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2008 DIGILAW 1122 (AP)

A. Appa Rao v. Competent Authority, Defence Estates Officer and Competent Authority (ULC), and A. P. Circle, Secunderabad

2008-12-30

L.NARASIMHA REDDY

body2008
ORDER One Sri C.P. Thamaskoty, S/o. late Dewan Bhadur C. Padmarao Kudaliar, was the owner of property in Bungalow No. 184, comprised in GLR Sy. No. 518, admeasuring Ac. 6.72 cents in the Secunderabad Cantonment. He sold the same in favour of one Sri P. Kuppu Swamy, through sale deed dated 16-02-1962. The Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (for short 'the Act') applies to the Secunderabad Cantonment, which is part of Hyderabad Urban agglomeration. The 1st respondent is the Competent Authority, to determine the claims under the Act, as regards the lands in Secunderabad Cantonment Area. Therefore, Kuppu Swamy filed a declaration under Section 6 of the Act, before the 1st respondent. He has also filed an application under Section 20 of the Act, before the Revenue Department, Government of Andhra Pradesh, for exemption from the provisions of the Act. 2. The 1st respondent informed Kuppu Swamy, through letter dated 14-12-1977 that, since construction over the land in Bungalow No. 184 is prohibited by the relevant provisions of law, it cannot be treated as vacant land, within the meaning of Section 2(q) of the Act. Therefore, the declaration was not processed. Through his letter dated 19-06-1978, the 1st respondent, however, informed Kuppu Swamy that the restrictions on construction of buildings on the properties similar to bungalow No. 184 have been removed through the orders of GOC-in-C, Southern Command, and in that view of the matter, the necessity has arisen for filing of a declaration. Accordingly, a fresh declaration was filed by Kuppu Swamy, on 04-09-1978. The declarant stated that there is no vacant land. Thereafter, he sold the property in favour of the petitioners herein through sale deed dated 30-04-1981. 3. The petitioners state that, when they were taking steps to prevent encroachment over the property and were causing the repairs to the fencing, the officials of the Cantonment have objected by taking the stand, that the land was declared as excess under the Act, and that the possession thereof was taken. The petitioners claim that, on verification, they came to know that their vendor, Kuppu Swamy, died on 18-10-1981, and after his death, an order under Section 9 of the Act was passed, on 24-021982, without there being any order under Section 8(4) of the Act. The petitioners claim that, on verification, they came to know that their vendor, Kuppu Swamy, died on 18-10-1981, and after his death, an order under Section 9 of the Act was passed, on 24-021982, without there being any order under Section 8(4) of the Act. They also submit that the notifications, under different subsections of Section 10, were published in the year 1985, against a dead person. 4. This writ petition is filed challenging the order dated 24-02-1982, passed under Section 9 of the Act, and the subsequent proceedings, including the one, published under Section 10(1) of the Act, in the gazette dated 20-06-1985. 5. During the pendency of the writ petition, the Parliament repealed the Act. The State Legislature has also passed a resolution, adopting the repealing Act. In view of this development, the petitioners filed W.P.M.P.No. 26974 of 2007 seeking permission to amend the prayer, to the effect that, in view of the Repeal Act 1999, the alleged vesting of the property, under Section 10(3) of the Act, would not take away the rights of the petitioners. The amendment was ordered by this Court through order dated 30-07-2008. 6. The 1st respondent filed a counter-affidavit. He contends that the Union Government is the owner of the property and C.P. Thamaskoty, had only rights of enjoyment. It is stated that the transfer of the property in favour of Kuppu Swamy was effected without permission of the Union Government, and as such, it is ineffective in law. The factum of Kuppu Swamy submitting a declaration, initially in the year 1976, and thereafter in tile year 1978. is admitted. The averment, that Kuppu Swamy, died on 18-10-1981, is not denied, and in fact, a copy of the death certificate is enclosed to the counter-affidavit. According to the respondents, Kuppu Swamy did not derive any right, vis-a-vis the land, and that the transfer in favour of the petitioners is hit by the provisions of the Act. It is statod that the declaration that was submitted by Kuppu Swamy in the year 1978 was processed, and various orders up to the stage of Section 10(5) of the Act wore passed. Possession of the land IS said to have been taken on 13-07-1992 Substantial portion of the counter-affidavit is devoted to emphasize that, as per the entries In the GLR, the Government of India, Ministry of defence is the owner of the property. 7. Possession of the land IS said to have been taken on 13-07-1992 Substantial portion of the counter-affidavit is devoted to emphasize that, as per the entries In the GLR, the Government of India, Ministry of defence is the owner of the property. 7. Sri R. Raghunandhan, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the various orders, with reference to the declaration filed by Sri Kuppu Swamy were passed after the death of the declarant and as such they are non-est in law. He contends that an order to be passed under Section 9 is only in the form of a decree, and actual adjudication of the rights of a declarant takes place in reasoned order to be passed under Section 8(4) of the Act, and that such an order was not passed at all. Learned Counsel contends that the transfer of property in favour of his clients would enable them to represent the estate of late Kuppu Swamy, and they never claimed independent rights on the strength of the sale deed. He submits that the prohibition contained under the Act against the sale of lands in urban agglomeration is only to preserve legal status of the land, and as long as the petitioners intend to step into the shoes of their vendor, without claiming any independent rights, the prohibition does not have any adverse effect upon them. He further contends that the possession of the land continued to be with the petitioners, and the various records as well as the ground situation vouches for it. Learned counsel submits that, in view of the repeal of the Act, the entire proceedings become untenable. 8. Sri A. Rajasekhar Reddy, learned Assistant Solicitor General, appearing for the respondents submits that the petitioners do not have any locus standi to file the writ petition, nor their vendor Kuppu Swamy had derived any rights, vis-a-vis the land, which is an old grant, in favour of the Ministry of Defence. He contends that none of the proceedings and orders under the Act were challenged before any forum, and it is not at all open to the petitioners to challenge the consequences thereof, in this writ petition. He submits that the repeal Act saves such lands; the possession of which has been taken, and since the possession of the land is taken in the year 1992, the repeal Act has no impact on the proceedings. He submits that the repeal Act saves such lands; the possession of which has been taken, and since the possession of the land is taken in the year 1992, the repeal Act has no impact on the proceedings. He places reliance upon the Judgments of this Court in Mahesh Cooperative Housing Society Limited, v. Special Officer and Competent Authority, Urban Land Ceilings' and Parchuri Ratnakar Rao v. State of A.P. 9. Before discussing the matter on merits, the preliminary objections raised on behalf of the respondents need to be considered. The first objection is, as to the very character of the land. It is stated that though C.P. Thamaskoty held occupancy rights, the actual management and ownership vested with the Government of India, Ministry of Defence, as per entries in the GLR of Secunderabad Cantonment. It is also pleaded that the sale in favour of Kuppu Swamy in the year 1962 is not valid, since it was effected without the permission of the Government of India. The second objection is that the petitioners have no locus standi to challenge the proceedings, since the sale in their favour is hit by Section 5 of the Act. 10. As regards the first objection, it needs to be observed that it is the 1st respondent, who received and processed the declaration filed by Kuppu Swamy. It is he, who addressed letter dated 14-12-1977, informing Kuppu Swamy, that the land is not covered by the Act, since construction is prohibited in Bungalow No. 184. It is once again the 1st respondent that addressed letter dated 19-06-1978, to Kuppu Swamy, requiring him to file declaration, in view of the changes brought in the Cantonment, as regards the permission for construction. If at all, the land was owned by the Government and no, other individual had any right upon it, the question of requiring anybody to file declaration, much less pass an order, holding it to be in excess of ceiling limit, does not arise. Secondly, if the land was held by the Government, there was no question of taking possession thereof. 11. Further, filing of a declaration under the Act or processing thereof, up to any stage, by itself, does not alter the character or ownership of land. The Act obligates not only the absolute owners of vacant land, but also anybody, "who holds it", In any capacity to file declaration. 11. Further, filing of a declaration under the Act or processing thereof, up to any stage, by itself, does not alter the character or ownership of land. The Act obligates not only the absolute owners of vacant land, but also anybody, "who holds it", In any capacity to file declaration. The first objection is therefore overruled, but with an observation that the mere fact that the land was dealt with under the Act does not have any impact upon the character it partakes. It would continue to possess the same legal characteristics, as it did, before the declaration came to be submitted. 12. The second objection is based upon Section 5 of the Act. The respondents contend that any sale of a vacant land is prohibited under Section 5 of the Act, and as such, the petitioners do not have any locus standi to file the writ petition. It is not in dispute that the sale in favour of the petitioners was effected in the year 1981. Section 5 of the Act deals with transfer of land. It prohibits sale of vacant land, in excess of ceiling limits, held by a declarant, immediately before commencement of the Act. Sub-section (4) of Section 4 of the Act directs that where any vacant land has been transferred between the appointed day i.e., the date on which the Act was introduced in the Parliament, and the date on which it came into force l.e.17-02-1976, such lands shall also be included in the holding. The object underlying Sections 4 and 5 is that, mere transfer of vacant land by an owner does not effect the holdings. 13. For instance, if an individual held 500 sq. meters, in excess of ceiling limits, as on the date on which, the Act came into force, the subsequent transfer thereof, does not have the effect of bringing the holding of the declarant within limits. The sales made subsequent to the notified date, would not have any impact upon the determination of holdings of the declarants. A Full Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Jitenderal Nanalal v. Patel Lallubai EswarbaP held that, it is possible for the holder of a land to enter into transactions, and they would, however, be subject to the outcome of the various steps under the Act, including the one, for exemption. A Full Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Jitenderal Nanalal v. Patel Lallubai EswarbaP held that, it is possible for the holder of a land to enter into transactions, and they would, however, be subject to the outcome of the various steps under the Act, including the one, for exemption. From this, it becomes evident that the sale in favour of the petitioners does not have the effect on the holdings of the concerned persons. The holdings have to be reckoned irrespective of subsequent transfers. The petitioners cannot claim independent rights, that too, in negation of the provisions of the Act, and at the same time, they can step into the shoes of their vendor, and carry the proceedings, under the Act, forward, in the same manner, as the latter could have. The petitioners cannot claim any change of status of the land, on the basis of the sale in their favour. 14. In Mahesh Co-operative Housing Society Limited v. Special Officer and Competent Authority, Urban Land Ceilings (1 supra), this Court dealt with the question as to whether the purchasers of vacant land, subsequent to the notified date, can be said to have held the land, so that they can independently pursue remedies. It was held that the land, which assumed the character of vacant land, would retain the same, till the Special Officer and Competent Authority passed final orders. It was also held that neither the change of land use, not the transfer would effect such a character. Almost to the same effect is the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Parchuri Ratnakar Rao's case (2 supra). That was a case where the lands, which were already declared surplus, were purchased. The facts of the present case are totally different. Therefore, this objection is also negatived, I With the above observation. 15. The challenge to the various proceedings, initiated vis-a-vis the land is threefold: The first is that the orders are passed against a dead person. The second is that no order under Section 8(4) of the Act was passed, and straightaway an order under Section 8(4) of the Act was passed, and straightaway an order is passed under Section 9. The third is that, in view of the repeal of the Act, the entire proceedings become invalid and untenable. 16. The second is that no order under Section 8(4) of the Act was passed, and straightaway an order under Section 8(4) of the Act was passed, and straightaway an order is passed under Section 9. The third is that, in view of the repeal of the Act, the entire proceedings become invalid and untenable. 16. The declaration under Section 6 of the Act was filed twice by Kuppu Swamy, during his lifetime. The first was in the year 1976, and the second, in the year 1978. The circumstances, under which the declaration had to be made for the second time, have already been mentioned earlier. The petitioners assert that Kuppu Swamy died on 18-10-1981. Apart from not denying this fact, the 1" respondent had filed a copy of the death certificate of Kuppu Swamy, which supports the plea. The certificate was issued by none other than the Secunderabad Cantonment Board. It shows that Kuppu Swamy died on 18-10-1987, and the said factum was reported to the Cantonment Board, on 20-10-1981. 17. Any proceedings vis-a-vis the lands declared by Kuppu Swamy could have been continued after his death, only after his legal representatives are brought on record. The legal representatives can be either his legal heirs or others, who derive right from him vis-a-vis the land. 18. Section 8 of the Act contemplated several steps. Draft statement is required to be made under sub-section (1) of Section 8 of the Act. Sub-section (3) mandates that the draft statement shall be served on the declarant in the prescribed manner. An order under sub-section (4) has to be passed after considering the objections received in response to the notice referred to in subsection (3) It also contemplates that the declarant must be given con opportunity of being heard. It is beneficial to extract Section 8 of the Act. "Section 8: Preparation of draft statement as regards vacant land held in excess of ceiling limit. 19. The counter-affidavit is silent, as to (1) On the basis of the statement filed the date on which the draft statement was under Section 6, and after such inquiry as the competent authority may deem fit to make, the competent authority shall prepare a draft statement in respect of the person who has filed the statement under Section 6. 19. The counter-affidavit is silent, as to (1) On the basis of the statement filed the date on which the draft statement was under Section 6, and after such inquiry as the competent authority may deem fit to make, the competent authority shall prepare a draft statement in respect of the person who has filed the statement under Section 6. (2) Every statement prepared under subsection (1) shall contain the following particulars, namely: (i) The name and address at the person: (ii) The particulars of all vacant lands and of any other land on which there is a building, whether or not with a dwelling-unit therein, held by such person; (iii) The particulars of the vacant lands which such person desires to retain within the ceiling limit; (iv) The particulars of the right, title or interest of the person in the vacant lands; and (v) Such other particulars as may be prescribed. (3) The draft statement shall be served in such manner as may be prescribed on the person concerned together with a notice stating that any objection to the draft statement shall be preferred within thirty days of the service thereof. (4) The competent authority shall duly consider any objection received, within the period specified in the notice referred to in sub-section (3) or within such further period as may be specified by the competent authority for any good and sufficient reason, from the person on whom a copy of the draft statement has been seNed uncier that sub-section and competent authority shall, after giving the objector a reasonable opportunity of being heard, pass such orders as it deeds fit". 19. The counter-affidavit is silent, as to the date on which the draft statement was served on the declarant i.e. Kummu Swamy, or as to the nature of service. It is also not clear as to whether any order under Section 8(4) of the Act was passed, at all. 20. Similar provisions are contained in the A.P. Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act In Arvala Appalaswamy Naidu v. State of A.P." a declaration, as required under the Act was filed on 05-04-1975, and the declarant died on 16-11-1975, before his holding was determined. No application was filed to bring the legal representatives of the deceased declarant on record. However, the Tribunal proceeded to pass an order, determining the holdings. No application was filed to bring the legal representatives of the deceased declarant on record. However, the Tribunal proceeded to pass an order, determining the holdings. This Court held that, an order passed against a dead person is a nullity. The Kerala High Court, in Janaki Amma v. State of Kera/a' observed that even where a statute is silent as to the nature of steps to be taken on the death of a declarant, under the similar statute, bringing the legal representatives on record is mandatory. Support was derived for this, from the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ebrahim Aboobaker v. Tek Chand DolwanJ3, which arose under the administration of Evacuee Property Act 21. Once it has emerged that all the orders, including those, under Section 9 and different sub-sections of Section 10 were passed only after death of Kuppu Swamy, ie., the declarant, they become void ab initio, and they do not give rise to any legal consequences. 22. Coming to the second aspect, the actual determination of the holdings of a declarant under the Act takes place in an order to be passed under sub-section (4) of Section 8 of the Act It is supposed to be a reasoned order, dealing with the contentions of the declarant and reflecting the opinion of the competent authority. What is to be prepared under Section 9 is, only a final statement This, in turn, is to be prepared on the basis of an order passed under Section 8(4) of the Act, and by making necessary alterations in draft statement It does not contain any reasons. In W.P.No.6404 of 1980, through its order dated 29-08-1981, this Court held that failure to pass order under Section 8(4), even where no objections were received, in response to a draft statement, under Section 8(1), is illegal, and the consequential statement, prepared under Section 9 of the Act, cannot be sustained in law. In the instant case, no order under Section 8(4) of the Act was passed, and straightaway, a statement under Section 9 was prepared. Therefore, the failure on the part of the 1" respondent, in this regard, is fatal to the proceedings. 23. The third contention is based upon I the repeal of the Act The Parliament repealed the Act in the year 1999. Therefore, the failure on the part of the 1" respondent, in this regard, is fatal to the proceedings. 23. The third contention is based upon I the repeal of the Act The Parliament repealed the Act in the year 1999. Section 7 of the repeal Act provided that all the proceedings Initiated under the Act would abate, except where the land vested in the Government, and possession thereof has been taken. The repeal Act was not immediately adopted by the A.P. State Legislature. It was only in the recent past, that the A.P. State Legislature has passed a resolution, adopting the repealing Act 24. The learned Assistant Solicitor General submits that the repeal Act does not have any impact on the land in question, since possession of the land has al ready been taken. Petitioners on the other hand, dispute the very factum of taking possession. Even assuming that the possession of the land was taken, in the preceding paragraphs, it has been held that the entire proceedings are void ab initio and without any legal consequences; firstly because they were issued against a dead person, and secondly, because no order was passed under Section 8(4) of the Act The result is that, the possession, even if taken; would be on the strength of illegal and void orders, and it cannot be recogmzed in law. Had the Act been in force, it would have been possible for the respondents, to resume the proceedings, duly bringing the legal representatives of late Kuppu Swamy on record, That possibility does not exist, in view of the repeal of the Act. 25. For the foregoing reasons, the writ petition is allowed, as prayed for, It is, however, made clear that, this Judgment shall not be treated as the one, determining the character of the land, particularly with reference to the entries made in the GLR. 26. There shall be no order as to costs.