Judgment I. MAHANTY, J.:- Paradeep Phospates Ltd. the petitioner-company is a company incorporated and registered under the Indian Companies Act, 1956. The petitioner-company has commissioned a fertilizer plant near Paradeep Port in the district of Jagatsinghpur, since 1982, as a joint venture company, of Government of India and the Government of Nauru. In course of time the Government of Nauru withdrew its investment and the Government of India became the sole 'shareholder of the petitioner company. From the writ petition it further appears that Government of India divested 74% share of the petitioner-company in favour of M/s. Zuari Maroc Phosphates Ltd. By virtue of the said share purchase agreement dated 2.8-2-2002 where by the management and control of the petitioner-company was handed over to M/s. Zuari Maroc Phosphates Ltd. The petitioner-company needed to import raw materials, machineries and other equipments for the purpose of manufacture of different types of fertilizer and also for the purpose of export of its finished products and for the said purpose needed a berthing• facility within the Paradeep Port. Apart from berthing facility the petitioner-company also required to construct a gallery from the berth situated inside the Port to its plant premises. Pursuant to the negotiation between the petitioner-company and the opposite party, an agreement dated 3-8-1985 was executed between the Paradeep Phospates Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "PPL") (Petitioner) and Paradeep Port, Trust (hereafter referred to as "PPT") (Opposite party). In terms of the said agreement under Annexure-l to the writ petition, the petitioner-company was permitted to construct a fertilizer berth in Paradeep Port-Trust area apart from being permitted to install its conveyor belt/pipeline on a structure for moving cargo from dedicated berth within Paradeep Port to the factory premises located at Paradeep. 2. Shorn of unnecessary detail the petitioner-company in the present writ petition has sought to challenge a demand for sharing revenue earned from M/s. Cargill India Private Limited by the PPL on a 50:50 basis by the Paradeep Port Trust, vide their letters dated 23-5-2006, 7-6-2006 under Annexure-3 and 6 respectively and further has sought to challenge the direction issued by the Paradeep Port Trust to the petitioner-company for payment, failing which it threatened the removal of the pipeline vide its letter dated 31-8-2006 under Annexure-8. 3. 3. The case of the petitioner -company is that, in terms of clauses 12, 13 and 17 of the agreement dated 3-8-1985, the petitioner-company had constructed different structures, installed different machineries and equipment both in the captive berth as well as has made some structures on the land belonging to Paradeep Port Trust to support the galley running from captive berth within Paradeep Port premises to its factory located adjacent to the Port. It is submitted that this gallery constructed by the petitioner-company has the facility of running a conveyor felt apart from also carrying a number of pipelines for the use of the petitioner. The real controversy in the present case arises from the fact that the petitioner has entered into an agreement with a company known as M/s. Cargill India Private Limited, under the terms of which it has permitted Cargill India Private Ltd. to lay its pipe line on the gallery constructed by the petitioner-company. (It is important to take note that this purported agreement between the petitioner-company and the said company M/s. Cargill India Private Limited has not been annexed to the writ petition). The case of the petitioner is that it is within the petitioner's contractual competence to allow the installation of the pipeline on the gallery constructed by it by M/s. Cargill India Private Ltd. Pursuant to its agreement dated 3-8-1985 with the Paradeep Port Trust. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on clauses 12, 13 and 17 of the agreement which are quoted hereunder:- "12. That without any prejudice to the exclusive ownership of Paradeep Port Trust, the Paradeep Phosphates Ltd. shall have all just and reasonable right of way upon the land occupied by conveyor, gallery, pipeline from captive berth to their site and for a road which approximately covers 28.75 acres (11.50 Hectares) of Port land as described in Drawing No. CEPT/278/84 D/- 20-61984 (attached as MAP 'A') for movement of men and materials on payment of consideration @ 2% of the present land premium i.e. Rs. 143.75 lakhs for enjoyment of such easementary right. The Paradeep Phosphates Ltd., shall be allowed to erect such structures in this land as per the plans to be approved by the Chief Engineer, Paradeep Port Trust. But the Paradeep Phosphates ltd, the second party, shall have no right, title and interest over the land in question. 13. 143.75 lakhs for enjoyment of such easementary right. The Paradeep Phosphates Ltd., shall be allowed to erect such structures in this land as per the plans to be approved by the Chief Engineer, Paradeep Port Trust. But the Paradeep Phosphates ltd, the second party, shall have no right, title and interest over the land in question. 13. Without any prejudice to the exclusive ownership of the Paradeep Port Trust, the Paradeep Phosphates Ltd., shall have all just and reasonable right of way upon the land measuring 77.60 acres (31.04 hectares), more particularly described in Drawing No. CETP/283/85 dated 1-8-85 (enclosed as map 'B') for construction of approach road, canal from the Express Highway and to their plant site on payment of Rs. 77,600 (Rupees Seventy-seven thousand six hundred) only per annum as calculated @ 2% of cost of the land being Rs. 30.80 lakhs as easement money for enjoyment of such easementary right only. 17. The Paradeep Phosphates Ltd. the second party at anytime during the said term without prior permission in writing of the Paradeep Port Trust shall not erect any building or structure or made any alternative or addition whatsoever in or to any structure which may hereafter be erected on the lands described in paras 12 and 13 without such permission as aforesaid. However, this Paradeep Port Trust shall not withhold permission for reasonable requests of the Paradeep Phosphates Ltd. in this regard. " 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner placing reliance on the aforesaid clauses of the agreement between the parties submits that the petitioner-company has all just and reasonable right of way upon the land/ structure described in the agreement and therefore, on a conjoint reading of the aforesaid clauses the agreement between the parties is a "lease agreement" and the petitioner has a "right of easement" over the land for construction of structure and installations as well as a right to allow a third party to use the same and the opposite party had no right to raise any demand for share of revenue being earned by the petitioner-company nor justified in law in threatening to demolish the pipeline installed by M/s. Cargill Private India Ltd. 5. Mr. Mr. Ganeswar Rath, learned counsel appearing for Paradeep Phosphates submitted that clause 17 of the agreement vests the necessary authority with the petitioner-company not only to erect any building, structure or to make any alterative or addition whatsoever subject to the prior permission in writing of the Paradeep Port Trust and the PPT cannot withhold such permission for such reasonable request being made by the petitioner-company. In this regard learned counsel for the petitioner asserted that by letter dated 6-5-2003 the petitioner sought permission from the' Paradeep Port Trust in terms of clause 17 of the agreement to allow M/s. Cargill India Private Limited to lay their edible oil pipelines in its conveyor gallery without' making any alteration or addition to the existing structure. 6. It is asserted that the petitioner in the said letter under Annexure-2 to the writ petition also intimated that if no communication was received from the PPT within one month from the date of issuance of their letter it would be deemed that permission had been accorded. Learned counsel further submitted that since the opposite party Paradeep Port Trust chose not to reply to the said letter under Annexure-2, the petitioner proceeded to sign an agreement with M/s. Cargill India Private Limited on the basis of the "deemed approval" of the Paradeep Port Trust. Pursuant to the said deemed approval M/s. Cargill India Private Limited has laid edible oil pipeline on the conveyor gallery of the petitioner. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that it is only after a period of three years that the Traffic Manager of Paradeep Port Trust issued a letter dated 23-5-2006 to Paradeep Phosphates Ltd. alleging that the petitioner-company had without taking permission from the Paradeep Port Trust, executed an agreement with M/s. Cargill India Private Limited. thereby violating the clause 17 of the agreement. In the said communication the opposite party-Paradeep Port Trust demanded a portion from the payment being made by M/s. Cargill India Private Limited to Paradeep Phosphates Limited should be shared on 50:50 basis, since ownership of the land on which the conveyor gallery is built remained with the Paradeep Port Trust. 8. thereby violating the clause 17 of the agreement. In the said communication the opposite party-Paradeep Port Trust demanded a portion from the payment being made by M/s. Cargill India Private Limited to Paradeep Phosphates Limited should be shared on 50:50 basis, since ownership of the land on which the conveyor gallery is built remained with the Paradeep Port Trust. 8. In response to the aforesaid notice of the Paradeep Port Trust under Annexure-3 the petitioner-company responded by its letter dated 31-5-2006 asserting its claim that its "easementary rights" has transferable and in the absence of any prohibition clause in its agreement with Paradeep Port Trust dated 3-8-1985, transfer of easementary right in favour of M/s. Cargill India Private Limited was valid and is in accordance with law. 9. Thereafter the Chairman of PP1 through its letter dated 7-6-2006 reiterated that the agreement between the petitioner-company and M/s. Cargil India Private Limited dated 10-6-2003 having been entered into, without any written permission from the Paradeep Port Trust as required under clause 17 he demanded that the pecuniary benefit being arrived by the petitioner-company through its agreement with M/s. Cargil India Private Limited should be shared on 50:50 basis. It further appears that though some negotiations had been attempted, ultimately the Secretary of Para deep Port Trust on 31-8-2006 wrote a letter to the petitioner-company under Annexure-8 raising a demand of Rs. 26,81,250/- towards subletting charges of conveyor gallery for the period 16-2003 to 31-8-2006 failing which the petitioner was requested to remove the pipe lines of M/s. Cargill India Private Limited on or before 15-9-2006, In the light of the aforesaid facts, the present writ petition came to be filed by the petitioner-company challenging the demand raised by the opposite party Paradeep Port Trust under Annexure-3 and 6 as well as the direction for removal of the pipelines under Annexure-8. 10. Mr. Rath, learned counsel for the petitioner-company, inter alia, contended that the agreement dated 3-8-1985 made between the petitioner-company and the Paradeep Port Trust was in essence "a lease" and therefore, the petitioner is entitled to effect a sub-lease in favour of a third party. 10. Mr. Rath, learned counsel for the petitioner-company, inter alia, contended that the agreement dated 3-8-1985 made between the petitioner-company and the Paradeep Port Trust was in essence "a lease" and therefore, the petitioner is entitled to effect a sub-lease in favour of a third party. In this respect learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Delta International Limited v. Shyam Sundar Ganeriwalla, reported in AIR 1999 SC 2607 and in the case of the Corporation of Calicut v. K. Sreenivasan reported in AIR 2002 SC 2051 and the judgments of Madras High Court in the case of Petroleum Workers Union v. M/s. A. Mohamed and Co. Madras reported in AIR 1967 Madras 33 and in the case of Musunoori Satyanarayana Murti v. Chekka Lakshmayya, reported in AIR 1929 Madras 79. 11. In conclusion Mr. Rath learned counsel for the petitioner fairly submitted that unless the agreement 3-8-1985 between PPL and PPT is determined to be a "lease" the petitioner would not be entitled to the relief sought for. In other words he prayed that this Hon'ble Court may accept his contention that the agreement under Annexure-l is a lease and therefore consequently the petitioner has not violated any terms of the lease by granting M/s. Cargill India Private Limited the right to lay their pipeline on the structure constructed by the petitioner-company and the PPT would not be entitled to claim any share from the payment being received by the petitioner from M/s. Cargill India Private Limited. 12. Mr. G. Rath, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the opposite party-PPT in their counter affidavit has accepted the fact that the agreement between the parties under Annexure-l is a "lease agreement". He refers particularly to the averments made in para 9 of the counter-affidavit which indicates that opposite party-PPT admit having "leased" out the land to the petitioner under the agreement dated 3-81985 and he submits once such an admission on the part of opposite party exists, that the agreement between themselves is nothing else other than a "lease" then consequently the opposite party cannot be permitted to wriggle out of the situation by claiming that the petitioner only possessed "easementary right" and/or "right of way only" and therefore not transferable. 13. Mr. 13. Mr. S. K. Padhi, learned Senior counsel for the opposite party-PPT on the other hand submitted that on a complete reading of the agreement between the parties under Annexure-l dated 3-8-1985, all that can be derived from the said agreement is that Paradeep Port Trust only granted the petitioner -company a "right of way", alone which was stipulated to be only an "easementary right" for which the petitioner was required to pay only a fraction of consideration, i.e. @ 2% of the cost of the land and in every clause of the agreement it has been reiterated that the "petitioner-company shall have no right, title or interest over the land" in question. Learned counsel for the opposite party placed reliance on various terms and conditions of the agreement to highlight his plea that the agreement in question and in particular the permission granted to the petitioner-company to erect towers for carrying conveyor belt and the pipeline was only a grant of a "right of way", which is nothing else other than an "easementary right" and therefore the agreement cannot be deemed to a "lease" but merely a "licence". 14. Mr. Padhi submitted that although the term 'lease' had been used by the opposite party in their counter-affidavit at certain places, the same is merely an erroneous term of expression, and the "licence agreement" between the parties cannot become a "lease merely by an erroneous use of the term in the counter-affidavit. He also placed reliance upon the judgment of the Delta International Limited ( AIR 1999 SC 2607 ) (supra) and stated that the nomenclature of a document, per-se is not determinative of the nature of the agreement. He further submitted that on plain reading of the agreement between the parties, the intention of the parties is writ large on the face of the said agreement and is nothing more than a licence agreement to granting "easementary right or right of way" and therefore, neither by pleading or admission would such an agreement be held to be a lease. 15. In the light of the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the contesting parties as has been noted hereinabove, we are of the considered view that this Court has to gather and find out the true "intention of the parties" as to whether the document under Annexure-I dated 3-81985 creates a lease or license. 15. In the light of the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the contesting parties as has been noted hereinabove, we are of the considered view that this Court has to gather and find out the true "intention of the parties" as to whether the document under Annexure-I dated 3-81985 creates a lease or license. It is well settled that the "dominant intention" of the parties is to be gathered from the terms of the documents, irrespective of contentions made by the parties. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in its judgment rendered in the case of Delta International Limited (supra) has clearly held in paragraph 9, which reads as follows :- "From the aforesaid submissions it is apparent that the common contention of the learned counsel for both the parties is that the Court has to gather and find out the true 'intention of the parties' as to whether the document creates a lease or license, the dominant intention of the parties is to be gathered from the terms of the document irrespective of the labels that the parties may put upon it. It is to be, stated that even I though it is the common contention of the learned counsel for the parties that dominant intention of the parties is to be gathered from the document, yet all throughout the question had remained a vexed one, having no easy solution and precise mathematical tests. Because ultimately 'intention of the parties' is to be inferred......." Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court placed reliance upon the 'tests' for ascertaining the 'dominant intention' laid down 'by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Associated Hotels (P) Ltd. v. R. N. Kapoor, (1960) 1 SCR 368 : ( AIR 1959 SC 1262 ) which has been relied upon new more sub-sequent decisions. In the said judgment it has been laid down that for the purpose of determination of the parties the following proposition may be taken as well established: "(1) To ascertain whether a document creates a licence or lease; the substance of the document must be preferred to the form; (2) The real test is the intention of the parties - whether they intended to create a lease or a licence; (3) If the document creates an interest in the property, it is a lease; but if it only permits another to make use of the property, of which the legal possession continues with the owner, it is a licence; and (4) If under the document a party gets exclusive possession of the property, prima facie, he is considered to be a tenant; but circumstances may be established which negatived the intention to create a lease." 16. Therefore before we venture to analyze the facts of the present case in dispute, it is essential to take note the terms of the agreement dated 31-8-1985 ; Clause-l That the said captive berth shall be exclusively provided for use of the Paradeep Phosphates Limited..... Clause 3 That such installations and fixtures as stated above, even if done permanently to the ground within the port limits and its vicinity would not vest and/or create any right title and interest in land to which such permanent installations are made, in favour of Paradeep Phosphates Ltd., ......and the same shall always continue to rest and vest with the Paradeep Port Trust. Clause-12 That without any prejudice to the exclusive ownership of Paradeep Port Trust, the Paradeep Phosphates Ltd., shall have all just and reasonable 'right of way' upon the land occupied by conveyor. Gallery, pipeline... for enjoyment of such easementary right. The Paradeep Phosphates Ltd. shall be allowed to erect such structures in this land as per the plans to be approved by the Chief Engineer, Paradeep Port Trust. But the Paradeep Phosphates Ltd, the second party, shall have no right, title and interest over the land in question. Clause 13 That without any prejudice to the exclusive ownership of the Paradeep Port Trust........ . Clause-15 ..........But the Paradeep Phosphates Ltd. the second party. shall have no right, title and interest over the said land. Clause-21 That if the Paradeep Phosphates Ltd., the second party. Clause 13 That without any prejudice to the exclusive ownership of the Paradeep Port Trust........ . Clause-15 ..........But the Paradeep Phosphates Ltd. the second party. shall have no right, title and interest over the said land. Clause-21 That if the Paradeep Phosphates Ltd., the second party. contravenes any conditions of the deed of agreement executed between the parties, the Board of Trustees of Paradeep Port Trust shall have every right to withdraw the easementary right granted to them. 17. It is important to note that the aforesaid terms of the document have not been provided by any illiterate lay man or poor person in need some premises for his residence or business but executed by Paradeep Port Trust (a statutory body) and the petitioner-company (which is a multi-crore enterprise). Therefore it would be safe to presume that the aforesaid agreement was entered into between the parties after a full understanding all the terms of the agreement and to avoid any wrong inference intention. This agreement repeatedly mentioned that the agreement in question vests "only easementary rights" in favour of the petitioner and the agreement repeatedly declares that, at all points of time right, title and interest shall remain vested with the Paradeep Port Trust even while allowing the petitioner to make some permanent construction thereon and to carry its conveyor belt and pipeline yet the agreement reiterates that, even then, the right, title and interest on the said property shall remain vested with Paradeep Port Trust. On a reading of the agreement, it is clear that various clauses in the agreement are stated in positive and negative form and clearly provide that the petitioner has been granted with "easementary right" alone and nothing else. It is well settled that when the parties, which are capable of understanding their right fully have expressly agreed and declared that the document does not create any right other than easementary right or right of way, it would be impermissible to conjecture or infer that their relationship should be construed as that of a landlord or tenant. It is well settled that when the parties, which are capable of understanding their right fully have expressly agreed and declared that the document does not create any right other than easementary right or right of way, it would be impermissible to conjecture or infer that their relationship should be construed as that of a landlord or tenant. On reading of the aforesaid terms, the intention of the parties and repeated use of certain terms such as right, title and interest shall always remain vested and shall vest with Paradeep Port Trust, we are of the view that the intention of the parties is clear and the agreement in question cannot be treated as a "lease" as sought to be pleaded by the petitioner. 18. Secondly, on a reading of the agreement it is clear that the parties to the agreement were fully aware that no change of construction, or alteration could be made in the gallery constructed by the petitioner "without written consent of the Paradeep Port Trust." At this point it needs to be noted that at various places of the agreement the object of the agreement remains limited to the reasons/objectives for which the parties entered into the agreement. The said agreement clearly declares that Paradeep Phosphates Limited has entered into the said agreement for "importing of raw materials, machineries and equipments and for exporting its finished products in future". In other words, the agreement between the parties is only for the use of these facilities by the petitioner-company. Clause-17 in our view would only come into operation if the requirement for erecting any building or structure or to make any alteration and addition whatsoever to any structure was required by PPL for its own use, prior permission in writing of the Paradeep Port Trust was required. But in the present case since use of such addition or alternation was sought for the benefit of a third party, namely M/s. Cargill India Private Limited, we are of the view that no such provision for third party would have been sought for nor permitted. But in the present case since use of such addition or alternation was sought for the benefit of a third party, namely M/s. Cargill India Private Limited, we are of the view that no such provision for third party would have been sought for nor permitted. We are in respectful disagreement with the learned counsel for the petitioner not only to the extent of holding that the agreement between the parties is not a "lease" but a "licence" but we are of the further view that, the petitioner could not have sought for nor have been granted with any permission for use of the structure by any third party, i.e. M/s. Cargill India Private Limited. 19. Even otherwise clause- 17 of the agreement between the parties does not contain any clause of "deemed permission" and on the contrary, it specifically mandates that "without prior permission in writing" of the Paradeep Port Trust, M/s Paradeep Phosphates Limited shall not erect any building or structure or make any alternative or addition whatsoever to any structure. Therefore, the attempt made by the petitioner in its letter dated 6-5-2003 under Annexure-2 f while seeking permission under Clause 17 and at the same declaring therein that if no communication was received within one month from Paradeep Port Trust "it would deem" that permission has been accorded cannot be relied upon. We are afraid that Clause 17 of the agreement permits that no such inference of "deemed permission" and therefore, any action taken by the petitioner, "without prior permission in writing" of the Paradeep Port Trust, is clearly and manifestly in violation of clause 17 of the agreement. 20. It is clear that the petitioner was fully conscious that without obtaining the consent of Paradeep Port Trust in writing, no change at all would be effected to the structure erected by the petitioner and permitting a third party to install their pipeline is clearly iliegal. As noted hereinabove clause 17 of the agreement clearly requires the petitioner to obtain the prior written consent of the Paradeep Port Trust, without which, any action on the part of the petitioner has to be held to be in violation of the requirement of the said clause. As noted hereinabove clause 17 of the agreement clearly requires the petitioner to obtain the prior written consent of the Paradeep Port Trust, without which, any action on the part of the petitioner has to be held to be in violation of the requirement of the said clause. Since no written permission has admittedly been granted by the Paradeep Port Trust, the only course open for Paradeep Phosphates Limited, in absence of any response by the Paradeep Port Trust to its request under Annexure-2 was to seek appropriate remedy available to it under law and not to act on a "presumptive deemed permission". Since non-response to such request would amount to a denial of written permission. The PPL could have sought for appropriate remedy in the said regard, but the petitioner was not to law entitled to proceed on a "presumption of deemed permission". 21. Thirdly, in the present case it has not been contended by the petitioner-company that the agreement in question was camouflage to circumvent the provisions of law or to defeat the rights of the owner or tenant. It is well settled that in cases where contract for licence is executed by handing over exclusive possession of the premises, the distinguishing line between the lease and license is absolutely thin. In such cases, the terms of the document are to be read as they are and it would be unreasonable to draw any inference that the parties intended to create relationship of landlord and tenant despite express contrary terms in the deed, which are binding between the parties. It further needs to be noted that the petitioner has not made out a case that the present agreement is a camouflage or mask, which requires to be removed for determining the true intent and purpose of the document. In fact in the present case there is no pleading by the petitioner that the document is a camouflage so as to defeat the rights of owner or tenant who had been inducted by the opposite party owner to the premises. In fact in the present case there is no pleading by the petitioner that the document is a camouflage so as to defeat the rights of owner or tenant who had been inducted by the opposite party owner to the premises. Therefore on the essential issue that arises for our consideration, we are constrained to note that we are unable to accept the contentions advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner and come to hold that the agreement in question is merely a licence under which easementary right has been granted to the petitioner for its own use and the said agreement does not amount to a lease as advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner. 22. In the case of Corporation of Calicut ( AIR 2002 SC 2051 ) (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has clearly sought to distinguish the term "lease" from the term "licence" in paragraph 7, which is quoted below: "7. 'Lease' has been defined under Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 relevant portion whereof reads thus : "S. 105. Lease defined - A lease of immovable property is a transfer of a right to enjoy such property, made for a certain time, express or implied, or in perpetuity, in consideration of a price paid or promised, or of money, a share of crops, service or any other thing of value, to be rendered periodically or on specified occasions to the transferor by the transferee, who accepts the transfer on such terms". 'Licence' has been defined under Section 52 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882 to mean a grant by one person to another or to a definite number of other persons, a right to do, or continue to do, in or upon immovable property of the grantor, something which would, in the absence of such right be unlawful and such right does not amount to an easement or an interest in the property. Section 53 specifies the persons who can grant a licence and Section 54 lays down that the grant may be express or implied whereas Section 55 defines accessory licence. According to Section 56 only certain types of licences enumerated thereunder are transferable and not all. Duties of the grantors are specified in Sections 57 and 58 whereas Section 59 says that grantor's transferee is not bound by the licence. According to Section 56 only certain types of licences enumerated thereunder are transferable and not all. Duties of the grantors are specified in Sections 57 and 58 whereas Section 59 says that grantor's transferee is not bound by the licence. Section 60 provides grounds for revocation of licence and Section 62 the contingencies under which a licence is deemed to be revoked whereas Section 61 lays down that revocation of licence may be express or implied. Rights of a licensee, whose licence has been revoked in accordance with law. to remain in occupation of the property for a reasonable time after its revocation, have been enumerated in Section 63. Under Section 64 even if a licensee is evicted, though grounds for revocation of licence do not exists or forcefully evicted, his only remedy is to recover compensation from grantor and not to resume occupation which undoubtedly would never mean that a licensee can be forcefully evicted by the grantor without taking recourse to the provisions of law. We may usefully refer to the provisions of Section 52 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882 which run thus: "So 62. Licence defined - Where one person grants to another, or to a definite number of other persons, a right to do, or continue to do, in or upon the immovable property of the grantor, something which would, in the absence of such right, be unlawful, and such right does not amount to an easement or an interest in the property, the right is called a licence". 23. In terms of the distinction made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as noted hereinabove we are of the view that a licence as has been defined under Section 52 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882 contemplates grant by one person to another or to a definite number of other persons a right to do, or continue to do, in or upon the immovable property of the grantor, something which would, on the absence of such right be unlawful, and such does not amount to an easement or an interest in the property as contemplated under Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act. 1882. In the present case the opposite party PPT have granted the petitioner-PPL a right to erect gallery and to use such gallery for the purpose of installing a conveyor belt and pipeline for its own use alone. 1882. In the present case the opposite party PPT have granted the petitioner-PPL a right to erect gallery and to use such gallery for the purpose of installing a conveyor belt and pipeline for its own use alone. Therefore, clearly he agreement in question satisfied the requirements of a licence as defined under 5ection 52 of the Indian Easement Act, 1882. 24. Reliance also be placed upon a judgment of single Judge of Hon'ble Madras High court in the case of Petroleum Workers Union ( AIR 1967 Mad 33 ) (supra). This was a case where a tenant in possession of a premise had permitted others to use the premise and such use by other was held not to amount to subletting. We are afraid the aforesaid judgment is of no real use to the petitioner, since facts of the present case are clearly distinguishable from the facts that arose for consideration by the Hon'ble Madras High Court. In the aforementioned case there was no dispute that the tenant had been granted a lease whereas in the present case at hand, we have reached a conclusion that the agreement between the parties is a "licence", therefore aforesaid judgment can have no application to whatsoever. 25. Apart from the aforesaid case laws, the petitioner also relied upon a judgment of a single Judge of Hon'ble Madras High Court in the case of Musunoori Satyanarayana Murti ( AIR 1929 Mad 79 ) (supra). In the said case Hon'ble Madras High Court was dealing with the question as to whether a particular document on the basis of which easementary right was claimed was inadmissible in evidence for want of registration as required under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act (in short T. P. Act"). On this point Hon'ble Madras High Court determined that on a reading of Section 54 of the T.P. Act along with Section 6(c) of the T.P. Act, it concluded that the provision contemplated a "transfer of an existing easement" as distinguished from the creation of or the imposition of a "new easement". On this point Hon'ble Madras High Court determined that on a reading of Section 54 of the T.P. Act along with Section 6(c) of the T.P. Act, it concluded that the provision contemplated a "transfer of an existing easement" as distinguished from the creation of or the imposition of a "new easement". His Lordship's view was that there is a clear distinction between transfer of an existing easement and the creation or grant of a new easement and that it is only where the transfer of an existing easement is the act of the dominant owner and is inseparable from the transfer of the dominant heritage, that requires registration, while the creation of a new easement does not involve transfer of ownership in immovable properties as contemplated under Section 54 of the T.P. Act and hence does not require registration. We are of the considered view that this issue also does not arises for our consideration in the facts of the present case, inasmuch as, the agreement dated 3-8-1985 between the petitioner and the opposite party was a creation of a "new easement" and not a transfer of an existing easement as part of transfer of dominant heritage. Therefore, as has been held by the Hon'ble Madras High Court, the grant of an easement in favour of the petitioner by the opposite party does not involve a transfer of ownership in immovable properties as is contemplated under Section 54 of the T.P. Act. We are of the considered view that this judgment also does not in supporting the case of the petitioner and on the other hand in effect supports our conclusion that the grant of a "right of way" or "easement" does not amount a transfer of ownership in immovable properties and hence the agreement in question is to be held to be a "licence" and not a "lease". 26. In the light of the aforesaid conclusion arrived at by us hereinabove we have no alternative other than to dismiss the writ petition and vacate all interim orders in the matter. Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, C.J. :- 27. I agree. Order accordingly.