ORDER D.G.R. Patnaik, J. 1. By this common order, both these writ applications are disposed of since issues involved are identical. 2. Challenge in both these writ applications is to the orders dated 1.2.2008 6.2.2008 passed by the Certificate Officer, Dhalbhum, Jamshedpur (Respondent No. 2) in C.C. No. 120(BL) of 2007-2008 and C.C. No. 123 (BL) of 2007-08 respectively, whereby the objection of the petitioners against continuation of the certificate proceeding for recovery of the debt due to the respondent Bank before the Certificate Officer, was rejected, 3. The petitioners in both these writ applications, who are referred to as "debtors" had obtained loan from the respondent Bank. The principal amount of debt payable by the petitioners was above Rs. 11 lakhs excluding interest. Consequent upon failure of the petitioners to repay the debt amount, the respondent Bank filed two separate cases before the Certificate Officer, Dhalbhum, Jamshedpur under the Bihar and Orissa Public Demands Recovery Act against the petitioners individually for realisation of the debt amounts. Certificate proceedings vide C.C. No. 120 (BL) of 2007-08 against the petitioner of WP(C) No. 1070 of 2008 and C.C. No. 123 (BL) of 2007-08 against the petitioner of WP(C) No. 1074 of 2008 were initiated. Notice under Section 7 of the Bihar and Orissa Public Demands Recovery Act was issued and served upon the petitioners in each of the certificate proceedings. The petitioners appeared in the proceedings and filed their respective objections under Section 9 of the Act, praying for dismissal of the certificate proceedings primarily on the ground that the Certificate Officer lacks jurisdiction to entertain the claim of the bank and to proceed for recovery of the debt amount, since such jurisdiction was barred under the provisions of Recovery of Debt Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993. 4. By the impugned orders, the Certificate Officer summarily rejected the objections and directed the petitioners to pay off the claim amount, within the dates stipulated in the impugned orders, else coercive measure for recovery would follow. Aggrieved by the impugned orders, the petitioners have filed the instant writ applications. 5. 4. By the impugned orders, the Certificate Officer summarily rejected the objections and directed the petitioners to pay off the claim amount, within the dates stipulated in the impugned orders, else coercive measure for recovery would follow. Aggrieved by the impugned orders, the petitioners have filed the instant writ applications. 5. Dwelling upon the grounds advanced in these writ petitions, Sri Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the petitioners explains by referring to the provisions of Recovery of Debt Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, that the Recovery of Debt Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1993) has been brought in the Statute Books as a special enactment in respect of the debts owed to any Bank or Financial Institution or to a consortium of Banks or Financial Institutions which stipulates that where the amount of debt exceeds Rs. 10.00 lakhs or such other amount, the claim for recovery can be adjudicated upon by the Debt Recovery Tribunals established under the Act. Learned Counsel explains that definition of 'banks' as given in the Act of 1993 brings within its fold the respondent Bank is. It is further explained that the Act of 1993 also contains provision of an establishment of Debt Recovery Tribunal and also provision for establishment of an Appellate Tribunal. Referring to the impugned orders, learned Counsel submits that the learned Certificate Officer has assumed the authority without jurisdiction and has committed serious error by summarily rejecting the objections raised by the petitioners without discussing the grounds of objection in proper perspective. Learned Counsel adds further that since the impugned orders have been passed without jurisdiction, the petitioners have a right to avail the remedy under the writ jurisdiction of this Court and the counter plea taken by the respondent Bank, against the maintainability of the writ petition on the ground of alternative remedy of appeal available against the impugned orders under the Bihar and Orissa Public Demands Recovery Act, is totally misconceived as, the filing appeals under the Bihar and Orissa Public Demands Recovery Act against the impugned orders, would amount to conferring jurisdiction of an authority which he does not possess. 6. 6. Per contra, the stand taken by the respondent Bank through its counter-affidavit in both these writ applications is that the instant writ applications are not maintainable since, there is an alternative remedy available to the petitioners against the impugned orders under the Bihar and Orissa Public Demands Recovery Act. As regards the grounds pleaded by the petitioners against the continuation of the certificate proceeding and the jurisdiction of the Certificate Officer, the stand of the respondent Bank is that the Bihar and Orissa Public Demands Recovery Act as enacted by the State Legislature, enables the banks to recover the money due from the borrower by way of public demand, through the certificate proceedings. 7. Shri Rajan Raj, learned Counsel for the respondent Bank by reading out verbatim the observations of the Patna High Court in the case of Sawar Mal v. State of Bank of India [1987]165ITR467(Patna) , Court would explain that enactment of the Bihar and Orissa Public Demands Recovery Act is within the competence of the State Legislature by virtue of Entry-43 of the Concurrent List III of the Constitution of India. It is also within the ambit of Entry-11a and 13 of the said List. The recovery of monies due to State owned Banks is in pith and substance of Public Demand and even if these incidentally overlap an element of banking, it would squarely remain within the sweep of Entry 43 of the Concurrent List. Learned Counsel would explain further that the Act of 1993 enacted by the Parliament being a legislation with respect to Banking is in respect of substantive provisions of legislation and an Act under Entry 45 of the banking List-I of the Constitution of India. As per the" settled law. where the two statutes occupy a particular field and operate in the same field without coming into collision with each other, no repugnancy results, or any statute occupying the same field seeks to create distinct and separate offences, no question of repugnancy arises, then arguments of repugnancy cannot arise in legislation pertaining to different lists. As per the" settled law. where the two statutes occupy a particular field and operate in the same field without coming into collision with each other, no repugnancy results, or any statute occupying the same field seeks to create distinct and separate offences, no question of repugnancy arises, then arguments of repugnancy cannot arise in legislation pertaining to different lists. To buttress his argument, learned Counsel refers to and relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Modern Syntax (i) Limited v. Debts Recovery Tribunal, Jaipur and the case of Raghunath Rai Bareja v. Punjab National Bank AIR 2006 All 1641, and also in the case of Greater Bombay Co-op Bank Ltd. v. United Yara Tex Ltd. AIR2007SC1584 . Learned Counsel argues further that Section 31 of the Act of 1993 refers to transfer of 'every suit or other proceeding pending before any Court.' According to the learned Counsel, the word 'Court' in the context of the Act of 1993 signifies 'civil Court' and not the Court of Certificate Officer. As such certificate cases in respect of the petitioners being of the year 2007-08, do not fall in the category of cases which require to be transferred to the Debt Recovery Tribunal after the establishment of such Tribunal and as such, the proceedings cannot be transferred to the Debt Recovery Tribunal. 8. The twin questions which arise for consideration from the rival submission of the parties are,: i. Whether the claim of the respondent Bank for recovery of debt amount from each of the petitioners could be entertained by the Certificate Officer under the provisions of Bihar and Orissa Public Demands Recovery Act and; whether the certificate proceedings before the Certificate Officer under the aforesaid Act for recovery of debts, can continue before the Certificate Officer, in view of the special provision under the Act of 1993? ii. Whether the writ applications are maintainable? 9. It is not disputed that enactment of Bihar and Orissa Public Demands Recovery Act was within the competence of the State Legislature and Article 15 (inserted by Bihar Act of 1974) of Schedule I of the aforesaid Act is also within the competence of the State Legislature. The Act enables recovery of any money declared as a public demand and recoverable as arrears of land revenue. The Act enables recovery of any money declared as a public demand and recoverable as arrears of land revenue. Article 15 of Schedule I of the PDR Act enables recovery of money payable to the Banks specified in column II of Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970. The mode of recovery of monies as public demands owed to the Bank- as laid down in the Act is through certificate proceedings. 10. However, after introduction of the Act of 1993 (RDB Act) in the statute Book, which deals essentially with debts due to financial institutions including the banking companies, the situation becomes different. The RDB Act of 1993 enacted by the Parliament as a special legislation, relates to financial institutions including banking companies and applies to claims for recovery of debts owed to the banks where the amount of debt due is Rs. 10.00 lakhs or above. Section 1 of the RDB Act is worth to be quoted. Short title, extent, commencement and application.-(1) This may be called the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993. (2) It extends to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir. (3) It shall be deemed to have come into force on the 4th day of June 1993. (4) The provisions of this Act shall not apply where the amount of debt due to any bank or financial institution or to a consortium of banks or financial institutions is less than ten lakhs rupees or such other amount being not less than one lakh rupees, as the Central Government may, by notification, specify. 11. Prior to coming into force the RDB Act, the forum in respect of claim for recovery of debts of companies was available through the civil Courts of competent jurisdiction arid through certificate proceedings under the PDR Act. Under the RDB Act, a special Tribunal known as 'Debt Recovery Tribunal' was established in order to facilitate recovery of debt due to banks and financial institutions where the amount of debt exceeds Rs. 10.00 lakhs. 12. It is evident from the above, that while Public Demands Recovery Act and RDB Act operate in the same field, but in the case of debts due to banks, the amount above Rs. 10.00 lakhs, the RDB Act would assume exclusive jurisdiction and have overriding effect over the other law. 10.00 lakhs. 12. It is evident from the above, that while Public Demands Recovery Act and RDB Act operate in the same field, but in the case of debts due to banks, the amount above Rs. 10.00 lakhs, the RDB Act would assume exclusive jurisdiction and have overriding effect over the other law. The RDB Act by nature, is a special enactment and would therefore prevail upon the general law. 13. Since the RDB Act came into force from the appointed date i.e. on 24.6.1993 and since claim of debt against the petitioners herein is above Rs. 10.00 lakhs, the procedure for recovery of the claim amount can be made only through Debt Recovery Tribunal established under the RDB Act and not through certificate proceeding under the Public Demands Recovery Act. The claim of the respondent bank for recovery of the debt amounts against the petitioners could not therefore be entertainable by the Certificate Officer under the Public Demands Recovery Act. The Certificate Officer cannot therefore exercise any jurisdiction to adjudicate upon and to execute the claim of the respondent bank against the petitioners through certificate proceedings under the PDR Act. The judgment referred to by the learned Counsel for the respondents in the case of Greater Bombay Co-op Bank, (supra) would not apply to the facts of the present case since, the facts of the aforesaid case relate to Cooperative Bank which does not come within the definition of 'Bank' as provided under Section 2(d) of the Act of RDB Act. Likewise, the judgment referred to in the case of Modern Syntax (i) Ltd. (Supra) would also not apply to the facts of the present case as because, issues in the aforesaid case relates to the claim of recovery of debt owed by Industrial Undertaking which was declared as Relief Undertaking under the meaning of Rajasthan Relief Undertakings (Special Provisions) Act, 1961 under which special provision for recovery of debt has been laid down. 14. As regards the next contention of the learned Counsel for the respondent Bank that since alternative remedy of appeal against the impugned orders of the Certificate Officer is available under the PDR Act, the present writ application cannot be maintainable, the same in my opinion, is misconceived in the context of the present case. 14. As regards the next contention of the learned Counsel for the respondent Bank that since alternative remedy of appeal against the impugned orders of the Certificate Officer is available under the PDR Act, the present writ application cannot be maintainable, the same in my opinion, is misconceived in the context of the present case. It is by now well settled that the existence of alternative statutory remedy of appeal is not a constitutional bar to High Court's jurisdiction but is a self imposed restriction and the alternative remedy would not operate as a bar. 15. In the case of Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai AIR1999SC22, the Supreme Court while dealing with the subject, has observed that "existence of alternative remedy would not operate as a bar in at least three contingencies and is not a constitutional bar to High Court's jurisdiction but is a self imposed restriction and the alternative remedy would not, operate in at least three contingencies. 1. Where the writ petition seeks enforcement of any of the fundamental rights; 2. Where there is violation of principles of natural justice; or 3. Where the order or the proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. 16. In the present writ applications, 1 find that the initiation of the certificate proceedings by the Certificate Officer at the instance of the respondent Bank for recovery of debt amount exceeding Rs. 10.00 lakhs, is wholly without jurisdiction of the Certificate Officer and in this view of the matter, subjecting the petitioners to avail the alternative remedy of appeal under the RDB Act, would confer jurisdiction of an authority which it does not possess. 17. In the light of the above discussions. I find merit in the grounds advanced by the petitioners in these two writ applications. Accordingly, both these writ applications are allowed. The impugned orders dated 1.2.2008 and 6.2.2008 passed by the Certificate Officer, Dhalbhum, Jamshedpur in C.C. Case No. 120(BL)/2007-08 and C.C. Case No. 123(BL}/2007-08, are hereby quashed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to cost(s). 18. The respondent Bank, if so advised, shall be at liberty to file applications for recovery of the debt amount against the petitioners before the Debt Recovery Tribunal established under the Recovery of Debt Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act. 1993. Application allowed.