JUDGMENT SUDHIR AGARWAL, J. - Heard Sri Bharatji Agrawal, Senior Advocate and Sri Rahul Agarwal for the petitioner and Sri S. P. Kesarwani, learned Standing Counsel for the respondents. The petitioner is challenging the vires of rule 43(4)(a) of the U.P. Trade Tax Rules, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as, "the Rules") and has also sought a writ of certiorari quashing the order dated 19th June, 2002 passed by the Commissioner, Trade Tax, U.P., Lucknow (respondent No. 1) whereby it has directed the petitioner to pay the entire amount of trade tax for the period of December 2, 1999 to February 20, 2001 in view of the discontinuance of business by the petitioner. The facts in brief, giving rise to the present dispute are as under : Section 4A of the U.P. Trade Tax Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as, "the Act") empowers the State Government to grant certain exemption/concession from payment of tax/reduction in tax to certain industrial units by issuing a notification. The notification was issued on March 31, 1995 granting exemption from payment of trade tax to certain industrial units which are established as new units or have undergone expansion, modernisation, etc., after April 1, 1994 and before March 31, 2000. Section 8 of the Act provides for payment and recovery of tax and sub-section (2) thereof provides that the persons who have been found eligible for exemption in view of the notification under section 4A of the Act, if they so opt, in lieu of exemption or concessional rates of tax, they may be allowed deferment of tax subject to such conditions as may be prescribed. For the purpose of section 8(2A) of the Act, rule 43 has been enacted containing terms and conditions upon which moratorium under section 8(2A) can be provided. The petitioner, M/s. J.C.L. International Limited, established a manufacturing unit in the industrial area Sikandarabad for manufacturing of L.P.G. cylinders for oil companies like Indian Oil, Bharat Petroleum and Hindustan Petroleum Corporation, etc. The petitioner applied for and was issued eligibility certificate granting exemption/concession of tax for the period of June 20, 1998 to December 20, 2006 vide order dated October 10, 2001. In lieu of exemption/concession in tax under section 4A, the petitioner vide application dated January 1, 2002 (annexure 2 to the writ petition) applied to the Commissioner, Trade Tax, U.P., Lucknow, for granting moratorium under section 8(2A) of the Act. In lieu of exemption/concession in tax under section 4A, the petitioner vide application dated January 1, 2002 (annexure 2 to the writ petition) applied to the Commissioner, Trade Tax, U.P., Lucknow, for granting moratorium under section 8(2A) of the Act. Even before issuance of eligibility certificate, the petitioner sold out his unit to M/s. Quality Synthetic Industries Limited vide sale deed dated March 1, 2001. It is said that information of sale was conveyed to the Trade Tax, Commissioner, Sikandarabad vide petitioner's letter dated March 24, 2001 (annexure 4 to the writ petition). The eligibility certificate was also surrendered along with the said letter with the request of cancellation thereof. The petitioner's successor - company, namely, M/s. Quality Synthetic Industries Limited submitted an application dated January 2, 2002 in the office of the Additional Director, Directorate of Industries, Meerut claiming exemption under section 4A(2)(b) of the Act in place of the petitioner. It also filed an affidavit of the Director of the successor - company that it undertake the responsibility of repayment of deferred amount of trade tax under section 8(2A) of the Act for the period when the unit was owned by the petitioner and for subsequent period when the successor would have continued to operate the same. The said application is said to have been referred to the Secretary, Tax and Registration, U.P., for favourable consideration vide the Executive Director, Udyog Bandhu, U.P.'s letter dated April 6, 2002. In the meantime, the Commissioner, Trade Tax, vide letter dated June 19, 2002 (impugned in this writ petition) has rejected the petitioner's application submitted under section 8(2A) of the Act and has required him to pay the entire trade tax for the period up to February 28, 2001. The learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently contended that the petitioner was admittedly found eligible for exemption under section 4A of the Act. That being so, section 8(2A) of the Act provides for moratorium in lieu of exemption under section 4A. Therefore, no condition which was not available for claiming exemption/concession under section 4A of the Act could have been imposed under section 8(2A) of the Act and such a condition, if imposed, would be ultra vires of the spirit and objective of section 4A read with section 8(2A) of the Act. Therefore, no condition which was not available for claiming exemption/concession under section 4A of the Act could have been imposed under section 8(2A) of the Act and such a condition, if imposed, would be ultra vires of the spirit and objective of section 4A read with section 8(2A) of the Act. It is further contended that under section 4A(2)(b) of the Act, the successor - manufacturer can apply for exemption for the balance period and if that is so, then the same benefit must be available for granting moratorium under section 8(2A) of the Act and, therefore, rule 43(4)(a) which provides that on discontinuance of the business by the manufacturer he would be entitled to pay the entire tax in lump sum is contrary to the spirit and object set out under section 4A of the Act. Reliance is placed on a Division Bench decision of this court in Jagat Machinery Manufacturers Private Limited, Ghaziabad v. State of Uttar Pradesh [1987] UPTC 1358 and a single judge decision in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. General Engineering Corporation [1986] UPTC 305. He lastly contended that in respect to the transfer of erstwhile U.P. Cement Corporation, a similar moratorium benefit has been allowed by the State Government and, therefore, denial thereof to the successor of the petitioner's unit is arbitrary and discriminatory. S. P. Kesarwani, on the contrary, submitted that the scope of section 8(2A) is different and, therefore, the conditions set out for granting moratorium under section 8(2A) vide rule 43 are within the legislative competence of the rule framing authority. None of the provision thereof can be said to be inconsistent or contrary to any of the provision of the Act. He further contended that neither of the judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner are applicable in the present case nor he has any locus standi to hold the brief of a successor, namely, Quality Synthetic Industries Limited for claiming moratorium after sale of the unit to the petitioner. First of all, we propose to consider the question as to whether rule 43 of the Rules can be said to be ultra vires of any provision of the Act. First of all, we propose to consider the question as to whether rule 43 of the Rules can be said to be ultra vires of any provision of the Act. The three provisions, which have been referred to and relied repeatedly by the learned counsel for the parties, namely, section 4A, section 8(2A) of the Act and rule 43 of the Rules, it would be appropriate to reproduce as under : "4A. Exemption from trade tax in certain cases. - (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other provisions except the provisions of section 3H of this Act, where the State Government is of the opinion that it is necessary so to do for increasing the production of any goods or for promoting the development of any industry in the State generally or any district or parts of district in particular, it may on application or otherwise, in any particular case or generally by notification, declare that the turnover of sales in respect of such goods by the manufacturer thereof shall, during such period not exceeding fifteen years from such date on or after the date of starting production as may be specified by the State Government in such, notification, which may be the date of the notification or a date prior or subsequent to the date of such notification, and where no date is so specified from the date of first sale by such manufacturer, if such sale takes place within six months from the date of starting production, and in any other case from the date following the expiration of six months from the date of starting production, and subject to such conditions as may be specified, be exempt from trade tax on sale of goods whether wholly or partly or be liable to tax at such reduced rate as it may fix : Provided that in respect of goods manufactured in a new unit having a fixed capital investment of five crore rupees or more or in an existing unit which may make fixed capital investment of five crore rupees or more in expansion, diversification, modernisation and backward integration or in any one of them, within such period not exceeding five years, as may be specified in the notification, the exemption from or reduction in the rate of tax may be granted. (2) It shall be lawful for the State Government to specify in the notification under sub-section (1) that the exemption from, or reduction in the rate of tax, shall be admissible - (a) generally in respect of all such goods manufactured subsequent to the date of such notification; or (b) in respect of such of those goods only as are manufactured in a new unit, the date of starting production whereof falls on or after the first day of October, 1982; or (bb) in respect of those finished goods which are manufactured in a unit which has undertaken backward integration; or .... (c) in respect of those goods only which are manufactured in a unit which has undertaken expansion, diversification or modernisation on or after April 1, 1990, and which, in the case of diversification, are different from the goods manufactured before such diversification, and in the case of expansion or modernisation are additional production as a result of such expansion or modernisation; and (d) only if the manufacturer furnishes to the assessing authority an eligibility certificate granted by such officer, in accordance with such procedure, as may be specified; (e) with effect from a date prior of the date of the notification. (2A) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in sub-section (2) or any notification issued in pursuance thereof, the State Government may grant exemption, under this section, to a new unit which has obtained power connection, if it has, after the date of starting production and before the twenty-ninth day of January, 1985, consumed at least 25 per cent of the total sanctioned electricity load in the manufacture of goods as distinct from the consumption in connection with the establishment of the factory or workshop. (2B) If there is discontinuation of business, within the meaning of sub-section (1) of section 18 of the manufacturer who was eligible for exemption from or reduction in the rate of tax under sub-section (1), whether such exemption from or reduction in rate of tax was already granted or not, and if he is succeeded by another manufacturer, by means of sale, licence, contract, lease, managing agency or in any other manner such successor - manufacturer may, subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), apply to the officer competent to grant eligibility certificate under clause (d) of sub-section (2), within sixty days of such succession, for the grant, under this section, of exemption from or reduction in rate of tax for the unexpired portion of the period for which exemption from or reduction in the rate of tax was or could be granted to the former manufacturer : Provided that the aforesaid officer may, in its discretion and for adequate and sufficient reasons to be recorded in writing, entertain an application moved within six months of the date of the expiration of the period specified in this sub-section : Provided further that such manufacturer and successor - manufacturer for the purpose of liability of tax shall be treated as the transferror and the transferee under section 3C : Provided also that in computing the unexpired portion of the period, the period during which the production of successor - manufacturer remains closed on account of an order passed by any court or Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction or Appellate Authority for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction shall be excluded. (3) Where the Commissioner is of the opinion that the facility of exemption from, or reduction in the rate of tax obtained on the basis of an eligibility certificate referred to in clause (d) of sub-section (2) or on the basis of any eligibility certificate issued under any executive orders of the Government issued before or after September 13, 1985 has been misused in any manner whatsoever or there is any legal or factual error in issuing such eligibility certificate or that the new unit has committed breach of any of the conditions, subject to which the facility of exemption from, or reduction in the rate of tax was granted or that the new unit to which the eligibility certificate has been granted in accordance with the provisions of this Act, is not entitled to facility under this section or is entitled to such facility for a lesser period or from a different date, he may, by order in writing passed before or after the expiration of the period of exemption or reduction, cancel or amend the eligibility certificate from a date specified in the order and such date may be prior to the date of such order, so however, that in cases of misuse or breach, the cancellation of eligibility certificate shall have effect not before the date of such misuse of breach : Provided that no order under this sub-section shall be passed without giving the dealer a reasonable opportunity of being heard. (4) For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that where an eligibility certificate has been cancelled or amended under sub-section (3), the dealer shall be liable to pay tax on his turnover of the period during which the facility of exemption or reduction under this section is not admissible to him. (4) For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that where an eligibility certificate has been cancelled or amended under sub-section (3), the dealer shall be liable to pay tax on his turnover of the period during which the facility of exemption or reduction under this section is not admissible to him. (5) A manufacturer shall be entitled to the facility of exemption from, or reduction in the rate of tax, notified under sub-section (1), - (a) if he applies for such facility within six months from the relevant date of commencement of the period of facility referred to in that sub-section or within six months from the date of notification issued under that sub-section or by September 30, 1992, whichever, expires later, for the entire period notified under that sub-section; (b) if he applies for such facility later than the date specified in clause (a) only for part of the period notified under sub-section (1), which shall be computed from the date of the application and not from the relevant date of commencement of the period of facility referred to in sub-section (1) till the end of the period of facility; (c) in relation to a new unit referred to in Explanation (1), where the conditions specified in clauses (a) to (d) of the said Explanation (1) are fulfilled on a date later than the date of commencement of the period of facility notified under sub-section (1), then subject to the provisions of clause (b), only for part of the period, notified under sub-section (1), which shall be computed from the date on which all the conditions referred to in the said clauses (a) to (d), have been fulfilled or 20th July, 1992 whichever is later, till the end of the period of such facility, so however, that a manufacturer who was eligible for such facility under clause (c) as it stood prior to 20th July, 1992 and had applied for the facility prior to the said date, shall be entitled to the facility in accordance with the said clause (c); (d) in relation to a new unit manufacturing same goods established on or adjacent to the site of an existing factory or workshop by a person who has interest in the existing factory or workshop as proprietor or partner or agent or managing director or promoter director or as holding company or subsidiary company if the production of the existing factory or workshop is not less than the base production : Provided that if the production of the existing factory or workshop falls short of the base production the turnover of sale of the new unit to the extent of the quantity covered by such short fall from base production shall be liable to tax. ... 8. Payment and recovery of tax. - (1) ... (2A) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sections (1), (1A), (1B), (1C) or (2), the Commissioner may, on the application of a manufacturer within such time and in such manner as may be prescribed grant in lieu of exemption, under section 4A, moratorium for payment of the admitted tax subject to such conditions as may be prescribed. The Commissioner may withdraw any such moratorium in the circumstances in which it could have withdrawn the exemption under section 4A, but no such withdrawal shall be made with retrospective effect : Provided that on and after the commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Trade Tax (Amendment) Act, 1997 the Commissioner may on the application of a manufacturer having a small-scale industry, the date of starting production of which falls on or after April 1, 1990, grant in a lieu of exemption under section 4A, moratorium for payment of the admitted tax and the provision of rule 43 of the Uttar Pradesh Trade Tax Rules, 1948 as amended by the Uttar Pradesh Trade Tax (Second Amendment) Rules, 1993 shall apply for granting such moratorium." "Rule 43. Conditions for grant of moratorium under section 8(2A). - The Commissioner, on application of a manufacturer may, in lieu of exemption under section 4A grant moratorium for payment of tax admittedly payable by such manufacturer on sale of goods manufactured by him beyond the period prescribed in rule 41 subject to the following conditions, namely : (1) the facility shall be available only to the manufacturer who is registered under the Act and has been granted an eligibility certificate under section 4A and has filed the returns of his turnover as per Rules; (2) the facility shall be available, - (a) only for the period for which exemption from or reduction in rate of tax is admissible according to eligibility certificate issued under section 4A of the Act; (b) for the amount up to which exemption from or reduction in rate of tax is admissible according to the eligibility certificate plus fifty per cent of the fixed capital investment mentioned in the eligibility certificate. (3) the moratorium for payment of tax admittedly payable for each of the assessment years may be granted for a period of five years the computation of which shall be done from the last date for furnishing the last return according to sub-rule (1), (2) or (3) of rule 41 for the assessment year concerned. The amount of tax admittedly payable for each assessment year shall be paid by the manufacturer in a lump sum within one month of the expiry of the period of moratorium; (4) the moratorium shall cease and the total amount of the tax admittedly payable shall become payable - (a) on the date of discontinuance of business where the manufacturer discontinues business, within the meaning of sub-section (1) of section 18 of the Act; (b) on the date on which the unit becomes ineligible for exemption under section 4A, and the amount shall be paid in lump sum within three months of its so becoming payable. (5) the facility shall not be admissible in respect of the amount of tax assessed in excess of the tax admittedly payable by the manufacturer on the turnover admitted by him in the returns filed or in any proceeding under the Act, whichever is greater, whether the excess tax so assessed is due to detection of any evasion of tax made, or disallowance of any exemption claimed, by such manufacturer or for any other reason, and the amount of tax so assessed in excess shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules. (6) the facility shall be available to the manufacturer on creating first or second charge on its property in favour of the State Government, sufficient to cover the amount of tax in respect of which moratorium has been granted. (7) if the amount in respect of which moratorium has been granted is not paid within the period specified in clause (3) or (4), as the case may be, the manufacturer shall, in addition to any penalty which the assessing authority may deem fit to impose under section 15A be liable to pay interest in accordance with sub-section (1) of section 8 for the entire period during which the amount remained deferred and subsequently till the time of its payment. (8) A manufacturer who has availed of the facility of exemption from or reduction in the rate of tax whether wholly or in part under section 4A shall not be entitled to the grant of moratorium." A perusal of section 4A of the Act shows that the Government by notification may provide for exemption/concession in respect of tax under the Act to certain class of dealers/who fulfil the requirement prescribed thereunder. In respect to such category of dealers, who are given or found eligible for tax concession under section 4A, another mode of tax concession is provided under section 8(2A) when such dealer opts that in lieu of exemption/concession in the tax under section 4A, he may be allowed deferment of tax for certain period as prescribed and, thereafter, such dealer would be liable to pay the entire tax for the entire period in such manner as prescribed. The application of section 8(2A) is, thus, obviously distinct and operates in a different field. It cannot be controlled in its entirety or in any manner as suggested and argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner, by section 4A of the Act for the reason that the deferment of tax provided under section 8(2A) is governed by the provisions made thereunder and is not subject to the provision of section 4A of the Act. For attracting section 8(2A), obviously only dealer entitled for exemption/concession under section 4A is necessary, but thereafter the conditions whereupon such deferment under section 8(2A) can be granted must also exist. They cannot be controlled and governed by section 4A. Section 8(2A) clearly provides that the deferment of tax would be subject to such conditions, as may be prescribed. The applicability of section 4A with respect to section 8(2A) is only at the entry point, namely, whether the person, who is exercising option, is eligible to opt or not and not beyond that. Once he is eligible to opt for deferment of tax under section 8(2A), thereafter what conditions he will have to follow and would be abide by are not governed by section 4A. The same, on the contrary, is within the authority of delegated legislation to provide in exercise of powers under section 8(2A) independently. It is not the case of the petitioner that the conditions provided under rule 43(4)(a) are inconsistent or ultra vires of any provision of the Act as such. The same, on the contrary, is within the authority of delegated legislation to provide in exercise of powers under section 8(2A) independently. It is not the case of the petitioner that the conditions provided under rule 43(4)(a) are inconsistent or ultra vires of any provision of the Act as such. On the contrary, what he submits is that the spirit of the provision, with which a dealer is given exemption/concession under section 4A, that is violated by the conditions prescribed under rule 43(4)(a) of the Rules. We are afraid that this cannot be a reason to strike down an otherwise valid piece of delegated legislation, which has been made in exercise of statutory powers by competent authority. Such a vague concept of spirit of a provision will not be available to test the validity of statute. No doubt, it is true that a rule (delegated legislation) must be consistent with the provision of the Act (parent legislation) and if it is not so, it would be ultra vires of the Act. However, it does not mean that in order to judge the validity of a delegated legislation, the court can embark upon such aspects of the principle legislation, which are not expressly legislative but in the words of the petitioners it is spirit of the parent legislation, i.e., the inference and conjecture of the individual. Such vague allegations cannot be a basis to challenge a subordinate legislation. It is well-settled that rules made on matters permitted by the Act in order to supplement the Act and not to supplant the Act cannot be made in violation of the Act. Like substantive law, a delegated legislation also raises a presumption of constitutionality as well as statutory validity unless shown otherwise. Attempt is made for upholding the same unless it cannot be read harmoniously with the provisions of the Act. In Bombay Dyeing & Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Bombay Environmental Action Group [2006] 3 SCC 434 in para 214 of the judgment the court observed : "A substantive law as also delegated legislation raises a presumption of constitutionality. Attempt is made for upholding the same unless it cannot be read harmoniously with the provisions of the Act. In Bombay Dyeing & Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Bombay Environmental Action Group [2006] 3 SCC 434 in para 214 of the judgment the court observed : "A substantive law as also delegated legislation raises a presumption of constitutionality. ..." In Kerala Samsthana Chethu Thozhilali Union v. State of Kerala [2006] 4 SCC 327, the apex court quoted with approval the following passage from the G. P. Singh's "Principles of Statutory Interpretation", 10th Ed., Page 916 : "Grounds for Judicial review : Delegated legislation is open to the scrutiny of courts and may be declared invalid particularly on two grounds : (a) Violation of the Constitution; and (b) Violation of the enabling Act. The second ground includes within itself not only cases of violation of the substantive provisions of the enabling Act, but also cases of violation of the mandatory procedure prescribed. It may also be challenged on the ground that it cannot be said to be in conformity with the statute or article 14 of the Constitution or that it has been exercised in bad faith. The limitations which apply to the exercise of administrative or quasi-judicial power conferred by a statute except the requirement of natural justice also apply to the exercise of power of delegated legislation. Rules made under the Constitution do not qualify as legislation in true sense and are treated as subordinate legislation and can be challenged in judicial review like delegated legislation. Compliance with the laying requirement or even approval by a resolution of Parliament does not confer any immunity to the delegated legislation but it may be a circumstance to be taken into account along with other factors to uphold its validity although as earlier seen a laying clause may prevent the enabling Act being declared invalid for excessive delegation." The same has also been quoted with approval in Vasu Dev Singh v. Union of India [2006] 12 SCC 753. As we have already discussed above, the learned counsel for the petitioner could not show that rule 43(4)(a) of the Rules, in any manner, as such, is inconsistent to any provision of the Act. As we have already discussed above, the learned counsel for the petitioner could not show that rule 43(4)(a) of the Rules, in any manner, as such, is inconsistent to any provision of the Act. Even otherwise, we find that the entire edifice of the argument that it is contrary to the spirit of the policy of exemption allowed under section 4A has no legs to stand and on closure scrutiny we find that even this argument is without any substance. When an unit is allowed exemption/concession, under section 4A subject to the conditions prescribed thereunder the exemption/concession goes with the time without any future liability of payment of tax to the State and, therefore, nothing is to be said with respect to the future conditions or circumstances, in which the tax is to be collected for the period the incumbent was availing of the exemption/concession. However, when he opts for deferment of tax in lieu of exemption/concession in the rates of the tax, the person concerned enters into a contract with the State agreeing to pay tax at some later point of time and that is an agreement between the parties, namely, the State and person concerned. Such agreement, obviously, would be binding upon the parties, who have executed the agreement and if, there is any change in the parties, the agreement would not bind the successor and is liable to come to an end at that stage itself. It is always open to either of the parties to the agreement to provide that in case there is any substantive change in the ownership of the unit concerned, which has entered into the agreement, the option of deferment of tax would seize then on and the optee has to pay the entire tax. Such condition, by no manner of imagination, goes inconsistent or contrary to the policy of exemption/concession of tax under section 4A. Therefore, we are not impressed by the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that rule 43(4)(a) is against the spirit of the exemption/concession granted under section 4A and, therefore, is liable to be struck down. Such condition, by no manner of imagination, goes inconsistent or contrary to the policy of exemption/concession of tax under section 4A. Therefore, we are not impressed by the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that rule 43(4)(a) is against the spirit of the exemption/concession granted under section 4A and, therefore, is liable to be struck down. Coming to the last log of the argument that some concession has been allowed with respect to continuance of deferment of tax on change of parties to one dealer and, therefore, the same benefit must be allowed to the petitioner also, we are afraid that contrary to what is provided in the statute and rule 43, this court cannot issue a mandamus to the respondents to act in breach of the statutory provisions. It is well established that two wrongs will not make one right and in any case, in the presence of rule 43(4)(a) of the Act, which is admittedly applicable to the case in hand, we are not inclined to hold that the petitioner is entitled for issuance of mandamus directing the respondents to dispense with the requirement of rule 43(4)(a) of the Rules upon the petitioner as that would amount to make a statutory provision by judicial order inapplicable upon the petitioner, though otherwise, by operation of law, it is applicable, binding and cannot be dispensed with. In view thereof, we do not find any error in the order dated September 16, 2002, impugned in this writ petition, passed by respondent No. 1. The petitioner, in our view, thus, is not entitled for any relief as sought in this writ petition. The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed without there being any order as to costs.