JUDGMENT Shantanu Kemkar, J. 1. Being aggrieved by the order dated 10.9.2004 (Annexure P/1) passed by the Labour Court, Indore in Case No. 40/04 Ref. I.D. by which the Labour Court has ordered for reinstatement of the members of the respondent Union with full backwages, the petitioner has filed this petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India. Brief facts necessary for the disposal of this writ petition are that the petitioner a small scale industry was carrying on the manufacturing of electric filament in its factory situated A-4-D, Industrial Estate, Polo Ground, Indore. The M.P. Financial Corporation (for short M.P.F.C.) invoking the provisions of the State Financial Corporation Act took over the possession of the petitioner industry on 29.10.2003 and sold it to a third party buyer. As a result of taking over the possession of the petitioner industry by the M.P.F.C. the service of workmen working in the petitioner industry stood automatically terminated. 2. Aggrieved by the termination of service of as many as twenty five workmen working in the petitioner's industry, the respondent claiming to be registered upon representing the employees of the petitioner industry approached to the appropriate Government for making reference of the dispute. As no settlement could be arrived at between the parties in a conciliation proceedings a reference was made by the State Government invoking the powers under section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 to the Labour Court, Indore for decision as to whether the termination of 25 employees of the petitioner industry as per the list attached was legal and proper and if not for what relief they are entitled and what directions are to be given to the employer. 3. After receipt of the aforesaid reference the Labour Court, Indore issued notice to the parties to appear before it on 5.7.2004 which was the date fixed for filing of the statement of claim by the respondent. On 5.7.2004 the case was adjourned for 2.8.2004 for submission of statement of claim. On 2.8.2004 the Labour Court proceeded ex parte against the petitioner and fixed the case for recording of respondent's evidence and thereafter vide impugned award ordered for reinstatement of the employees mentioned in the award with full backwages. 4. On 5.7.2004 the case was adjourned for 2.8.2004 for submission of statement of claim. On 2.8.2004 the Labour Court proceeded ex parte against the petitioner and fixed the case for recording of respondent's evidence and thereafter vide impugned award ordered for reinstatement of the employees mentioned in the award with full backwages. 4. After passing of the said ex parte award the petitioner submitted an application under Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure for setting aside the ex parte award. The Labour Court after hearing the arguments of learned Counsel for the parties rejected the petitioner's application for setting aside the ex parte award vide order dated 25.5.2005 (Annexure P/6) holding therein that the award was passed on 10.9.2004 which was published on and an application for setting aside the same has been submitted on 7.12.2004, in the circumstances the award having become enforceable after 30 days of its publication the application for setting aside the ex parte award after more than 30 days of its publication is not maintainable. 5. The petitioner's case is that it had not served with the notice of reference sent by the Labour Court. According to it on 20.10.2003 the possession of industry was already taken by the M.P.F.C. The notice sent by the Labour Court on the factory address was not received by the petitioner but was received by one 'Shrikisan' who was neither petitioner's representative nor any way connected or authorised by the petitioner to receive notice/summons on its behalf. In the circumstances according to the petitioner the service of notice/summons was not effected upon it, still the Labour Court proceeded ex parte against it. It is also the case of the petitioner that the Labour Court has erred in not setting aside the ex parte award by holding that after 30 days of its publication the award became enforceable and it had no jurisdiction to entertain the application for setting aside ex parte award after lapse of 30 days from the date of its publication. 6. The case of the respondent is that the Labour Court had rightly proceeded ex parte against the petitioner in view of the fact that even after service of the summons the petitioner did not appear before the Labour Court. In the circumstances the respondent stated that the impugned award dated 10.9.2004 is perfectly justified. 6. The case of the respondent is that the Labour Court had rightly proceeded ex parte against the petitioner in view of the fact that even after service of the summons the petitioner did not appear before the Labour Court. In the circumstances the respondent stated that the impugned award dated 10.9.2004 is perfectly justified. It is also stated that in view of the Judgment of the Supreme Court passed in case of Sangham Tape Company v. Hans Raj 2004 (103) FLR 699 (SC), the order dated 25.5.2005 (Annexure P/6) passed by the Labour Court refusing to set aside the ex parte award is also perfectly justified. 7. As regards challenge to the order dated 25.5.2005 (Annexure P/6) is concerned admittedly the ex parte award was passed on 10.9.2004 and it was published under section 17 of the Act on 18.10.2004. According to the petitioner on getting knowledge of the said award an application for setting aside the ex parte award was submitted on 7.12.2004. Thus according to the petitioner from the date of knowledge of the ex parte award the application for setting it aside having been submitted within 30 days, the same ought to have been considered by the Labour Court on merits. It is further case of the petitioner that the Labour Court granted 90 days time to comply the said award dated 10.9.2004 in the circumstances it was not enforceable within 90 days and therefore in view of section 17-A(4) the award having not come into operation when the application for setting it aside was submitted on 7.12.2004 the Labour Court had ample jurisdiction to decide the application for setting aside the ex parte award on merit. 8. At the first place I deem it proper to decide as to whether the order dated 25.5.2005 passed by the Labour Court refusing to entertain the application for setting aside the ex parte award is legal and proper or not. The Supreme Court in case of Sangham Tape Company (supra) has held that even though the rules framed under the Industrial Disputes Act may provide for applicability of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure but an industrial adjudication is governed by the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The Supreme Court in case of Sangham Tape Company (supra) has held that even though the rules framed under the Industrial Disputes Act may provide for applicability of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure but an industrial adjudication is governed by the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Once the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure are made applicable to the industrial adjudication indisputably the provisions of Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure would be attracted. But unlike an ordinary Civil Court the Industrial Tribunal and the Labour Court as the case may be having limited jurisdiction in that behalf. The jurisdiction of setting aside an ex parte award has to be exercised having regard to the provisions contended in section 17-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. An application for setting aside the ex parte award may be filed before the expiry of 30 days from the date of publication of the award. Till the expiry of 30 days the Industrial Court or the Labour Court retains the jurisdiction over the dispute referred to it for adjudication and only up to that date it has the power to entertain an application in connection with such dispute. The award passed by the Industrial Court or Labour Court becomes enforceable under section 17-A of the Act on the expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication and once it becomes enforceable the Industrial Court or the Labour Court becomes functus Officio. In this view of the matter the application for setting aside the ex parte award filed by the petitioner after 30 days of the publication of the award was rightly not entertained by the Labour Court holding it to be not maintainable. The petitioner's contention that the Labour Court itself made the award operative after 90 days from the date of its passing and therefore the application for setting aside the award could have been filed before the award became operative is wholly misconceived. Section 17-A(4) itself provides that subject to the provisions of sub-section (1) and sub-section (3) regarding the enforceability of an award the award shall come into operation with effect from the said date as may be specified therein. This itself shows that the sub-clause (4) has been made subject to the provisions of sub-sections (1) and (3). Section 17-A(4) itself provides that subject to the provisions of sub-section (1) and sub-section (3) regarding the enforceability of an award the award shall come into operation with effect from the said date as may be specified therein. This itself shows that the sub-clause (4) has been made subject to the provisions of sub-sections (1) and (3). Moreover the two terms enforceability and coming into operation as has been used in this section are having their own independent meaning. Merely because the Labour Court has ordered that the award is to be complied with within 90 days it will not defer the enforceability of the award under section 17-A(1) of the Act after 30 days of its publication under section 17 of the Act. Thus the order of the Labour Court rejecting the petitioner's application for setting aside the ex parte award on the ground that it had no jurisdiction after 30 days of publication of award is perfectly justified in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in case of Sangham Tape Company (supra). 9. The petitioner's challenge to the impugned ex parte award dated (Annexure P/1) is on the ground that the notice of reference sent by the Labour Court at the factory address was not served upon it but was served upon one Shrikisan who was not anyway connected with the petitioner and was not its authorised representative. 10. From the averments of the parties I find that it has not been disputed by the respondent that on the date when the notice was sent by the Labour Court to the petitioner the possession of the petitioner industry was already taken over by the MPFC. There is no denial that the persons who received the notice was not authorised to receive the notice for the petitioner. In the circumstances the service of summons on one Shrikisan cannot be said to be service of notice on the petitioner. Who was the said Shrikisan and in what capacity he accepted the notice has also not been disclosed in the receipt of the said notice. It is also not the case of the respondent that the said Shrikisan was petitioner's representative. In the circumstances the Labour Court has committed patent illegality in proceeding ex parte against the petitioner. 11. Who was the said Shrikisan and in what capacity he accepted the notice has also not been disclosed in the receipt of the said notice. It is also not the case of the respondent that the said Shrikisan was petitioner's representative. In the circumstances the Labour Court has committed patent illegality in proceeding ex parte against the petitioner. 11. The next question which arises for consideration is whether this Court while exercising writ jurisdiction can set aside the ex parte award after 30 days of its publication under section 17 of the Act. The powers of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India are powers of Superintendence over all Courts and Tribunals falling within its territorial jurisdiction. Its function is to keep the Tribunal within the bounds of its jurisdiction. In case a Tribunal acts arbitrarily or it exceeds its jurisdiction the High Court has power to interfere. The High Court if finds that the tribunal has acted against the principles of natural justice or acted without jurisdiction or if there is apparent error of law the Courts jurisdiction to interfere gets attracted. In the present case in the absence of service of notice on the petitioner the Labour Court could not have proceeded ex parte against it and could not have passed the impugned ex parte award. In the circumstances the impugned ex parte award dated 10.9.2004 passed by the Labour Court deserves to be and is hereby quashed. 12. The petition is allowed. The parties are directed to appear before the Labour Court for fresh adjudication of the dispute on 25.9.2008. On that date the Labour Court shall fix a date for submitting reply to the statement of claim. Thereafter, the Labour Court shall proceed for adjudication of the dispute referred to it in accordance with law, as expeditiously as possible. C.C. within seven days.