JUDGMENT : A.S. Naidu, J. - Admittedly the Appellant as Plaintiff had filed T.S. No. 362 of 1987 in the court of then 2nd Addl. Subordinate Judge (presently Civil Judge, Senior Division), Cuttack praying for a decree of permanent injunction and realisation of damages of Rs. 6,400.00 against fourteen Defendants. 2. The suit lands appertain to Sabak Settlement Plot No. 1211 of Khata No. 693 corresponding to Hal Settlement Plot No. 286 of Khata No. 251 measuring Ac. 0.60 decimals out of Ac. 1.365 decimals of village Bahar Bisinabar, Cuttack Town as per Schedule 'A' to the pliant. 3. This being a Second Appeal without dilating the facts, it will suffice to say that the Plaintiff claimed right, title and interest over the disputed lands by virtue of a sale deed said to have been executed in her favour by Tilotama Praharaj. According to the Plaintiff, the disputed lands were part and parcel of an intermediary estate of late Chadrasekhar Praharaj, husband of Tilotama and situated at Mouza Bahar Bisinabar under Sidheswarpur Estate. After vesting of the estate, the same were settled in favour of Tilotama. On the other hand, according to the Defendants, Chandrasekhar Praharaj was never the intermediary in respect of the disputed lands and rather Padmanav Acharya and Gajendra Acharya were the intermediaries. They had inducted one Judhistir Pradhan as a tenant and the latter was in possession of the lands. After vesting of the Mouza in the State, Ekpadia was submitted in favour of said Judhistir and his name was also reflected in the Tenants' Ledger. He was recognized as a tenant by the State. After death of Judhistir, his son had alienated the suit lands in favour of the Defendants by different registered sale deeds and conveyed absolute right, title and interest in respect thereof. The Defendants thus claim to be the absolute owners in possession of the disputed lands which they claimed to have purchased. 4. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the Trial Court framed eight issues for deciding the suit. In order to substantiate their respective cases, both sides adduced oral and documentary evidence. The Trial Court after discussing the evidence in extenso and relying upon the order passed in favour of Tilotama under Sections 6, 7 and 8A of the OEA Act in OEA Misc. In order to substantiate their respective cases, both sides adduced oral and documentary evidence. The Trial Court after discussing the evidence in extenso and relying upon the order passed in favour of Tilotama under Sections 6, 7 and 8A of the OEA Act in OEA Misc. Case No. 22 of 1958 held that she had acquired valid title to the suit lands and the Plaintiff by virtue of the registered sale deed executed by Tilotama had also acquired valid right, title and interest over the said lands. Accordingly the Trial Court decreed the suit permanently restraining the Defendants by way of injunction from interfering with Plaintiffs possession over the suit lands and directing the Defendants to pay a sum of Rs. 6,400.00 as damages to the Plaintiff. The judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court were assailed by the Defendants in Title Appeal No. 16 of 1992 which was heard by the 1st Addl. District Judge, Cuttack. The Defendants also field a petition under Order 41, Rule 27 of the CPC with a prayer to accept a certified copy of Register 'D-Part I' combined with Register 'A' maintained by the OEA authorities as additional evidence in support of their case stating that the said registers indicated the names of intermediaries in respect of the Mouza to which the suit lands appertained and threw light on the controversy and was also very much necessary for complete adjudication of the inter se dispute. The Appellate Court after hearing the counsel for the parties and considering the averments made in the petition and the objection thereto, came to the conclusion that the certified copies sought to be accepted as additional evidence were highly essential for arriving at a just decision in the case. Accordingly it allowed the petition and accepted the said documents as additional evidence by marking the same as Ext. 14 and Ext. V. After hearing the counsel for the parties and discussing the entire evidence, the Appellate Court came to the conclusion that members of one Acharya family were the ex-intermediaries in respect of the suit village and not Praharaj family. It further held that Judhistir Pradhan was inducted as a tenant by the ex-proprietor Padmanav Acharya which fact was corroborated from Rent Roll Ext. B, Tenants' Ledger Ext. It further held that Judhistir Pradhan was inducted as a tenant by the ex-proprietor Padmanav Acharya which fact was corroborated from Rent Roll Ext. B, Tenants' Ledger Ext. C. He was recognised as owner of the lands in question and had been paid compensation under the Land Acquisition Act. The said Court further held that Judhistir Pradhan had valid right, title and interest in respect of the suit lands and after his death his son had acquired such right, title and interest by succession and that the Defendants having purchased portions of the suit lands through registered sale deeds Exts. F, G and H from the true owner, title to the said lands passed on to them. So far the question of possession of the suit lands was concerned, the Appellate Court after discussing the evidence held that there was No. material evidence to establish that the Plaintiff was in possession of the suit lands and rather it appeared from the evidence that Judhistir was possessing the suit lands and there was No. evidence as to when Judhistir had been dispossessed from the suit lands by Tilotama or any other person. On the basis of such conclusions the Appellate Court allowed the appeal, thereby setting aside the impugned judgment and decree of the Trial Court. The Plaintiff has therefore filed this Second Appeal. 5. this Court admitted the Second Appeal on the following substantial questions of law: (1) Whether the first Appellate Court had jurisdiction to sit upon an order of the O.E.A. Collector? and (2) Whether the first Appellate Court is justified in admitting certain documents as additional evidence in support of the case of the present Respondents? 6. In course of hearing it was contended by Mr. Bhuyan, the Learned Counsel for the Respondents, that during pendency of this Second Appeal, Defendant-Respondent Nos. 4, 6 and 9, namely, Jhari Bhoi, Bangali Bhoi and Pari Bhoi respectively, having expired and No. substitution of their legal representatives having been made, the appeal abated against them and this Court has ordered accordingly, vide order dated 12-03-1999. The disputed land being the same and the relief against the Defendants being also same and the decree being inseparable, as a consequence of abatement of the appeal as against the deceased Respondents, the appeal bates as a whole and cannot subsist against the surviving Respondents alone. The disputed land being the same and the relief against the Defendants being also same and the decree being inseparable, as a consequence of abatement of the appeal as against the deceased Respondents, the appeal bates as a whole and cannot subsist against the surviving Respondents alone. The Second Appeal is therefore liable to be dismissed on this technical ground alone. Emphasizing further, he submitted that by abatement of the Second Appeal against the deceased Respondents the decision of the Appellate Court remains confirmed, I.e. the Plaintiff has lost the suit against the said Respondents. As the said deceased Respondents were in possession of portions of lands respectively purchased by them out of the very same suit lands like the surviving Respondents and the Plaintiff had sought the same relief, i.e. permanent injunction and recovery of damages against the deceased Respondents as well as the surviving Respondents, the decision of this Court on merit may result in conflict, inasmuch as the subject-matter of dispute and the relief sought by the Plaintiff being one and same against all the Defendants, surviving and deceased, decision may be different in respect of them which will lead to a chaotic situation. Though he fortified his 'contention by certain decisions, this Court feels it just and prudent to look into the merit of the appeal first, rather than delving into the technical-oriented contention. 7. Therefore this Court heard the appeal on merit. In course of hearing Mr. Kar, Learned Counsel for the Appellant, addressed this Court on the first substantial question involved in this appeal. He submitted that a Civil Court has No. jurisdiction to sit upon an order of settlement passed Cinder the Orissa Estates Abolition Act. In support of his contention he relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of Krushna Chandra v. Hemamani Biswal, reported in AIR 1971 Ori 140 , wherein it was held that a settlement by the OEA Collector cannot be questioned by a civil court and that the findings of an OEA Collector regarding possession of a disputed land cannot be challenged in such Court. 8. Referring to Section 39 of the OEA Act he further submitted that jurisdiction of a Civil Court has been ousted in certain matters. 8. Referring to Section 39 of the OEA Act he further submitted that jurisdiction of a Civil Court has been ousted in certain matters. The said Section provides as follows:- No suit shall be brought in any Civil Court in respect of any entry in or omission from a Compensation Assessment Roll or in respect of any order passed under Chapters II to VI or concerning any matter which is or has already been a subject-matter of any application made or proceeding taken under the said Chapters. According to Mr. Kar, a Civil Court has No. jurisdiction to sit upon a decision of an OEA Collector or an order of settlement made under the said Act. This submission of Mr. Kar is strongly repudiated by Mr. Bhuyan. According to Mr. Bhuyan civil court has always jurisdiction to examine validity of a decision of the OEA 'authorities, and as a matter of fact a quasi-judicial authority has limited jurisdiction. In other words, a suit will always lie to examine the validity or otherwise of a decision of the OEA authorities. While dealing with a similar question in the case of Raghunath Subudhi Vs. The State of Orissa and Others this Court held that bar u/s 39 would not be attracted to an administrative order of settlement. A citizen has always a remedy in ordinary Civil Court for redressal of his grievance. Such a remedy can be held to be barred only on very clear and unmistakable indication to the contrary in any special Statute. To put it otherwise, a Civil Court, assumes jurisdiction to delve into disputes of civil nature unless a special Statute creates an express bar. The question of exclusion of jurisdiction of Civil Court to entertain a civil case by virtue of specific provisions contained in a special Statute came for examination in several cases. In the case of Firm and Illuri Subbayya Chetty and Sons Vs. The State of Andhra Pradesh it was held as follows:- ...Non-compliance with the provisions of the Statute to which reference is made by the Privy Council must, we think, be Non-compliance with such fundamental provisions of the statute as would make the entire proceedings before the appropriate authority illegal and without jurisdiction. The State of Andhra Pradesh it was held as follows:- ...Non-compliance with the provisions of the Statute to which reference is made by the Privy Council must, we think, be Non-compliance with such fundamental provisions of the statute as would make the entire proceedings before the appropriate authority illegal and without jurisdiction. Similarly, if an appropriate has acted in violation of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure, that may also tend to make the proceedings illegal and void and this infirmity may affect the validity of the order passed by the authority in question. It is cases of this character where the defect or the infirmity in the order goes to the root of the order and makes it in law invalid and void that these observations may perhaps be invoked in support of the plea that the civil court can exercise its jurisdiction notwithstanding a provision to the contrary contained in the relevant statute. The Privy Council in the case of AIR 1940 105 (Privy Council), while dealing with a similar controversy observed as follows:- Exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is not to be readily inferred, but that such exclusion must either be explicitly expressed m clearly implied. It is also well settled that even if jurisdiction is so excluded, the Civil Courts had jurisdiction to examine into cases where the provisions of the-Act had not been complied with or the statutory Tribunals had not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. this Court had also the occasion to deal with similar question in the case of Puri-Konark Development Authority Vs. Ratna Bhadra and Others and held that Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to examine cases where there are allegations that the provisions of a particular Act has not been complied with or a statutory authority has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. Considering the matter from a different angle, this Court feels that even if a Civil Court had jurisdiction to examine into the cases where the provisions of the Act had not been complied with or statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure or there was violation of principles of natural justice and equity. In such cases the Civil Court has jurisdiction to examine the propriety or validity of the order passed. In such cases the Civil Court has jurisdiction to examine the propriety or validity of the order passed. The first substantial question of law is answered with the aforesaid discussion. 9. Before delving into the second substantial question of law, it would be prudent to analyze the facts of the case a little more. Admittedly the suit lands situate in village Bahar Bisinabar which was a part of Sidheswarpur Estate. According to the Plaintiff, late Chandrasekhar Praharaj was the ex-intermediary and after his death his widow Tilotama Dibya became the intermediary and in her favour the lands had been settled. On the other hand, the contention of the Defendants was that Padmanav Acharya and Gajendra Acharya were the ex-proprietors of Sidheswarpur Estate. In support of such averment, the Defendants relied upon the ROR prepared in the 1929 Settlement. The Plaintiff claims to have purchased the suit land from Tilotama; whereas according to the Defendants one Judhistir Pradhan had been inducted as a tenant in respect of the property in question by Padmanav Acharya and Gajendra Acharya and after vesting of the estate in the State, on the basis of the Tenants' Ledger (Ekpadia) and possession, he was recognised as a tenant under the State and the Defendants had purchased the suit land from the son of Judhistir after the death of the latter. 10. In course of hearing of the Title Appeal before the Appellate Court, a petition was filed under Order 41, Rule 27 CPC by the Defendants praying to accept the certified copies of Part-I of 'D' Register and also 'A' Register as additional evidence along with objection dated 21-3-1997. After hearing the Learned Counsel for the parties, the Appellate Court felt that for effectual and complete adjudication of the inter se disputes those documents were very much necessary and all the documents being public documents he admitted the same into evidence and marked the same as Exhibits. 11. Order 41, Rule 27 of the CPC deals with production of additional evidence in Appellate Court. 11. Order 41, Rule 27 of the CPC deals with production of additional evidence in Appellate Court. It stipulates that if a party to an appeal can establish that notwithstanding exercise of due diligence he could not produce certain evidence as he was not in know of the same to the time of the decree appealed against was passed and/or the Appellate Court in course of hearing requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable ti to pronounce the judgment or for any other substantial cause, it may allow such evidence or document to be produced. Thus it is well settled that additional evidence can be accepted when a Court feels that such evidence is required to enable to pronounce the judgment or for other substantial reasons. In other words, if the documents are found relevant to decide the real issue in controversy and if the Appellate Court feels that interest of justice requires that the documents may be received, exercising the power under Order 41, Rule 27 Code of Civil Procedure, it can receive the documents and consider their effect (see Billa Jagan Mohan Reddy and Another Vs. Billa Sanjeeva Reddy and Others, ). 12. In the case of Iswar Dehury v. Suchi Dei, reported in AIR 1986 Orissa 130, it was held that an Appellate Court can refuse to accept additional evidence solely on the ground that it was not given in Trial Court. The sole consideration should always be as to whether an additional evidence is needed to pronounce a judgment. 13. Considering the facts of the present case in the touch-stone of the aforesaid principles of law, this Court finds that the Appellate Court has not committed any mistake and was justified in admitting certain documents as additional evidence which went to the root of the dispute, i.e. who was the intermediary in respect of Sidheswarpur Estate. The second substantial question framed is answered accordingly. 14. Now coming to the facts of the case, it appears that the Trial Court accepted Tilotama Dibya, vendor of the Plaintiff, as the ex intermediary in respect of Mouza-Bahar Bisinabar where the suit lands situate and concluded that the Plaintiff had acquired title to the said land by virtue of her purchase. 14. Now coming to the facts of the case, it appears that the Trial Court accepted Tilotama Dibya, vendor of the Plaintiff, as the ex intermediary in respect of Mouza-Bahar Bisinabar where the suit lands situate and concluded that the Plaintiff had acquired title to the said land by virtue of her purchase. On the other hand, the Appellate Court after discussing the evidence came to the conclusion that neither Umakanta Praharaj nor his widow Tilotama Was ex-intermediary in respect of the suit lands and rather Padmanav Acharya and Gajendra Acharya were the ex-intermediaries. They had inducted Judhistir as tenant in respect of the suit lands and he was recognized as a tenant under the State after vesting of the suit lands in the State Government. By virtue of a sale deed executed by the son of Judhistir, after the death of Judhistir, the Defendants claimed title to the suit lands. 15. To appreciate the aforesaid findings, it would be prudent to scan through the evidence adduced in the suit. Ext. K is a record of rights prepared on 17th February, 1932 recording the lands in-question along with other lands in favour of one Gajendra Kumar Acharya and Ors. indicating that the Acharya family was the owner/proprietor of the lands. 16. Umakanta Praharaj, son of Tilotama who was the vendor of the Plaintiff was examined as P.W. 1. In para-7 of his deposition he stated that the previous records in respect of the suit lands stood in the names of Gajendra Kumar Acharya and Padmanav Acharya. The said statement is corroborated by Ext. 14 and Ext. v. which were certified copies of Register 'D' and Register 'A' respectively. Both the said documents reveal that Gajendra, Padmanav and Ors. were the ex- intermediaries in respect of the suit village. Ext. 14. is a public document prepared in due course official business, that too much before any dispute cropped up. Thus it throws sufficient light on the controversy. Ext. 14 and Ext. v. reveal that Praharaj family was the ex-intermediary in respect of the lands situated in Mouzas-Aralia, Boudha Chada ' Kacharamal and nine other Mouzas. But then the said registers do not reveal that village Bahar Bisinabar was part of the intermediary estate of Praharaj family. Thus it appears that Praharaj family was never the ex- intermediary in respect of the suit village. On the other hand, Ext. But then the said registers do not reveal that village Bahar Bisinabar was part of the intermediary estate of Praharaj family. Thus it appears that Praharaj family was never the ex- intermediary in respect of the suit village. On the other hand, Ext. v. reals that Gajendra Kumar Acharya, Padmanav Acharya and Ors. were the ex-intermediaries in respect of suit Mouza Bahar Bisinabar and other five villages. Thus from Ext. 14 and Ext. V, it is clear that the Acharya family and Ors. excluding Praharaj family were the ex-intermediaries in respect of the suit Mouza. Further it appears that in the year 1955, a portion of the lands out of disputed Khata were acquired under the Land Acquisition Act and compensation was granted in favour of Judhisthir Pradhan. Not being satisfied with the quantum of compensation, Judhisthir had raised objection and the matter being referred to Civil Court, Land Acquisition Misc. Case No. 34 of 1954 was registered in the Court of the District Judge, Cuttack-Dhenkanal, Cuttack. The certified copy of the order passed in the said Misc. Case has been marked Ext. A. It reveals that compensation in favour of Judhisthir had been enhanced. The said amount was paid to him subsequently. Ext. B the Rent Roll and Ext. C the Tenants' Ledger indicate the name of Judhistir as tenant. Ext. D is the draft ROR which indicates that the suit lands were recorded in the name of the son of Judhsitir after his death. Exts. F, G and H are the sale deeds by which the son of Judhistir had sold the lands in favour of the Defendants. It is pertinent to note that though Tilotama claimed to be the intermediary in possession of the suit lands, No. steps were taken by her or the Plaintiff who claimed title through her in the Land Acquisition proceeding, nor was any compensation awarded in their favour. That apart it appears that there was a partition suit of all properties belonging to Praharaj family. The said dispute was finally decided by the Privy Council as would be evident from the decision reported in AIR 1931 84 (Privy Council) and the lands of village Bahar were held not as a part of the suit property. Thus it can be safely concluded that the suit lands did not belong to Praharaj family. The said dispute was finally decided by the Privy Council as would be evident from the decision reported in AIR 1931 84 (Privy Council) and the lands of village Bahar were held not as a part of the suit property. Thus it can be safely concluded that the suit lands did not belong to Praharaj family. On the basis of such materials, the Appellate Court categorically held that neither Tilotama nor her husband were ex-intermediaries in respect of the suit lands nor were they in possession thereof, and this Court finds No. illegality or infirmity in such finding. 17. So far as the order passed by the OEA authorities settling the suit lands in favour of Tilotama u/s 8A of the OEA Act is concerned, it appears that Tilotama had filed the petition u/s 8A which had been registered as Misc. Case No. 22 of 1958. But then the OEA Act does not contain any provision for an intermediary to file a petition u/s 8A of the Act. On the other hand, after vesting of an estate, the intermediary concerned was to apply for settlement of the lands in respect of which he was in Khas possession under Sections 6 and 7 of the Act. Thus filing of a petition u/s 8A and settlement of the lands on that basis has been rightly held to be void by the Appellate Court. 18. Perusal of the impugned judgment of the Appellate Court clearly reveals that the said Court had considered the entire evidence, both oral and documentary, and this Court finds that the conclusions arrived at by it do not suffer from any infirmity. That apart, the same being findings of fact, are not open to challenged in Second Appeal. 19. Now coming to the question of abatement, this Court takes note of the pressing submission of Mr. Bhuyan that the appeal has to abate as a whole, while Mr. Kar's submission is that abatement of the appeal against some Respondents who have died cannot affect the appeal against the other Respondents. this Court takes note of the settled position of law that a decree under appeal if joint and indivisible, an appeal having abated against some of the Respondents, disposal of the said appeal on merit may create conflict among the decision in respect of the deceased Respondents and that in respect of the surviving Respondents. this Court takes note of the settled position of law that a decree under appeal if joint and indivisible, an appeal having abated against some of the Respondents, disposal of the said appeal on merit may create conflict among the decision in respect of the deceased Respondents and that in respect of the surviving Respondents. Considering the nature of the decree this Court finds that the same cannot be split up and as such the appeal has to abate as a whole. The decree under challenge being joint and indivisible, the appeal cannot proceed against the surviving Respondents and has to be dismissed consequent upon abatement of the appeal as against some Respondents due to their demise. This view of mind finds support from the decisions of this Court reported in 76 (1993) CLT 4 (Banamali Raiguru v. Bhabani Shankar Mishra) and ILR 1962 Ori 17 (State of Orissa v. Nityaranjan Bohidar). 20. Fact remains, the Defendants including the deceased Defendants having purchased the suit lands by different sale deeds are exercising their right, title and interest over the same. Even according to the Plaintiff the Defendants claiming title to the property were disturbing her possession which led her to file the suit seeking decree of permanent injunction. Thus decree of permanent injunction restraining the Defendants depends upon their title and possession. The Appellate Court has come to a definite conclusion that the Defendants had acquired valid title to the suit lands and they are in possession thereof. The said finding having attained finality in respect of the three deceased Respondents and the appeal having abated as against them, if a contrary decision is taken by this Court, that will lead to conflicting and contradictory decrees in respect of the same subject-matter and, as such, this Court holds that the Second Appeal has abated as a whole. 21. For the foregoing discussions, the Second Appeal fails on merit as also on technical ground. this Court accordingly dismisses the same and directs the parties to bear their respective costs. Final Result : Dismissed