JUDGMENT By the Court.—Heard Sri S.D. Dube, Advocate for the petitioner and learned Standing Counsel for the respondents. 2. Aggrieved by the order suspending fair price agreement of the petitioner, he has approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by means of this writ petition seeking a writ of certiorari for quashing of the aforesaid order. 3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that the respondent No. 2 was under an obligation to pass order of suspension only after giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and in support of his submission placed reliance on a Division Bench decision of this Court in Harpal v. State of U.P. and others, 2008 (3) ADJ 36 . He further contended that there is no material whatsoever before respondent No. 2 for suspending the licence of the petitioner and further that no reason has been assigned by the respondent No. 2 in the impugned order. He lastly contended that the allegations in the impugned order are false and therefore, does not amount to complying with the Government Order dated 29.7.2004 as held by this Court in Harpal (supra). 4. Per contra, learned Standing Counsel submitted that before passing the order of suspension no opportunity of hearing is contemplated either under any statutory provision or under any other law and, therefore, the impugned order of suspension cannot be faulted on the aforesaid ground. He further submitted that after receiving complaint a preliminary inquiry was conducted against the petitioner wherein it was found that the petitioner was guilty of committing several irregularities in distribution of essential commodities to the public at large and hence agreement for distribution of essential commodities through fair price shop has been suspended and the petitioner has been afforded opportunity to explain their conduct before the question of cancellation is to be considered by the authority. He, therefore, submits that the impugned order is in accordance with law. He also submitted that in any case the distribution of fair price shop licence is a matter of agreement and, therefore, in view of the Full Bench decision of this Court in U.P. Sasta Galla Vikreta Parishad, Allahabad v. State of U.P. and others, 1992 (2) EFR 655 the writ petition is not maintainable. 5. He also submitted that in any case the distribution of fair price shop licence is a matter of agreement and, therefore, in view of the Full Bench decision of this Court in U.P. Sasta Galla Vikreta Parishad, Allahabad v. State of U.P. and others, 1992 (2) EFR 655 the writ petition is not maintainable. 5. Sri Dube, however, contesting the argument that the writ petition is not maintainable, submitted that even in contractual matters, writ petition would be maintainable, if, the action of the State under challenge is wholly illegal and without jurisdiction or in violation of principles of natural justice or is in violation of fundamental rights, and, placed reliance on the Apex Court decision in Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trademarks, Mumbai and others, 1998 (8) SCC 1 and M/s Popcorn Entertainment and another v. City Industrial Development Corporation and another, 2007 (3) Supreme 52 : JT 2007(4) SC 70. He also contended that the procedure of allotment of fair price shop and execution of agreement is not a mere contract but is governed by the statutory provision and the Government Orders which have statutory flavour hence violation thereof can be challenged in writ jurisdiction. Sri Dube submitted that after 73rd Amendment of the Constitution the “public distribution system” has been inserted in the Constitution as a constitutional function of local bodies like, Gram Panchayat etc. The subsequent and consequential amendments made in the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 making provisions consistent with 73rd Amendment of the Constitution shows that the statutory function of “public distribution system” is that of Gram Panchayat and any irregularity or breach thereof is open for judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution. In support thereof, he placed reliance on a Division Bench decision of this Court in Pappu v. State of U.P. and others, 2000 (1) AWC 1 . Elaborating his submission it is contended that under the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the “1947 Act”) though procedure of allotment of fair price shop and other consequential proceedings and action is not provided yet since the “public distribution system” is provided as one of the functions of Gram Panchayat, the Government orders issued from time to time laying down procedure for such allotment and its monitoring are referable to the aforesaid statutory provisions and have statutory flavour making the contract in question statutory. Any breach thereof in violation of principles of natural justice or otherwise or where the action of the authorities is arbitrary, is amenable to writ petition and the matter is open for judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution. 6. On the contrary, learned Standing Counsel placing reliance on the Full Bench judgment in U.P. Sasta Galla Vikreta Parishad (supra) and a recent decision of Apex Court in Swapan Kumar Pal v. Achintya Kumar Nayak and others, 2008(1) SCC 379 , contended that the right of petitioner being contractual in nature, and not statutory, the remedy, if any, lies either by filing appeal before the appropriate authority under the Government Orders and/or if the petitioner otherwise feel aggrieved, have a remedy of filing civil suit for claiming damages, if any, for alleged breach of contract but this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution would not exercise its extraordinary equitable jurisdiction in such matter. 7. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties at length and perused the record as well as various authorities cited at the Bar. 8. It is not in dispute that essential commodities which are being distributed through the public distribution system are essential commodities within the meaning of Section 2(a) of Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the “1955 Act”). The 1955 Act was enacted in the interest of general public for control of the production, supply and distribution of, and trade and commerce, in certain commodities. It was enacted by the Parliament in exercise of concurrent jurisdiction under Entry 33, List III, Schedule VII of the Constitution as amended by the Constitution (3rd Amendment) Act, 1954. The Entry 33 as amended in 1954 is as under : “33. Trade and commerce in, and the production, supply and distribution of.— (a) the products of any industry where the control of such industry by the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest, and imported goods of the same kind as such products; (b) foodstuffs, including edible oilseeds and oils; (c) cattle fodder, including oilcakes and other concentrates; (d) raw cotton, whether ginned or unginned, and cotton seeks; and (e) raw jute.” 9. Section 3(1) of 1955 Act provides, if the Central Government is of the opinion that it is necessary so to do for maintaining or increasing supply of any essential commodity or for securing their equitable distribution and availability at fair prices, or for securing any essential commodity for the defence of India or the efficient conduct of military operations, it may, by order, provide for regulating or prohibiting the production, supply and distribution thereof and trade and commerce therein. 10. Section 5 of 1955 Act provides that Central Government may, by notified order, direct that the power to make orders or issue notifications under Section 3 shall, in relation to such matters and subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified in the direction, be exercisable also by State Government or authority subordinate thereto. It is not in dispute that in exercise of the said power the Central Government has, by notified order, directed that its power under Section 3 of the Act can also be exercised by the State of U.P. With the objective, to obtain some of the essential commodities from producers for supplying the same to the public at large at fair price through its own agency, certain orders were issued by the Central Government as well as the State Government from time to time. The aforesaid order relates to production, distribution and supply of such commodities, as well as the quantity of storage, display, price etc. However, we have not been shown any such order which control the manner of appointment of agents by Government for distribution of essential commodities which it has purchased or acquire or collected for distribution to public at large at fair price or controlled priced as fixed by the Government. 11. One order which has been placed before us is Public Distribution System (Control) Order, 2001 (hereinafter referred to as the “PDS Order, 2001”) issued by the Government of India in exercise of power under Section 3 of 1955 Act. A perusal of the entire PDS Order, 2001 nowhere shows as to how and in what manner the fair price shops shall be allotted by the authorities concerned for the purpose of distribution of essential commodities to public at large. A perusal of the entire PDS Order, 2001 nowhere shows as to how and in what manner the fair price shops shall be allotted by the authorities concerned for the purpose of distribution of essential commodities to public at large. The term “fair price shop” and “fair price shop owner” has been defined under clause 2(j) and (k) of PDS Order, 2001 and reads as under : “2(j) “fair price shop” means a shop, which has been licensed to distribute essential commodities by an order issued under Section 3 of the Act, to the ration card holders under the Public Distribution System; (k) “fair price shop owner” means a person and includes a cooperative society or a corporation or a company of a State Government or a Gram Panchayat or any other body in whose name a shop has been licensed to distribute essential commodities under the Public Distribution System;” 12. Clause 7 thereof provides for licensing or authorisation to the fair price shop for distribution of essential commodities and reads as under : “7. Licensing : (1) The procedure for issue of licenses or authorization to the fair price shops for the distribution of essential commodities under Public Distribution System and duties and responsibilities of the fair price shop owners shall be as per paragraph 5 of the Annexe to this Order. (2) The ration card holder shall not be denied the supply as per entitlement of the essential commodities, lying in stock, by the fair price shop owner under the Public Distribution System. (3) The fair price shop owner shall not retain cards after the supply of the essential commodities. (4) A fair price shop owner shall provide the relevant extracts of the records maintained by him to the beneficiary on payment of the prescribed fee.” 13. Para 5 of the Annexe, PDS Order, 2001 referred to in Clause 7 of the said order reads as under : “5. Licensing : State Governments shall issue an order under Section 3 of the Act for regulating the sale and distribution of the essential commodities. The licenses to the fair price shop owner shall be issued under the said order and shall lay down the duties and responsibilities of the fair price shop owner. Licensing : State Governments shall issue an order under Section 3 of the Act for regulating the sale and distribution of the essential commodities. The licenses to the fair price shop owner shall be issued under the said order and shall lay down the duties and responsibilities of the fair price shop owner. The responsibilities and duties of fair price shop owners shall include, inter alia : (i) sale of essential commodities as per the entitlement of ration card holders at the retail issue prices fixed by the concerned State Government under the Public Distribution System; (ii) display of information on a notice at a prominent place in the shop on daily basis regarding (a) list of BPL and Antodaya beneficiaries, (b) entitlement of essential commodities, (c) scale of issue, (d) retain issue prices, (e) timings of opening and closing of the fair price shop, (f) stock of essential commodities received during the month, (g) opening and closing stock of essential commodities and (h) the authority for redressal of grievances/lodging complaints with respect to quality and quantity of essential commodities under the Public Distribution System; (iii) maintenance of records of ration card holders (APL, BPL and Antyodaya), stock register, issue or sale register; (iv) furnishing of copies of specified documents, namely, I ration card register, stock register, sale register to the office of the Gram Panchayat or Nagar Palika or Vigilance Committee or any other body authorized by State Governments for the purpose; (v) display of samples of foodgrains being supplied through the fair price shop; (vi) production of books and records relating to the allotment and distribution of essential commodities to the inspecting agency and furnishing of such information as may be called for by the designated authority; (vii) account of the actual distribution of essential commodities and the balance stock at the end of the month to the designated authority of the concerned State Government with a copy to the Gram Panchayat; (viii) opening and closing of the fair price shop as per the prescribed timings displayed on the notice board.” 14. Clause 6 provides for Monitoring of fair price shop and Clause 7 provides for Appellate Authority and read as under: “6. Monitoring : (1) State Governments shall ensure a proper system of monitoring of fair price shops and prescribe model sale register, stock register and ration card register. Clause 6 provides for Monitoring of fair price shop and Clause 7 provides for Appellate Authority and read as under: “6. Monitoring : (1) State Governments shall ensure a proper system of monitoring of fair price shops and prescribe model sale register, stock register and ration card register. (2) State Governments shall ensure regular inspections of fair price shops not less than once in six months by the designated authority. State Governments may issue orders specifying the inspection schedule, list of check points and the authority responsible for ensuring compliance with the said orders. (3) Meetings of the Vigilance Committees on the Public Distribution System at the State, District, Block and FPS level shall be held on a regular basis. The date and periodicity shall be notified by State Governments. However, the periodicity shall not be less than one meeting a quarter at all levels. (4) State Governments shall ensure a periodic system of reporting and the complete information in this regard shall be sent in the prescribed form as follows : (i) By fair price shops to the District Authorities by the 7th of the month following the month for which allocation is made in Form ‘A’. (ii) By the District Authorities to State Government by the 15th of the month following the month for which allocation is made in Form ‘B’. (iii) By the State Government to the Central Government by the end of the month following the month for which allocation is made in Form ‘C’. (5) Future allocation of foodgrains to States shall be linked to the receipt of regular reports from the respective States and furnishing of utilization certificates by them within a period of two months from the month for which allocation is made. (6) State Governments shall ensure monitoring of the functioning of the Public Distribution System at the fair price shop level through the computer network of the NIC installed in the District NIC centers. For this purpose computerized codes shall be issued to each FPS in the district. (7) State Governments shall educate the ration card holders regarding their rights and privileges under the Public Distribution System by use of electronic and print media as well as display boards outside fair price shops. (8) State Governments shall issue and adopt the Citizens Charter based on the model Citizens Charter issued by the Central Government. (7) State Governments shall educate the ration card holders regarding their rights and privileges under the Public Distribution System by use of electronic and print media as well as display boards outside fair price shops. (8) State Governments shall issue and adopt the Citizens Charter based on the model Citizens Charter issued by the Central Government. (9) The designated authority shall direct the concerned fair price shop owner to provide relevant extracts of the documents maintained by him on an application made by a beneficiary, on payment of a prescribed fee.” “7. Appellate Authority : The State Governments shall appoint the Appellate Authority for the purposes of this order.” 15. Pursuant to the power conferred under PDS Order, 2001 the State Government has issued notification dated 20.12.2004 namely, U.P. Essential Commodities Distribution Order, 2004 (hereinafter referred to as the “2004 Order”). Clause 3 and 4 thereof provides for establishment and operation of fair price shops and reads as under : ^^3- vuqlwfpr oLrqvksa dk mfpr forj.k djkus dh n`f"V ls jkT; ljdkj vfèkfu;e dh èkkjk&3 ds vèkhu fdlh {ks= esa ,slh jhfr ls vkSj mruh la[;k esa mfpr ewY; dh nqdku LFkkfir djus ds fy, funsZk ns ldrh gS] tSlk og mfpr le>sA 4- ¼1½ mfpr ewY; dh dksbZ nqdku ,sls O;fDr ds ek/;e ls vkSj ,slh jhfr ls pyk;h tk;sxh tSlh dysDVj jkT; ljdkj ds funsZkksa ds vèkhu jgrs gq, fofufpr djsaA ¼2½ mi[k.M ¼1½ ds vèkhu mfpr ewY; dh nqdku pykus ds fy, fu;qDr dksbZ O;fDr jkT; ljdkj ds vfHkdrkZ ds :i esa dk;Z djsxkA ¼3½ mi[k.M ¼1½ ds vèkhu mfpr ewY; dh nqdku pykus ds fy, fu;qDr dksbZ O;fDr bl vknsk ls layXu izk:i ds vuqlkj mfpr ewY; dh nqdku pykus ds lEcU/k esa jkT; ljdkj ds funsZkkuqlkj mDr fu;qfDr ds izHkkoh gksus ds iwoZ l{ke izkfèkdkjh ds le{k ,d vuqcUèk i= gLrk{kfjr djsxkA** 16. Certain general conditions to be followed by the agents appointed by the authorities for running fair price shop are contained in Clause 25 and 26 of 2004 Order which reads as under : ^^25- vfHkdrkZ ,slh krksZa dk vuqikyu djsxk tSlh jkT; ljdkj ;k dysDVj }kjk fyf[kr :i ls le;≤ ij nqdkuksa ds [kksyus] LVkd ds j[kus] vuqlwfpr oLrqvksa ds lEHkj.k vkSj forj.k] ys[kk ds vuqj{k.k] jftLVjksa ds j[kus] foojf.k;ka izLrqr djus vkSj jkku dkMZ /kkjdksa dh jlhn tkjh djus vkSj vU; lacafèkr fo"k;ksa ds lacaèk esa funsZk fn;s tk;A 26- l{ke vf/kdkjh }kjk vfHkdrkZ ds :i esa izkf/kd`r dksbZ O;fDr fdlh mivfHkdrkZ dh fu;qfDr ugha djsxk] u viuh ,tsalh dks fdlh Hkh ek/;e ls fdlh vU; O;fDr dks vUrfjr djsxk vkSj vfHkdrkZ ds :i esa izkfèkd`r O;fDr ls fHkUu dksbZ O;fDr ;k rks mi vfHkdrkZ ds :i esa ;k vfHkdrkZ ls vUrfjrh ds :i esa ;k ,sls vfHkdrkZ dh vksj ls vU; izdkj ls dkjksckj ugha djsxkA** 17. Vide Clause 30 of 2004 Order U.P. Essential Commodity Distribution Order, 1990 has been rescinded. 18. Learned Counsel for the petitioner referring to the aforesaid orders, thus sought to argue that the procedure of appointment of fair price shop dealers is now covered by the statutory provisions and, therefore, an order passed by the authorities adversely affecting the interest of fair price shop dealers is liable to be assailed under Article 226 of the Constitution and open for judicial review. He also sought to argue that in view of the aforesaid provisions the appointment of fair price dealers ceases to be a mere ordinary contract but for all practical purposes it is a statutory contract and any infraction thereof would give rise to a right to the affecting party to challenge it in a writ Court. 19. It would be appropriate to consider the basic idea of distribution of essential commodities under the 1955 Act and the system of appointment of agents in furtherance of discharge of the aforesaid function. It cannot be disputed that even before 73rd Amendment of the Constitution the Government has undertaken the responsibility of distribution of essential commodities to public at large at controlled or fair price. The purpose of the said responsibility is obvious. The majority of the citizens in the country live either below poverty live or almost at par or little above thereof. The purpose of the said responsibility is obvious. The majority of the citizens in the country live either below poverty live or almost at par or little above thereof. They are not able to meet their two times meals by the meagre income they earn and, therefore, the market forces, if are allowed to operate freely without any protection to such persons, probably majority of such people would be forced to die of starvation and they may not be able to survive at all. This experience we had even before independence and immediately after independence when the hoarders created a situation of scarcity of food items causing virtual revolution in different parts of the country at times. Various social and welfare measure were taken by the then Government and one of the major decision taken with the intervention of Parliament is enactment of 1955 Act conferring power upon the Government to control production, supply and distribution of, and trade and commerce in certain commodities, namely, essential commodities as defined under Section 2(1) of 1955 Act. Therefore, the basic idea and intention of the legislature under the Act is to make available essential commodities to the public at large at fair price except of the cases where the availability and equitable distribution would be necessary for defence of India or for any efficient conduct of military operations. The Act intends to provide welfare measure for availability of essential commodities to public at large at fair price and rest of the machinery or mechanism is incidental for achieving the aforesaid goal. The appointment of fair price shop dealers, therefore, as such, is not the primary objective of 1955 Act but it is a channel by which the objective of making essential commodities available to public at large at fair price is to be achieved. It is always permissible and open to the Government to make the essential commodities available to public at large at fair price through the agencies or instrumentalities of its own namely, its own officers or officials or by creating a department or alike. Simultaneously, instead of undertaking the said job on its own it can discharge the aforesaid obligation through private persons or bodies by appointing them as its agents. Simultaneously, instead of undertaking the said job on its own it can discharge the aforesaid obligation through private persons or bodies by appointing them as its agents. Bereft of the authority conferred upon such agents by the Government for distribution of essential commodities at fair price, such persons had no fundamental or legal right of dealing with such essential commodities on behalf of the Government to distribute to public at large the essential commodities at fair prices, though on their own, in their private capacity, it is always open to them to make the commodities which are essential commodities under the Act available to public at large at fair price without having any corresponding burden upon the Government if there is no otherwise prohibition under any other law and the statutory provisions otherwise controlling the production, storage etc. of such essential commodities are observed by them. The position, therefore, of the persons who are appointed as agent by the authorities for distribution of essential commodities at fair prices is that of an “agent” and “principal” respectively as defined under Section 182 of Contract Act, 1872 (hereinafter referred to as the “1872 Act”) which reads as under : “182. “Agent” and “principal” defined.—An “agent” is a person employed to do any act for another or to represent another in dealings with third persons. The person for whom such act is done, or who is so represented, is called the “principal”. 20. Such an agency can be terminated by either side at any point of time as provided under Sections 201 and 203 of 1872 Act subject of course to the condition that if there is any breach of conditions of the contract between the principal and agent, the other side may claim for such compensation and damages as permissible in law. Since the number of appointment of such agents, considering the vast population of State of U.P., is quite big, the entire system has created a parallel channel of huge block of interested persons working as agents to continue with agency and whenever action is taken for cancelling or terminating agency or suspending the contract for the time being, it has resulted in heavy litigation time and again. 21. 21. Without going in much earlier past in the matter, it would be useful to refer first major decision on the issue delivered by a Full Bench of this Court in Shitla Prasad v. M. Saidullah and others, AIR 1975 All 344 , wherein similar arguments were raised, though of course, that was a case prior to 73rd Amendment of the Constitution but that we propose to consider later on. Referring to the various provisions of 1955 Act, and U.P. Sugar Control Order, 1966 it was argued that the contract of distribution of essential commodities at fair price through fair price shops is not a mere ordinary contract and if the termination of the agreement/contract is penal in nature and in violation of the principles of natural justice, the aggrieved person can approach this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. Repelling the above submission, this Court held : “.........even if an appointment is made in the exercise of a statutory power of entering into a contract, no petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution would lie for enforcing the rights flowing from such contract. In the instant case also, even if it be accepted that the Sugar Control Order of 1966, which is a statutory order contemplates the appointment of an authorised retailer, the rights and obligation of an authorised retailer would flow only under the agreement entered into between him and the District Magistrate......” (para 15) 22. In para 23 of the judgment the Court further held as under : “23. In the result we are of the opinion that by terminating the agreement the respondents did not interfere with any right of the petitioner which could be secured by filing a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. Infringement, if any, was that of petitioners contractual rights which he can, if so advised, secure in a properly instituted suit.” 23. Another chain of litigation again attracted the attention of this Court vide another Full Bench decision in U.P. Sasta Galla Vikreta Parishad (supra). Infringement, if any, was that of petitioners contractual rights which he can, if so advised, secure in a properly instituted suit.” 23. Another chain of litigation again attracted the attention of this Court vide another Full Bench decision in U.P. Sasta Galla Vikreta Parishad (supra). The change which caused the matter to be referred to the Full Bench was enactment of U.P. Scheduled Commodities Distribution Order, 1990 in exercise of power under Section 3 of 1955 Act on the strength whereof it was sought to be argued that after issuance of said notification governing appointment of fair price shop dealers, the right has become a statutory one instead of mere contract and, therefore, the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution would be maintainable. This Court, however, held : “........the contracts made by the petitioners with the Collectors are not statutory contracts.” (para 9) “.........where the contract, which has been entered into between the State and the person aggrieved, is non-statutory, the rights of the parties thereto are governed by the terms of the contract and not by constitutional provisions and no writ or order can be issued under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by this Court for enforcing such a contract........” (para 10) “14. It thus stands established by the Supreme Court that in the matter of non-statutory contracts rights and obligations of the parties arising thereunder are governed by the terms and conditions of the contract and constitutional provisions like Article 14 cannot be extended and in such cases the question of violation of Article 14 or other provisions of the Constitution by the State or its official does not arise. Any action taken or any order passed under such a contract by the State or its official, howsoever, wrong or arbitrary it may be, cannot be challenged under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is not open to this Court to enforce such a contract or to remedy the breach thereof by the State in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226.” “21. Even though the petitioners and other authorised agents cannot challenge the breach of their contract on the ground of violation of constitutional provisions before this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution but they are not remedyless. Government letter itself provides for appeal against some of the orders, which may be passed by the authorities. Even though the petitioners and other authorised agents cannot challenge the breach of their contract on the ground of violation of constitutional provisions before this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution but they are not remedyless. Government letter itself provides for appeal against some of the orders, which may be passed by the authorities. That apart the authorised agents like the petitioners have remedy of civil suit before the appropriate Civil Court, which they can institute before filing of the appeal as well as after the appeal is decided.” 24. Initially the law appeared to have been settled by aforesaid two Full Bench decisions of this Court but then came in 73rd Amendment of the Constitution. Under Part IX of the Constitution, provisions pertaining to “Panchayat” were inserted providing for its constitution, composition, reservation of seats, duration of Panchayats, disqualification for membership, powers, authority and responsibilities of Panchayats, elections to the Panchayats etc. The aforesaid 73rd Amendment Act, 1992 of the Constitution came into force on 24.4.1993. For the purpose of present case it would be appropriate to refer Article 243-G which reads as under : “243-G. Powers, authority and responsibilities of Panchayats.—Subject to the provisions of the Constitution, the Legislature of a State may, by law, endow the Panchayats with such powers and authority as may be necessary to enable them to function as institutions of self-Government and such law may contain provisions for the devolution of powers and responsibilities upon Panchayats, at the appropriate level, subject to such conditions as may be specified therein, with respect to— (a) the preparation of plans for economic development and social justice; (b) the implementation of schemes for economic development and social justice as may be entrusted to them including those in relation to the matters listed in the Eleventh Schedule.” 25. The Eleventh Schedule as referred to in Article 243-G contains a list of various activities which are 29 in number and item 28 thereof reads as under : “28. Public distribution system.” 26. It would be important to notice at this stage that even prior to 73rd Amendment, Village Panchayat system was already recognised and well established in the State of U.P. and was governed by 1947 Act. Public distribution system.” 26. It would be important to notice at this stage that even prior to 73rd Amendment, Village Panchayat system was already recognised and well established in the State of U.P. and was governed by 1947 Act. Consistent with the amendment made in the Constitution, 1947 Act was also amended and Section 15 which provides for functions of Gram Panchayat was also substituted by U.P. Act No. 9 of 1994. It would be appropriate to reproduce hereunder the relevant part of Section 15 as under : “15 (xxix) Public distribution system : (a) Promotion of public awareness with regard to the distribution of essential commodities. (b) Monitoring the public distribution system.” 27. Besides above, we have not been shown any other provision which would have dealt with the “public distribution system” under 1947 Act. Section 15 thus as is apparent confer general functions upon the Gram Panchayat i.e. promoting public awareness with regard to distribution of essential commodities and monitoring the public distribution system. It does not provide for the establishment and setting up of public distribution system by Gram Panchayat itself. Even the said function of Gram Panchayat is subject to such conditions as may be specified by State Government from time to time. 28. In the light of the aforesaid development again an issue was raised before this Court as to whether suspension or cancellation of fair price shop would be amenable to writ jurisdiction and the matter came upon before a Division Bench of this Court in Pappu (supra). Referring to Article 243-G, Eleventh Schedule of the Constitution and Section 15 of 1947 Act read with the Government Order dated 10.8.1999 this Court in para 9 of the judgment held that the allotment of fair price shop or its cancellation is now a statutory function of Gram Panchayat and exercise of such power for collateral purpose is interdicted by Article 14 of the Constitution. It also held that any arbitrary grant or cancellation of fair price shop is open for judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution. This Court held that the Full Bench decision in U.P. Sasta Galla Vikreta Parishad (supra) has rendered obsolete in view of the Constitutional and statutory amendment as above. It also held that any arbitrary grant or cancellation of fair price shop is open for judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution. This Court held that the Full Bench decision in U.P. Sasta Galla Vikreta Parishad (supra) has rendered obsolete in view of the Constitutional and statutory amendment as above. This judgment is the sheet anchor of learned Counsel for the petitioner to substantiate his argument that the writ petition is maintainable and the earlier two Full Bench judgments are no more a good law and, therefore, have lost their potentiality of binding a Division Bench of this Court with its precedential authority. 29. We are, therefore, inclined to consider as to whether the Full Bench judgments rendered by this Court can be ignored in such a manner or so long as the matter is not referred to a Larger Bench and a contrary view is taken, they have a binding force on a Division Bench, and, any other view on the part of the smaller Bench would be against judicial propriety, decorum and the system of precedents. 30. The entire edifice of the argument to wriggle out the two Full Bench decisions is based upon the 73rd Amendment of the Constitution as well as the amendment of 1947 Act as referred to above. It would be appropriate to consider the same at length. After the enactment of 73rd and 74th Amendment of Constitution, with the object to re-enforce the institutions of self Government in the country at village level and above, the aforesaid amendments were made, but, to our mind, the same have not conferred upon the said institutions, any status or role conferred upon State as provinces in the federation. Considering the effect of insertion of part IX in the Constitution, the Apex Court in M/s Gujarat Pradesh Panchayat Parishad and others v. State of Gujarat and others, 2007(5) Supreme 716 , in para 26 of the judgment observed as under : “Part IX of the Constitution confers certain powers on Local Self Government. It promises duration of five years, free and fair election, representation of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the administration of institutions of Local Self Government, `no-interference’ by other organs of the State, including judiciary, etc. It promises duration of five years, free and fair election, representation of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the administration of institutions of Local Self Government, `no-interference’ by other organs of the State, including judiciary, etc. In our opinion, however, the High Court was right in observing that “a District Panchayat cannot arrogate to itself the status of a body as independent or autonomous as a Province in a Federation”. Part IX of the Constitution or Article 243-G makes no change in the essential feature of the Panchayat organization. What was sought to be done by the Seventy-third Amendment was that constitutional status to the Local Self Government was conferred to District Panchayats, Taluka Panchayats and Village Panchayats. A State Legislature, in the light of constitutional provisions in Part IX, cannot do away with these democratic bodies at the local level nor their normal tenure be curtailed otherwise than in accordance with law nor State Government can delay elections of these bodies.” 31. Similarly, in Kishansing Tomar v. Municipal Corporation of the city of Ahmedabad and others, 2006(8) SCC 352 , referring to 74th Amendment of Constitution which is with respect to municipalities the Apex Court said : “The object of introducing these provisions was that in many States the local bodies were not working properly and the timely elections were not being held and the nominated bodies were continuing for long periods. Elections had been irregular and many times unnecessarily delayed or postponed and the elected bodies had been superseded or suspended without adequate justification at the whims and fancies of the State authorities. These views were expressed by the then Minister of State for Urban Development while introducing the Constitution Amendment Bill before the Parliament and thus the new provisions were added in the Constitution with a view to restore the rightful place in political governance for local bodies. It was considered necessary to provide a Constitutional statute to such bodies and to ensure regular and fair conduct of elections.” 32. It was considered necessary to provide a Constitutional statute to such bodies and to ensure regular and fair conduct of elections.” 32. Article 243-G from a bare reading shows that it empowers the legislature of State to endow the Panchayats with such powers and authority as may be necessary to enable them to function as institutions of self Government and such law may contain provisions for the devolution of powers and responsibilities upon Panchayat subject to such conditions as may be specified therein with respect to the preparation of plans for economic development and social justice; the implementation of schemes of economic development and social justice as may be entrusted to them including those in relation to matters listed in the Eleventh Schedule. Therefore, with respect to preparation of plans and implementation of schemes, in relation to matters pertaining to public distribution system, the law can be made by the legislature. That is how we are able to read and understand Article 243-G of the Constitution. The legislature in furtherance thereof has provided in Section 15 of 1947 Act that the Gram Panchayat shall perform the functions enumerated therein subject to such conditions as may be specified therein and in respect to the “public distribution system” the two functions which are entrusted to Gram Panchayat under 1947 Act are: (a) Promotion of public awareness with respect to the distribution of essential commodities, and (b) Monitoring the public distribution system. 33. It is not in dispute that for carrying out the purposes of 1947 Act the State Government is empowered to frame rules under Section 110 of 1947 Act and sub-section (2) and clause (xvi-a) of Section 110 reads as under : “110. Powers of State Government to make Rules.—(1) The State Government may, by notification in the Gazette make rules for carrying out the purposes of this Act. (2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power such rules may provide for— ..................................... (xvi-a) the carrying out of functions and duties of Gram Panchayats as mentioned in Sections 15, 16 and 17; ...................................." 34. It is not the case of parties that any rules have been framed by the Government in exercise of the aforesaid provisions. 35. (xvi-a) the carrying out of functions and duties of Gram Panchayats as mentioned in Sections 15, 16 and 17; ...................................." 34. It is not the case of parties that any rules have been framed by the Government in exercise of the aforesaid provisions. 35. A bare reading of Section 15 of 1947 Act does not lead to the conclusion that the establishment of “public distribution system”, procurement of essential commodities and appointment of agents for distribution of essential commodities at fair prices to public at large is within the purview of Section 15 of 1947 Act. Being a statutory body of local Government, the statute presupposes existence of public distribution system, monitoring whereof subject to such conditions as may be imposed by the State Government has been conferred upon Gram Panchayat, but, beyond that, any construction of the aforesaid provision would add certain words in the statute which are otherwise not provided by the legislature. Going by the golden rule that the Court should read statutory provisions plainly in a manner they are enacted without adding or subtracting therein, we are clearly of the view that Section 15 of 1947 Act by itself does not authorise “Gram Panchayat” to take over as such, the entire system of “public distribution system” under its control substituting the Government and its machinery already existing and operating in the area concerned. 36. Moreover, neither the Constitution nor the Act nor any statutory rule has been brought to our notice which provides for such appointment of the agents by Gram Panchayat. At this stage, our attention is drawn to the Government Orders dated 3.5.1999 and 18.5.1999. A perusal of the Government Order dated 3.5.1999 shows that in order to strengthen the Panchayat system and to make it more effective the Government communicated its decision of delegating power of appointment and cancellation of fair price shop and to exercise control thereon to Gram Panchayat. Keshettra Panchayats were also authorised to supervise the distribution of warehouses at block level. In furtherance of the Government Order dated 3.5.1999 another order was issued on 18.5.1999 containing various instructions with respect to appointment and cancellation of fair price shops by Gram Panchayats, and, the earlier Government Order dated 3.7.1990 was accordingly superseded thereby. Keshettra Panchayats were also authorised to supervise the distribution of warehouses at block level. In furtherance of the Government Order dated 3.5.1999 another order was issued on 18.5.1999 containing various instructions with respect to appointment and cancellation of fair price shops by Gram Panchayats, and, the earlier Government Order dated 3.7.1990 was accordingly superseded thereby. Para 7 thereof provides that District Magistrate, Additional District Magistrate, District Supply Officer and Sub-Divisional Officer, on their own or on complaints, shall also be entitled to enquire into the functioning of fair price shop dealer and in case of any irregularity may pass orders cancelling or suspending the dealership and such order shall be binding on Gram Sabha as well as the dealer. The Government Orders dated 3.5.1999 and 18.5.1999 though admittedly refers to 73rd Amendment of the Constitution but nowhere mention that the same are being issued by the State Government in exercise of any statutory power and, therefore, it is difficult to hold that said Government Orders are statutory in nature. No doubt true that every executive order is referable to Article 162 of the Constitution since that is the executive power of the State and coextensive with legislative power but every exercise of executive power under Article 162 of the Constitution does not result in issuance of a statutory order otherwise it would mean that every executive order issued by the Government would be referable to Article 162 of the Constitution and, therefore, it would be a statutory order. This is neither correct in law nor can be accepted in the light of binding precedent of the Apex Court as well as Larger Bench decisions of this Court. It would be useful to refer to the Apex Court decision in M/s Raman and Raman Ltd. v. State of Madras and others, AIR 1959 SC 694 , where the Apex Court observed : “Nor is there any basis for the argument thai as the directions are issued under a statutory power, they are “laws”. The source of the power does not affect the character of the things done in exercise of that power. Whether it is a law or an administrative direction depends upon the character or nature of the orders or directions authorized to be issued in exercise of the power conferred.” 37. The source of the power does not affect the character of the things done in exercise of that power. Whether it is a law or an administrative direction depends upon the character or nature of the orders or directions authorized to be issued in exercise of the power conferred.” 37. The Government Order dated 3.5.1999 and 18.5.1999 have been issued in the same manner as was the Government Order dated 3.7.1990 was issued which was up for consideration before the Full Bench in U.P. Sasta Galla Vikreta Parishad (supra) and considering thereto the Full Bench in para 8 of the judgment held as under : “The letter dated 3.7.1990 is in the form of a letter from the Secretary, Government of U.P., addressed to all the District Magistrates of the State, who have been required to take necessary action in pursuance thereof. It contains the instructions and directions issued by the Government regarding the selection of the authorised agent and the manner for running the fair price shop. This letter is addressed to the Collectors and not to any other person. Statutory Orders/laws are normally not issued in the form of letters addressed to the officials of the State only.” 38. Learned Counsel for the petitioner also could not show that the Government Orders dated 3.5.1999 and 18.5.1999 can be said to have been issued by the State Government under provision of 1947 Act and on the contrary conceded that they are executive orders issued by the State Government and referable to Article 162 of the Constitution. It is important to notice at this stage that like any other person, the State is also entitled to enter into the contract subject to the provisions of the Constitution namely, Article 299 which reads as under : “299. Contracts.—(1) All contracts made in the exercise of the executive power of the Union or of a State shall be expressed to be made by the President, or by the Governor of the State, as the case may be, and all such contracts and all assurances of property made in the exercise of that power shall be executed on behalf of the President or the Governor by such persons and in such manner as he may direct or authorise. (2) Neither the President nor the Governor shall be personally liable in respect of any contract or assurance made or executed for the purposes of this Constitution, or for the purposes of any enactment relating to the Government of India heretofore in force, nor shall any person making or executing any such contract or assurance on behalf of any of them be personally liable in respect thereof.” 39. The Government can issue various orders in exercise of its executive power for the guidance of its authority, and every such order cannot be said to be a statutory order merely because it has been issued by the State Government and is referable to Article 162 of the Constitution. The Government Orders may contain certain policy directions, instructions for the guidance of the authorities, and so on. Repeatedly, it has been held that such Government Orders are not enforceable in the Court of law which lay down certain guidance for the authorities or convey certain policy decisions, except those orders which convey or confer some vested right upon third person. In the matter of transfer Government Orders laying down policy have been held to be non-enforceable in the Court as is evident from the following observations of the Apex Court in Union of India and others v. S.L. Abbas, AIR 1993 SC 2444 : “The said guideline, however, does not confer upon the Government employee a legally enforceable right.” 40. The only distinction made in the Government Orders issued in 1999 is that earlier agency on behalf of Government for distribution of essential commodities at fair price to public at large could be granted by the District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate but now this power has been delegated to Gram Panchayat. The Gram Panchayat, therefore, would act as a delegate of the State Government for entering into the contract with the fair price dealer but would not be exercising any power on its own since the Government Order is not statutory in nature. The rights, therefore, of the fair price dealer would emanate only from the agreement or contract which it would be executing after its appointment. The rights, therefore, of the fair price dealer would emanate only from the agreement or contract which it would be executing after its appointment. That being so, what was held in U.P. Sasta Galla Vikreta Parishad (supra) by the Full Bench that the contracts executing in pursuance of the Government Order dated 3.7.1990 by the agents with the Collectors cannot be said to be statutory contract still holds good with the distinction that in place of 3.7.1990 we can read the Government Orders dated 3.5.1999 and 18.5.1999 and that would not make any further change. Before taking a contrary view and holding that the said Full Bench is no long a good law it was not open for a Bench of smaller constitution to declare the judgment of Larger Bench to be obsolete and we are constrained to observe that to this extent the decision of the Division Bench in Pappu (supra) cannot be said to be binding being directly in the teeth of Larger Bench decision and in case of any disagreement it ought to have been referred to Larger Bench otherwise the Full Bench decision has the binding effect and the Division Bench could not have taken otherwise view. 41. In State of Tripura v. Tripura Bar Association and others, 1998 (5) SCC 637 , the Apex Court held that even a co-ordinate Bench of High Court wanted to take a different view from that taken by the earlier Division Bench, the proper course would be to refer the matter to a larger Bench. The same view has been reiterated in Rajasthan Public Service Commission and another v. Harish Kumar Purohit and others, AIR 2003 SC 3476 . 42. However, for the purpose of present case the matter does not rest here for the reason that now subsequently in exercise of power under Section 3 of 1955 Act the Central Government has issued PDS Order, 2001 and the State Government has issued Order 2004 and thus it is to be seen as to whether the said notifications have made any change in the position as discussed above. 43. 43. It is no doubt true that under PDS Order, 2001 it is provided that for the purpose of distribution of essential commodities it is the State Government which shall issue order for regulating sale and distribution and such order shall also provide for the licences to be issued to fair price shop owners and the duties and responsibilities thereof. Pursuant thereto the State Government has issued 2004 Order. Para 3 thereof provides that the State Government may give instructions for establishment of a fair price shop in an area as it finds appropriate and shall also give instructions regarding the manner of operating fair price shop. Clause 4(2) of 2004 Order clearly provides that such person shall run fair price shop as an agent of the State Government and Clause 4(3) provides that he shall execute an agreement for the said purpose. The appointment of fair price shop dealer, therefore, under the agreement still continued to be contractual in nature and the said contract cannot be said to be a statutory contract. This aspect has also been dealt with by the Full Bench in U.P. Sasta Galla Vikreta Parishad (supra) in para 15 of the judgment which reads as under : “15. With regard to the contract made by the authorised agent with the Collector for the sale of scheduled commodities through fair price shops there is a line of decisions of the Courts holding that these contracts are non-statutory and the rights of the parties thereto are governed by the terms and the conditions of the contract and not by constitutional provisions such as Article 14 and no writ can be issued under Article 226 of the Constitution or compelling the authorities to remedy the breach of such a contract. In S.C. Sekharan v. T.N. Government, AIR 1974 SC 1543 , the Supreme Court held that a person who has been appointed as distributor by the Government under a contract for sale of levy sugar under Levy Sugar (Supply Control) Order, 1972 has no legal right to trade in levy sugar, as right of such a person is purely contractual. In S.C. Sekharan v. T.N. Government, AIR 1974 SC 1543 , the Supreme Court held that a person who has been appointed as distributor by the Government under a contract for sale of levy sugar under Levy Sugar (Supply Control) Order, 1972 has no legal right to trade in levy sugar, as right of such a person is purely contractual. A Full Bench of this Court in Shitla Prasad v. Saidullah, AIR 1975 All 344 (FB), also compelled the similar contentions which have been raised before us in the instant case, holding that no writ petition can be filed under Article 226 of the Constitution to remedy the breach of contract entered into by a dealer with the District Magistrate for sale of levy Sugar. It was further laid down that if there has been breach of such a contract the only remedy is before the Civil Court where the person aggrieved can secure specific performance of contract and can seek other necessary reliefs in connection therewith. Division Bench of this Court in M/s Raj Kumar Ashok Kumar v. Additional District Magistrate, 1981 ALJ 271 and Ram Avadh v. State of U.P., 1990 ALJ 867, have also reiterated the same principle while dismissing the writ petition of the dealers. The decision of Division Bench of this Court in Gopal Das Sahu v. State of U.P., 1991 ALJ 498 : 1991(2) EFR 44 (All)(DB), deals with the cancellation of contract executed by an agent with the Collector for sale of the scheduled commodity under the Order. This Court held that neither Article 14 of the Constitution nor principle of natural justice are attracted when agreement to sell the Government Foodgrains through fair price shops is terminated. It was further laid down that relationship of the agents with the Government is contractual which is non-statutory in nature, and therefore, writ under Article 226 of the Constitution, is not maintainable to compel the Government to supply the quota of scheduled commodities to the petitioner therein. The decision of the Division Bench of this Court in case of Gopal Das Sahu (supra), and other cases of this Court mentioned hereinbefore lay down correct law.” 44. It is important to notice at this stage that anything which is referable to some statute does not ipso facto become statutory in nature. The decision of the Division Bench of this Court in case of Gopal Das Sahu (supra), and other cases of this Court mentioned hereinbefore lay down correct law.” 44. It is important to notice at this stage that anything which is referable to some statute does not ipso facto become statutory in nature. For example before registration of a company under the Companies Act, 1956 it has to submit an Article of Association and Memorandum of Association before the Registrar of the Company as provided under the aforesaid Act but such Article of Association which is specifically referable to the provisions of Companies Act, 1956 has been held to be non-statutory and non-enforceable in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Similarly, a cooperative society or a society under the Cooperative Societies Act or Societies Registration Act is required to submit its bye-laws before the Registrar before its registration and the Registrar only after being satisfied that the said bye-laws contains various clauses consistent with the provisions of the Act and thereafter register the body. It has repeatedly been held that such bye-laws are not statutory and cannot be enforced in writ jurisdiction. [See Co-operative Central Bank Ltd. and others v. Additional Industrial Tribunal, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad and others, AIR 1970 SC 254, (para 10) and Babaji Kondaji Garad and others v. Nasik Merchants Co-operative Bank Ltd., Nasik and others, AIR 1984 SC 192 , (para 15)]. 45. Similarly, every agreement which would be executed between the parties would have to be governed by the provisions of the Contract Act but still there is a line of decisions of the Apex Court as well as this Court that neither such contracts are statutory nor writ petition would lie for enforcement of such contracts. 46. 45. Similarly, every agreement which would be executed between the parties would have to be governed by the provisions of the Contract Act but still there is a line of decisions of the Apex Court as well as this Court that neither such contracts are statutory nor writ petition would lie for enforcement of such contracts. 46. In Bareilly Development Authority and another v. Ajay Pal Singh and others, AIR 1989 SC 1076 , the Court held : “There is a line of decisions where the contract entered into between the State and the persons aggrieved is non-statutory and purely contractual and the rights are governed only by the terms of the contract, no writ or order can be issued under Article 226 of the Constitution of India so as to compel the authorities to remedy a breach of contract pure and simple : Radhakrishna Agarwal v. State of Bihar, (1977) 3 SCR 249 : ( AIR 1977 SC 1496 ); Premji Bhai Parmar v. Delhi Development Authority, (1980) 2 SCR 704 : ( AIR 1980 SC 738 ) and D.F.O. v. Biswanath Tea Company Ltd., (1981) 3 SCR 662 : ( AIR 1981 SC 1368 ).” 47. In S. Chandra Sekharan and others v. Govt. of T.N. and others, AIR 1974 SC 1543 the Court held that a person appointed as distributor by the Government under a contract for sale of levy sugar under Levy Sugar (Supply Control) Order, 1972 has only contractual right not enforceable in writ jurisdiction. 48. In M/s Popcorn Entertainment (supra), relied on by learned Counsel for the petitioner the Court held that even in contractual matters the writ petition against the State would be maintainable; (1) if the action of the State is illegal and without jurisdiction, (2) if principles of natural justice have been violated, and (3) if the fundamental rights of the petitioner have been violated. In the case in hand neither it can be said that the order of suspension is without jurisdiction nor learned Counsel for the petitioner could show that any fundamental rights of the petitioner have been violated. In the case in hand neither it can be said that the order of suspension is without jurisdiction nor learned Counsel for the petitioner could show that any fundamental rights of the petitioner have been violated. The rights of the petitioner in any case emanates from the agreement whereby the agency of the petitioner was created and the same having been suspended in terms of the agreement, even it cannot be said that the principles of natural justice are necessarily attracted what to say of violation thereof. Thus the aforesaid judgment does not help to petitioner. For the same reasons the law laid down in Whirlpool Corporation (supra) also does not apply to this writ petition. 49. On the contrary, we find support from the Apex Court decision in Kerala State Electricity Board and another v. Kurlen E. Kelathil and others, AIR 2000 SC 2573 , where the Court held that if a term of a contract is violated, ordinarily the remedy is not by filing writ petition under Article 226 but such disputes must be settled by the ordinary principle of law of contract and availing remedy provided in the common law. The Court also held that a contract would not become statutory simply because it is for construction of a public utility and it has been awarded by a statutory body. Similarly the obligations imposed by the contract since comes within the purview of Contract Act, that also would not make the contract statutory. In para 11 of the judgment, the Court further held : “11. A statute may expressly or impliedly confer power on a statutory body to enter into contracts in order to enable it to discharge its functions. Dispute arising out of the terms of such contracts or alleged breaches have to be settled by the ordinary principles of law of contract. The fact that one of the parties to the agreement is a statutory or public body will not of itself affect the principles to be applied. The disputes about the meaning of a covenant in a contract or its enforceability have to be determined according to the usual principles of the Contract Act. Every act of a statutory body need not necessarily involve an exercise of statutory power. Statutory bodies, like private parties, have power to contract or deal with property. Such activities may not raise any issue of public law. Every act of a statutory body need not necessarily involve an exercise of statutory power. Statutory bodies, like private parties, have power to contract or deal with property. Such activities may not raise any issue of public law. In the present case, it has not been shown how the contract is statutory. The contract between the parties is in the realm of private law. It is not a statutory contract. The disputes relating to interpretation of the terms and conditions of such a contract could not have been agitated in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. That is a matter for adjudication by a civil Court or in arbitration if provided for in the contract. Whether any amount is due and if so, how much and refusal of the appellant to pay it is justified or not, are not the matters which could have been agitated and decided in a writ petition. The contractor should have been relegated to other remedies.” 50. In National Highways Authority of India v. Ganga Enterprises and another, AIR 2003 SC 3823 , following the above dictum, the Apex Court held : “It is settled law that dispute relating to contracts cannot be agitated under Article 226 of the Constitution.” 51. Similarly in U.P. State Spinning Co. Ltd. v. R.S. Pandey and another, 2005(8) SCC 264 , it was held that the remedy provided in a writ jurisdiction is not intended to supersede completely the modes of obtaining relief by an action in a civil Court or to deny defence legitimately open in such actions. 52. In Binny Ltd. and another v. V. Sadasivan and others, AIR 2005 SC 3202 in para 32 of the judgement the Court held : “Applying these principles, it can very well be said that a writ of mandamus can be issued against a private body which is not a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and such body is amenable to the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution and the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution can exercise judicial review of the action challenged by a party. But there must be a public law element and it cannot be exercised to enforce purely private contracts entered into between the parties”. 53. But there must be a public law element and it cannot be exercised to enforce purely private contracts entered into between the parties”. 53. In Star Paper Mills Ltd. v. State of U.P. and others, 2006 (10) SCC 201 it was again reiterated that writ jurisdiction is not intended to supersede the remedy available in common law. 54. It is true that in ABL International Ltd. and another v. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Ltd. and others, 2004(3) SCC 553 , the Court held that merely because one of the parties to the litigation raises a dispute with respect to the facts of the case the Court is not bound to relegate the parties to avail remedy in common law instead of entertaining writ petition under Article 226 and even in contractual matters, in appropriate cases, the writ petition may be entertained by the Court but a perusal of para 23 of the judgments clearly shows that it was held therein that if the State or its instrumentalities is party to the contract, it is an obligation for it, in law, to act fairly, justly and reasonably and that is the requirement of Article 14 of the Constitution. If it contravenes thereto, a writ petition would lie and Writ Court can issue suitable direction to enforce such right and against the arbitrary action of the respondents. It is thus evident therefrom that if it can be shown that there is a contravention of fundamental right under Article 14 of the Constitution, in appropriate cases, the Writ Court may interfere but it is not that in all cases wherever there is a contract and a breach thereof, the writ petition would lie merely because one of the party to the contract is State. The words of caution are reiterated by the Apex Court in ABL International (supra) in para 28 and it would be appropriate to reproduce the same as under : “28. However, while entertaining an objection as to the maintainability of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Court should bear in mind the fact that the power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 of the Constitution is plenary in nature and is not limited by any other provisions of the Constitution. However, while entertaining an objection as to the maintainability of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Court should bear in mind the fact that the power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 of the Constitution is plenary in nature and is not limited by any other provisions of the Constitution. The High Court having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. The Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions in the exercise of this power [See; Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and others]. And this plenary right of the High Court to issue a prerogative writ will not normally be exercised by the Court to the exclusion of other available remedies unless such action of the State or its instrumentality is arbitrary and unreasonable so as to violate the constitutional mandate of Article 14 or for other valid and legitimate reasons, for which the Court thinks it necessary to exercise the said jurisdiction.” 55. Here, in all these cases, though the respondents are State authorities, and are party to the agreement but between the petitioner and the respondents the rights of the petitioner flow from the agreement of agency and in effect the petitioner is not enforcing any public functioning of the State but it is the private right which is being enforced i.e. continuance of agency though in the garb of widely acclaimed public function namely “public distribution system”. This ignores the fact that essential commodities at fair prices are made available to the public whether by X, Y or Z is wholly irrelevant for the system as such. The petitioner claim would not affect the public distribution system as such inasmuch as, the respondents would have to make arrangement of distribution of essential commodities to public at large to those units who were being distributed essential commodities by the petitioner, through some other agents. Therefore, even if it is said that a writ petition in appropriate cases may be entertained, we have no manner of doubt to hold that it would be prudent exercise if in such matters the Writ Court decline to entertain the writ petition for enforcement of such contractual rights unless it is shown to be in violation of some statutory provisions or the order is wholly without jurisdiction. 56. 56. In fact a combined reading of what we have discussed above shows that fair price dealers appointed for achieving the objective of distribution of essential commodities at fair price to public at large have dispute carrying two shades when an action is taken by the authorities. One, when an action is taken against a fair price dealer for committing breach in distribution of essential commodities which amounts to violation of 1955 Act attracting penalty thereunder and may also amounts to an offence for which prosecution may be initiated. Second is regarding continuance of contractual obligation of retaining agency for distribution of essential commodities and when the agency is terminated or suspended, attempt is made on the part of the agent to continue thereon in one or other manner. 57. In the former kind of cases whenever there is any infraction of the statute, there is no manner of doubt that constitutional remedy under Section 226 of the Constitution would be available in appropriate cases, but, in the later kind of cases where the agent is only attempting to continue his agency with the authorities, in our view, since it is a pure and simple contractual matter, in the light of the two Full Bench decisions as discussed above, the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution should not be available, and, instead, the aggrieved person either may avail remedy as provided in the contract before the authorities concerned or file a civil suit for claiming damages for enforcing common law rights. It would be necessary to remind that the purpose of public distribution system is not to benefit certain individuals who are engaged as agents for distribution of essential commodities at fair prices to public at large but the objective is to make essential commodities available to public at large at fair price and the engagement of agents is a means to achieve the said goal. If for the reason of vested interest of agents, repeated interference or frequent interference is allowed in the matter of appointment of agents, it is likely to become a menace for the basic objective namely, making essential commodities available at fair price to public at large. If for the reason of vested interest of agents, repeated interference or frequent interference is allowed in the matter of appointment of agents, it is likely to become a menace for the basic objective namely, making essential commodities available at fair price to public at large. Whether the commodity is so made available to public by A, B or C that should not be hold the authorities so long as the attempt is made to distribute essential commodities to public at large at fair prices and the authorities must have a reasonably free hand to deal with the situation. If an agency is terminated by the authorities in breach of the norms of contract or agreement, sufficient remedial measures are available under law enabling the aggrieved agent to avail such remedy in common law and claim compensation/damages for breach of terms of agreement/contract. 58. We make it clear that if the authorities have acted illegally and have committed breach of the terms of agreement and cause to be paid punitive damages, if any, to the agents, the same can be recovered or realised from the authority concerned in his personal capacity as well who has caused such illegality. In our opinion, this would be sufficient measure to check the authorities from acting illegally, but in any case frequent interference under Article 226 of the Constitution for enforcement of contractual rights of the agents had to be curbed and snubbed so as not to by-pass the common law remedy available in law. It would be appropriate to reproduce the similar words of caution expressed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Swapan Kumar Pal (supra): “19. In a case of this nature, ordinarily, the High Court would not exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. For exercising the power of judicial review, the Court has a limited role to play. It could interfere only if any legal error has been committed in the decision-making process. It could not enter into the merit of the decision.” 59. In view of the above discussion even if we come to the conclusion that as such the petitioner may not be non-suited on the ground that the writ petition is not maintainable yet it cannot be said that the Writ Court must entertain the writ petition whenever there is any complaint of breach of certain contractual rights. The legal position is otherwise. The legal position is otherwise. As observed by the Apex Court in Swapan Kumar Pal (supra) the scope of judicial review is only limited to interfere when there is any error in decision-making process and not otherwise. Even if the writ petition, as such, may not be dismissed on the ground that it is not maintainable yet we are of the view that in such matters exercise of discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution by entertaining writ petition would not be prudent unless it is shown that there is any violation of statutory provisions particularly when alternative remedy is available to the petitioner. 60. We have also gone through the entire judgment of this Court in Harpal (supra) and could not find that this Court has held that before suspending the fair price agreement of an agent an opportunity must be afforded to such an agent. What has been held therein is that whenever the agreement is to be suspended, it should not be on mere conjectures but there must be some material with the authorities to arrive at a conclusion that regular inquiry is needed and in the meantime the agreement may be suspended. Moreover, from the entire judgment it does not appear that attention of Hon’ble Court was drawn to the two Full Bench decisions as referred to hereinabove and, therefore, to that extent in our respectful opinion we are bound by the law laid down by the Full Bench of this Court in Shitla Prasad (supra) and U.P. Sasta Galla Vikreta Parishad (supra). 61. In the result, we do not find any reason to interfere in this writ petition and the same is dismissed without there being any order as to costs. ————