JUDGMENT RAJIV SHARMA, J. Heard Shri Mushtaq Ahmed Siddiqui, appearing for the petitioners and Sri S.P. Shukla, appearing for the contesting respondents 2. Petitioners have filed a suit (Regular Suit No. 10/1963) for possession of land by demolition of the structure thereon and recovery of arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation. The said suit was decreed by the erstwhile Court of Civil and Sessions Judge on 15.2.1965. The decree dated 15.2.1965 was challenged by Rajendra Prasad alias Nageshwar Prasad and others before this Court by filing an appeal which was numbered as Appeal No. 3/65 and this Court confirmed the decree in respect of some plots and as regards other plots the same was set aside. 3. Feeling aggrieved by the dismissal of the appeal by the High Court, said Rajendra Prasad alias Nageshwar Prasad and others preferred Special Leave Petition No. 2143 of 1982 before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court after hearing the parties dismissed the appeal vides judgment and order dated 30.7.1982. However it pro tided that the eviction shall not be executed before the end of April 1983 on the condition that the respondents-petitioners shall hand over the vacant and peaceful possession of the suit premises to the landlord on or before the end of April, 1983. It was further provided that the respondent shall clear the arrears of rent and shall also pay compensation for use and occupation of the suit premises month by month. 4. It has been pointed out by the Counsel for the petitioners that during the pendency of Appeal No. 3/65 before this Court, plaintiff No.2 (Mian Saifullah Shah) expired. In the judgment, the name of legal heirs were to be substituted but inadvertently the name of the petitioner No.2 alone was substituted by the order dated 24.4.1980 and as such an application for correction was moved and the necessary correction could be made only after the passing of order dated 5.12.1991. Thereafter, the petition moved an application for execution of decree on 14.12.1992 in good faith before the Court of 1st Additional District Judge as the decree was rinsed by the Civil and Sessions Judge" to which opposite party Nos. 1 to 4 filed objections on 11.8.1995 stating therein that the Court of Additional District Judge has no jurisdiction to executed the decree and also the said objections were filed after three years. 1 to 4 filed objections on 11.8.1995 stating therein that the Court of Additional District Judge has no jurisdiction to executed the decree and also the said objections were filed after three years. The Additional District Judge vide order dated 21.2.1997 held that the application for execution was not maintainable before the Court of Additional District Judge and directed for return of the execution application for presentation before the appropriate Court. 5. It may be pointed out that the Court of Civil and Sessions Judge was abolished and in its place, the Court of Additional District Judge was created. 6. Consequent to the return of the execution application, the petitioners presented the same before the Court of Civil Judge alongwith an application under section 5/14 of the Limitation Act praying therein that the delay in filing the execution application may be condoned for the period in which the same remained pending before the Additional District Judge. The Civil Judge, Bacharach rejected the application for condo nation of delay and also dismissed the execution case on the ground of it being barred by time. 7. Against the order passed by the Civil Judge, the petitioners preferred a revision. In the revision it was mentioned that the decree holders/petitioners moved an application for executing the decree passed in Original Suit No.3 of 63 in the Court of Civil Judge and an application under section 5/14 of the Indian Limitation Act was also filed for excluding the period from 14.12.1992 to 21.2.1997 between which the decree holder had been prosecuting the execution in the Court of IInd Additional District Judge with due/diligence and in good faith. The Revisional Court while dismissing the revision observed that the first appeal was decided by the High Court on 11.12.1981 and S.L.P. was rejected by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 30.7.1982. Therefore, the period of limitation is to be calculated from 30.7.1982 and as the execution was filed in the Court of Civil Judge on 22.4.1998, the decree had obviously become time-barred it is contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that the question of limitation is always based on facts of individual case and the same can be a question of law and fact. 8. 8. It has been pointed out by the Counsel for the petitioners that the first appeal being decided by this Court on 11.12.1981 and the application for execution was made on 10.12.1993. In the intervening period, the matter was penning before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and thereafter miscellaneous applications were pending before this Court. The Additional District Judge' passed the order on 21.2.1997 for return of the execution application, which could only be returned by the Court on 22.4.1997 and on the same day, it was presented before the Court having competent jurisdiction. Even if the period from 21.2.1997, i.e., the date on which the Court passed the order for return of the execution application to 22.4.1997 i.e., the date on which the application was presented before the Civil Judge, is not excluded then too, one year was left to the petitioners/ decree holders to apply for execution and there was no delay in presenting the execution application. In catena of decisions, it has been held that where an order of return of an application is passed and filed, it shall be treated to be in continuation of the original proceedings. 9. Placing reliance on Islam Shah v. Wali Mohd. Khan, 1 it has been argued that in such cases benefit of section 14 of the Limitation Act is to be given which has been denied in the present case. He further added that in view of Article 136 of the Limitation Act, limitation is to run from the date when the decree becomes executable. In the instant case, as certain mistakes crept into the decree which could be rectified only by the order dated 20.4.1992 therefore the Court below should have calculated the limitation from this date alone and not any other date. 10. In support of his above contentions, learned Counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance on (1) Nanwas v. Maulaya Abdul Mughni2 (2) Dakhlilal Kushwflha v. Additional District Judge and others (3) Apex Court decision in Deep Chand v. Mohan Lal3 (4) Akkayanaicker v. AAA Kotchadainaidu and another4 (5) Vijay Kumar Rampal v. Diwan Delvi5 and (6) Supreme Court decision rendered in Collector, Land Acquisition Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji and others.6 11. Sri S.P. Shukla appearing for the contesting respondents that the decree as passed by the Appellate Court on 11.12.1981 became executable and the limitation for executing this decree is in question. Katiji and others.6 11. Sri S.P. Shukla appearing for the contesting respondents that the decree as passed by the Appellate Court on 11.12.1981 became executable and the limitation for executing this decree is in question. In the present case the decree was for possession by demolition' hence the possession to the decree holder was to be given after demolishing the structure. Thus, the decree holder had to first execute the first part of the decree to get the structures demolished and thereafter, it could have got the possession decree executed. 12. According to him, Article 135 of the Limitation Act provides three years limitation for mandatory injunction like demolition, therefore, the decree holder should have applied for execution of the demolition part within 3 years from the date of decree. Hence, the execution application moved even in a wrong Court on 14.12.1992 was time-barred. Referring to Article 136 of the Limitation Act, learned Counsel submitted that the decree of possession was to be considered as executable after demolition then the 12 years period would be counted from the date of demolition. Hence, in a situation where no demolition was got done within limitation of three years, the decree never became executable as far as the possession was concerned because, it was decree for ejectment. Further the period of 12 years, in the instant case, was to be counted w.e.f. 11.12.1981, the date when the decree became executable. 13. Learned Counsel for the respondent vehemently argued that the petitioner is not entitled for the benefit of time taken by the Supreme Court in deciding the S.L.P and the time consumed in making the application for correction of errors in the decree before the Appellate Court and the correction of the decree by the High Court. By the order dated 11.12.1981, the Appellate Court provided that the plaintiffs-petitioner suit will stand decreed for ejectment by demolition only in respect of plot Nos. 1089, 1090 and 1091 while the same in respect of Plot Nos. 1092, 1093, 1094/1 and 1094/2 will stand dismissed. The said order was challenged by the answering respondent by way of S.L.P. before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, which was subsequently dismissed. According to Counsel, law of merger will not apply when the S.L.P. is dismissed. Hence, the - decree of High Court did not merge with the Supreme Court order dismissing the S.L.P 14. The said order was challenged by the answering respondent by way of S.L.P. before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, which was subsequently dismissed. According to Counsel, law of merger will not apply when the S.L.P. is dismissed. Hence, the - decree of High Court did not merge with the Supreme Court order dismissing the S.L.P 14. To give strength to his arguments, he has relied upon the citations of Ram Awalamb v. Jata Shankar1 and Maqbul Ahmad and others v. Pateshwari Partab Narain Singh and others.2 15. In Deep Chand's case on which reliance has been placed by the petitioner, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph 5 of the report held as under: ".......Generally a decree or order becomes enforceable from the date, but in appropriate cases the Court passing the decree may prescribe time where from the decree becomes enforceable on a future date. It must, however, be remembered that the purposes of execution proceedings is to enable the decree-holder to obtain the fruits of his decree. In case where the language of the decree is capable of two interpretations, one of which assist the decree holder to obtain the fruits of the decree and the other preventing him from taking the benefits of the decree, the interpretation which assists the decree holder should be accepted. The execution of the decree should not be made futile on mere technicalities which does not, however, mean that where a decree is in capable of being executed under any provision of law it should, in all cases, be executed notwithstanding such bar or prohibition. A rational approach is necessitated keeping in view the prolong factum of litigation result in the passing of a decree in favour of a litigant. The policy of law is to give a fair and liberal and not a technical construction enabling the decree-holder to reap the fruits of his decree." (Emphasis supplied) 16. In Akkayanaicker's case (supra) the decree-holder could not enforce his decree because of the legislative intervention. It is only the amended decree which could be enforced. If the period of 12 years is counted from the date of amendment of the decree, then the execution petition filed by the decree holder can be said to be within the period of limitation. It is only the amended decree which could be enforced. If the period of 12 years is counted from the date of amendment of the decree, then the execution petition filed by the decree holder can be said to be within the period of limitation. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in this regard, observed in paragraph 15 of the report as under: "In my opinion, the proper interpretation would be, to reckon the period from the date of the decree that is sought to be enforced, i.e., if there is an appeal, it is the appellate decree and if there is an amendment, it is from the date of the amended decree. As I said earlier, even in a case of affirmance if time begins to run from the date of the appellate decree and not the original decree, much more so in the case of a decree which is amended as the original decree no longer retains its form. The amendment gives a fresh starting point of limitation. Even though Article 136 does not contain the words in case of an appeal, the Courts have construed that it is the appellate decree that is relevant as ultimately it is that decree which becomes capable of execution. In the case of an amendment, the original decree no longer retains its form and what is sought to be executed is the amended decree. Therefore, the words, 'enforceable' must be construed with reference to the decree that is sought to be enforced. Reckoned from the date of the amendment, the execution petition filed is within time." 17. In Badri Prasad v. Surya Narain,l an application for execution of a decree passed by the Additional Civil Judge was presented in the Court of Civil Judge and was subsequently transferred to Additional Civil Judge, who has• passed the decree. The application was returned for proper presentation on the ground that the original application was filed before the Civil Court and not before the Additional Civil Judge. By the time subsequent application was filed, limitation period of three years had expired. When this question came up before the High Court, this Court held that as under: "........Once the original presentation which was admittedly within time of the two applications for execution was valid in law, no orders passed later on would affect the limitation. By the time subsequent application was filed, limitation period of three years had expired. When this question came up before the High Court, this Court held that as under: "........Once the original presentation which was admittedly within time of the two applications for execution was valid in law, no orders passed later on would affect the limitation. May be that the decree-holder was bound by the order and he observed that order by taking the two applications back from the Court of the Additional Civil Judge and again presenting them formally before the same Court, subsequently, do not subscribe to the view canvassed by the learned Counsel for the judgment-debtor that this presentation will amount to the filing of fresh application for execution. I think that the order of the Additional Civil Judge returning the two applications for presentation to the proper Court was itself hyper technical and can be disregarded in the special circumstances of the instant case. The fact remains that it were the same two old applications which were formally again presented in pursuance of the said order. It is still the same subject-matter in execution which was prosecuted in the two execution applications originally presented within time in the Court of the Civil Judge. In this view of the matter no occasion arises for the decree-holder to take the benefit of the provisions of section 14 of the Limitation Act as the two applications were filed within time." 18. In the instant case, it is an admitted fact that an application for correction in the judgment and decree was allowed by the High Court in First Civil Appeal No.3 of 1965 on 5.12.1991. On 14.12.1992 the application for execution was moved in the Court of Additional District Judge by the Counsel for the petitioner which was registered as 1 of 1992. On 11.8.1995 objections under section 47, C.P.C. were filed by the answering respondents mentioning therein that the application should have been filed in the Court of Civil Judge. However, without deciding the objection, on 16.9.19% the Court passed an order for disuse of commission. Thereafter, the Commission visited the spot, prepared the report and submitted the same before the Court. On 19.10.1996 an application for rehearing the objection was made by the answering respondents. However, without deciding the objection, on 16.9.19% the Court passed an order for disuse of commission. Thereafter, the Commission visited the spot, prepared the report and submitted the same before the Court. On 19.10.1996 an application for rehearing the objection was made by the answering respondents. Thereafter the case was taken up on 21.2.1997 and the Additional District Judge allowed the objections of the respondents and passed the order for returning the execution application to the decree holder for being presented before the proper Court. 19. On 22.4.1997 the original execution application was returned and was filed on the same day in the Court of Civil Judge. The petitioner by way of abundant caution moved an application under section 5/14 of the Limitation Act but on 12.8.1997 the Civil Court rejected the execution application against which revision was preferred which too was rejected and It was held that period of limitation is to be calculated from 30.7.1982 the date on which S.L.P was dismissed. Further, a finding was recorded that there was lack of due diligence in moving the application in the Court of Additional District Judge. 20. It may be mentioned that it would be improper to say that the petitioners deliberately filed the application for execution in a wrong Court when the petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest have instituted a suit in 1965 and contested the matter up to the Supreme Court in order to achieve their legal and justified claim. Had the petitioner known that filing of execution application in the Court of Additional District Judge will deprive them of their valuable rights, they never would have done this. 21. Undoubtedly the period of limitation prescribed under Limitation Act would start from the date when the decree becomes enforceable. The first appeal was decided by the High Court on 11.12.1981. Thereafter, the special leave petition was dismissed however it was provided that the decree would not be executed till 30.4.1983. Furthermore certain errors were detected in the decree passed by the High Court and as such, they moved an application for correction which was allowed by the High Court on 5.12.1991 admittedly the first appeal was decided on 11.12.1981 and as such, time till 10.12.1993 was available for making application for execution. The petitioner made an application for execution on 14.12.1992. The petitioner made an application for execution on 14.12.1992. The order of returning the original application was passed on 21.2.1997 but the application could be returned to the petitioners only on 22.4.1997 and on the same day it was presented before the proper Court. 22. It is relevant to add that the Supreme Court itself has provided while dismissing the S.L.P. that order of eviction shall not be executed before the end of April, 1983 and as such the contention of the answering respondents that the benefit of the time consumed in S.L.P. would not be available has no force. Further, the Revisional Court has also committed an error in holding that the period of limitation is to be calculated from 30.7.1982 when the Supreme Court itself has provided that the order of eviction shall not be execute before end of April, 1983. The Revisional Court has also erred in not considering the fact that the answering respondents have flouted the order passed by the Supreme Court and their acts were contumacious. 23. It may be added that, at the cost of repetition that the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dismissing the special leave petition preferred by the opposite parties directed that the order of eviction shall not be executed before end of April, 1983 as they have given an undertaking that they will handover the vacant possession of the suit premises. This order was not complied by the opposite parties and now they are coming with the case that the decree has become in executable as the petitioners have not shown due diligence in prosecuting the case. 24. It is settled law one should approach the Court with clean heart and clean mind to get a relief and one who does not come with clean heart and clean mind disentitles himself from getting any relief from the Court. The answering respondents were bound to honors the judgment passed by the Apex Court of the country. The Courts below have lost sight of this fact. 25. The Revisional Court as well as Execution Court committed an error in not considering the directions of the Supreme Court in the S.L.P preferred by the respondents and rejecting the application for execution on the ground that the petitioners have failed to show due diligence in moving the execution. The Courts below have lost sight of this fact. 25. The Revisional Court as well as Execution Court committed an error in not considering the directions of the Supreme Court in the S.L.P preferred by the respondents and rejecting the application for execution on the ground that the petitioners have failed to show due diligence in moving the execution. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Deep Chand (supra) has held in specific words that the policy of law is to give a fair and liberal deal and not a technical construction enabling the decree holder to reap the fruits of his decree. In view of the aforesaid facts and the recent decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court the case laws cited by the respondents are of no avail to him. 26. In Salem Advocates Bar Association v. Union of India. l the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: "The rules of procedure are made to advance the cause of justice and not to defeat it. Construction of the rule of procedure which promotes justice and prevents miscarriage has to be preferred. The rules of procedure are handmaid of justice and not its mistress." 27. It is significant to mention that in the present context the strict interpretation would defeat justice and the law is always subservient to and is in aid to justice. In the instant case the maxim of equity, namely acts curiae nominee gravidity and act of Court shall prejudice no man, shall be applicable. The maxim is founded upon justice and good sense which serves a safe and certain guide for the administration of law. For the reasons aforesaid, it cannot be said that the application for execution was time barred. The Courts below should have considered the fact as to when the decree becomes capable of execution. The petitioners are litigating this matter since the year 1963 and inspire of having a decree in their favour, which they got much earlier, have not been able to reap the fruits of the decree merely because they preferred the application for execution in a wrong Court. A party cannot be refused a just relief merely because of some mistake, negligence or inadvertence of his Counsel. 28. A party cannot be refused a just relief merely because of some mistake, negligence or inadvertence of his Counsel. 28. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed and the judgments and orders dated 12.8.1997 and 25.9.1997, passed by the Courts below are hereby set aside The Executing Court shall proceed with the matter and conclude the same within a maximum period of three months from the date a certified copy of this order is brought on record before the Court concerned, as the parties are litigating the matter for the last 44 years and no unnecessary adjournment shall be granted. Petition Allowed