JUDGMENT Hon’ble Sudhir Agarwal, J.—Aggrieved by the order dated 30.4.2008, whereby the Presiding Officer, Rampur has rejected application of the petitioners regarding the authority of Sri Harsh Kumar Gupta to represent respondent No. 1 (employer) in various adjudication cases pending thereat, this writ petition has been filed contending that though the petitioners have not given any consent for representation of the respondent No. 1 through a legal practitioner, yet in utter violation of provisions of Section 6-I (2) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘1947 Act’) read with Rule-40 of U.P. Industrial Disputes Rules, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as ‘1957 Rules’) the respondent No. 2 has illegally rejected their objection. It is contended that unless there is a clear consent given by the parties before the Tribunal, other party cannot be represented through a legal practitioner and in support of the above submission reliance has been placed on the judgment of this Court in Fertilizer Karkhana Mazdoor Union etc. v. P.O. Industrial Tribunal, II, Lucknow and others, 1987 (54) FLR 577 and another single Judge judgment of High Court of Delhi in Hindustan Motors Limited v. Presiding Officer and others, 2004 (100) FLR 31. 2. I have considered the above submissions. However, I am not inclined to accept the same. In my view, the writ petition does not deserve any merit and is liable to be dismissed in limine. From the order of the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, it is evident that on the date when Sri Harsh Kumar Gupta filed his authority to represent respondent No. 1 in various adjudication cases, no objection was raised by the authorized representative of the petitioners on those dates. Thus, Sri Harsh Kumar Gupta continued to represent the respondent No. 1 on some further dates thereat. It is only at a later stage, an objection has been raised by the petitioners regarding the authority of Sri Harsh Kumar Gupta on the ground that no consent has been given by the petitioner and that application has been rejected by the respondent No. 2 by the order impugned in this writ petition. 3. It is only at a later stage, an objection has been raised by the petitioners regarding the authority of Sri Harsh Kumar Gupta on the ground that no consent has been given by the petitioner and that application has been rejected by the respondent No. 2 by the order impugned in this writ petition. 3. This Court in Fertilizer Karkhana Mazdoor Union (supra), in view of the specific provision under Section 6-I (2) of the 1947 Act has rightly held that before being represented by a legal practitioner, it is incumbent upon the party concerned to have consent of the other side as also leave of the Labour Court or the Tribunal, as the case may be. However, in the same judgment, this Court has also held that if express consent is not secured, sometimes consent can be implied by conduct and acts of the party concerned. It would be useful to reproduce the following observations in the aforesaid judgment : “Even if express consent is not secured sometimes consent can be implied by conduct and acts. In Wharton’s Law Lexicon the word `consent’ has been defined as “and act of reason accompanied with deliberation, the mind weighing, as in balance the good or evil or either side consent supposes three things a physical power, a mental power and a free and serious use of them.” If by acts and conduct are allowed otherwise freely and seriously without any objection for which consent is required consent will be implied. In the instant case both before the Labour Court and Industrial Tribunal representatives of both the parties were present. They exchanged pleadings and got issue framed in the case. After appearing at least on 15 dates it is difficult to accept that the employers representative was not aware that employers representative was a practising lawyer. The position will obviously be different if the employees representative was not aware that employers representative was a practising lawyer at Gorakhpur, but it is a question of fact and through it may be difficult to accept such ignorance, but no definite observation can be made in this writ petition. 4. The position will obviously be different if the employees representative was not aware that employers representative was a practising lawyer at Gorakhpur, but it is a question of fact and through it may be difficult to accept such ignorance, but no definite observation can be made in this writ petition. 4. In the present case, it is not the case of the petitioners that on the date when Sri Harsh Kumar Gupta filed his authority for representing respondent No. 1, the petitioners were not aware that he is a legal practitioner and, therefore, on that date and subsequent thereto, they could not file any objection, but subsequently they came to know and then filed objection. On the other hand, from the arguments advanced by learned Counsel for the petitioners, it appears that from very beginning, the petitioners were aware that Sri Harsh Kumar Gupta was a legal practitioner, but they did not raise any objection regarding his authority to represent respondent No. 1 when he filed the same and the matter, thereafter, proceeded on certain other dates. It is only at a later date that the said objection has been raised. So far as the leave of the Court is concerned, when the authorization is filed by the legal practitioner and has been taken on record by the Labour Court or the Industrial Disputes Tribunal, as the case may be, on a particular date without there being any objection by the other side and, thereafter, the matter has proceeded on certain dates, in my view, it is sufficient compliance of Section 6-I (2) of 1947 Act and the leave of the Court concerned can be treated to have been granted impliedly. Subsequently it is not permissible to such party to raise an objection that the other side is represented by a legal practitioner, though no consent has been given for the said purpose. In Fertilizer Karkhana Mazdoor Union (supra), the Court has upheld this view that consent and leave can be by implication and not being in writing as would be evident from the following : “Normally, any leave granted by a Court or a Tribunal would be in writing and consent by a party in writing. But in view of Section 36(4) which does not contain any such requirement it cannot be said that consent is negatived by the Statute. But in view of Section 36(4) which does not contain any such requirement it cannot be said that consent is negatived by the Statute. The consent of the other side can be implied from the facts and circumstances of the case.” 5. The judgment of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in support of the contention that even if initially consent may be implied but it is always open to withdraw the same subsequently, I am of the view that a perusal of the 1947 Act as well as Rules framed thereunder nowhere permits such a course open to that party to subsequently invalidate the representation of a party through legal practitioner by withdrawing consent or by raising an objection regarding the representation through legal practitioner. From the judgment of the Delhi High Court, it appears that three Hon’ble High Courts, namely, Kerala High Court in the case of Calicut Co-operative Milk Supply Union v. Calicut Co-operative Milk Supply Workers Union, 1987 (54) FLR 326, Hon’ble Bombay High Court in Engineering Mazdoor Sabha, Bombay v. Meher and others, 1966 (1) LLJ 580 and Msco Private Limited v. S.D. Rane and others 1982 FLR 89 (Bom.) and Hon’ble Calcutta High Court in Reckitt and Colman of India Ltd. and others v. Jitendra Nath Maitra and others, A.I.R. 1956 Cal. 353, have also taken a similar view that once consent is there, subsequently, it cannot be withdrawn but the Hon’ble Delhi High Court has taken a different view following its earlier decision. In my view, considering the scheme of 1947 Act and Rules framed thereunder, there is no provision or scope of making an otherwise valid representation of the party to be invalid or incompetent at a later stage and, therefore, I am inclined to concur the view taken by Hon’ble Calcutta, Bombay and Kerala High Courts. 6. In the result, I do not find any merit in this writ petition warranting interference against the order impugned in this writ petition. It is, accordingly dismissed. ————