JUDGMENT 1. Rule returnable forthwith. Heard finally by consent of the parties. 2. In Writ Petition No.1839/1993, this Court delivered judgment on 18.6.2007, allowing the writ petition thereby this Court quashed the order dated 12.1.1993, passed by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Nagpur and restored the order dated 6.11.1989, made by Sub Divisional Officer, Jalgaon (Jamod) with costs of Rs.10,000/- and with further direction to deliver the possession to the original petitioner landlord within a period of four weeks. 3. The review applicants claiming to be the tenants, filed this review petition and since Advocate Shri S.R. Deshpande for the applicants argued that the said judgment, dated 18.6.2007, was contrary to the Supreme Court judgment in the case of Ramchandra Keshav Adke (Dead) by Lrs. ...Versus...Govind Joti Chavare and others, reported in AIR 1975 Supreme Court 915 as well as full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Madhao Tatya Sonar...Versus...The Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, at Nagpur and others, reported in AIR 1971 Bombay 106 and another judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Jairam s/o Krishnas Mali (Sonune)...Versus...Digambar Gopinath Sutar (dead) through Lrs., reported in 2008 (2) Mh.L.J. 523 but in consonance with Division Bench judgment in Letters Patent Appeal No.38/1984, (Krishnabai Babarao Wasankar and others...Versus...The State of Maharashtra) decided on 12.12.1986, this Court stayed the said judgment dated 18.6.2007 and decided to hear the review petition. 4. The contentions now raised by Advocate Shri Deshpande in review petition were not raised when the said writ petition No.1839/1993 was finally heard. However, since it was stated that the judgment under review was contrary to the aforesaid judgments, I decided to hear this review petition with a view to decide the legal aspect of the matter. 5. 4. The contentions now raised by Advocate Shri Deshpande in review petition were not raised when the said writ petition No.1839/1993 was finally heard. However, since it was stated that the judgment under review was contrary to the aforesaid judgments, I decided to hear this review petition with a view to decide the legal aspect of the matter. 5. Advocate Shri Deshpande for the review applicants raised the following contentions : (1) There was no legal and valid surrender of tenancy under Section 20 of the Bombay Tenancy & Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act, 1958 by the original tenant Dattu Ramu on 1.3.1959, inasmuch as there was no evidence to show that the surrender was made voluntarily by him to the landlord and that the document of surrender was not verified by Tahsildar and further that there was no order under Section 36 (2) of the Tenancy Act for delivery of possession by tenant Dattu Ramu to the original landlord, though the surrender deed shows handing over of possession by Dattu Ramu on his own. The full Bench of this Court took the view that a tenant does not cease to be a tenant, even though he has handed over possession, without an order of possession made under Section 36 (2) by Tahsildar. (2) The requirements of valid surrender have been found to be mandatory by the Supreme Court in the case of Ramchandra Adke, reported in AIR 1975 Supreme Court 915 and in this case requirements not being made surrender stood vitiated. (3) There was no enquiry made as contemplated by Section 21 of the Tenancy Act and, therefore, also the surrender was vitiated. Application under Section 120 of the Tenancy Act filed by the landlord was not maintainable. In case of invalid surrender, the review applicants become deemed owners. (4) Rule 11 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Rules, amended on 10.11.1959 has no application because the alleged surrender took place on 1.3.1959 i.e. prior to the coming into force of amended Rule 11 of the Rules. (5) The possession having not been obtained by landlord within two years from the date of surrender, the landlord lost his rights to obtain/retain possession as permanent tenancy is conferred on such tenant despite surrender. (6) Despite delivery of possession in 1959 upon surrender as recited in the surrender deed, the tenant remained in possession continuously till 1984 and thereafter. (5) The possession having not been obtained by landlord within two years from the date of surrender, the landlord lost his rights to obtain/retain possession as permanent tenancy is conferred on such tenant despite surrender. (6) Despite delivery of possession in 1959 upon surrender as recited in the surrender deed, the tenant remained in possession continuously till 1984 and thereafter. (7) In case this Court finds existence of contradictory judgments of this Court, this Court should request Hon'ble the Chief Justice to constitute Larger Bench. 6. The original applicant/landlord despite service did not appear in the review proceedings and, therefore, the learned A.G.P. was requested to assist this Court, but none from the office of Government Pleader was prepared with the matter on the dates of final hearing of this review petition on the ground that the office of Government Pleader did not have the file of the review petition and connected documents. When Advocate Shri Deshpande was asked about it, he replied that at least on two occasions xerox sets were provided to the office of Government Pleader. On 14.7.2008, I made the following order : Mr. Jichkar, A.G.P. to collect the xerox copy of the petition along with all documents annexed with the petition by today evening. List the matter on 16.7.2008 at Sr. No.1 for final disposal. Interim orders to continue.. On 16.7.2008, Mr. Khubalkar, A.G.P. appeared and sought adjournment on the ground that services of 'A' panel Counsel were being engaged. Deprecating this attitude, I refused to grant adjournment since litigation which commenced in the year 1959 is yet to see its end. With this state of affairs, I decided to proceed with hearing with the assistance of learned Counsel for the review petitioner after going through the R & P myself for hours together. 7. Original petitioner Laxmikant filed application under Section 120 of the Tenancy Act in respect of the suit property, namely, Survey No.3/2, 35/3 Mouja Patan, Tq. Jalgaon (Jamod). It was stated in the application that Dattu Ramu the original tenant held the said suit fields as tenant since 1951-52 till 1961-62. He filed surrender deed dated 1.3.1959 under his signature, signed by two witnesses, which recites that the suit land was given in possession of the landlord, as Dattu Ramu wanted to surrender the said tenanted lands voluntarily and would never object to the same in future. He filed surrender deed dated 1.3.1959 under his signature, signed by two witnesses, which recites that the suit land was given in possession of the landlord, as Dattu Ramu wanted to surrender the said tenanted lands voluntarily and would never object to the same in future. This surrender deed dated 1.3.1959 was then verified and accepted and ultimately on 19.11.1962 the decision of verification and acceptance was taken and proceedings were disposed of. Record shows that the landlord came into possession accordingly and vide crops statements filed along with list of documents at page No.81 of the record of Sub Divisional Officer that in the year 1962-63, 1963-64, 1971-72 and 1977-78 Ganesh, Laxmikant and Parvati were placed in possession and nowhere there is name of Dattu Ramu. It appears that from 1982-83 to 1986-87 the lands were not cultivated and were shown as fallow but suddenly the name of Gitabai has been inserted as in cultivating possession. There is no explanation as to how Gitabai came in possession at such late stage and it is rightly observed by the S.D.O. coupled with the evidence of landlord that the applicants in the application were in service and the land was being looked after with the help of Dattu Ramu. Dr. Siddheshwar used to look after the land at Patan while residing at Jalgaon Jamod intermittently and since the land was not brought into cultivation in some years, it remained fallow. It appears that again in 1984-85 the legal representatives of Dattu Ramu took possession and that is why the application under Section 120 was filed filed by the landlord. There is whatsoever no pleading or evidence from the review applicants that any fresh agreement of tenancy was entered into either with Dattu Ramu during his life time or after his death in 1977 with Gitabai or other legal representatives. In the written statement that was filed to the said application on 14.7.1987, the review applicants denied the execution of surrender deed itself. No other plea now argued about maintainability on any other ground was at all raised. In the wake of document of surrender on record corroborated by the fact that crop statements for 1962-63, 1963-64, 1971-72 i.e. immediately after order, dated 19.11.1962, and surrender deed, dated 1.3.1959, do not show the name of Dattu Ramu at all but show the names of landlords, mere denial was of no consequence. In the wake of document of surrender on record corroborated by the fact that crop statements for 1962-63, 1963-64, 1971-72 i.e. immediately after order, dated 19.11.1962, and surrender deed, dated 1.3.1959, do not show the name of Dattu Ramu at all but show the names of landlords, mere denial was of no consequence. There was no challenge to the surrender deed on any count whatsoever except saying that there was no surrender deed executed. On the contrary, in paragraph No.9, it was stated that after accepting an amount of Rs.1368/- the sale-deed was executed by landlord in favour of Dattu Ramu and the said document was relied. But the same was never produced. Thereafter, it is stated in the written statement that an amount of Rs.1,000/- was paid to the father of the applicants and the sale-deed was to be executed thereafter but since Dattu Ramu died, sale-deed could not be executed. 8. It is pertinent to note that there is absolutely no challenge in the written statement to the document of execution of surrender deed dated 1.3.1959 nor it was the case of the review applicants that the surrender was not voluntary and that the possession was never delivered on 1.3.1959 or in 1962-63 to the landlord immediately after surrender was accepted on 19.11.1962. It was never stated that the surrender was never verified by Tahsildar or that the requirements of Sections 20, 21 and Rule 11 were not complied with. Such a stand was never taken. Therefore, the submissions regarding validity of surrender sought to be put to challenge now on these grounds cannot be allowed and the presumption of genuineness attached to the surrender deed cannot be wiped out. Therefore, the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Ramchandra Adke and other related judgments on that point are not applicable. Similarly, no plea was set up anywhere that there was no order under Section 36 (2) for putting the landlord in possession after surrender and, therefore, on facts even the full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Madhao Tatya (supra) cannot be made applicable. Similarly, no plea was set up anywhere that there was no order under Section 36 (2) for putting the landlord in possession after surrender and, therefore, on facts even the full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Madhao Tatya (supra) cannot be made applicable. Even then at a later point of time, I will give reasons as to why the full Bench decision and the decision rendered by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Jairam...Versus...Digambar are contrary to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Vallabbhai Nathabhai...Versus...Bai Jivi and others, reported in AIR 1969 Supreme Court 1190 as rightly found by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Krishnabai Babarao Wasankar and others...Versus...The State of Maharashtra, decided on 12.12.1986 (unreported), cited supra. 9. In the evidence of Pralhad, contrary stand was taken that Dattu Ramu had never filed any document of surrender but then that is falsified by the documentary evidence, existing in the office of Tahsildar, certified copy of which is filed on record. The evidence of Laxmikant that surrender was verified after the same was filed has gone unchallenged. The evidence of Laxmikant is fully corroborated regarding delivery of possession to landlord after surrender as is clear from the crop statements of 1962-63 onwards. It is thus clear that the surrender was fully acted upon and attained finality. The review applicants cannot be allowed to open the said issue over and again. Now there is a report that relevant records of this case has been destroyed as per rules. Following observation in paragraph No.9 of the order made by the Sub Divisional Officer is relevant. In my opinion, the non applicants have failed to prove that their possession is lawful and authorized. The contract of tenancy is not proved. It is not known as to who and what that money. No receipts of payments of amount or cash are produced, hence entry in crop statement without the above particulars will not help the non applicants.. 10. The contract of tenancy is not proved. It is not known as to who and what that money. No receipts of payments of amount or cash are produced, hence entry in crop statement without the above particulars will not help the non applicants.. 10. In AIR 1969 SC 1190 (supra) Shelat, J. delivering the judgment of the Supreme Court has observed in para 5 at page 831 of the report as under : Under Section 15 (1) a tenant, as defined by Section 2 (18) of the Act, can terminate the tenancy in respect of the land held by him as a tenant by surrendering his interest in favour of his landlord and as provided by sub-section (2) on such surrender of the tenancy the landlord becomes entitled to retain the land so surrendered by the tenant in the same manner as when the tenancy is terminated under Sections 31 and 31-A of the Act. The tenancy on such surrender comes to an end and thereupon the relationship between them of a landlord and a tenant and the rights arising out of that relationship terminate. The Legislature, however, was aware of the possibility of landlords taking advantage over the tenants and therefore to safeguard the tenants against such a possibility it laid down through the proviso that a surrender by a tenant could only be valid and binding on him if it was in writing and was verified by the Mamlatdar. Before the Mamlatdar would verify such surrender it would be his duty to ascertain whether the surrender was voluntary and was not under pressure or undue influence of the landlord. But once the surrender satisfies these two conditions it has the same effect as the termination of tenancy: the tenancy comes to an end and the landlord becomes entitled to retain the land of which possession is delivered to him by the tenant surrendering his interest as a tenant therein.. The Supreme Court has placed the above interpretation on Section 15 of the Act and it proceeds upon the footing that if there is a valid surrender within the meaning of Section 15, the tenancy comes to an end on such valid surrender. The Supreme Court has placed the above interpretation on Section 15 of the Act and it proceeds upon the footing that if there is a valid surrender within the meaning of Section 15, the tenancy comes to an end on such valid surrender. The tenant thereafter ceases to be a tenant and the relationship of landlord and tenant comes to an end thereafter there is no question of the landlord being required to secure any order for possession because at the time of surrender itself the tenant would deliver possession of the land, till then in his cultivation, to the landlord. It does not appeal to logic as to how even after a valid and voluntary surrender, a tenant continues to be a tenant and despite the tenant surrendering possession voluntarily, the landlord is under an obligation to take resort to Sub Section 2 of Section 36 of the Tenancy Act. It is unfortunate that the decision in Vallabhbhai's case, AIR 1969 SC 1190 (supra) was not brought to the attention of the Full Bench of this Court because the Full Bench proceeds upon the footing that even though there may be a valid surrender, the tenant does not cease to be a tenant and he continues to be a tenant until an order is passed by the Mamlatdar or the Tahsildar, as the case may be, directing possession to be handed over. I may point out that under Section 2 (18) (s), .tenant. means a person who holds land on lease and includes a person who is deemed to be a tenant under Section 4. It is in the light of this definition of the word .tenant. occurring in Section 2 (18) that the Supreme Court in Vallabhbhai's case (supra) interpreted the provisions of Section 15 (1) of the Act. 11. In L.P.A. No.38/1984 (Krishnabai Babarao Wasankar and others...Versus...The State of Maharashtra), decided on 12.12.1986, this Court considering the above judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Vallabbhai observed thus : We have examined the relevant provisions as contained in Bombay Act as well as in the Vidarbha Act, Section 36 (1) of the Vidarbha Act provides the media to a tenant for taking possession like section 29 (1) of the Bombay Act. Section 36 (1) simply incorporates an additional contingency when a tenant can take resort to the provisions laid down therein for taking possession, if he is evicted in contravention of sub-section (2) of Section 36. Except this addition, the provisions and the scheme under Section 36 (1) of the Vidarbha Act is virtually pari materia to the provisions laid down under Section 29 (1) of the Bombay Act. However, what is relevant for our consideration is not the provisions laid down under sub-section (1) but sub-section (2) of Section 36 of the Vidarbha Act is identical to Section 29 (2) of the Bombay Act. Similarly, the provisions laid down under Section 20 of the Vidarbha Act are identical to those laid down under Section 15 (1) of the Bombay Act. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the decision of the Supreme Court in Vallabhbhai's case is all fours for deciding the question involved herein. Section 20 of the Vidarbha Act reads as under :- A tenant may terminate the tenancy at any time by surrendering his interest as a tenant in favour of the landlord. Section 15 (1) of the Bombay Act reads as under :- A tenant may terminate the tenancy in respect of any land at any time by surrendering his interest therein in favour of the landlord.. On plain reading of these provisions, it appears that one of the mode to bring an end to the relationship of landlord and tenant is by surrendering the interest by a tenant in favour of a landlord. The purport of these provisions do not indicate that the tenant continues to be so even after validly surrendering the tenancy right in favour of a landlord and further voluntarily delivering the possession to him. Section 36 (2) of the Vidarbha Act contemplates various occasions when the landlord is required to take resort for obtaining possession of a land held by a tenant. However, in our opinion, on surrendering the tenancy right in his favour by a tenant and consequent termination of a tenancy, is not an occasion which is comprehended under the provisions of Sub-Section 2 of Section 36, for obtaining possession by a landlord with order of Tahsildar. After valid surrender of tenancy rights, according to us, the land cannot said to be held by a tenant, as contemplated under Section 36 (2) of the Vidarbha Act. After valid surrender of tenancy rights, according to us, the land cannot said to be held by a tenant, as contemplated under Section 36 (2) of the Vidarbha Act. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in appeal Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.11663/1987, decided on 20.2.1989 against this judgment made the following order. In view of the facts mentioned in paragraphs 9 and 10 of the judgment under appeal, we are of the opinion that this case does not call for interference in any manner under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. In the aforesaid view of the matter, we are also of the opinion that it is not necessary for us to express any opinion on the correctness or otherwise on the other aspect of law discussed by the High Court. We, therefore, do not express any opinion on the correctness or otherwise on the decision rendered by the Full Bench of the High Court in Madhav Vs. Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal and Others (1970 Maharashtra Law Journal 991). The Special Leave Petition, therefore, fails and is dismissed accordingly. 12. The judgment rendered by the Division Bench in the case of Jairam s/o Krishnas Mali (Sonune)...Versus...Digambar Gopinath Sutar (dead) through Lrs., reported in 2008 (2) Mh.L.J. 523 does not correctly consider the binding effect of the Supreme Court judgment in the case of Vallabbhai. Therefore, I prefer to hold that the judgment rendered by the Division Bench in the case of Krishnabai Babarao Wasankar and others...Versus...The State of Maharashtra (unreported) correctly recognizes the binding effect of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Vallabbhai and since the Full Bench in the case of Madhao Tatya Sonar...Versus...The Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, at Nagpur and others, reported in AIR 1971 BOMBAY 106 is not in line with the Supreme Court judgment in the case of Vallabbhai, what would be binding on me is the said Supreme Court judgment in the case of Vallabhbhai. Hence, I do not feel that there is any need to request the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of this Court to refer the matter to the Larger Bench. 13. The term surrender as per Advanced Law Lexicon 3rd Edition 2005 is as under : Surrender of tenancy. The termination of a lease, which occurs when a tenant gives up his interest to his landlord. Surrender can be express of implied. 13. The term surrender as per Advanced Law Lexicon 3rd Edition 2005 is as under : Surrender of tenancy. The termination of a lease, which occurs when a tenant gives up his interest to his landlord. Surrender can be express of implied. Express surrender is usually in the form of a deed. When the lease is for less than three years, no deed is needed provided that the tenant signs a written agreement to surrender. Implied surrender occurs when the actions of both parties show that they consider the lease to be at an end; for example, then the tenant gives up possession and the landlord reoccupies the property. (Oxford Law Dictionary, 5th Edn., 2003). It would be travesty of justice if the real meaning to the word .surrender. is not given. When Dattu Ramu during his life time never disputed the surrender deed, accepting the story of the legal representatives about the alleged void character of the surrender would be nothing but making Section 20 of the Act nugatory. 14. The contentions raised by Advocate Shri Deshpande about maintainability of application under Section 120 of the Tenancy Act and the doctrine of holding over/on and the judgment of Single Judge of this Court in the case of Bapuappa s/o Punjappa Wani...Versus...Shiram s/o Balwanta Muley and others, reported in 1996 (1) Bom. C.R. 107 cannot be considered since this plea was never raised or set up at any point of time right since inception. Other points raised by Advocate Shri Deshpande cannot be considered, having been raised for the first time after long number of years. 15. This Court had while dismissing Writ Petition No.1839/1993 saddled costs of Rs.10,000/- on the respondents in that petition and review applicants herein. Looking to the conduct of the respondents in somehow dragging the proceedings for over two decades and not delivering the possession despite surrender, I impose costs of Rs.30,000/- (Thirty Thousand Only) on the review applicants, payable to the original petitioner/landlord within a period of four weeks from today. Earlier costs of Rs.10,000/- in Writ Petition No.1839/1993, if not paid, and the present costs of Rs.30,000/- shall be recovered from the review applicants by Tahsildar as arrears of land revenue and paid to the original petitioner/landlord within a period of ten weeks from the date of receipt of writ of this Court. Earlier costs of Rs.10,000/- in Writ Petition No.1839/1993, if not paid, and the present costs of Rs.30,000/- shall be recovered from the review applicants by Tahsildar as arrears of land revenue and paid to the original petitioner/landlord within a period of ten weeks from the date of receipt of writ of this Court. The Tahsildar concerned shall deliver the possession of the suit fields within four weeks from today to the landlords. 16. The Misc. Civil Application is, thus, dismissed with costs of Rs.30,000/- (Rupees Thirty Thousand Only). Rule is discharged.