JUDGMENT : Pradeep Kant, Narayan Shukla, JJ. The present writ petition has been filed challenging the orders passed by the Lucknow Development Authority, Lucknow dated 7.12.2007, cancelling the sanctioned building plans of the Petitioner Company, which was issued on 5.5.2005, unilaterally, i.e., without affording any opportunity of any explanation or hearing, and also the order dated 6.12.2007, was passed by the Vice Chairman, Lucknow Development Authority, in compliance of which the order dated 7.12.2007 has been passed by the Lucknow Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as the L.D.A.). The order dated 6.12.2007, passed by the Vice Chairman, L.D.A. is not made available to the Petitioners, therefore, a prayer has been made for quashing of the same after summoning from the L.D.A. 2. The aforesaid orders have been challenged mainly on the ground that they are factually incorrect and have been passed grossly in violation of principles of natural justice and also against the terms and conditions of the sanction granted by the L.D.A., that too at the time when the conditions imposed regarding deposit of certain amount within stipulated time already stood fulfilled, as the said amount was deposited though late, but was duly accepted by the L.D.A. and, therefore, the impugned orders are based on non-existent facts and are a result of irrelevant considerations and suffer from arbitrariness, which is hit by Wednesbury's principles. 3. Another order dated 7.12.2007 is also under challenge, by means of which the premises of the Petitioners was directed to be sealed, which, in fact, was sealed also. 4. By means of an interim order, the interest of the Petitioners was protected to the extent that the Respondents were restrained from taking any action against the Petitioners on the basis of the impugned orders and the egress and ingress of the persons, who were living in the flats constructed and sold by the Petitioners, were directed not to be disturbed by the Respondents. 5. It would be apposite to mention here that though the impugned orders dated 7.12.2007. which refer to the order of the Vice Chairman, L.D.A. dated 6.12.2007, only says that building plan has been cancelled by the L.D.A. because of the non-deposit of the amount of Rs. 5. It would be apposite to mention here that though the impugned orders dated 7.12.2007. which refer to the order of the Vice Chairman, L.D.A. dated 6.12.2007, only says that building plan has been cancelled by the L.D.A. because of the non-deposit of the amount of Rs. 1 crores and 30 lakhs within the time prescribed which was a condition appended with the sanction of building plans, subject to the aforesaid deposit being made within a given time, but while defending the aforesaid orders, learned Chief Standing Counsel, Sri D. K. Upadhyaya, who appeared for the State as well as for the L.D.A., made an attempt to justify the aforesaid orders on the grounds, other than those mentioned in the impugned order, which we will discuss later on, though a specific objection has been raised by the learned Counsel for the Petitioners Sri Prashant Chandra, senior advocate, that the orders impugned cannot be protected by giving reasons which were not taken into consideration at the time of passing of the order and in any case, which do not find mention in the order, particularly when the order itself gives a particular reason for cancellation of the building plans. 6. Submission is that the orders can neither be improved nor can be read in any other way, as against the reasons which find mention in the order. 7. The impugned orders give a specific reason for cancellation of the building plans, namely, that the Petitioners have not complied with condition No. 8 of depositing the amount of Rs. 1.30 crores within time and, therefore, the building plans have been cancelled. 8. The sanction of building plan of the Petitioners by the L.D.A. for multi complex building having more than 600 flats, in fact a complete township and their litigation with the State Government at different stages right from 1980's is a chequered history, yet it is significant for deciding the controversy involved. 9. The Petitioner No. 1 is a company, registered under the Companies Act, 1956 having its registered office at Poora Imam Bux, Nishatganj, Lucknow. 9. The Petitioner No. 1 is a company, registered under the Companies Act, 1956 having its registered office at Poora Imam Bux, Nishatganj, Lucknow. It was granted a lease for building purposes by the Respondents in respect of a nazul land, measuring 72 bighas, 10 biswa, 11 biswansi, 18 kachwansi, situate at Poora Imam Baksh, Mohalla Hasanganj Par in the municipality of Lucknow for an aggregate term of 90 years on predefined and predetermined fixed terms and conditions elaborated in the lease deed dated 5.4.1944. The said lease came into force with effect from 1st April, 1942, which was initially for a period of 30 years, renewable twice for a period of 30 years each, thus, making it a lease of 90 years in aggregate, on the condition that the lessee shall pay an enhanced premium of 50% of the annual rent. 10. The lease deed was duly registered and it came into force with effect from 1st April, 1942. The Petitioners, after expiry of initial period of 30 years which came to an end some time in the year 1972, appear to have requested for renewal of the lease and for that matter they had deposited the enhanced premium of the annual rent and likewise they had deposited the further amount towards premium of enhanced rent on or before the expiry of the period of the span of second 30 years. In fact, it is admitted to the Respondents also that the requisite premium has already been deposited for the period upto the year 2032. The terms and conditions of the lease deed find mention in the lease deed dated 12.8.1944. 11. The Respondents plead that the lease deed was not for a period of 90 years but it was for a period of 30 years, which of course, was renewable after the expiry of the period of 30 years each, for two times but since the lease has never been renewed by the State Government as no lease deed has been executed or registered, therefore, merely on deposit of enhanced premium in terms of the lease deed, would not mean that the Petitioners remained the lawful occupants of the leased premises and, therefore, they were not entitled to get the building plans sanctioned for want of their title over the land. 12. 12. An argument has also been raised that since the Petitioners could not be accepted as the owners of the land, having title, therefore, a condition was affixed for payment of Rs. 1.30 crores within 20 days, while sanctioning the building plans, so that the land may be converted into free hold land so as to confer, or to say, perfect the rights of the Petitioners over the land in question, while allowing them to construct and raise the multi complex but having not deposited the amount within time, they lost their rights, if any, over the land in question and, therefore, the building plans had to be cancelled. 13. There is no denial of the fact from the Respondents that while cancelling the building plans after nearly three years from the date of its sanction and when considerable construction with respect to hundreds of flats has already been made, out of which many had already been transferred and sold to various persons, no opportunity of hearing or affording time for giving any explanation was given to the Petitioners. Admittedly, the building plans have been cancelled and the sealing orders were passed without affording any opportunity to the Petitioners and without giving any hearing before taking such an action. The cancellation orders have been passed in purported exercise of powers u/s 15 of the U. P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973 and the sealing orders have been passed u/s 28A of the Act. The orders, therefore, suffer from the vice of violation of principles of natural justice and are liable to be quashed on this ground alone. 14. The alternative plea of the Respondents, which though does not form the basis of order of cancellation, that the Petitioners' lease having not been renewed, they were not entitled to get the building plans sanctioned, nor were entitled to raise any constructions, requires us to have a look on the contents and tenor of the lease deed and on the circumstances, which led the Petitioners to undertake the development projects and the manner and circumstances, in which the building plans were sanctioned. 15. 15. It is on record and which facts are not disputed by the Respondents that the Petitioners for the purpose of their business had taken financial assistance in the past from the U. P. Financial Corporation but defaulted in repayment of the said loan amount, as a result of which the Company had to face closure. This happened some time before the year 1980. The recovery proceedings thus, were initiated against the Petitioner Company in the year 1979, against which the Company filed Writ Petition No. 2348 of 1979, wherein by virtue of order dated 22.10.1980, subsequently modified on 12.12.1980, the Petitioners were permitted to make a scheme for development of their land and the dues of the U. P. Financial Corporation were to be cleared from the sale proceeds realised by them. After protracted negotiations with U. P. Financial Corporation and after getting approval from it, the Company submitted a development plan to the L.D.A. for its sanction. The matter regarding sanction of the building plan remained pending for almost five years and finally on 28.8.1985, the Chief Engineer, L.D.A. pointed out certain minor objections in the sanction of the plan. The Petitioners removed the objections and submitted revised building plans on 1.7.1985. Certain technical objections were again removed by the Petitioners and a corrected plan was submitted on 29.8.1985. The aforesaid plans remained pending as the L.D.A. did not take any decision for a considerable period but on 28.3.1987, it informed the Petitioner Company that the lay out plan of the Petitioners could not be sanctioned since the land had been notified for acquisition under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. 16. The Petitioners thereupon challenged the acquisition of their land by filing Writ Petition No. 6363 of 1986 in the High Court, wherein an interim order was passed on 11.9.1986 staying the dispossession of the Petitioners from their land. However, since no award was pronounced in respect of the land of the Petitioners for the reason that the L.D.A. could not make the funds available to the State Government for carrying out the acquisition, finally on 17.10.1989, the Collector, Lucknow wrote to the L.D.A. that the acquisition proceedings stood lapsed and no further proceedings were pending with respect to acquisition at that time. 17. 17. Ultimately, in exercise of powers u/s 48 of the Land Acquisition Act, the land of the Petitioners was withdrawn from acquisition on 30.6.1993. The Petitioner Company was, however, required by the L.D.A. to give an affidavit that it would not claim any damages or compensation against the L.D.A. after the withdrawal of its land from acquisition. 18. It may be taken note of, that if the State Government was of the view that the Petitioners are not the lessees of the land, after the expiry of initial 30 years of lease for want of a renewed lease deed, or they were not the lawful occupants of the land, there could have been no occasion for the State Government to issue notification for acquisition, it being their own land. The aforesaid facts establish beyond doubt that the State treated the Petitioners as the lessee and rightful and lawful occupants of the land leased. 19. After the withdrawal of the land from acquisition and the objections as pointed by the Chief Town and Country Planner having been removed by submitting a final corrected plan, there remained probably no reason for not sanctioning the plan but the building plans were not considered for sanction, therefore, the Petitioners filed further two writ petitions bearing numbers 3484 of 1986 and 6363 of 1986, which were decided by a common judgment dated 29.9.1993 directing the Respondents to consider and take appropriate decision for according sanction to the building plans within one month from the date of production of the certified copy of the judgment. It was left open to the Petitioners to submit a revised plan, if necessary, or required by the Respondents and in that contingency, the Respondents were directed to consider the matter regarding sanction of the revised plan and decide the same in accordance with the law within two months from the date of submission of the revised plan. 20. The said judgment also mentioned that there was no hurdle in the way of the L.D.A. for considering the application of the Petitioners and passing orders thereon. 20. The said judgment also mentioned that there was no hurdle in the way of the L.D.A. for considering the application of the Petitioners and passing orders thereon. Since the building plans of the Petitioners, which had been submitted earlier, required some modifications due to passage of time after the judgment of this Court dated 29.9.1993, the Petitioners submitted the revised building plans on 14.10.1993 to the L.D.A. The Petitioners by means of letter dated 15.10.1993 also informed the L.D.A. about the 'no objection certificate' in respect of the department, acquisition, nazul etc. which were on record. Some objections however, were again raised by the Technical Committee, L.D.A. and on 1.11.1993, the Petitioners again submitted revised plans after removing all the objections. 21. Despite the aforesaid directions being issued by the High Court and objections being removed by the Petitioners and revised building plans having been submitted time and again, the building plans were not being released, therefore, the Petitioners had to file one more writ petition bearing number 1527 (M/B) of 1996, which was finally decided by the Court on 14.12.1999, when the Respondents were directed to release the building plans of the Petitioners. The building plans were thus, released after the aforesaid mandamus was issued by the High Court, vide permit No. 7221 dated 8.1.2002 valid till 7.1.2007 for 22 towers, 660 flats with 563 car parking and other allied infrastructure. The Petitioner company developed part of the project and thereafter in the year 2003 in order to develop and promote the balance sanctioned work over the land in question, entered into a builders agreement dated 20.6.2003 with M/s. Arif Industries Limited. 22. Though the Petitioners were having a sanctioned plan for 22 towers, 660 flats with 563 car parking but in view of the certain directions issued by the State Government in general with respect to multi complexes, for providing certain safety measures against fire etc., the Petitioners reduced the construction of flats marginally but then it required a revised building plan to be submitted, which was duly submitted and sanctioned by the L.D.A. on 8.4.2005 and released on 5.5.2005. It is this sanction of the building plans which is in question. 23. The condition of deposit of Rs. It is this sanction of the building plans which is in question. 23. The condition of deposit of Rs. 1.30 crores was appended, to this revised building plan, though the original building plan was duly sanctioned, that too without putting any condition nor the lease rights of the Petitioners came in the way of the L.D.A., while sanctioning the original plans, which were also sanctioned much after the expiry of initial 30 years of lease. 24. In fact, the revised building plans were sanctioned on 8.4.2005, without any condition of getting the leased property being converted into free hold, may be, because of the fact, that at that point of time, the Free Hold Policy of the State Government was in abeyance. The ban was lifted on 19.4.2005 and the Petitioners deposited, of their own, a sum of Rs. 90,00,000 only for conversion of leased property into free hold. As a matter of fact, before releasing the sanctioned building plans on 5.5.2005, the Petitioners were required on 3.5.2005 to undertake that they will deposit an amount of Rs. 1.30 crores within 20 days for conversion, failing which the plan will be cancelled. 25. It is the case of the Petitioners, which also finds strength from the defence of the Respondents, that the Company was required to get its property converted into free hold and for that purpose, the L.D.A. required the Petitioners to give an undertaking for depositing the requisite fee towards conversion charges. The Petitioners though were of the view that the insistence on the part of the L.D.A. to compel the Petitioners for converting the leased land into free hold was unreasonable and arbitrary but the Company acceded to the same as the project was being unduly delayed and further delay would have been detrimental to the Petitioners' interest. Consequently, an application was made on 28.4.2005 for the purpose together with a payment of Rs. 90 lakhs being 25% of the charges for converting lease hold right to free hold rights which according to their own assessment was 25% of the estimated cost. The policy, as it then existed, with respect to the conversion aforesaid, was contained in Government order dated 1.12.1998 and the terms of the said Government order were duly complied with. 90 lakhs being 25% of the charges for converting lease hold right to free hold rights which according to their own assessment was 25% of the estimated cost. The policy, as it then existed, with respect to the conversion aforesaid, was contained in Government order dated 1.12.1998 and the terms of the said Government order were duly complied with. The L.D.A. before permitting the Petitioners to commence the constructions by releasing/issuing the sanctioned plans, required them to submit an undertaking that the Petitioners shall get the land converted into free hold, as was required by the letter dated 3.5.2005, issued by the L.D.A. 26. The Petitioners submitted the undertaking on 3.5.2005 saying that the lease of the subject part of the land on which the group housing plans are sanctioned is valid till 2032. The Petitioners applied for conversion of the subject part of the lease hold for conversion into free hold by submitting the necessary application alongwith the self assessment amount of Rs. 90,00,000 (Rupees ninety lacs only) on 29.4.2005 towards the initial amount of 25%. 27. It further said that through letter No. 16/NS dated 3.5.2005 of the Special Nazool Officer, it is intimated that an amount of Rs. 1,30,40,265.43ps is additionally to be deposited towards the balance of 25% for considering the free hold application and for issuing the required N.O.C. and the Petitioners undertake to deposit the required amount calculated as per the norms within the allowed time of 20 days. The undertaking further said that 'the deponent further undertakes to abide by the lawful decisions of the Government and to deposit the balance of 75% amount of free hold charges on receiving the demand note within the framework of the Nazool Policy and the relevant Government orders' and that he further undertakes to deposit the difference of amount mentioned therein, i.e., Rs. 1.30 crores and odd within the allowed time, failing which the Petitioners will have no objection if the sanctioned plans are recalled as per law. 28. Here it is pertinent to emphasize that this is the undertaking, which is said to have been violated, for which the building plans have been cancelled. 1.30 crores and odd within the allowed time, failing which the Petitioners will have no objection if the sanctioned plans are recalled as per law. 28. Here it is pertinent to emphasize that this is the undertaking, which is said to have been violated, for which the building plans have been cancelled. As a consequence of the aforesaid undertaking being given by the Petitioners, a letter dated 4.5.2005 was served upon the Petitioners indicating therein that as per the value of the land as per the estimation of the L.D.A., the Petitioners were to make further deposit of Rs. 1.30 crores, failing which the building plans will be cancelled. It was thereafter that the building plans were released on 5.5.2005 with certain conditions appended thereto, including the one of the aforesaid undertaking. 29. Since the Petitioners could not arrange for the money, it being a considerably big amount, they prayed for extension of time and an extension of three months were granted to the Petitioners. On 4.8.2005 the Petitioners made an application indicating that total area sought to be converted into free hold was only 50435.39 sq. metres and as such a sum of Rs. 86,32,213 was required to be deposited at that stage, with a request to accept the same in terms of the undertaking given by the Petitioners. The deposit of Rs. 86,32,213 was made vide treasury challan on 4.8.2005, but the Respondents who did not cancel the building plans at that time probably because the condition imposed by them was not sufficient to cancel the building plans, all of a sudden on the same very ground of violation of deposit of Rs. 1.30 crores within the time prescribed, cancelled the same vide order dated 7.12.2007. 30. The Petitioners started their construction activities on the sanction of the building plans and no objection was raised by the L.D.A. or the State Government at any point of time in carrying out their construction activities. 31. 1.30 crores within the time prescribed, cancelled the same vide order dated 7.12.2007. 30. The Petitioners started their construction activities on the sanction of the building plans and no objection was raised by the L.D.A. or the State Government at any point of time in carrying out their construction activities. 31. It appears that though the construction activities of the Petitioners were not objected to and rightly so, as there was no restriction imposed in the sanction order of the building plans that unless the property is converted into free hold, they shall not be allowed to raise construction, the Petitioners continued with the constructions and in the meantime they enquired from the Respondents as to what is the amount, which is required to be deposited by them, if there is any shortfall in the amount deposited. No reply came from the Respondents but the Petitioners of their own deposited a further sum of Rs. 50 lakhs on 7.9.2007, which according to them was much more than the amount to be deposited at the initial stage. A prayer was also made to issue a demand note and completing the free hold process. 32. It is also to be taken note of, that once 25% amount is deposited, the State has to issue a demand note for the balance amount needed for conversion into free hold giving three months time and in case the balance amount is deposited within three months, the applicant is entitled to certain rebate but no such demand note has ever been issued to the Petitioners till date. 33. The Petitioners were also not informed at any point of time the exact amount which they should have deposited towards 25% of the amount for processing the application for conversion into free hold. The Petitioners in all had deposited Rs. 2,26,32,213 as indicated. It is evident and admitted that initially the Petitioners deposited an amount of Rs. 90 lakhs on 29.4.2005. Rs. 86 lakhs and odd on 3.8.2005 and an amount of Rs. 50 lakhs on 7.9.2007. In the undertaking given by them, they were required to deposit an amount of Rs. 1.30 crores in addition to Rs. 90 lakhs, which they had deposited earlier, of course, within a period of 20 days from the date of release of sanctioned plan but they deposited much more than the aforesaid amount, though belatedly. 50 lakhs on 7.9.2007. In the undertaking given by them, they were required to deposit an amount of Rs. 1.30 crores in addition to Rs. 90 lakhs, which they had deposited earlier, of course, within a period of 20 days from the date of release of sanctioned plan but they deposited much more than the aforesaid amount, though belatedly. But the fact remains that the deposits were made in the manner provided by law through treasury challans alongwith covering letters. These deposits were never objected to, nor the Petitioners were ever informed that the deposit so made, was not acceptable to the L.D.A. or the State Government. The Respondents do not deny the aforesaid deposits but say that this is not a valid tender/deposit in terms of the undertaking given and that the amount is not sufficient to proceed with the process of conversion of property into free hold. 34. The Respondents' plea is based on the ground that the amount of Rs. 1.30 crores was not deposited within time, meaning thereby that had the amount of Rs. 1.30 crores been deposited within 20 days, the conversion could have been processed. The amount which was required to be deposited as per the Respondents was Rs. 90 lakhs plus Rs. 1.30 crores, i.e., a total amount of Rs. 2.20 crores as against which the Petitioners had deposited Rs. 2,26,32,213. 35. In view of the given facts, the question arises as to whether the delay on the part of the Petitioners in making the deposit of Rs. 1.30 crores, which amount admittedly has been deposited and rather, in excess of the said amount, deposit has been made, the building plans could have been cancelled after the deposits so made, solely on the ground that the deposit was not made within 20 days or within the extended time of 90 days, which was given to the Petitioners in the year 2005. 36. The Respondents were not able to rebut the plea of the Petitioners that the time provided in the undertaking could have been extended, and it was also not such an undertaking so as to infer a contract, in which the time was the essence of a contract, the Respondents themselves having extended the time for 90 days, it was not open for them to say that deposit made after 20 days was not a valid deposit. 37. 37. It is clear that the intention of the Respondents was not to cancel the building plans but to make the Petitioners deposit the amount, which they undertook to deposit within a given time, for carrying forward the conversion process. 38. In regard to the undertaking given by the Petitioners, needless to emphasize that the Respondents having accepted the money and having not objected to such a deposit, at any point of time, before passing the impugned orders, it would not constitute a ground for cancelling the building plans after such a long time from the date of deposits. Even otherwise, the Respondents having extended the time once, the time prescribed in the undertaking was thus, given flexibility by the conduct of the parties, which also stood corroborated by the fact that all the deposits made by the Petitioners were not objected to, by the Respondents. 39. The next question is as to whether any such condition could have been imposed by the L.D.A., while sanctioning the building plans for getting the leased property converted into free hold and on the presumption that the same would be got done by the Petitioners, the building plans could have been sanctioned, if otherwise, the Petitioners were not to be treated as the owners or the lawful occupants of the land having any title for making constructions over the same on the alleged plea of the Respondents that the term of the lease had expired and the same having not been renewed, they were not entitled to raise any constructions. 40. Section 15 of the Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973 vests power with the L.D.A. to sanction and approve the building plans for any development work or scheme, without which sanction no development activity can be undertaken. An application has to be moved for obtaining requisite permission for undertaking any development over any land within the limits of the development authority and on necessary enquiry being made by the L.D.A., building plans are either sanctioned or refused. Before refusing sanction, opportunity is to be given to the applicant for removing the defects or objections and consequently orders are passed. The entire scheme of Section 15 does not say anywhere that a lessee cannot ask for permission for raising construction over leased land, unless, of course, terms of the lease do not permit such constructions to be raised over the land leased. 41. The entire scheme of Section 15 does not say anywhere that a lessee cannot ask for permission for raising construction over leased land, unless, of course, terms of the lease do not permit such constructions to be raised over the land leased. 41. There is no such plea that the lease executed in favour of the Petitioners did not permit raising of construction over the leased property. 42. Sub-clause (9) of Section 15 gives power to the Vice-Chairman to cancel any permission, in case the Vice-Chairman is satisfied that such permission was granted as a consequence of material misrepresentation or any fraudulent statement or information furnished, but while doing so, he has to afford reasonable opportunity of hearing to the concerned person before adverting to passing of any order of cancellation. 43. So far the sanction of original building plans is concerned, permission was duly granted by the L.D.A., after being satisfied about right and title of the Petitioners over the land in question and after removal of all objections, that too after a long drawn litigation, reference of which has been made above, but to mention for the purpose, the most relevant amongst them are the two writ petitions filed by the Petitioners ; one for getting a direction issued to the L.D.A. to consider the sanction of building plans and the other one for releasing the building plans, which were already sanctioned. 44. The permission to the original building plans u/s 15 was granted by the L.D.A. with full knowledge and information that it was a lease deed with given terms, by virtue of which the Petitioners were in possession of the same and had submitted their building plans for carrying out the development work, that too again in pursuance of the permission granted by the High Court in Writ Petition No. 2348 of 1979 with an obligation upon the Petitioners to clear of the dues of U. P. Financial Corporation from the sale proceeds. Thus, it cannot be said that permission was granted by the L.D.A. without full knowledge and information of the facts on which the permission was sought for. On the aforesaid facts, the permission was not refused u/s 15(2) but was granted by a specific order. Thus, it cannot be said that permission was granted by the L.D.A. without full knowledge and information of the facts on which the permission was sought for. On the aforesaid facts, the permission was not refused u/s 15(2) but was granted by a specific order. That being so, there, cannot be a case that the Petitioners obtained permission as a result of any misrepresentation or any fraudulent statement made by them or any incorrect information having been furnished. 45. The L.D.A. granted permission with full knowledge and with open eyes to the present revised building plans also after knowing the terms and conditions of the lease and the status of the Petitioners. Thus, on the ground that since the lease has not been renewed, the building plans could not have been cancelled u/s 15(9) of the Act nor, as a matter of fact, the plans have been cancelled on this ground, though the Respondents have made an unsuccessful attempt by raising such a plea, just to defend the impugned order. 46. Not to repeat, that the cancellation order was passed without affording any opportunity to the Petitioners, though it is the statutory requirement that cancellation order be passed after giving reasonable opportunity of hearing to the person concerned. 47. It also could not be clarified by the Respondents that in what manner and under which authority, the L.D.A. could have imposed the condition of depositing Rs. 1.30 crores to the State Government, that too within a given time while sanctioning the building plans, as under the provisions of the Urban Planning and Development Act, there is no such provision which permits the L.D.A. to insist for conversion of leased rights into free hold right before granting sanction. It was for the State Government to see that whether the property should be converted into free hold or not but putting a condition which was foreign to the Act and the Rules for the purpose, was in itself a totally uncalled for condition, not supported by any law and which the Petitioners had to abide under the circumstances beyond their control for getting the building plans sanctioned. 48. 48. If any amount was to be recovered towards the processing charges for conversion of the leased land into free hold, the State Government ought to have made a demand and raised such objections and in case of violation on the part of the Petitioners to either satisfy the objections or to meet the demand, the request for conversion either could have been refused or accepted. But in such an event also, right of construction over the leased land could not have been defeated. Either the sanction could have been granted by the L.D.A. having full knowledge of the status of the Petitioners and the leased land or could have been refused, but it could not have been made a ground for cancellation, once the L.D.A. had granted permission after conscious deliberations. 49. The Respondents' alternative defence is that since the lease hold rights of the Petitioners came to an end in the year 1972 after the expiry of the initial period of 30 years, unless the lease was actually renewed or the lease hold rights had been converted into free hold rights, the Petitioners could not be treated to be the owners of the land having title for using it or for making constructions over the same and, therefore, the orders impugned are perfectly legal and valid. 50. The plea that the Petitioners were not having right over the land in question on the date of sanction of building plans for want of renewal of the lease, as already observed above, has to be tested on the terms of the lease and also on the conduct of the parties. 51. The relevant covenant of the lease deed of the nazul land which became effective from 1.4.1942 recites as under: ....and the possession of which has been delivered to the lessee, TOGETHER with all rights, easements and appurtenances whatsoever to the said plot of land belonging or in anyway appertaining TO HOLD the premises hereby demised unto the lessee for the term of thirty years renewable upto an aggregate period of 90 (Ninety) years subject to the enhancement of rent by 50% after passing 30 years from the 1st (First) day of April, 1942.... 52. The lease was granted for building purposes. 53. The Petitioners had admittedly, deposited the enhanced rent for the period upto 2032, though a renewed lease deed has not been executed. 54. 52. The lease was granted for building purposes. 53. The Petitioners had admittedly, deposited the enhanced rent for the period upto 2032, though a renewed lease deed has not been executed. 54. The conduct of the parties leave no scope of doubt that they worked under the bona fide impression that by depositing the enhanced amount of premium, the lease stands extended and fact of the matter also is that the Petitioners had performed their part of obligation, what they could have done for renewal of the lease and the State Government also did not object to their continuance over the property in question as lessee and, therefore, it is not open for them to say now that the Petitioners are not the lawful occupants of the premises. 55. The relevant terms of the lease deed are: (i) the period of the lease commenced from the first day of April, 1942 ; (ii) the aggregate period of lease is 90 years, i.e., initially for a period of 30 years renewable, subject to the enhancement of rent by 50% each on the expiry of 30 years twice ; and (iii) the lease was granted for building purposes. 56. The lease deed thus, contained therein all the terms relating to the leased property, including the rate of annual rent, the conditions of renewal and the aggregate period for which the lease is granted. The terms are predefined and predetermined and nothing has been reserved for the lessor, including any right to alter or modify the aforesaid terms of the lease. 57. Though in the rejoinder-affidavit filed by the Petitioners to the counter-affidavit filed by the Respondents No. 2 to 6, it is stated in Para 3 that at the time of execution and registration of the lease deed on 2nd May, 1944, the stamp duty paid thereon was for the full term of 90 years and that at present the annual lease rent in terms of the lease already stood paid/deposited in advance with the lessor for the full term, i.e., till 2032, there is no denial by the Respondents to the fact that the stamp duty was paid for the full period of 90 years, even in the supplementary counter-affidavit filed in reply to the rejoinder-affidavit. 58. 58. A plea, however, has been taken that the lease deed has not been renewed and the Petitioners have deposited lease rent upto 2032 directly in the treasury of the State Government without any intimation to the nazul department. The aforesaid plea also stands negated by the fact that the building plans were submitted by the Petitioners initially in pursuance of the directives issued by the High Court in Writ Petition No. 2348 of 1979 filed against the U. P. Financial Corporation and Ors. wherein objections were raised by the L.D.A. that 'no objection certificate' by the nazul department was not then received by the L.D.A. This objection finds place in letter dated 28.8.85 issued by the L.D.A. The Special Nazul Officer of the nazul department vide letter dated 12.8.1983 had informed the Petitioners that the lease of the land in question is for a period of 90 years, of which rent has been increased by 50% and has been deposited, therefore, renewal of the lease deed is not required. 59. The learned Counsel for the Respondents tried to dispute the genuineness of this document which is dated 12.8.1983 and which bears the signatures of an officer of the nazul department but could not substantiate the aforesaid plea. There is another document on record dated 18.6.1984, namely, the 'no objection certificate' issued by the nazul department, in which it has been stated that the lease has been given for residential/commercial purposes and wherein against Column No. 5, which makes a query that whether the lease is required to be renewed or not and when it is to be renewed and in whose name and when renewal is to take place, the word 'direct' has only been mentioned. Certain other queries were again made saying that 'no objection certificate' may also be obtained from the acquisition department. 60. In the year 1983, the L.D.A. and the Special Land Acquisition Officer alongwith State of Uttar Pradesh made an attempt to interfere with the possession of the Petitioners over their four Settling Water Tanks established over a portion of the leasehold land, otherwise than by due process of law, which compelled the Petitioners to file a regular suit No. 291 of 1983 for perpetual injunction to restrain the Defendants of the said suit, namely, the aforesaid parties, in perpetuity, to dispossess the Petitioners and a declaration was also sought in their favour. 61. 61. The L.D.A. filed a separate written statement, while the Special Land Acquisition Officer and the State of U. P. contested the suit by filing joint written statement. The case was contested by the Defendants to the suit, namely, the State of U. P., L.D.A. and the Special Land Acquisition Officer saying that the lease was for a period of 30 years and in the absence of renewal deed, the Petitioner No. 1 ceased to possess rights pursuant to the lease deed in respect of the leasehold land. 62. The learned Civil Judge, Malihabad, Lucknow considered the submissions and adjudicated the controversy and while deciding the issue No. 6, it was specifically held that it was a lease for a period of 90 years and as per the terms of the lease deed, the Company was liable to pay 50% enhanced rent on the expiry of 30 years, which was deposited. It was further held that after the expiry of next 30 years, there will be further 50% enhancement in the rent. It was held that the Plaintiff Company (Petitioner No. 1) was already depositing the enhanced rent which was being duly accepted by the concerned department, therefore, it was wrongly urged by the Defendants (Respondents) that the period fixed in the lease deed expired. The lease deed subsists and is valid till 2032 as the Petitioner has been depositing the enhanced lease rent, a fact which was not disputed by the Respondents. The certified copy of the aforesaid judgment has been brought on record. 63. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and decree, the L.D.A. preferred First Civil Appeal Bearing Number 89 of 1985 before the High Court at Lucknow, wherein a specific ground was taken in the memo of appeal challenging the finding of the lower court that the payment of rent by the Plaintiff (Petitioners) after the expiry of the period of lease, amounting to the renewal of the lease, is wrong. The High Court finally disposed of the said first civil appeal by issuing a direction to the effect that the L.D.A. shall not interfere with the possession and use of the Petitioner No. 1 in respect of four Settling Water Tanks of the Paper Mills in question. 64. The High Court finally disposed of the said first civil appeal by issuing a direction to the effect that the L.D.A. shall not interfere with the possession and use of the Petitioner No. 1 in respect of four Settling Water Tanks of the Paper Mills in question. 64. However, the finding recorded by the trial court on the points in controversy raised by the L.D.A., State of U. P. and another, that the lease was only for 90 years, was not upset or set aside by the High Court. The said judgment is also brought on record. 65. Subsequently, it appears that some clarification was sought for, by the L.D.A. saying that the dispute related only to the four Settling Water Tanks and did not relate in respect of the passage and parts of the metal street which goes from Outram road to the Municipal Sullage Farm and the judgment be confined to that position only, which clarification was not opposed to, by the Petitioners and was accepted by the High Court. 66. In the 'no objection certificate' alongwith the report of the Nazul Officer submitted on 19.4.1993 on the building plans/housing plans submitted on behalf of the Petitioners, in Column 5, the Special Nazul Officer stated that the lease was for a period of 90 years, while giving answer, as to whether the lease was to be renewed or not and when it is to be renewed. In column No. 1 it was stated that the lease commenced with effect from 1st April, 1942 and also gave the name of the lessee, i.e., the Petitioners. In Column 9, it was stated that the old constructions were to be demolished and group housing were proposed to be constructed and accordingly 'no objection certificate' alongwith the report dated 19.4.1993 was submitted. The report was duly signed and given by the Special Nazul Officer on 21.1.1994. In Column 9, it was stated that the old constructions were to be demolished and group housing were proposed to be constructed and accordingly 'no objection certificate' alongwith the report dated 19.4.1993 was submitted. The report was duly signed and given by the Special Nazul Officer on 21.1.1994. One more glaring feature is that the State Government itself issued notifications for acquisition of the land in question on 25.8.1986 and 1.9.1986 under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, meaning thereby that the land was treated to be the land of the Petitioners under the lease deed even after the expiry of the first phase of 30 years, as otherwise, if the land belonged to the State Government, there was no question of issuing any notifications of acquisition of the land, as there could not have been any acquisition proceedings for acquiring their own land by the State Government. Not only this, the land was also released/exempted from acquisition by the State Government by exercising powers u/s 48 of the Act by issuing notification on 30.6.1993. On denotifying the land from acquisition, the L.D.A. also required the Petitioner Company to give an affidavit that it would not claim any damages and compensation against the L.D.A. for their actions concerning the acquisition and withdrawal of the land from the acquisition proceedings. 67. All the aforesaid facts on record, clearly prove that the plea of the Respondents that the Petitioners were not the lessee of the land after the expiry of the initial period of 30 years, in the absence of renewed lease deed, was never accepted, nor could be substantiated even in the present petition. Apart from this, the conduct of the State Government in acquiring the land and then releasing it in favour of the Petitioner Company also supports the plea that the Respondents did recognize the right of the Petitioners throughout as lessee. 68. The original building plans, as already stated earlier, were not being considered for being sanctioned and after sanction, they were not being released, therefore, writ petition was filed, in which orders were passed in favour of the Petitioners. 68. The original building plans, as already stated earlier, were not being considered for being sanctioned and after sanction, they were not being released, therefore, writ petition was filed, in which orders were passed in favour of the Petitioners. Pertinent to mention here is that the original building plan was placed in a meeting, before the Board of L.D.A., attended by the Commissioner, Lucknow Division and Chairman, L.D.A., the Housing Commissioner, U. P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad, the Vice-Chairman, L.D.A., the District Magistrate, Lucknow, the Mukhya Nagar Adhikari, Nagar Mahapalika, Lucknow the Special Secretary, Finance, Government of U.P., the Special Secretary, Housing, Government of U. P., the Chief Country and Town Planner, U.P., the Chief Engineer, Uttar Pradesh Jal Nigam, Lucknow and the Secretary, L.D.A. The Board granted approval to the building plans of the Company in the said meeting held on 27th November and 2nd December, 1993. In this approval, no condition for getting the land converted into free hold was imposed. The said documents have also been brought on record and in reply to the said averments made in the rejoinder-affidavit, the Respondents in Para 17 of the supplementary counter-affidavit, admitted that the L.D.A. Board had passed the resolution for sanction of building plan on receipt of 'no objection certificate' from the nazul department. 69. There is a clear admission on the part of the Respondents in Para 17 of the supplementary counter-affidavit about the approval of the original building plans being granted by the L.D.A. Board for sanctioning the building plans and that too on receipt of the 'no objection certificate' by the nazul department. The situation with respect to the right, title and interest of the Petitioners over the land in question, did not change when the present revised building plans were submitted and even thereafter, which position remains the same, till date. 70. It is also relevant to mention that nazul policy regarding the conversion of leasehold rights into freehold, in respect of nazul land, was under suspended animation till 18.4.2005. 70. It is also relevant to mention that nazul policy regarding the conversion of leasehold rights into freehold, in respect of nazul land, was under suspended animation till 18.4.2005. The Government pursuant to the notification dated 19.4.2005 lifted the animated suspension and required the authorities to act as per the nazul policy contained in Government order dated 10.12.2002 for conversion of leasehold rights into freehold and in the meantime, since sufficient time had passed and the Petitioners wanted to develop their property in best possible way and since it was necessary and practical to have more parking in the project, the revised building plans were submitted by the Petitioners before the L.D.A. on 8.4.2004, relating to Group Housing Project basically to increase the parking provisions from 553 cars sanctioned earlier to 1117 cars. This resulted in reducing the number of towers from 22 to 20, as were previously sanctioned. The Petitioners willingly gave up these flats so that the residents of the flats have more parking and open spaces. These revised plans took about 13 months and were released only on 5.5.2005. 71. The Petitioners had performed their part of the obligation and the State Government as well as the L.D.A., both continued to reel under the same premise accepting the leasehold rights of the Petitioners, though at times, they disputed the same but could not succeed. 72. The Respondents also took a plea that the entire action of sanction of building plans was a result of collusion between the officers/officials of the L.D.A., may be the State Government and the Petitioner Company, because of which an enquiry was got conducted by the State Government and that on the basis of the said enquiry F.I.Rs. have been lodged against the Petitioner No. 2, the then Vice-Chairman of the L.D.A. alongwith Chairman and Managing Director of M/s. Arif Industries Limited. 73. We are not concerned with the enquiry aforesaid nor with the action taken in pursuance of that enquiry as they are not under challenge before us, but we do take notice of the fact that merely by making enquiry and lodging F.I.Rs. 73. We are not concerned with the enquiry aforesaid nor with the action taken in pursuance of that enquiry as they are not under challenge before us, but we do take notice of the fact that merely by making enquiry and lodging F.I.Rs. against certain persons, the factual and legal position cannot be changed and that though we do not find it necessary to delve on the plea of the Petitioner that all such action has been taken when there has been change in the Government in May, 2007, but we do observe that by mere change in the Government, all actions taken in the erstwhile regime, cannot be presumed to have been taken illegally, fraudulent or maliciously, unless, of course, such connivance and violation of rules, laws and norms is found established. 74. The plea aforesaid of the Respondents, even otherwise, looses all relevance, in view of the categorical stand taken by them, that even if the Petitioners were not having any subsisting right over the leased land on the date of applying for sanction of building plans, the said shortcoming could have overcome, in case they had got the leasehold land converted into freehold. 75. Sri D. K. Upadhyaya, learned Chief Standing Counsel, made it clear that under the policy of the State Government and in accordance with the relevant Government orders, even a trespasser could get his right perfected over the nazul land, if he gets it converted into free hold. That being the settled and admitted legal position, all effort of the Respondents to establish, that the building plans could not have been sanctioned in the absence of a revised lease deed having been executed, becomes wholly irrelevant and meaningless. 76. In the case of Purshottam Dass Tandon and Others Vs. State of U.P. Lucknow and Others, AIR 1987 All 56 , a Division Bench of this Court, considering the case of such lessees who were granted lease of nazul land by the Government and who continued over the land after expiry of the leased period and no action for revocation of lease having been taken by the Government, have been found to be entitled to get the fresh lease executed. 77. 77. While considering the denial of renewal of lease of the lessees of nazul land in Allahabad and considering that whether the lessees had any right in law to get their leases renewed and could they invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel or claim being put at par with those whose leases had been renewed either because of Article 14 or under Administrative Law, applying the rule of election, the Court observed that 'In law where a person, having two alternative courses of actions mutually exclusive chooses to adopt one and rejects the other expressly or impliedly then he is said to have elected to chose one. He is subsequently precluded from adopting the course which he intended to reject. It is known as doctrine of election. Like estoppel it is also child of equity. It is founded on the principle that one should not be permitted to approbate and reprobate that estoppel to prevent a person from falling a victim to what would have otherwise resulted in injustice to him and unfair advantage to other. In Chapter XIII of Estoppel by Representation by Spencer Bower and Turner II Edition page 314, the principle is explained thus: Where A, dealing with B, is confronted with two alternatives and mutually exclusive courses of action in relation to such dealing, between which he may make his election and A so conducts himself as reasonably to induce B to believe that he is intending definitely to adopt the one course, and definitely to reject or relinquish the other and B in such belief alters his position to his detriment, A is precluded as against B, from afterwards resorting to the course which he has thus, deliberately declared his intention of rejecting. 78. The Court further observed that: 'If the land is needed or building has to be demolished in public interest for general welfare, probably no exception can be taken as the interest of the individual has to be sacrificed for the Society. But asking the lessee to vacate or remove Malwa for no rhyme or reason but because the State was the owner cannot be accepted to be in consonance with present day philosophy and thinking about role of State.' 79. The High Court held that the State Government was bound to renew the lease held by Purshottam Dass Tandon in accordance with the covenant for renewal. The High Court held that the State Government was bound to renew the lease held by Purshottam Dass Tandon in accordance with the covenant for renewal. The State of U. P. and Ors. preferred SLP against the judgment of the Allahabad High Court which was dismissed on 14.1.1987 refusing to interfere with the decision of the High Court. 80. There it was a case where Government had issued orders for renewal of the lease on fresh terms and conditions and it was not the case like the present one, where the Petitioner stands on an entirely different and better footing. The terms of the Petitioners' lease are well defined and predetermined. Nothing was reserved for the lessor to alter or amend or modify the terms of the lease for getting the term of the lease renewed on the expiry of 30 years. At the time execution of lease deed, stamp duty for complete 90 years had also been paid. 81. Under the facts and circumstances of the case and on reading and seeing the tenor of the lease deed, it can safely be held that the Petitioners are and continue to be the lessees and lawful occupants of the land in question and want of execution of renewed lease deed would not defeat their right nor they lose their rights as lessee over the land in question, moreso, when it is the own case of the Respondents, that if the property is converted into free hold, then the Petitioners would continue to be the rightful owners of the property in question. 82. In fact, on deposit of full stamp duty for the total aggregate term of 90 years at the time of execution of the lease deed and on fulfilling the unalterable predetermined conditions for renewal of the lease after the expiry of the first phase of 30 years, and thereafter also after the expiry of the second phase of 30 years, viz., deposit of enhanced rent, there was no requirement to have a renewal lease deed executed. 83. In the case of State of U.P. and Others Vs. Lalji Tandon (Dead), (2004) 1 SCC 1 , the question of renewal of lease came up for consideration before the Apex Court with respect to Government Estate. 84. 83. In the case of State of U.P. and Others Vs. Lalji Tandon (Dead), (2004) 1 SCC 1 , the question of renewal of lease came up for consideration before the Apex Court with respect to Government Estate. 84. The Apex Court, considering the renewal of a lease with respect to the said land, observed that: 'There is a difference between an extension of lease in accordance with the covenant in that regard contained in the principal lease and renewal of lease again in accordance with the covenant for renewal contained in the original lease. In the case of extension it is not necessary to have a fresh deed of lease executed as the extension of lease for the term agreed upon shall be a necessary consequence of the clause for extension. However, option for renewal has to be exercised consistently with the terms of the covenant for renewal and, if exercised, a fresh deed of lease shall have to be executed between the parties. Failing the execution of a fresh deed of lease another lease for a fixed term shall not come into existence though the principal lease in spite of the expiry of the term thereof may continue by holding over for year by year or month by month, as the case may be. 85. In India, a lease may be in perpetuity. Neither the Transfer of Property Act nor the general law abhors a lease in perpetuity. 86. The Court took, notice of the observations made by the Andhra Pradesh High Court, which said that: 'to find an answer to the question whether a covenant for renewal contained in the lease deed construed properly and in its real context, entitles the tenant to continue as long as he chooses by exercising the option of renewal at the end of each successive period of 5 years subject to the same terms and conditions depends on the deed of lease being read as a whole and an effort made to ascertain the intention of the parties while entering into the contract. No single clause or term should be read in isolation so as to defeat other clauses. The interpretation must be reasonable, harmonious and be deduced from the language of the document.' 87. The Petitioners are thus, the lessee and lawful occupants of the land in question, in pursuance of the lease deed executed in their favour. 88. No single clause or term should be read in isolation so as to defeat other clauses. The interpretation must be reasonable, harmonious and be deduced from the language of the document.' 87. The Petitioners are thus, the lessee and lawful occupants of the land in question, in pursuance of the lease deed executed in their favour. 88. One more aspect of the matter is that the construction activity was not dependent upon the leased property being converted into free hold and the Petitioners were entitled to raise constructions, the moment building plans were sanctioned and released. 89. We are informed that for construction of a large number of towers with hundreds of flats has already been undertaken and most of them have already been transferred to the purchasers and all these activities went on, to the knowledge of the L.D.A., but surprisingly, after the deposit of the amount, detailed above, the L.D.A. has chosen to cancel the sanctioned building plans on a ground, which is wholly irrelevant, that too after lapse of a long time. 90. There is no allegation of any deviation or variation in constructions, as per the sanctioned building plans and there is also no explanation from the Respondents, as to why no action for resumption of the land was taken by the State Government at the initial stages of construction or at any point of time right from the year 1972-73, when the initial period of 30 years of lease came to end and, therefore, also the law as well as equity, both demand the quashing of the impugned orders. 91. It is also of great significance that non-renewal of the lease deed is not the main plank of defence of the Respondents, which alleged defect, according to them, would have stood cured, in case the Petitioners had got their land converted into free hold. This means that if the land is converted into free hold, there would be no objection to the building plans or to the constructions on the ground that the lease has not been renewed by executing a fresh lease deed, nor there would be any requirement of getting a renewed lease deed executed or registered. 92. So far the conversion of the property into free hold is concerned, the Petitioners had applied for it long back. They had deposited Rs. 92. So far the conversion of the property into free hold is concerned, the Petitioners had applied for it long back. They had deposited Rs. 90 lakhs alongwith the application, the same being 25% amount of the processing cost, as per self-assessment, which was required as per relevant Government orders. Thereafter, they made further deposits totalling Rs. 2,26,32,213, though in two stages and with little delay. 93. There was also some dispute regarding circle rate, namely, as to whether the land in question falls within Nishat Ganj area or Mohalla Chakkarpurwa and no demand having been raised by the State till date, it cannot be said that the Petitioners defaulted in any manner so as to deprive them of their right to get the land converted into free hold, particularly, when the Petitioners have categorically stated that they are prepared to pay the amount whichever is found to be due or whichever is required for processing the application for conversion into free hold and of course they would also pay the amount, whichever is claimed by the Respondents as per the rules, after a demand is raised by the State Government for depositing the balance amount within 90 days. 94. We also find force in the argument of the Petitioners that out of the total amount demanded towards 25% of the cost as per the own calculation of the Respondents, Rs. 90 lakhs was deposited by the Petitioners initially and Rs. 1.30 crores asked by the L.D.A., for which undertaking was given by the Petitioners, has also been deposited, though belated, and thus, no further amount can be asked for, for processing the free hold application but we do give liberty to the Respondents that in case any further amount is required to be deposited as per rule towards 25% initial deposit for the said purpose, that can still be asked for from the Petitioners to be deposited within a reasonable time, which they are ready to deposit. 95. In view of our findings that the L.D.A. was having no authority or power to cancel the sanctioned building plans on the ground of non-deposit of the amount of Rs. 95. In view of our findings that the L.D.A. was having no authority or power to cancel the sanctioned building plans on the ground of non-deposit of the amount of Rs. 1.30 crores for processing the application for conversion into free hold within time, that having been deposited later on, and that the building plans were cancelled after such a long delay, allowing the construction activities to be undertaken, without any objection, coupled with the fact that the nazul department time and again has reiterated that lease was for a period of 90 years and that there was no need to renew the lease deed and also the fact that the execution of fresh renewed lease deed is not the reason for cancellation of the building plans nor it could be the reason for doing so, coupled with the specific case of the Respondents that in case the land is got converted into free hold, then the Petitioners' right to continue over the property as owner, cannot be questioned, we hold that the impugned order dated 6.12.2007 and the two orders dated 7.12.2007 are liable to be quashed. 96. The grounds taken by the Respondents in defence of the impugned orders, other than the grounds mentioned in the order itself, though could not have been seen nor could be of any assistance to the Respondents in view of the Apex Court judgment in the case of Mohinder Singh Gill and Another Vs. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and Others, (1978) 1 SCC 405 , in which it has been observed that orders are not like old wine becoming better as they grow old, we do also find that the aforesaid pleas are also not tenable for the aforesaid reasons. 97. For the aforesaid reasons, the two orders dated 7.12.2007 contained in Annexures-1 and 2 are quashed. The order dated 6.12.2007, passed by the Vice-Chairman, L.D.A. is also liable to be quashed. Let a writ in the nature of certiorari be issued quashing the aforesaid order dated 6.12.2007, passed by the Vice-Chairman, L.D.A., respectively. 98. 97. For the aforesaid reasons, the two orders dated 7.12.2007 contained in Annexures-1 and 2 are quashed. The order dated 6.12.2007, passed by the Vice-Chairman, L.D.A. is also liable to be quashed. Let a writ in the nature of certiorari be issued quashing the aforesaid order dated 6.12.2007, passed by the Vice-Chairman, L.D.A., respectively. 98. A further direction is issued to the Respondents to indicate the amount, which is required for proceeding with the conversion of the property into free hold requiring the Petitioner to make deposit within a reasonable time for the initial amount, if any such amount still is found to be paid for processing the free hold application and thereafter allow them to deposit the balance amount within the statutory period as per rules. The State Government shall proceed for conversion of the property into free hold expeditiously, in accordance with law. 99. We further direct that the Respondents shall not interfere with the construction activities of the Petitioners, subject to their following the sanctioned building plans. The writ petition is allowed. No order as to costs.