1. This civil first appeal is directed against the exparte judgment and decree dated 14th of May, 1999, (for short the impugned judgment) passed by learned District Judge, Udhampur, in a suit titled State Bank of India, Branch Udhampur v. M/s Trishul Pickle Industries Garhi, Udhampur & Others, whereby and whereunder, suit came to be dismissed as time barred. 2. The short controversy involved in this appeal is whether the suit filed by the appellant-plaintiff bank is time barred? 3. In order to return finding, it is necessary to notice the brief facts of the case herein: 4. Appellant-plaintiff bank filed a suit for recovery of Rs. 11,97,9347- against the defendants on 5lh of May, 1994 before this court-came to be transferred to the trial court-District Court Udhampur. The trial court diarized it on 12th of May, 1994 and dismissed it vide impugned judgment as time barred. 5. The case of the appellant-plaintiff bank is that defendant No. 1 -respondent No. 1, M/s Trishul Pickle Industries Garhi, Udhampur through its sole proprietor, Sh. Dwarka Nath Koul (deceased) sought and obtained financial assistance-cash credit limit of Rs. 1, 50,000/- and also availed bill limit of Rs. 1,00,000/-. He had executed documents described in the plaint as well as in the impugned judgment. Defendant No.5 executed guarantee deed for re-payment of the loan granted to defendant No. 1 as an additional guarantee and defendant No. 1, Late Dwarka Nath Koul, also executed a mortgage deed in favour of the plaintiff bank. 6. It is also averred in the plaint that defendants failed to liquidate the loan amount and committed default and thereby an amount of Rs. 11,97,934 became due from them and suit came to be filed for recovery of the said amount. As per the plaint, cause of action accrued to the plaintiff bank on 10th of January, 1993-date of execution of the mortgage deed and on 15lh of June, 1984-the date of execution of loan documents. 7. Defendants resisted the suit by the medium of written statement. Issues came to be framed and parties were directed to lead evidence. 8. Plaintiff examined PWs RC Sharma, Rakesh Kumar and Om Parkash. Defendants have not led any evidence in rebuttal. 9. It is necessary to give brief resume of the plaintiff s evidence herein: 10. 7. Defendants resisted the suit by the medium of written statement. Issues came to be framed and parties were directed to lead evidence. 8. Plaintiff examined PWs RC Sharma, Rakesh Kumar and Om Parkash. Defendants have not led any evidence in rebuttal. 9. It is necessary to give brief resume of the plaintiff s evidence herein: 10. The witnesses of the plaintiff have deposed that respondent-defendant No. 1 M/s Trishul Pickle Industries, was granted loan of Rs. 1,50,000/- as cash credit facility and Rs. 1,00,000/- as bill limit and deceased Dwarka Nath Koul executed the documents as mentioned in para-5 of the plaint including the deed of guarantee. Mortgage deed was executed on 10th of January, 1983 and registered on 11th of January, 1983. Defendant No. 1 did not keep its account well and despite being repeatedly asked, no repayment of the loan was made. The statement of accounts came to be exhibited EXPW-RC and EXPW-RC1. Witness Om Parkash, admitted his signatures on the mortgage deed and also proved the contents of it and came to be exhibited as EXPW-OP. 11. While going through the plaint and the evidence led by the plaintiff bank, one comes to an inescapable conclusion that deceased Dwarka Nath was the sole proprietor of M/s Trishul Pickle Industries and had obtained two loans of Rs. 1,50,000/- and Rs. 1,00,000/- on 16lh of April, 1984 but he had not made any repayment and thereby committed default. 12. The crux of the plaint as well as of the evidence of the plaintiff bank is that defendant No. 1 failed to liquidate the amount of loan obtained by him despite repeated demands. The trial court discussed only issued No.2 and dismissed the suit as time barred. 13. Learned counsel for the appellant-plaintiff bank argued that suit is not for recovery of money but is for sale of mortgage property. Thus suit was within time. 14. It is apt to reproduce the title and relief clause of the plaint herein: "Suit for recovery of Rs. 11,97,934/- value for the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction Rs. 11,97,934/-" Relief: "The plaintiff, therefore, most humbly prays that a decree for Rs. 11,97,934/- with interest @ 15% p.a. with quarterly rests from 1.4.1994 and costs be passed in favour of the plaintiff:- a/By sale of mortgaged property Land and building measuring one kanal 8 marlas under Khasra No.498 min, situated at vill. 11,97,934/-" Relief: "The plaintiff, therefore, most humbly prays that a decree for Rs. 11,97,934/- with interest @ 15% p.a. with quarterly rests from 1.4.1994 and costs be passed in favour of the plaintiff:- a/By sale of mortgaged property Land and building measuring one kanal 8 marlas under Khasra No.498 min, situated at vill. Rehamble Teh. Udhampur b/By sale of the hypothecated goods of voice Shelter hypothecated in favour of the plaintiff. c/From the other properties of the defendants. And if the decretal amount still remain unsatisfied then it be further decreed that the remaining decreetal amount be recovered from the defendants personally. For such other and further reliefs to which the plaintiff is found entitled thereto or the facts of the case may deem fit and proper be allowed to the plaintiff Bank." 15. While going through the plaint, the suit is for decree for recovery of Rs. l 1,97,934/- and the consequential relief is to recover the same by sale of mortgaged property. Thus, the main relief sought for is suit for recovery of Rs. l 1,97,934/-. 16. It is beaten law of the land that cause of action accrues from the date when the loan is made or when the demand is made. In terms of Articles 87 and 90 of the first schedule of Limitation Act, suit is to be instituted within six years when the loan is made or when the demand is made. It is profitable to reproduce Articles 87 and 90 of the first schedule of Limitation Act herein: Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run 87. For money payable for money lent. Six years When the loan is made. 90. For money deposited under an agreement that it shall be payable on demand, including money of a customer in the hands of his banker so payable. Six years When the demand is made 17. In the instant case, admittedly loan was sanctioned on 16th of April, 1984 and repeatedly demands were made to the borrower - defendant No. 1 till May, 1986 but no payment was made. The suit came to be filed on 5th of May, 1994. As per the documents and statement of accounts loan amount was paid on 16 of April, 1984 and the demand was made till May, 1986. The suit came to be filed on 5th of May, 1994. As per the documents and statement of accounts loan amount was paid on 16 of April, 1984 and the demand was made till May, 1986. Thus, cause of action accrued either on 1984 or after committing default from the date the demand was made i.e. after May, 1986-either in the month of June, 1985 or October 1986 as per the account statement EXPW-RC and EXPW-RC1. In the given circumstances, the suit was time barred. 18. The argument of the learned counsel for the appellant - plaintiff bank is also devoid of force for the simple reason that suit is simply for recovery of money. 19. Madhya Pradesh High Court in a case titled Saraswati Devi v. Krishnaram Baldeo Bank Ltd., AIR 1998 MP 73, held that when loan - debt amount is to be paid in installments and if default is committed in payment of installment, the limitation for filing suit for recovery of loan/debt begins to run from the date the first installment fell due and not from the date of execution of the mortgage deed. It is profitable to reproduce para-11.1, herein: "11.1. The aforesaid authorities, relied upon by the appellant Shri Sharma, are distinguishable on facts and do not apply to the present case in view of the default clause and provision of repayment by installments. In view of this position, the date of deed becomes inconsequential and the date on which the first installment fell due would be the relevant factor for computation of the limitation. The two Courts below have applied the correct facts and law. The contention is, thus, found to be inutile and futile. Even when we examine the question from different angle, i.e. the default clause, becoming operative on non-payment of interest for two months i.e. after 10-8-69, I find that the suit is within limitation even on this linchpin. The contention about bar of limitation is firstly without substance on appreciation of factual matrix and secondly is not entertainable in the Second Appeal in view of the decision of the Apex Court (supra). Admittedly limitation is three years." 20. Applying the ratio of the aforesaid judgment to the instant case, the defendant had to repay the loan amount by installments and even the borrower has failed to pay the first installment. Admittedly limitation is three years." 20. Applying the ratio of the aforesaid judgment to the instant case, the defendant had to repay the loan amount by installments and even the borrower has failed to pay the first installment. Thus, thereby committed default and the limitation started to run from the date of first installment i.e. 15th June, 1984. 21. If the decree would be granted then the question of conducting of sale of mortgage property would arise-thus that is an ancillary relief. The court has to first find out whether suit is maintainable and what amount is due. Thereafter, the next question to be determined is that whether the decree for sale of mortgaged property is to be granted? When the main relief is time barred, the consequential relief cannot be granted. The main relief as prayed for is time barred. My this view is fortified by Apex court judgment delivered in case titled State of Punjab v. Balkaran Singh, reported as 2007 AIR SCW 240. It is profitable to reproduce para-17 of the said judgment herein: "17. Once the prayer for declaration sought for in the suits is found lo be barred by limitation, it has to be noticed that the prayer that follows is only consequential on the relief of declaration. That prayer is to the effect that the plaintiff is entitled to the pay scale of Rs. 1200-1850/- as against the scale of pay of Rs. 940-1850/- with effect from 1.1.1978 and entitled for payment of all other service benefits including yearly increments, arrears and interest thereon at the rate of 18 per cent per annum up to the date of payment with effect from 1.1.1978. It must be noticed that there is no independent prayer for recovery of arrears of pay and the prayer is couched in such a manner that it can be understood only as consequential on the grant of the first relief. In other words, it is not an independent relief that could be granted even if the main prayer is declined. In that view, it has to be held that a consequential relief could not be granted in view of the fact that the main relief of declaration sought for has been held to be barred by limitation." 22. Keeping in view the above discussion, the trial court has rightly dismissed the suit as time barred. In that view, it has to be held that a consequential relief could not be granted in view of the fact that the main relief of declaration sought for has been held to be barred by limitation." 22. Keeping in view the above discussion, the trial court has rightly dismissed the suit as time barred. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed and the impugned judgment and decree is upheld. 23. Registry to prepare a decree sheet and send down the record along with a copy of this judgment and decree sheet.