Judgment ( 1. ) FEELING aggrieved by the order dated 4-5-2007 passed by the First additional District Judge, Balaghat in Civil Suit No. 2-A/2007 dismissing the application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of CPC filed by the plaintiff appellant, this appeal has been filed under Order XLIII Rule 1 (r) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1908. ( 2. ) THE plaintiff is a lessee of the suit property and has filed a suit before the Trial Court for injunction that plaintiff may not be dispossessed by the defendant from the suit property. According to the plaint averments, the suit property which is open land, was given on lease to the plaintiff on 27-4-1987 for 20 years for construction of bus stand and for other purposes mentioned in the schedule A annexed to the plaint. Thereafter, the plaintiff constructed the bus stand and godown etc. on the leased suit property. According to the plaint averments, the original lessee was Malajkhand Special Area Development authority (SADA), however, the property of the SADA was merged in municipal Council, Malajkhand. Hence, the Municipal Council, Malajkhand who is the plaintiff by operation of law became lessee of the defendant. ( 3. ) IT is further case of the plaintiff that on 14-1-2007, a notice has been received that lease period is going to be expired on 26-4-2007 and therefore after the expiry of the lease period, possession of the suit property be delivered to the defendant. According to plaintiff after having constructed permanent structure of bus stand and godown etc. the nature of lease became permanent. Earlier the defendant filed suit against SADA (from whom plaintiff is deriving right on the suit property) but later on compromise arrived between the parties and by filing an application was filed by both the parties that on account of compromise having been arrived between them, plaintiff, i. e. , defendant of present case does not want to proceed with the suit as a result of which the suit was withdrawn. Thereafter, the plaintiff has also constructed a shopping complex bus stand etc. with the consent of defendant and the maps etc. were also approved by the defendant. Not only this with the consent of defendant Guest house was also constructed and electricity etc. has also been installed. ( 4. Thereafter, the plaintiff has also constructed a shopping complex bus stand etc. with the consent of defendant and the maps etc. were also approved by the defendant. Not only this with the consent of defendant Guest house was also constructed and electricity etc. has also been installed. ( 4. ) AN application for issuance of temporary injunction has also been filed by the plaintiff stating that till the disposal of the suit, defendant be restrained from interfering with plaintiffs possession on the suit property. ( 5. ) A reply to the application of the plaintiff under Order XXXIX Rule 1 of CPC has been filed by the defendant/respondent stating therein that the lease period has come to an end on 26-4-2007 and after the expiry of the lease period the possession of plaintiff on the suit property is that of a trespasser. In this regard, the averments made in Para 16 of the reply may be seen. Inter alia it has also been contended in the reply by the defendant that the terms of the lease have been violated by the plaintiff and therefore application of issuance of temporary injunction may be dismissed. ( 6. ) THE learned Trial Court by the impugned order has dismissed the application for issuance of temporary injunction of the plaintiff. In this manner, this appeal has been filed by the plaintiff assailing the impugned order. ( 7. ) THE contention of Ku. C. V. Rao, learned Counsel for the appellant is that the plaintiff has raised serious questions of fact and difficult question of law which requires investigation and recording of evidence and therefore plaintiff is having a prima facie case in its favour. Admittedly, plaintiff is in possession of the suit property and therefore if the plaintiff Municipal Council is dispossessed, it will suffer irreparable loss. She further submits that the balance of convenience is also in favour of the plaintiff and therefore by allowing this appeal, application for issuance of temporary injunction filed by the plaintiff may be allowed. ( 8. ) SHRI A. G. Dhande, learned Senior Counsel, appearing for the defendant/respondent, submitted that the property in dispute was given on lease to the plaintiff and according to the lease deed the lease period was of 20 years and the same has been expired on 26-4-2007. ( 8. ) SHRI A. G. Dhande, learned Senior Counsel, appearing for the defendant/respondent, submitted that the property in dispute was given on lease to the plaintiff and according to the lease deed the lease period was of 20 years and the same has been expired on 26-4-2007. By inviting my attention to Section 111 (a) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (for short the Act), it has been contended that despite the lease was determined after the expiry of the lease period, by taking abandon precaution, on 14-1-2007 a registered notice was sent on behalf of the defendant to plaintiff determining its tenancy with effect from 26-4-2007. The contention of the learned Counsel is that factum of receiving notice is not disputed since it has been admitted by the plaintiff in its plaint as well as in the application for issuance of temporary injunction. Learned Senior counsel has placed reliance on decision of the Supreme Court B. Arvind Kumar vs. Government of India androth%rs, (2007) 5 SCC 745 , wherein it has been held that after determination of the tenancy, if the lessee is continuing in possession it cannot be said that tenancy at will is created in its favour. He also placed reliance on another decision of Supreme Court in CM. Beena and another Vs. P. N. Ramachandra Rao, AIR 2004 SC 2103 and argued that what are the rights of the lesser and lessee when the lease is determined. Further placing reliance on the decision of Supreme Court in C. A Ibert Morris Vs. K. Chandrasekaran and others, (2006) 1 SCC 228 , it has been argued that after the tenancy has been determined the possession of the lessee cannot be said to be that of tenant and it cannot be said that tenant is enjoying the tenancy right under the head of holding over the tenancy. On these premised submissions, it has been argued by learned Senior Counsel that learned Trial Court has rightly dismissed the application of the plaintiff holding that there is no prima facie case in favour of the plaintiff and therefore this appeal deserves to be dismissed. ( 9. ) HAVING heard learned Counsel for the parties, I am of the view that this appeal deserves to be allowed. ( 10. ( 9. ) HAVING heard learned Counsel for the parties, I am of the view that this appeal deserves to be allowed. ( 10. ) IN the present case, the plaintiff has come up with a case that original lessee was SADA, Malajkhand, however, by operation of law, SADA has been merged in the Municipal Council, Malajkhand. This fact has also been admitted by defendant in its notice dated 14-1-2007. According to the plaint averments, the lease deed was executed on certain conditions which are mentioned in the plaint and thereafter the plaintiff by abiding those conditions constructed bus stand, drains, godown, etc. Earlier also, defendant filed one suit in the Court of Civil Judge Class-II, Baihar bearing Civil Suit No. ll-A/1989, which was withdrawn on the ground that compromise has been taken place out of the Court between the parties. That suit was filed against present plaintiff who was arrayed as defendant. The said civil suit was dismissed as withdrawn on 2-7-1990. According to the plaintiff, even after the dismissal of the said suit filed by the present defendant, the plaintiff continued to possess the suit property and therefore according to learned Counsel for plaintiff the status of plaintiff would become that of permanent lessee. Although acquiring the status of permanent lessee by the plaintiff, has been denied by the defendant, but, factum of filing of suit in the Court of Civil Judge Class-II, Baihar has not been denied and withdrawing that. suit is also not disputed in the reply. Thus, according to me, whether plaintiff has acquired status of a tenant at will or tenant at sufferance or tenancy continued by holding it over, as well as whether the lease has been rightly determined or not, is a matter of investigation and the parties are required to adduce evidence in that regard. This Court in Shankerlalrathore Vs. State ofm. P. and others, 1978 JLJ 51 , has categorically held that although it is said that plaintiff must show a prima facie case in support of the right claimed by him in the suit before he can be granted temporary injunction, the real thing to be seen only is that plaintiffs plaint is not frivolous or vexatious; in other words, there is a serious question to be tried -. It is not the function of the Court at this stage to resolve disputed questions of fact or difficult questions of law which should be left to be decided at the conclusion of the trial. Thus, where the tenancy has been determined by afflux of time or rightly came to an end by sending notice of termination of lease is a serious question of fact as well as difficult question of law which should be left to be decided at the time of passing of the judgment. What is the status of the plaintiff and whether he can be said to be a tenant at will or tenant at sufferance are the difficult questions of law and they are also disputed questions of fact which requires investigation and recording of the evidence and therefore, to me, there is a prima facie case in favour, of the plaintiff. This Court in Shankerlal Rathore Vs. State of M. P. and others (supra), by placing reliance on American Cyanamid Vs. Ethicon, (1975) 1 all OR 504, has categorically held that while taking into consideration the application of temporary injunction generally the plaintiff is not required to make out a clear legal title but is only required to satisfy the Court that he has a fair question to raise as to the existence of the legal right claimed by him in the suit is well recognized in India. Therefore, to me, at this stage, it is difficult to say that the plaintiff is a trespasser as argued by learned Senior Counsel for respondent. ( 11. ) ADMITTEDLY, the plaintiff is in possession on the date of filing of the suit and therefore his possession is required to be protected. In this context, I am placing reliance on a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Durg Transport co. Private Ltd. , Durg Vs. Regional Transport Authority, Raipur and others, AIR 1965 MP 142 , wherein in Para 4, it has been held that the principle that a stay order or an ad interim injunction is issued to maintain and preserve the status quo existing at the time of the institution of the proceedings cannot be doubted. Private Ltd. , Durg Vs. Regional Transport Authority, Raipur and others, AIR 1965 MP 142 , wherein in Para 4, it has been held that the principle that a stay order or an ad interim injunction is issued to maintain and preserve the status quo existing at the time of the institution of the proceedings cannot be doubted. The real point, which has to be decided when an application for stay or for a temporary injunction is made, is not how the question ought to be investigated; but it is whether the matter should not be preserved in status quo until the question can be finally disposed of. As per defendants own showing the plaintiff is in possession of the suit property, if application for temporary injunction of plaintiff is dismissed,it would amount to give a licence to the defendant to take possession from the plaintiff by taking the law in their own hands by using muscle power which cannot be permitted. The Supreme Court in C. Albert Morris (supra), in Para 26 by placing reliance on its decision in Raptakos Brett and Co. Ltd. Vs. Ganesh Property, (1998) 7 SCC 184 , has held that the lessee cannot be thrown out physically by the landlord. It would be apposite to quote Para 13 of the decision of Raptakos Brett and Co. Ltd. Vs. Ganesh Property (supra), which reads thus:- "in view of the aforesaid settled legal position, it must be held that on the expiry of the period of lease, the erstwhile lessee continues in possession because of the law of the land, namely that the original landlord cannot physically throw out such an erstwhile tenant by force. He must get his claim for possession adjudicated by a competent Court as per the relevant provisions of law. The status of an erstwhile tenant has to be treated as a tenant at sufferance akin to a trespasser having no independent right to continue in possession. " The Supreme Court in Ashwin Kumar K. Patel Vs. Upendra J. Patel and others, (1999) 3 SCC 161 , in Para 12 has held possessory right was sufficient to permit plaintiff to have an order of temporary injunction in his favour. ( 12. ) THE decisions which have been placed reliance on by learned Senior counsel for the respondent are not applicable at this stage of consideration of application for issuance of temporary injunction. ( 12. ) THE decisions which have been placed reliance on by learned Senior counsel for the respondent are not applicable at this stage of consideration of application for issuance of temporary injunction. Those decisions may be relevant at the time of final adjudication of the suit before the Trial Court. ( 13. ) THUS, on the above said analysis, I am of the view that the plaintiff appellant is having a prima facie case and having possession on the suit property, the balance of convenience is also in its favour. Since all the three principles of grant of temporary injunction are in favour of the plaintiff, I am of the view that the learned Trial Court erred in law in rejecting the application for temporary injunction. ( 14. ) THIS appeal is accordingly allowed, the impugned order is hereby set aside and the application for issuance of temporary injunction filed by the plaintiff is hereby allowed. The defendant is restrained from interfering with the possession of the plaintiff till the suit is decided. However, looking to the controversy involved in the matter, the learned Trial Court is hereby directed to decide the suit as early as possible preferably within a period of one year from today. No costs.