JUDGMENT R.R. Prasad, J. 1. Since the issues involved in both the cases are same and even the parties are the same, both the cases were heard together and hence, both the matters are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. The facts which have given rise to W.P.(S) No. 1366 of 2003 are as follows: One B.N.P. Srivastava, respondent No. 4, while was working as Stenographer in the Divisional Office of Life Insurance Corporation of India at Muzaffarpur, visited Purnea on an official work. Thereupon he claimed Rs. 85.50 paise as travelling allowance which was paid but subsequently, in course of enquiry, it could be ascertained that on the date of journey, i.e, 16.4.1981, not a single 1st ticket of class had been issued from Muzaffarpur to Purnea and, therefore, charge was framed putting an allegation that respondent No. 4 deliberately made a false claim of Rs. 85.50paise as travelling allowance and thereby he acted in the manner prejudicial to good conduct and detrimental to the interest of the Corporation and as such, he is liable to be punished under Regulation 39(1)(a) to (g) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulation, 1960 for violating provisions of Clauses 21, 24 and 39 of the aforesaid Regulation. Accordingly, enquiry officer was appointed to enquire into the charge framed against the respondent No. 4. The enquiry officer having found the respondent No. 4 guilty for the charges submitted its report to the Disciplinary Authority, who on finding the second show cause to be unsatisfactory imposed penalty for reduction in pay by three stages in terms of Regulation 39(1)(d) and also passed an order for recovery of Rs. 85.50paise. 3. Being aggrieved with that order, respondent No. 4 preferred an appeal under Clause 46 of the Regulations before the Appellate Authority, who affirmed the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority. Thereafter memorial preferred by the appellant was also dismissed. 85.50paise. 3. Being aggrieved with that order, respondent No. 4 preferred an appeal under Clause 46 of the Regulations before the Appellate Authority, who affirmed the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority. Thereafter memorial preferred by the appellant was also dismissed. Thereupon, respondent No. 4 raised an industrial dispute before the Assistant Labour Commissioner (Central), Ministry of Labour, Government of India, whereupon Central Government in exercise of power conferred under Section 10(1)(d) of the Industrial Disputes Act referred the dispute for its adjudication to the Central Government Industrial Tribunal, Dhanbad and the terms of reference was as follows: Whether the action of the management of Life Insurance Corporation of India, Muzaffarpur in imposing the punishment on Shri B.N.P. Srivastava, Stenographer, by way of reduction by three stages in the existing time scale per month and recovery of Rs. 85.50paise from him is justified, if not, what relief is the said workman entitled to. 4. The Tribunal after taking into consideration the evidences led by the parties came to the conclusion that action of the management imposing the punishment on the workman Shri B.N.P. Srivastava, is not justified and accordingly, management was directed to restore all the benefits to the respondent No. 4. 5. After participating in the said proceeding when the order went against the appellant (Life Insurance Corporation of India), Life Insurance Corporation of India has preferred this writ application challenging the award on the ground that reference by the Central Government to the Tribunal is itself illegal, arbitrary and without any authority of law as services of the concerned workman is being regulated in accordance with Regulations/Rules framed by the Central Government by virtue of the power conferred under Section 48 as amended by the Amending Act 1981 of the Life Insurance Corporation of India Act, 1956. 6. The facts giving rise to W.P.(S) No. 4455 of 2003 are as follows. 7. 6. The facts giving rise to W.P.(S) No. 4455 of 2003 are as follows. 7. The same B.N.P. Srivastava at one point of time was asked to report to Investigating Officer, namely, B.P. Singh and to give assistance in connection with investigation of one case but he remained absent from duty from 3.12.1985 to 13.3.1986, though it was claimed by the petitioner that he remained engaged with the said Police Officer during that period but the petitioner being a public servant was not supposed to remain absent without consent of the employer and therefore, a proceeding was initiated for enquiring into said charge. After submission of the enquiry report, Disciplinary Authority inflicted punishment of censure and at the same time salary for the said period was not paid as his unauthorized absence was treated as extraordinary leave. Thereafter the petitioner preferred statutory appeal which was dismissed. Thereupon, an application was filed under Section 33(C) of the Industrial Dispute Act before the Presiding Officer, C.G.I.T No. 1 Dhanbad wherein said B.N.P. Srivastava put a claim of Rs. 12,670/-.68paise as salary from December 1986 to 13.3.1986 and also claimed interest over the said amount. 8. The petitioner did appear before the Tribunal and questioned about the maintainability of the application. However, the absence of the applicant was never found to be an unauthorized by the Tribunal and, hence, the Tribunal directed the petitioner to pay admissible amount and also interest @ 6% per annum on the total amount which is due to be paid to B.N.P. Srivastava. 9. Being aggrieved with that order, this writ application has been filed assailing the order on the same point which has been raised in other writ application. 10. 9. Being aggrieved with that order, this writ application has been filed assailing the order on the same point which has been raised in other writ application. 10. It was submitted by learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner that under Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation of India Act, Central Government is empowered to make rules to carry out for the purposes of the Act for all or any of the matters specified in Sub-section (2) of said Section 48, whereas Section 49 of the Act provides that the Corporation may with the previous approval of the Central Government by notification in the Gazette of India, make regulations, not consistent with the Act and the rules made thereunder, to provide for all matters for which provision is expedient for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of the Act and accordingly, Corporation framed Regulation in the year 1960 known as Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulation, 1960 defining the terms and conditions of service of its employees. 11. It was further pointed out that as per Regulation 39, an employee is liable to punishment if he does anything detrimental to the interest of the Corporation and the kind of punishment which could be imposed is also enshrined under Regulation 39(1)(a) to (h). 12. Learned Counsel proceeds further to place that in the year 1981, there was significant change in the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 wherein new Sub-clause (cc) relating to the terms and conditions of the services of the employees and agents of the Corporation was inserted with retrospective effect in Sub-section (2) of Section 48 of the Principal Act by virtue of amending Act 1981. 13. Further Section 2(c) was added to Section 48 whereby any rule made under the said Clause (cc) shall have retrospective effect notwithstanding anything contained in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 or any other law or any agreement, settlement, award etc. and as such, when terms and conditions of the service is itself regulated by the Regulation framed under the Act which has its force as that of rules, provisions of Industrial Dispute Act cannot be enforced and this proposition of law has already been laid down in a case of A.V. Nachane and Anr. v. Union of India and Anr. and as such, when terms and conditions of the service is itself regulated by the Regulation framed under the Act which has its force as that of rules, provisions of Industrial Dispute Act cannot be enforced and this proposition of law has already been laid down in a case of A.V. Nachane and Anr. v. Union of India and Anr. 1981CriLJ750 and also in a case of V. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of India, Machilipatnam, Andhra Pradesh and Anr. (1994)ILLJ597SC . 14. Thus, it was submitted that when the respondent No. 4 was found guilty for the charge not only by the Disciplinary Authority but even by Appellate Authority and also by Revisional Authority by way of deciding memorial, the issue can not be allowed to be agitated in terms of the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, when the provisions of the Life Insurance Corporation of India Act and its Rules/Regulation will have overriding effect upon the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. 15. Learned Counsel further submitted that the impugned award is also bad on account of the fact that once the authority under the Life Insurance Corporation of India Act decided the issue which got its finality that will operate as res judicata upon the subsequent proceeding. 16. As against this, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that when the appellant had participated in a proceeding before the Tribunal and never raised legality of the reference it would not be open for the appellant to challenge the award on the ground of reference being illegal when the appellant had lost before the Tribunal. 17. Learned Counsel further submitted that the jurisdiction of Industrial Tribunal to decide validity of the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority or by the Appellate Authority has never been ousted expressly or by implication by the Amending Act of the Life Insurance Corporation of India and hence, there has been no merit in the submission advanced on behalf of the appellant. 18. Learned Counsel in support of his submission has relied upon a decision rendered in a case of Life Insurance Corporation of India v. R. Suresh. 19. In the context of the submission advanced hereinabove on behalf of the parties, amendment made in the Life Insurance Corporation of India Act, 1956 by Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment ) Act, 1981 (Act 1 of 1981) needs to be taken notice of. 19. In the context of the submission advanced hereinabove on behalf of the parties, amendment made in the Life Insurance Corporation of India Act, 1956 by Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment ) Act, 1981 (Act 1 of 1981) needs to be taken notice of. Clause (cc) added to Sub-section (2) of Section 48 with effect from 31.1.1981 reads as follows: (cc) the terms and conditions of service of the employees and agents of the Corporation including those who became employees and agents of the Corporation on the appointed day under this Act. 20. With introduction of Clause (cc), the Central Government can by notification in Official Gazette, make rules in respect of the terms and conditions of the service of the employees and agents of the Corporation. By the aforesaid Amending Act, three new sub Sections were also introduced, which are relevant for the present case: (2-A) The regulations and other provisions as in force immediately before the commencement of the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, with respect to the terms and conditions of service of employees and agents of the Corporation including those who became employees and agents of the Corporation on the appointed day under this Act, shall be deemed to be rules made under Clause (cc) of Sub-section (2) and shall subject to the other provisions of this section, have effect accordingly. (2-B) The power to make rules conferred by Clause (cc) of Sub-section (2) shall include- (i) the power to give retrospective effect to such rules; and (ii) the power to amend by way of addition, variation or repeal the regulations and other provisions referred to in sub-section(2-A), with retrospective effect, from the date not earlier than the twentieth day of June, 1979. (2-C) The provisions of Clause (cc) of Sub-section (2) and Sub-section (12-B) and any rules made under the said Clause (cc) shall have effect, and any such rule made with retrospective effect from any date shall also be deemed to have had effect from that date notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court, tribunal or other authority and notwithstanding anything contained in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947) or any other law or any agreement, settlement, award or other instrument for the time being in force. 21. 21. Thus, by virtue of incorporation of these provisions in the Principal Act the regulation framed under the Principal Act would have effect as that of rules and the same will have overriding effect over the provisions of Industrial Dispute Act in respect of terms and conditions of an employee of the Corporation who is covered under the definition of workman under the Industrial Dispute Act. 22. The aforesaid amended provision came up for consideration before the Honble Supreme Court in a case of V. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of India, Machilipatnam, Andhra Pradesh and Anr. (supra) where the petitioner of that case had questioned the legality of the order of his termination However, it was held by the Court that the amendments introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act have clearly excluded the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2)(cc) but that proposition was laid down on the factual background of the case that the termination effected in terms of Clause 14 of the Regulation during the period of probation of the petitioner of that case never considered to be a retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such, it was held that there was no application of Section 25(F) of the Industrial Dispute Act. 23. Therefore, having regard to the provision brought through amendment and the proposition of law laid down by the Honble Supreme Court in the case referred to above one can safely comes to conclusion that only those rules/regulations will have overriding effect over the provision of Industrial Dispute Act which are in inconsistent with the Regulation/Rules framed under the Life Insurance Corporation Act but if the Rules made under 1956 Act are not in conflict with the provisions giving jurisdiction to the Industrial Tribunal to go into the question of validity or legality of an order passed in departmental proceeding initiated in terms of the provision of Regulation, the question of jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal being ousted does not arise particularly when the Life Insurance Act does not contain any provision ousting the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal. Almost similar question fell for consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a case of Life Insurance Corporation of India v. R. Suresh (supra) and their Lordship took notice of the fact that 1956 Act never contained any provision ousting the jurisdiction of the civil court or the Industrial court and in that background their Lordships after considering the provision of Section 48(2)(cc) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India Act and also taking into consideration the ratio laid down in case of A.V. Nachane and Anr. v. Union of India and Anr. (supra) and also in the case of V. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of India, Machilipatnam, Andhra Pradesh and Anr. (supra) did observe that if rules made under the 1956 Act are not in conflict with the jurisdiction of Industrial Tribunal to go into the question of validity or legality of an order of termination of service, we fail to see how the jurisdiction of Industrial Code stood ousted ? Consequently it was held that jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal Court being wide and it having been conferred with to interfere with the quantum of punishment, it could go into the nature of the charge so as to arrive at a conclusion as to whether respondent had misused his position or his act or any breach of trust conferred upon by his employees. 24. In view of the proposition laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid case, I do not find any substance in the submission that the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal gets ousted by virtue of the enactment of the provisions by the Amending Act, 1981 as contained in Section 48(2)(cc) of the Principal Act and therefore, the Tribunal was quite justified to go into the legality of the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority and also by other authority including the Appellate Authority and the finding arrived at never seems to be erroneous. 25. In the result, I do not find any merit in these writ applications. Hence, both the writ applications are dismissed. Application dismissed.