SHIV NARAYAN DHINGRA J. 1. The petitioners have preferred this Revision Petition under Section 25-B(8) of Delhi Rent Control Act against an order dated 22.11.1999 passed by the learned ARC whereby an eviction petition of the respondent was allowed and petitioners were directed to handover the premises under their tenancy to the respondent (hereinafter petitioners are referred as tenant and respondent as landlord) [The tenant (father of petitioners) died during the pendency of the petition and his LRs were brought on record]. .2. The facts relevant for the purpose of deciding this Revision Petition are that the tenant was in possession of one room and two kothas on ground floor, let out to the father of the petitioners by the previous owner for residential purpose at premises no. 11111112, Gali Samosan, Farashkhana Delhi. The landlord pleaded that the premises was purchased vide a registered sale deed dated 6.5.1961 by his mother Smt. Chander Kala. Smt. Chander Kala died on 7.3.1988. Other LRs of Smt. Chander Kala i.e. her husband, one son and two daughters executed a Relinquishment Deed in favour of the landlord and he became absolute owner of the premises. No other premises was owned by the landlord. He was living with his father at House No. 260 Katra Peran, Tilak Bazar as a licensee. His father was pressing him hard to vacate the premises. Leave to defend was granted to the tenant on the question of ownership and letting purpose, since the tenant had challenged the contention of the landlord being owner of the premises and had also challenged the contention of the premises having been let out for residential purpose. The .evidence of the parties was recorded and the same was also confined to these two aspects only. The tenant himself objected to cross examination of his witnesses on any other aspect. 3. The learned Trial Court after recording evidence of both the parties and considering the documents placed on record by the parties came to conclusion that the letting purpose was residential and that the premises was owned by the landlord. The landlord was living as a licensee with his father. His family consisted of himself, his wife and a daughter. His requirement was considered as a bona fide requirement and an eviction order was passed against the tenant. 4. The landlord was living as a licensee with his father. His family consisted of himself, his wife and a daughter. His requirement was considered as a bona fide requirement and an eviction order was passed against the tenant. 4. The Counsel for the tenant argued that after passing of eviction order and during pendency of this Revision Petition, the father of the landlord had died and the status of the landlord living in the premises with his father as a licensee had changed and now the landlord was living in that premises as a matter of right, since he inherited the property. Thus, the cause of action had evaporated and this Court should take cognizance of this subsequent event and the Eviction Petition should be dismissed. The other argument is that right from the date of filing of Eviction Petition till date, it has not been the case of the landlord that fathers house was not reasonably sufficient for his residence and residence of his family members. Since, now father is no more in this world, the accommodation in possession of landlord, where he had been living, being sufficient for his family, the bona fide requirement could not be there. The tenant relied on Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. The Motor and General Traders AIR 1975 SC 1406 , Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad AIR 1981 SC 1711 , P.V. Papanna v. K.Padmanabhaiha AIR 1994 SC 1577 and Kedar Nath Agarwal v. Dhanraji Devi (2004) 8 SCC 76 to fortify his point that Court should take into account the subsequent events. The other point pressed during arguments of the Revision was that the letting purpose of the premises was commercial since the premises was a commercial godown and the Trial Court wrongly held that the premises was being used for residential purposes. 5. The argument of the tenant regarding letting purpose has become redundant in view of the judgment of Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by LRs v. Union of India and Anr. 2008(5) SCC 287 wherein the Supreme Court observed that Section 14(1)(e) of DRC Act would be equally applicable to commercial premises and a premises let out for commercial purpose could also be got vacated. 6. The way the residential premises have been put to commercial use in most of the areas in Delhi, it shows that any premises can be converted for use as per the requirement. 6. The way the residential premises have been put to commercial use in most of the areas in Delhi, it shows that any premises can be converted for use as per the requirement. If the need be, a premises can be converted to commercial purpose, if need be the same premises can be put to residential use. There is no area left in Delhi (except Lutyens Delhi) which is purely residential and there is no area in Delhi which is purely commercial. In the present case, also the room which has been let out to the tenant is having common use of latrine, WC bath etc and if the landlord wants to reside, he can bring the room to a proper shape and use it for residential purpose. There is no bar on the landlord from using this room for his residence. 7. There is no doubt that the view of the Supreme Court earlier had been that subsequent events should be taken into account however, the way the litigation in eviction matters has been taking decades, this view has now changed and the Supreme Court in recent judgment Usha P. Kuvelkar v. Ravndra Subrai Dalvi 2008(1) RLR 63, has observed as under: It was tried to be argued by the learned counsel for the respondent that since the landlord had died, the need had expired with him and that the question will have to be examined again regarding the bonafide personal need of the landlord. The question is no more res integra and is covered by the decision of this Court in Shakuntala Bai and Others vs. Narayan Das and Ors. [ (2004) 5 SCC 772 ]. This Court has observed: ...The bonafide need of the landlord has to be examined as on the date of institution of the proceedings and if a decree for eviction is passed, the death of the landlord during the pendency of the appeal preferred by the tenant will make no difference as his heirs are fully entitled to defend the estate. In the same decision a contrary note expressed by this Court in P.V. Papanna v. Padmanabhaiah [( 1994) 2 SCC 316] was held to be in the nature of an obiter. This Court in Shakuntala Bai and Ors. In the same decision a contrary note expressed by this Court in P.V. Papanna v. Padmanabhaiah [( 1994) 2 SCC 316] was held to be in the nature of an obiter. This Court in Shakuntala Bai and Ors. (supra) referred to the decision in Shantilal Thakordas v. Chimanial Maganlal Telwala [ (1976) 4 SCC 417 ] and specifically observed that the view expressed in Shantilal Thakordass case did not, in any manner, affect the view expressed in Phool Rani v. Naubat Rai Ahluwalia [ (1973) 1 SCC 688 ] to the effect that where the death of landlord occurs after the decree for possession has been passed in his favour, his legal heirs are entitled to defend the further proceedings like an appeal and the benefit accrued to them under the decree. Here in this case also it is obvious that the original landlord Prabhakar Govind Sinai Kuvelkar had expired only after the eviction order passed by the Additional Rent Controller. This is apart from the fact that the landlord had sought the possession not only for himself but also for his family members. There is a clear reference in Section 23 (1) (a) (i) of the Act regarding occupation of the family members of the landlord. In that view the contention raised by the learned counsel for the respondent must be rejected. 8. In 2007(2) RLR 481 Carona Ltd. v. Parvathy Swaminathan and Sons the Supreme Court considered the impact of subsequent events on the eviction decree and held as under: 37. In our judgment, the law is fairly settled. The basic rule is that the rights of the parties should be determined on the basis of the date of institution of the suit. Thus, if the plaintiff has no cause of action on the date of the filing of the suit, ordinarily, he will not be allowed to take advantage of the cause of action arising subsequent to the filing of the suit. Conversely, no relief will normally be denied to the plaintiff by reason of any subsequent event if at the date of the institution of the suit, he has a substantive right to claim such relief. .9. Conversely, no relief will normally be denied to the plaintiff by reason of any subsequent event if at the date of the institution of the suit, he has a substantive right to claim such relief. .9. The proposition that subsequent events should be taken into account may look attractive however, it is totally unjust proposition because most of the time only subsequent events of the landlord are placed before the Courts and subsequent events of tenant/tenants family are never taken into account. As in this case, the original tenant had died, the rent of the premises has not been paid since 1992 and whether the premises is actually being used or not nobody knows. Normally, in such premises nobody resides and they are kept under lock and key. The deceased tenants family also grew with time as his 5 LRs have been mentioned in the LRs application itself. It is obvious that they all would .not be living in one room; all of them would be having separate profession/business and would have acquired their own premises and living separately. The landlord, who had given one room on rent say on Rs.50 or Rs. 60 per month years ago would have no means to know the developments in the family of the tenant, unless he is living in the same premises or in adjoining area and is close to the tenants family. He would not know what different business interests the tenants sons had acquired, what different properties the tenants other family members had acquired; these things can only be found by investigating agencies. A person receiving rent of Rs.50 or Rs.60 per month would not like to spend Rs.30,000-40,000 on investigating agency just to find out the present status of tenants family. Most of the time tenants do not disclose their own growth, their own acquisitions of different premises either for residence or business and the premises are kept under lock and key only for the purpose of extracting money from the landlord at the time of vacating the premises, keeping in view of the fact that it takes 20-30 years in final culmination of a litigation in India. This is only one aspect. This is only one aspect. The other aspect of changing circumstances is that the person in dire necessity of premises for his bona fide requirement, files eviction petition under so-called summary procedure evolved by the legislature and this so-called summary procedure takes years and years and years in final culmination. The present Revision itself is pending in the Court since 2000 and has taken 08 years. During pendency of this Revision Petition, not only the father of the landlord/respondent had died but on the other hand the circumstances of tenants family also changed and original tenant died. The litigation in Courts progresses at snails pace. The judicial system, which is not alive to the urgent bona fide requirements of a landlord, cannot keep time standstill and cannot mandate that so long as the case is not decided, nothing shall happen in the world of landlord and tenant. Time does not wait for anybody, not even for Courts. The children of the landlord will grow. Finding that their own premises was under tenancy and was not being vacated despite litigation, they need not wait for 20 years to meet their requirement and are bound to make some alternate arrangements for themselves or for the other family members. It is highly unjust that the Court should not decide the matter within time bound limit and then take into account the change in circumstances of the landlord or tenant. 10. The span of 10-20 years, which is normally spent in eviction petitions, is long enough to change the circumstances in the life of anyone and with every change in circumstances, like growth in family or reduction in the family or death or marriage in the family, a new cause of action would arise during pendency of the Revision or Appeal and a de novo trial shall again start and in this manner no petition can come to an end during the lifetime of any person. I, therefore consider that the Court has only to look into the cause of action which was available at the time when eviction petition was instituted. Once the trial is over and judgment is pronounced no new circumstance can be considered either during revision or appeal. 11. Taking into consideration the subsequent events in fact has encouraged parties to prolong the case on one or the other pretext waiting for something to happen. Once the trial is over and judgment is pronounced no new circumstance can be considered either during revision or appeal. 11. Taking into consideration the subsequent events in fact has encouraged parties to prolong the case on one or the other pretext waiting for something to happen. If the landlord is old and ill enough the tenant keeps on dragging the petition waiting for landlord to die so that the entire cause of action evaporates. The dragging of petition is so easy in the Court that the whole purpose of filing the petition gets frustrated. I, therefore, consider that the subsequent events in the eviction petitions cannot form basis of decision in the revision and the Court has to stick to the cause of action which was there at the time of filing the petition. The subsequent events highly prejudice only one side because the subsequent events of the other side are always in dark. The argument of the petitioner is not tenable. 12. I find no force in the petition. The petition is hereby dismissed.