidence proving the competence of the testator and execution of the Will in the manner contemplated by law. In such circumstances, the onus shifts to the contestant, opposing the Will to bring material on record meeting such prima facie case in which event the onus shifts back on the propounder to satisfy the Court affirmatively that the testator did know well the contents of the Will and in sound disposing capacity executed the same. It is settled by a catna of decisions that any and every circumstance is not a suspicious circumstance. Even in a case where active participation and execution of the Will by the propounders/beneficiaries was there, it has been held that that by itself is not sufficient to create any doubt either about the testamentary capacity or the genuineness of the Will. 32. The law on the issue cam be summarised that a document like Will has to be proved giving strict adherence to the statutory provisions. The documents should be prepared at the instance of the testator, out of his free will. The testator should be mentally and physically fit to take the decision voluntarily to execute such a document. It is to be free from well founded suspicions. If allegation of fraud or coercion or undue influence is alleged, the burden to prove the same lies on the caveator. 33. It is also settled legal proposition that if the Courts below have recorded the finding of fact, the question of re-appreciation of evidence by the third Court does pot arise unless it is found to be totally perverse. The higher Court does not sit as a regular Court of appeal. It's function is to ensure that law is being properly administered. Such a Court cannot embark upon a fruitless task of determining the issues by re-appreciating the evidence. The Court would not ordinarily interfere with the concurrent findings on pure questions of fact and review the evidence for the third time unless there are exceptional circumstances justifying the departure from the normal practice. Such a Court cannot embark upon a fruitless task of determining the issues by re-appreciating the evidence. The Court would not ordinarily interfere with the concurrent findings on pure questions of fact and review the evidence for the third time unless there are exceptional circumstances justifying the departure from the normal practice. The position may undoubtedly be different if the inference is one of law from facts admitted and proved or where the finding of fact is materially affected by violation of any rule of law or procedure. (Vide Srinivas Ram Kumar Vs. Mahabir Prasad and Others, ; Tulsidas Khimji Vs. Their Workmen, ; and Pentakota Satyanarayana and Others Vs. Pentakota Seetharatnam and Others, ). 34. Where the Court below considered the material facts and did not take into consideration any inadmissible evidence etc., the interference is not required by Court on third instance, (vide Madhavan Nair v. Bhaskar Pillai (2005)10 SCC 553.) 35. In Babu Ram, Ashok Kumar and Another Vs. Antarim Zila Parishad the Full Bench of Allahabad High Court has observed as under: A Court of appeal would not interfere with the exercise of discretion by the Court below. If the discretion has been exercised in good faith, after giving due weight to relevant matters and without being swayed by irrelevant matters. If two views are possible on the question, then also the Court of appeal would not interfere even though it may exercise discretion differently, were the case to come initially before it. The exercise of discretion should manifestly be wrong. Thus, in view of the above the concurrent finding of facts do not require to be interfered by the third Court as we do not find any perversity in the findings recorded by the Courts below. 36. No case has been made out to doubt the validity of the settlement deed and/or Will. There is nothing on record to show that Smt. Urmila Padhi was not in sound mind or was not physically fit to take a free decision or such decisions had been taken under undue pressure or coercion. Appellant failed to lay down any factual foundation for suspicions at all. Therefore, the documents are held to be valid. In the instant case, Smt. Urmila Padhi-plaintiff herself pleaded that she had executed a deed of the settlement and a Will. Such an admission cannot be brushed aside. Appellant failed to lay down any factual foundation for suspicions at all. Therefore, the documents are held to be valid. In the instant case, Smt. Urmila Padhi-plaintiff herself pleaded that she had executed a deed of the settlement and a Will. Such an admission cannot be brushed aside. The case is similar to the case in Pentakota Satyanarayana (supra), referred to herein above. 37. More so, if Judhisthiro Padhi (D.1) during his life time had alienated certain property which had fallen in the share of Urmila Padhi, in favour of Kanchan (D.6), wife of Ramanath (D.2) after partition in the year 1968, that was null and void for the simple reason that he had no right to make a transfer of the property over which he had no title. Even if Kanchan (D.6) was in possession of the same as she did not claim any title over the said property by adverse possession, Smt. Kanchan (D.6) did not acquire any title over it. 38. In view of the above, we find no force in the appeals. The same as dismissed. No costs. B.N. Mahapatra, J. I agree. Final Result : Dismissed