JUDGMENT By the Court.—This writ petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by the petitioner which is a Co-operative Housing Society registered under the provisions of U.P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1965, challenges the order dated 4th July, 2003 communicated to the petitioner-society on 29th July 2003, a copy of which is annexed as Annexure-18 to the writ petition. The petitioner has further prayed for issue of writ of mandamus commanding the opposite parties to the present writ petition to allot 40% of the land acquired to the petitioner and the petitioner’s society acquired by the respondents in Sector No. 134-135 or any nearby Sector of NOIDA. 2. The brief facts are that the petitioner being registered Housing Co-operative Society and the membership of the petitioner’s society consists of officers from Indian Army, Border Security Force, Air Force, C.R.P.F., Delhi Police and other Government Department, most of the members of the petitioner’s society have already retired and have not been able to build their own houses. With the object to provide residential accommodations to its members, the petitioner-society was registered to acquire land to distribute the same to its members for housing and their residential units. The petitioner-society, which was registered in the year 1981, after registration, had purchased land from the landlords during the period 1981 to 1985 in the village Wajidpur, Tehsil Dadri, District Ghaziabad now known as District Gautam Budh Nagar, from the funds contributed by its members. It is also submitted that at the time when Ghaziabad Development Authority or NOIDA Authority were not in existence the land was not within the area for which Ghaziabad Development Authority or NOIDA Authority were constituted and as the lay out was prepared by the society it was approved by the Chief Town and Country Planner vide their order dated 3rd December, 1982, a copy whereof is annexed as Annexure-2 to the writ petition. Since the land of the petitioner-society was outside the limit of Ghaziabad Development Authority and the NOIDA Authority, the development of the area was to be taken with the approval of District Magistrate, Ghaziabad. Since the land of the petitioner-society was outside the limit of Ghaziabad Development Authority and the NOIDA Authority, the development of the area was to be taken with the approval of District Magistrate, Ghaziabad. The District Magistrate, Ghaziabad, after observing that the petitioners have completed all the formalities, entered into a registered agreement with the petitioner-society on 6th May, 1983 and thereby permitting the development of land in accordance with lay out plan, a copy of which is annexed as Annexure-3 to the writ petition. The petitioner-society has undertaken development of land, as stated above, and, according to the petitioner, has spent more than 65 lacs on roads and other internal and external developments. The petitioner has further submitted that in the year 1989 an area of about 748 acres of land in village Nagli Wajidpur was notified under the provisions of Land Acquisition Act by Notification dated 11th July, 1989. In the aforesaid notification the land belonging to petitioner-society measuring 92-19-04 Pucca Bighas was also notified. In view of the aforesaid notification dated 11th July, 1989 the petitioner-society was given a notice with the direction not to carry out any development activity in an around the area notified under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act. It further says that the development already carried out by the petitioner and its members are illegal and the petitioner was directed to remove all those constructions, 3. The notice dated 21st September, 1994 itself clearly demonstrates that the petitioner’s contention that they have already developed the land and the land was under the process of development as per sanction of the District Magistrate. The petitioner-society submitted reply dated 23rd September, 1994 to the aforesaid notice. The petitioner-society had also challenged the order dated 21st September, 1994 before this Court by means of Writ Petition No. 32957 of 1994 which was ultimately dismissed by a Division Bench on 1st July, 1997 with the direction. 4. The petitioner-society thereafter approached respondent No. 2 with a request either to permit the petitioner to develop residential sites or to allot a suitable developed plot. 4. The petitioner-society thereafter approached respondent No. 2 with a request either to permit the petitioner to develop residential sites or to allot a suitable developed plot. When there was no response from the respondents of the request of the petitioner, the petitioner under wrong legal advise filed an application No. MRTP 251 of 1997 before MRTP Commission, New Delhi which, however, was dismissed as not maintainable on account of the fact that MRTP New Delhi was not the proper forum for the issues raised by the petitioner-society. A copy of the order of MRTP Commission dated 21st September, 2000 is annexed as Annexure-8 to the writ petition, which is reproduced below : “It is submitted by the learned Counsel for the respondents that the total land measuring 748 acres is acquired and notified as industrial development area by the Government of Uttar Pradesh under the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Area Development Act, 1976 for which the provision of the said Act is attracted. This being so, in our opinion, no case for enquiry is made out against the respondents and the present RTPE 251/97 is accordingly dismissed. Notice of Enquiry and other interlocutory orders passed earlier by this Commission stand discharged.” 5. In the meantime a news item was published on 24th July, 1999 in the newspaper wherein it is notified for public in general that NOIDA authority has desired to settle down various disputes pending before various authorities. In view of the aforesaid public notice the petitioner approached NOIDA authority vide representation dated 28th July, 1999 with a request to settle the dispute outside the Court by either allowing the petitioner society to retain the present site or to allot a suitable alternative developed piece of land to enable petitioner society and its members to raise housing colony for their residence. The matter remained pending with NOIDA authority. In the meantime another development authority came in existence in the year 1991 known as Greater NOIDA Industrial Development Colony and this newly constituted authority has notified the land of different housing societies which were being developed by these Housing Cooperative Societies under the provision of Land Acquisition Act for acquiring these land for the same purpose i.e. for planned development to provide Housing site to the public. The names of such societies have been mentioned in paragraph 21 of the writ petition, namely, Jai Santoshi Sahkari Avas Samiti Limited, Alaknanda Sahkari Avas Samiti, Pushpa Enclave Sahkari Avas Grah Nirman, Chitragupt Sahkari Avas Samiti. 6. The petitioner further submitted that petitioner’s activity for allotment and construction of houses for their members was already completed much prior to issuance of notification in the year 1989 and in the year 1991. In view of the recommendation of the Committee known as ‘Khodaiji Committee’ the petitioners are entitled for allotment of either alternative site, or the land of the petitioner Society may be extended a copy of the recommendation of ‘Khodaiji Committee’ as acted upon by the authorities is annexed as Annexure-12 to the writ petition. The petitioner also relied upon a Government Order dated 2nd June, 1998 which categorically states that if the land of Co-operative Housing Society has been purchased before coming into existence of the Government Order of 1998 or if the society had duly transferred the land in favour of its members, the land may not be acquired and if it has already been acquired the same may be released. A copy of the Government Order is annexed as Annexure 13 to the writ petition. 7. The petitioner’s land in village Wajidpur has been acquired by notifications dated 20th October, 1999 and 9th March, 2000 for construction of Express High Way which shall joint Delhi, NOIDA with Agra. A new Master Plan has been enforced in the year 2001-2002 wherein land use of village Wajidpur has been changed from Agricultural or Green Belt to Residential. This master plan, according to the petitioner, shall remain in force till 2021. According to the petitioner, as per master plan referred to above, the change in land use clearly demonstrates that the authorities itself have earmarked the area for residential colonies and have notified the plans by publication in newspaper. The petitioner also made a representation dated 21st June, 2002 for the benefit of the aforesaid Government Order and decision in favour of petitioner in terms of the aforesaid Government Order. The petitioner also made a representation dated 21st June, 2002 for the benefit of the aforesaid Government Order and decision in favour of petitioner in terms of the aforesaid Government Order. The petitioner has further claimed benefit of Government Order dated 22nd October, 2002 (Annexure-15 to the writ petition) wherein it is provided that in case the land of housing co-operative societies has been acquired and notification under Land Acquisition Act has been issued them, to the extent of 50% of the acquired area may be allotted to the society as the purpose for acquisition and allotment of the land to the petitioner’s society is one and the same, namely, development of housing colonies. When no orders were passed by the respondents, the petitioner filed Writ Petition No. 45613 of 2002 which was disposed of by this Court by order dated 25th October, 2002. The order passed by this Court is reproduced below : “Heard. This petition is disposed of finally with the direction to the authority concerned to dispose of petitioner’s representation dated 21.6.2003 (Annexure 11 to the petition) preferably within six weeks, in accordance with law.” 8. The petitioner filed the copy of the aforesaid order of this Court before respondent No. 2 and prayed for disposal as per direction of this Court. The respondents by their communication dated 29th July, 2003 have informed the petitioner that petitioner’s representation dated 21st August, 2002 has been rejected by the Chief Executive Officer vide order dated 4th July, 2003. It is this order which is under challenge in the present writ petition, inter alia, on the following grounds : 1. The petitioner has been discriminated and denied benefit of the Government Orders referred to above by the respondents whereas they have given the similar benefit to other housing co-operative societies. 2. Petitioners representation has been rejected by the NOIDA authority without application of mind. 3. In terms of Government Orders referred to above the petitioner is entitled for allotment of land to the extent of 40% at least of the area acquired by the respondents in other similarly developed or developing area which violates the guarantee guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 4. The petitioner society is still ready and willing to abide by the terms and conditions set forth by the respondents in respect of the allotment of the land. 5. 4. The petitioner society is still ready and willing to abide by the terms and conditions set forth by the respondents in respect of the allotment of the land. 5. The petitioner’s case is squarely covered by the recommendation of Khudaiji Committee and as per decision of Apex Court in the case of Hira Lal Chawala as well as Uttar Pradesh Residents Employees Co-operative Housing Building Society and others v. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority and another, 1990 SCC (Suppl) 175, other case whereby the petitioner is entitled to 40% of the total land acquired. 9. The petitioner relies upon that in view of law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Pawan Alloys Casting Pvt. Ltd. v. U.P.S.E.B., 1997 (7) SCC 259, the petitioner is entitled to and can ask for the authority to stick to their promise. The case of the petitioner is fully covered by doctrine of legitimate expectation and denial by the respondents in the impugned order is wholly arbitrary and illegal. The petitioner submits that the Apex Court in the case of Punjab Communication Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1999 SC 1801 , particularly para 37, has held that the doctrine of legitimate expectation in the substantive sense has been accepted as part of our law and that the decision maker can normally be compelled to give effect to his representation in regard to the expectation based on previous practice or past conduct unless some overriding public interest comes in the way. 10. The petitioner has purchased the land way back in 1984-85 whereas notifications of the acquisition of land were issued in the year 1989. The petitioner has relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of Kendriya Karamchari Sahkari Grih Nirman Samiti Ltd. v. New Okhla Development Authority NOIDA, Writ Petition No. 39842 of 2001, decided on 5th August, 2003. 11. The respondent who contested the prayers of the petitioner and justified the order dated 4th July, 2003 impugned in the writ petition whereby the representation of the petitioner has been rejected by the authorities. Respondents have taken a stand that the petitioner cannot be given benefit of Government Order dated 22nd October, 2002 (Annexure-15 to the writ petition). 11. The respondent who contested the prayers of the petitioner and justified the order dated 4th July, 2003 impugned in the writ petition whereby the representation of the petitioner has been rejected by the authorities. Respondents have taken a stand that the petitioner cannot be given benefit of Government Order dated 22nd October, 2002 (Annexure-15 to the writ petition). Petitioner’s claim has been opposed on the ground that though the benefit of Government Order is given to various colonies raised by the different Authorities, i.e., Avas Vikas Parishad and Housing Cooperative Societies but it is not available to the petitioner because the petitioner has never sought benefit of the aforesaid Government Order from the NOIDA Authority in its representation and then further the Government Order is not available to the petitioner as it only stipulates the Government Order applies to Avas Vikas Parishad and Development Authorities constituted under the provisions of U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973. The contention of the respondent is that since NOIDA Authority has been constituted under the provisions of U.P. Industrial Area Development Act, 1976, therefore, the Government Order in question is not applicable to the petitioner. A comparative analysis of both the Acts namely U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973 and U.P. Industrial Area Development Act clearly demonstrates that so far as Housing colonies are concerned the scheme is the same in both the Acts, therefore, argument advanced by learned Counsel for the respondent that benefit is available only to Development Authority constituted under U.P. Planning and Development Act does not apply to U.P. Industrial Development Area Act, 1976, like NOIDA, cannot be accepted. 12. Respondents have further contended that only the provisions of releasing the land from acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act, after it is notified under the Act, is Section 48 which empowers the State Government to release the portion or the chunk of the land from the acquisition already notified under the Land Acquisition Act. Thus the benefit of Government Order referred to above cannot be extended to the petitioner. The further explanation of the respondents are that Khodaiji Committee, which is constituted for the purpose, submitted the report that the benefit of re-allotment or fresh allotment of the land to such societies will be available to the societies which were registered before 1976. Thus the benefit of Government Order referred to above cannot be extended to the petitioner. The further explanation of the respondents are that Khodaiji Committee, which is constituted for the purpose, submitted the report that the benefit of re-allotment or fresh allotment of the land to such societies will be available to the societies which were registered before 1976. The argument is that benefit of Khodaiji Committee report, which is otherwise available to the Co-operative Housing Societies, cannot be given to the petitioner-society only because the petitioner-society is not registered before 1976. We have gone through the report of Khodaiji Committee and we do not find any such observation as is attributed by the respondent to the aforesaid report. The report simply talks about the Co-operative Housing Societies irrespective of the year of registration. The petitioner’s society is definitely a registered Housing Co-operative Society. Therefore, the denial of benefit of Khodaiji Committee report to the petitioner is wholly arbitrary and discriminatory inasmuch as the benefit of this report have been extended by the respondent to other Housing Co-operative Societies. The petitioner’s case is further strengthen inasmuch as the petitioner has purchased the land from the farmers much before coming into existence of both these authorities, namely, NOIDA and Greater NOIDA authority or the Ghaziabad Development Authority. Before coming into existence of these authorities, the petitioner’s lay out plan was sanctioned by the then District Magistrate who happened to be the competent authority and the petitioner has undertaken external and internal developments. 13. Further contention of respondents that this Court has already opined that the remedy of petitioner is to file suit will not come in the way inasmuch as the order impugned has been passed on the direction of this Court by the respondents and secondly the proceedings leading to the passing of impugned order are initiated afresh when the NOIDA authority has published a public notice in the newspaper that all disputes are to be resolved and the petitioner’s application has been filed pursuant to the aforesaid publication and decided by the authority under the direction of this Court. The statement that the order for decision of their representation is obtained by the petitioner by misleading this Court and by concealing material facts simply seems to be after thought and inasmuch as at no point of time this objection has been raised and the petitioner has categorically stated in the writ petition that the matter is raised for reconsideration in pursuance of the invitation of the Development Authority to settle the dispute by public notice. So far as proceedings before MRTP is concerned the petitioner has very categorically stated that under the wrong advice the petitioner resorted to the proceedings under MRTP Act. The respondents have, in reply to the decision relied upon by the petitioner reported in AIR 1990 SC 1235, has stated that the judgment will apply to the societies registered before 1976. We have already held that this contention cannot be accepted, therefore, this contention raised on behalf of respondent deserves to be rejected and is hereby rejected. 14. In view of what has been stated above, we find force in the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner and, therefore, the petition succeeds and is hereby allowed. The order dated 4th July, 2003 is quashed. The matter is remanded to the authority with a direction to give benefit of Government Order dated 22nd October, 2002 to the petitioner. Since the matter is old the respondents are directed to decide the matter within a period of one month from the date a certified copy of this judgment is presented before the respondent. The parties are directed to maintain status quo as on today with regard to the land in question. ————