JUDGMENT 1. Heard further argument from the parties. Hearing is concluded and the judgment is as follows : 2. Appellant challenges the judgment dated 21.11.1998 of learned Addl.Sessions Judge, Rourkela in Sessions Trial No.211/61 of 1995 arising out of G.R. Case No. 861 of 1995 of the Court of S.D.J.M., Panposh corresponding to Lathikata P.S. Case No.17 of 1995. In that case accused stood charged for the offence under Section 302, I.P.C. and after completion of the trial, learned Addl. Sessions Judge found the accused guilty of the offence of murder and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life. 3. According to the prosecution, accused was unhappy on the conduct of Hari @ Harekrishna Senapati (hereinafter referred to as ‘deceased’) and therefore in the night between 22nd and 23rd of June, 1995 while the deceased was sleeping on the veran¬dah of the brick-kiln office of Giridhari Swain (P.W.6), accused came and dealt multiple blows by means of ‘Katari’ (knife), M.O.-I. After dealing such blows accused fled away from the spot, but the deceased shouted for help and sought for attendance of Periya Toppo (P.W.7). That witness together with some others arrived at the spot and found the deceased in severely injured and bleeding condition and administered water to him besides tying a napkin to check the profuse bleeding from the abdomen of the deceased. P.W.6 Giridhari Swain being the owner of the brick-kiln and uncle of the deceased, he was informed about the incident, and after his arrival in a vehicle the deceased was taken to Vesaj Patel Nursing Home. According to the prosecution, on arrival of P.W.7 the deceased made statement naming the accused as the author of the injuries. He also repeated the same statement after arrival of P.W.6 and when the deceased was in the process of shifting to the Nursing Home. Unfortunately he could not reach alive at the Nursing Home. He was found dead by the doctor in the Nursing Home and thereafter P.Ws.6 and 7 together with the dead body of the deceased and the other accompanying persons went to the police station and there P.W.7 lodged the F.I.R., Ext.5, naming the appellant as the assailant of the deceased. After conducting inquest and preparing the Inquest Report, Ext.4, the dead body was forwarded for post-mortem examination alongwith the requisi¬tion in the Dead Body Chalan. Dr. After conducting inquest and preparing the Inquest Report, Ext.4, the dead body was forwarded for post-mortem examination alongwith the requisi¬tion in the Dead Body Chalan. Dr. S.K. Pati, P.W.14 together with another doctor conducted post-mortem examination and in the trial Court proved the Post-mortem Report, Ext.10. On 24.07.1995 he also gave his Opinion Report, Ext.11/2 after examining M.O.-I and stating that the injuries found on the dead body of the deceased being possible by that weapon. In course of investigation, as¬sistance of Sri P.K. Pradhan, Scientific Officer (P.W.11) was taken to seize the bloodstained articles and other incriminating materials from the spot of occurrence. Accused was arrested on 23.06.1995, and in course of interrogation he made statement giving discovery of M.O.-I. That statement was recorded by the Investigating Officer and marked as Ext.18, whereas the Seizure List as Ext.2. At the time of arrest of the accused since there was an injury on his left palm and statement of the accused in course of the interrogation disclosed that he sustained that injury in course of assaulting because of some resistance provid¬ed by the deceased. Therefore, requisition Ext.14/2 for his examination by doctor was issued by the Investigating Officer and on that basis Dr. Jayakrushna Patel, the Medical Officer (P.W.17) examined the accused on 24.06.1995 at about 10.45 a.m. and in the Court he proved the Injury Certificate, Ext.14. He also collected the nail clippings and scrappings and forwarded the same under his Report, Ext.15. The spot map, which was drawn in course of the spot inspection, was proved by the Investigating Officer as Ext.17. The incriminating articles including the bloodstained earth, wearing apparels of the accused and the deceased, the weapon of offence, etc. were sent for chemical analysis and serological test in Regional State Forensic Science & Laboratory at Sambalpur (in short ‘RFSL’) and the report thereof has been marked as Ext.19. In course of the investigation the Investigat¬ing Officers (P.Ws.18 and 19) examined witnesses and collected material evidence and, finding prima facie case against the appellant, submitted Final Form (charge-sheet). After commitment of the case the trial Court heard the parties and framed charge against the accused under Section 302, I.P.C. To substantiate the charge, prosecution examined as many as 19 witnesses. The names and particulars of some of them have already been indicated. After commitment of the case the trial Court heard the parties and framed charge against the accused under Section 302, I.P.C. To substantiate the charge, prosecution examined as many as 19 witnesses. The names and particulars of some of them have already been indicated. Amongst others, P.W.1- Mahendranath Sahoo is a Pharmacist, who helped P.W.17 in connection with collection of nail clippings and scrappings. P.W.2 - Parasuram Toppo, P.W.3 - Manri Kerketta, P.W.4 - Bicha Kerketta, P.W.5 - Subadar Ram, P.W.6 - Giridhari Swain, P.W. 7 - Periya Toppo, P.W. 8 - Smara Toppo and P.W. 9 - Ghasiram Toppo were examined not only to prove the case of the deceased lying with injuries at the spot of occurrence but also about the dying declaration made several times by the deceased in different sequences. Amongst them P.Ws.1 to 4 and 7 to 9 besides P.Ws. 13 and 16 turned hostile and did not support the prosecution case relating to the dying declaration made by the deceased and on the seizure of the weapon of offence under Ext.2. 4. Accused took the plea of complete denial, but did not adduce any defence evidence. 5. Learned Addl. Sessions Judge, on analysis of the evi¬dence adduced by the prosecution, held that evidence of P.Ws.5 and 6 proves the dying declaration showing complicity of the accused in the alleged crime, recovery of M.O.-I under Section 27 of the Evidence Act corroborates to that evidence, and in view of the autopsy doctors’ evidence prosecution has proved the charge beyond all reasonable doubt that accused is guilty under Section 302, I.P.C. 6. While challenging the aforesaid order of conviction, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the impugned judg¬ment and order of conviction is not sustainable in as much as there has been delay in lodging the F.I.R., the dying declaration proved by P.Ws.5 and 6 is not credible and Ext.2 cannot be re¬garded as a seizure list under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. He argues that when all the independent witnesses have turned hos¬tile to the prosecution and the aforesaid circumstance stands in favour of the appellant so as to entertain doubt on the genuine¬ness of the prosecution case, therefore, appellant is entitled to an order of acquittal. In support of such contention he relies on the case of Jogendra Bhoi and three others v. State of Orissa, 2007 (Supplementary-I) OLR 291. 7. In support of such contention he relies on the case of Jogendra Bhoi and three others v. State of Orissa, 2007 (Supplementary-I) OLR 291. 7. Per contra, learned Standing Counsel argues that there is absolutely no delay in lodging the F.I.R. and notwithstanding hostility of other witnesses, evidence of P.Ws.5 and 6 are suffi¬cient to prove the charge against the appellant, and Ext.2 is also credible evidence to lend corroboration to the oral dying declaration. In support of his contention he relies on the case of Sham Shankar Kankaria v. State of Maharashtra, (2006) 35 OCR (SC) 435. 8. Though neither party has made any submission on the glaring lacuna in the impugned judgment, we noticed that the trial Court has failed to decide the case in a systematic manner, in as much as, when the charge is under Section 302, I.P.C., the first and foremost duty of the trial Court is to determine wheth¬er the deceased suffered homicidal death. Without determining that aspect the Court cannot proceed further, because Section 302, I.P.C. provides punishment for homicide and not for any other mode of death. Failure on the part of the trial Court, in the above context, however doesn’t keep either of the parties in advantageous or disadvantageous position, because, in view of the provision in Section 386, Cr.P.C. this Court, as the appellate Court, has the jurisdiction and responsibility to evaluate the evidence in a lawful manner and to record the findings either agreeing or disagreeing with the findings and/or the result in the impugned order of conviction. 9. As noted above, to sustain a charge under Section 302, I.P.C., prosecution has to prove that the deceased suffered homicidal death. In that context evidence of P.W.14 is relevant. P.W.14 deposed that in course of post-mortem examination he found one punctured stab wound on the left lateral abdomen below the left mid-coastal region and as a result of that the colon was protruding. He also noticed stab wound on the right upper abdomen and another on right mid-abdomen, one inch lateral to the umbili¬cus, one incised wound on left thigh, two incised wounds on left fore-arm, two incised wounds on left shoulder and mid-coastal region and one incised wound each on left chest below the mammary gland and occiput of the skull. He also noticed stab wound on the right upper abdomen and another on right mid-abdomen, one inch lateral to the umbili¬cus, one incised wound on left thigh, two incised wounds on left fore-arm, two incised wounds on left shoulder and mid-coastal region and one incised wound each on left chest below the mammary gland and occiput of the skull. P.W.14 opined that all the injuries were ante-mortem in nature and the cause of death was due to shock and extensive haemorrhage due to the above-noted in¬juries. He conducted post-mortem examination at 3.00 p.m. on 23.06.1995 and opined in his evidence that death was within six to eighteen hours from the time of post-mortem examination. He examined M.O.-I. The length of the blade of that weapon was 13½” and the width of the blade was about 1" whereas the total length of the weapon (including the handle portion) was 17½”. He opined that the injuries found on the dead body of the deceased were possible by that weapon. Such evidence of P.W.14 has remained unchallenged though he was cross-examined by the accused. Such evidence unhesitatingly leads to the result that deceased suf¬fered homicidal death. Thus, we record such a finding in favour of the prosecution. 10. After determination of the homicidal death of the deceased, it comes to the zone of consideration as to whether prosecution has proved the appellant as the author of the in¬juries which resulted in homicidal death of the deceased. In that context, as has already been indicated, prosecution relies on the dying declaration of the deceased and, in addition to that, seeks corroboration from leading to discovery as an aiding circum¬stance. On that score there is difference of opinion between the accused-appellant and the prosecution. Their respective conten¬tions have already been noted in a preceding paragraph and that needs consideration to determine the issue. 11. Delay in lodging F.I.R. is not always fatal to the prosecution unless such delay has caused prejudice to the accused or it is shown by the accused that such delay was committed with a motive to fabricate a case against the accused. 11. Delay in lodging F.I.R. is not always fatal to the prosecution unless such delay has caused prejudice to the accused or it is shown by the accused that such delay was committed with a motive to fabricate a case against the accused. In this case learned counsel for the appellant does not argue about any preju¬dice having been caused to the accused on the so called ground of delay in lodging the F.I.R. He also does not argue anything sug¬gesting for the possibility of forging or fabricating a case against the appellant by committing the alleged delay in lodging the F.I.R. On the other hand, looking to the sequence of events, as stated by the witnesses, we find sufficient force in the argument of learned Standing Counsel that there has been no delay in lodging the F.I.R. In that context, on a reference to the evidence of P.W.6 it reveals that at about 3.00 a.m. he got information about the injuries on the deceased and reached the spot with others in a jeep and therefrom the deceased was taken to the Nursing Home. In the cross-examination he has answered that it could have consumed around 45 minutes’ time to reach the Nursing Home. After the deceased was declared dead, they reached the Police Station, where P.W.7 lodged the report. It reveals from the F.I.R., Ext.5 about the sequence of events in the same manner till the time of lodging of the F.I.R. In the formal F.I.R. it has been noted that F.I.R. was received in the Police Station at 7.30 a.m. and the distance of the spot of occurrence from the Police Station is about five kilometres. Therefore, if the time element would be examined, then by around 4.00 a.m. to 4.30 a.m. the deceased was declared dead in the Nursing Home and thereafter covering a distance of 45 minutes from the Nursing Home and again a distance of five kilometres from the spot of occurrence to the hospital they reached and lodged the F.I.R. Of course, to the aforesaid aspect there is no positive evidence available regarding the exact time, because no answer was ex¬tracted in course of the examination-in-chief or cross-examina¬tion. On the other hand, the hostile witness, P.W.7, after being confronted with the statement in Ext.5, was suggested by the prosecution and he agreed to that suggestion in the following manner- “It is a fact that I narrated all the aforesaid incidents to police, which was read over to me and thereafter I signed Exts.5 and 5/1.” Thus, it appears that the claim of the accused about delay in lodging the F.I.R. is a myth. In other words, we do not find any delay in lodging the F.I.R. Such contention of the appellant is accordingly rejected. 12. In course of his submission, learned Standing Counsel referring to the case of Sham Shankar (supra), argues that legal position is well settled that if the dying declaration is credi¬ble, then that evidence alone is sufficient to prove the factum stated in the dying declaration. In that case, while in seisin of a case sought to be proved by the prosecution only through the dying declaration, their Lordships propounded that - “In the light of the above principles, the acceptability of alleged dying declaration in the instant case has to be considered. The dying declaration is only a piece of untested evidence and must like any other evidence, satisfy the Court that what is stated therein is the unalloyed truth and that it is absolutely safe to act upon it. If after careful scrutiny the Court is satisfied that it is true and free from any effort to induce the deceased to make a false statement and if it is coher¬ent and consistent, there shall be no legal impediment to make it basis of conviction, even if there is no corroboration. [See Gangotri Singh v. State of U.P. [JT 1992 (2) SC 417), Goverdhan Raoji Ghyare v. State of Maharashtra (JT 1993 (5) SC 87), Messala Ramakrishnan v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (JT 1994 (3) 232) and State of Rajasthan v. Kishore (JT 1996 (2) SC 595]” (paragraph-12 of the cited judgment) It follows from the aforesaid ratio that there has to be subjective satisfaction of the Court as to wheth¬er the dying declaration is true and free from any effort to induce the deceased to make a false statement or otherwise not credible. 13. 13. Challenging to the credibility of the dying declara¬tion, learned counsel for the appellant argues that the deceased could not have identified the accused in the darkness of the night and to that effect the findings of the trial Court by referring to the Case Diary about availability of electric bulb is improper. The criticism of the appellant on the aforesaid mode of gathering facts by the trial Court is found to be correct, in as much as, the factual aspect noted in the Case Diary by them¬selves do not constitute substantive evidence unless that is deposed or part of evidence in course of recording of evidence. At the same time, we find on record that neither party raised the issue in course of examination-in-chief and the cross-examination of the witnesses on the identity of the accused due to darkness. Such a contention was developed only at the stage of argument and, as observed above, learned Sessions Judge only with a view to repel the same not only referred to the Case Diary but also relied on that. Be that as it may, when the question on identity of the accused was never raised as an issue and there is no evidence on record to doubt the veracity of the deceased on identifying the accused in course of the occurrence, therefore, submission of the appellant to redeem him of the charge on the point of doubtful identification is far fetched. Therefore, such a non-existing issue need not be determined. 14. Learned counsel for the appellant argues that the uncorroborated evidence of P.W.6 in proving the dying declaration should be discarded when series of persons like P.Ws.1 to 4, 7 to 9, 13 and 16 have not supported the prosecution in that respect. Duty of the Court is to find out the truth from the evidence on record and not to go by majority. In other words, it is the quality and not the quantity which is material and relevant to assess evidence adduced in the case. In this case the aforesaid prosecu¬tion witnesses indeed did not support the prosecution and acted with hostility to not to support the prosecution on the dying declaration. That by itself is not sufficient to discard the evidence of P.Ws.5 and 6, if otherwise such evidence is found credible and reliable. In this case the aforesaid prosecu¬tion witnesses indeed did not support the prosecution and acted with hostility to not to support the prosecution on the dying declaration. That by itself is not sufficient to discard the evidence of P.Ws.5 and 6, if otherwise such evidence is found credible and reliable. Looking to the conduct of the aforesaid hostile witnesses and the manner in which they conducted them¬selves in the trial Court, we do not find credibility in their evidence when they declined to have knowledge on the dying decla¬ration. P.W.6 deposed about the statement of the deceased that accused inflicted the injuries. Admittedly, P.W.6 is an uncle of the deceased. It is within the reasonable human conduct to ask an injured as to how he sustained the injuries or who caused the same. Thus, P.W. No.6 by putting such a question to the deceased, nothing can be smelled to doubt the credibility of that dying declaration. The sequence in which P.W.6 asked question and the deceased answered is of course challenged by the appellant by stating that on sustaining about 9 to 10 injuries the deceased could not have been in a position to talk and, therefore, atleast on that score evidence of P.W.6 in proving the dying declaration should be discarded. Because of the evidence of P.W.14 we do not find any merit in that argument, in as much as, in course of the cross-examination P.W.14 stated that, “Person with all these injuries can talk up to the last moment.” P.W.14 also opined that, “A person with all these injuries can also cover half a kilometer after receiving the injuries. It depends upon the stamina of the injured.” 15. Apart from the aforesaid facts and circumstances, evi¬dence of P.W.5 provides total corroboration to the evidence of P.W.6 that the deceased made dying declaration naming the assail¬ants. That aspect has been stated by P.W.5 in the following manner : “We shifted Hari Babu to the jeep. He told to Swain Babu that a boy stabbed him, though he named the boy, yet I am for getting that name.” Such evidence was recorded in course of his examination-in-chief. That aspect has been stated by P.W.5 in the following manner : “We shifted Hari Babu to the jeep. He told to Swain Babu that a boy stabbed him, though he named the boy, yet I am for getting that name.” Such evidence was recorded in course of his examination-in-chief. In the cross-examination he stated that- “Hari disclosed the name of the assailant and his father’s name when he was shifted to the jeep.” He also stated that - “At that time Hari was talking fluently and was not stammer¬ing.” It is needless to say that the aforesaid evidence of P.W.5 provides total corroboration to the evidence of P.W.6 regarding the dying declaration. 16. P.W.6 is indeed an interested witness being the uncle of the deceased. But there is nothing on record to show or sug¬gest that he is inimical to the accused in any manner. Under such circumstance, P.W.6 would not have attempted to frame a false case against the accused by protecting the real assailant. That aspect also cannot be lost sight of while considering credibility of P.Ws.5 and 6. When clearly the deceased made statement that accused inflicted the injuries and that dying declaration has not been disproved in course of the cross-examination and when in that respect of P.Ws.5 and 6 are found credible and corroborating to the other facts and circumstances including the number of injuries on the person of the deceased so also about their natu¬ral appearance at the spot of occurrence and carrying the de¬ceased in the injured condition to the Nursing Home, therefore, we find the evidence of P.Ws.5 and 6 to be totally credible and evidence of P.W.6 sufficiently proving the dying declaration, which indicates that it is the accused-appellant who is the author of the injuries. 17. Ext.18 is the statement of the accused, which was recorded by the Investigating Officer. In that statement accused has assigned the reason for having the motive to commit murder and the manner in which and the weapon by which he committed the murder and thereafter concealed that weapon of offence. Ext.2 is the seizure list prepared in respect of leading to discovery of the knife and there also, in substance, the statement of the accused was noted only relating to leading to discovery. Ext.2 is the seizure list prepared in respect of leading to discovery of the knife and there also, in substance, the statement of the accused was noted only relating to leading to discovery. Section 25 of the Evidence Act mandates that - “No confession made to a police officer shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence.” In other words, the confession made before a police officer by an accused is inadmissible in evidence. Section 27 of the Evidence act provides that ‘so much of such information’ which is stated leading to discovery of fact in sequence of information received from a person who is not only an accused of the offence but also while in the custody of the police officer, that becomes a relevant fact which can be proved. It is the trite law that the confessional part of a crime incorporated in a statement even if recorded in the statement under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, such confessional part has to be discarded being barred by the provision in Section 25 of the Evidence Act. Notwithstanding that, the information which connects discovery of the incriminating materials and the information or the statement made thereof can be proved against the accused. That being the position of law, from Exts.2 and 18 only the fact leading to discovery of the weapon of offence is to be read in evidence. In this case that evidence has been proved and M.O.-I was recovered. P.W.14 in his deposition stated that he found that the injuries found on the dead body of the deceased could be caused by that weapon. 18. Learned counsel for the appellant argues that since the knife was discovered from underneath a stone in an open area accessible to general public, therefore, there should not be any credibility to the evidence of leading to discovery. It may be borne in mind that notwithstanding the fact that the open place was accessible to all, but concealment of weapon of offence underneath a stone was known to only the person who had concealed it or who had seen its concealment or who accidentally found such weapon after being concealed there. In the latter two categories of cases it cannot be regarded as evidence under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. But, in case of the earlier situation it can be accepted as evidence leading to discovery. In the latter two categories of cases it cannot be regarded as evidence under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. But, in case of the earlier situation it can be accepted as evidence leading to discovery. In course of the cross-examination of the witnesses and particularly P.W.19, nothing has been brought on record to show or suggest that ac¬cused had seen that weapon being concealed by somebody else or that accidentally he had discovered that weapon having been kept underneath the stone. Once those two possibilities are not fa¬vourable in favour of the accused because of lack of evidence, then presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act would go in favour of the prosecution that accused had concealed the weapon and therefore he gave discovery of the same. In this case we find such a fact situation and agree with the findings of the trial Court that a case of leading to discovery has been proved by the prosecution. That becomes an additional link to prove the fact of appellant being the assailant of the deceased, which has been proved by the prosecution from the dying declaration of the de¬ceased. 19. No other point is raised by the appellant while chal¬lenging to the order of conviction. We also find no illegality or perversity in the order of conviction of the accused under Sec¬tion 302, I.P.C. Thus, we find no merit in this appeal and ac¬cordingly the same is dismissed by maintaining the order of conviction and sentence. 20. In course of hearing of the appeal, keeping in view the comment of the trial Court on the conduct of the investigating agency and the Forensic Science & Laboratory relating to seizure, preservation and examination of the incriminating material/seized articles and useless outcome thereof in large number of cases, we had asked learned Standing Counsel to address the Court in that respect after obtaining necessary instruction. Accordingly he argues with disappointment about the manner in which the seized materials were preserved in this case and the report which was submitted by the Regional Forensic Science & Laboratory, Sambal¬pur. He has also filed affidavits of the Joint Director, S.F.S.L., Rasulgarh and Deputy Superintendent of Police, C.I.D., C.B. together with Police Orders No.174, 243 and 248. Accordingly he argues with disappointment about the manner in which the seized materials were preserved in this case and the report which was submitted by the Regional Forensic Science & Laboratory, Sambal¬pur. He has also filed affidavits of the Joint Director, S.F.S.L., Rasulgarh and Deputy Superintendent of Police, C.I.D., C.B. together with Police Orders No.174, 243 and 248. From the affidavits we find that the laboratory demands proper protection and packing of the articles seized so as to facilitate proper analysis in the laboratory and in that respect affidavit of the Deputy Superintendent of Police indicates that such instruction in the Police Orders are being followed. He has also stated that in cases of aberration, suitable action is being taken against the erring officials. It thus appears from the aforesaid affida¬vits that both Laboratory and the Police Investigating Agency have tried to wriggle out from the blame. We do not propose to undertake an exercise in respect of finding fault with either of the system or both of them but to see that criminal justice delivery system functions in a proper and effective manner for adjudication of the disputes strictly in accordance with law. 21. While dealing with Criminal Appeals and Government Appeals we also experience that the report from the Forensic Science & Laboratory seldom helps the prosecution in furtherance of proof of the fact through seized incriminating articles. It is the obligation and responsibility of the State to see that a crime is properly investigated and a trial is properly conducted so that no culprits should go scot free and innocent persons are not harassed. Under such circumstance, it is high time that a high level deliberation be made by the senior officials of the State like the Home Secretary, Law Secretary, D.G. of Police, the Director of S.F.S.L. along with a team of officers working at the field, i.e., in the field of investigation, conducting of post-mortem, conducting of scientific investigation or analysis of the articles in the laboratory, the prosecutors. Statistics in that respect be collected and cases of the recent origin disposed of in the recent past, be referred to and steps be taken to remove the loopholes and prevent aberrations so that proper materials come to the consideration of the Court for dispensing justice. Statistics in that respect be collected and cases of the recent origin disposed of in the recent past, be referred to and steps be taken to remove the loopholes and prevent aberrations so that proper materials come to the consideration of the Court for dispensing justice. Science is progressing fast and therefore in relation to detection of crime what was an impossible task a few decades back, has become a simple matter to detect by application of science and technology. The State cannot ignore this aspect when it relates to life and liberty of the people living in the State and their security besides maintaining law and order and public order, which is not only the duty but also responsibility of the State. Therefore, the State Govt. under the banner of Home De¬partment and the Secretary, Home Department being the convener, should take appropriate steps within a reasonable period of three months and formulate guidelines and the guidance be circulated to all concerned including the investigating and prosecuting agen¬cies and the adjudicatory system. Any deficiency noticed in doing the thing in the prescribed manner may be dealt severely even to the extent of removal from service of the negligent officers so that the system will remain alert and efficient. Because of the aforesaid observation, a free copy of this judgment be handed over to Sri A.K. Mishra, learned Standing Counsel to apprise the Advocate General and also the Secretary, Home Department for taking steps appropriately. Appeal dismissed.